The Impact of Criminal Law - Essay Example

1TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW This paper will present issues related to which crimes terrorists can be charged with, how defendants who commit crimes in other countries can be charged in the United States, and how we can prevent terrorism both inside and outside the United States. The agencies of the federal government define terrorism in several different ways. This lack of consistency may raise difficult legal questions when the government starts investigating and processing terrorist suspects under different legal procedures than it applies to other The Justice Department's Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) defines domestic terrorism as involving matters where individuals or groups seek to further political goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or the threat of force. The EOUSA defines international terrorism as a federal offense relating to international terrorism impacting United States interests. (Source: Dept. Of Justice internal database users' manual) Federal prosecutors listed more than forty specific statutes as the "lead charge" in domestic terrorism prosecutions. About one third of the total involved explosives and weapons. Another group centering on threats against the president and members of a federal; official's family was 14% of the total. The lead charge against three individuals concerned threats, interference, and firearms aboard aircraft. Two people were charged with violating certain prohibitions with respect to biological weapons. A smaller number of lead charges were reported in connection with international terrorism cases. Here, 20% were charged with kidnaping or hostage taking, 12% with murdering U.S. nationals, 12% being foreign agents, 8% with providing material support of terrorists, and 4% with fraud and misuses of visas. When the issue is trying terrorists, there appear to be only three options: trial in a federal court, trial before an international tribunal, or trial before a military tribunal. Trials in federal courts have features that make them totally inappropriate for the trial of terrorists. Jurors often respond to emotional appeals and would have good reason to fear for their and their families' safety if they convicted. Criminal trials have many procedural hurdles that guarantee a trial of many months. Appeals and petitions for habeas corpus can take years, and should the death sentence be given, the ACLU has shown how to delay execution for ten years or more through appeals and petitions. An open trial of that length, covered by the media, would be an ideal stage for an Osama bin Laden to spread his propaganda to all the Muslims in the world. Many Islamic governments would likely find that aroused mobs make it impossible to continue cooperating with the U.S. In open trials, our government would have to reveal much of our intelligence information, and the means by which it was gathered. In the trial of the bombers of our embassies in Africa, the prosecution had to reveal that American intelligence intercepted bin Laden's satellite phone calls. As soon as that testimony was published, Osama stopped using the satellite system and went silent. Disclosures in open court would inform not only Middle Eastern terrorists, but all the intelligence services of the world of out methods and sources. Trials before an international tribunal would have all of these defects and more. Picking the members of the court would be a diplomatic nightmare. It would be politically impossible to keep judges from Islamic countries off the court. In the past, international courts have often shown a pronounced anti-American bias. Our prosecutor would be helpless to avoid a propaganda circus and the disclosure of our intelligence capabilities and methods. In the end, convictions would be highly uncertain, but, if obtained, impassioned dissents and the martyrdom of the terrorists would be certain. We should be wary of international tribunals in any event, since their establishment seems part of a more general move to erode U.S. sovereignty by subjecting our actions to control by other nations. Military tribunals avoid or at least mitigate these problems. Propaganda by televised speeches would be impossible, and any disclosure of intelligence methods would be secret. Since trials could move far more efficiently and appeals are cut off by the president's order, punishment of the guilty would be prompt. One of the prices we pay for an all-volunteer military is that for most Americans their armed forces are an unknown world about which it is possible to imagine all sorts of evils; but military tribunals are not "kangaroo courts" or "drumhead tribunals." Much of the public is probably frightened by visions of defendants convicted and sent off to firing squads. If there is a problem with President Bush's order to create military tribunals to try suspected terrorists, it is the exemption of U.S. citizens from trials before military tribunals. Americans can be tried there, and it is clear that tey should. The trial of American terrorists in criminal court would pose all the problems of trying foreign terrorists there: the prosecution would have to choose between safeguarding our intelligence capacity and trying the terrorist. The terrorists could well go free. Contrary to heated reactions, military tribunals are well within our tradition. Such was used to try civilians suspected of disloyalty during the Civil War. When saboteurs were caught sneaking into the U.S. from Germany during WWII, President Roosevelt created a military commission to try them. All were convicted and some executed. The convictions were upheld by the Supreme Court, the rationale being that sabotage was a violation of the "law of war" and should be thus tried in a military court. As to preventing terrorism, governments can use their capacity to make terrorism too costly for those who seek to use it. One example is by military strikes against terrorist bases. Governments can make targets harder to attack, and they can use intelligence capabilities to gain advance knowledge of when attacks may take place. As targets are hardened, however, terrorists may shift their sights to softer targets. An example is the targeting of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 by truck bombs. Targets in Africa were chosen because of their lax security compared with targets in the Middle East. Governments can enter into negotiations with terrorist groups and make concessions in exchange for the groups' renunciation of violence. While governments are often reluctant to do so at the beginning of terror campaigns, negotiations may be the only way to resolve some long- standing disputes. Given the above sets of variables, the end of terrorism may result from one or more of the following situations. The terrorists may have accomplished their objectives, such as the overthrow of a government or the end of an occupation. Terrorism per se cannot achieve long-term goals such as revolution or independence, but it can do so in conjunction with less violent political action. To achieve objectives, it has to have at least achieved public recognition for an organization and the cause it espouses. In this case, continued terrorist actions may alienate supporters, sponsors, or key third-country participants for whom continued violence is unacceptable. Terrorist organizations, like any other, must constantly work to maintain themselves. If recruiting dries up, or if funding becomes unavailable, the organization may be unable to continue. On the other hand, self-preservation may force organizations to continue terrorist activities even if the leadership wishes to give up. It may be that the only way for the organization to continue to attract new recruits and financial support is to continue to gain publicity for its terrorist actions. Organizations may lose the support of the populations they seek to represent or the governments or other organizations that support them. They can do so for reasons of ideological or strategic differences, personality clashes, or just simple fatigue. Terrorist actions can also provoke moral outrage and undermine support. At times, other options for political change emerge. They can include more traditional forms of warfare or revolution, mass protests, or political negotiations. One effective tactic against terrorist organizations may be to promote their disintegration from the inside. Governments can demonstrate to groups that their support among the people those groups supposedly represent is waning. Governments can also split off members from a group, either by offering large rewards for information that undermines group solidarity, or by making promises of leniency for imprisoned group members. Another tactic may be to put pressure on states sympathetic to a terrorist group's goals, even if the states are not outright sponsors of the group. Expulsion from a haven often causes financial pressures or logistical difficulties and can sometimes end a group's viability. If efforts to eliminate a terrorist group through compulsion fails, governments are left trying to reach a peaceful settlement with that group. In civil conflicts, such a settlement will include negotiations for amnesty on both the individual and group levels. Governments must time their peace overtures carefully, first by making such gestures when their ability to reward is strong; secondly, by making them when the terrorist organization is going through some period of internal questioning. WORKS CITED TRAC Report: Criminal Enforcement Against Terrorists What Constitutes Terrorism Offenses http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/report National Review Online Article written by Robert H. Bork, contributing editor December 17, 2001 http://www.nationalreview.com USA Today, 10/14/2001 By Richard Willing, USA Today http://www.usatoday.com/news US Institute of Peace Special Report 48, May 25, 1999 http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports.html Read More