The Liability of the Manufacturers and Their Conduct in Case of Accidents - Essay Example

I. I disagree with the ments mentioned regarding the manufacturer’s liability, which seem to have no conceptual limit and would most often than not necessarily point to the defendant’s or manufacturer’s conduct in case of accidents. Courts have considered on a case to case basis the liability of the manufacturers and their conduct in case of accidents. For instance, in the case of Messina v. Clark Equipment, 263 F.2d 291, C.A.2 1959, the Court dismissed the appeal in an action against manufacturer of the earth mover in order to recover for machine operator’s death. In this case, the machine operator was killed while he was raising the scissor arms and bucket, and then had shut off the motor, and while doing this, he was actually getting out of cab when bucket fell causing him to be crushed between the scissor arms and the cab (Messina v. Clark Equipment 291). The Court dismissed the appeal because there was an absence of showing that there was indeed a hidden defect or concealed danger in earth mover (Messina v. Clark Equipment 291). It reasoned that under the New York law, a manufacturer has no duty to a remote user beyond the duty to keep the article of manufacture free from hidden defects or dangers (Messina v. Clark Equipment 291). Thus, if a remote user such as in this case, sues a manufacturer of an article for injuries suffered, he must allege and prove the existence of a latent defect or a danger not known to plaintiff or other users (Messina v. Clark Equipment 291). Citing the case of Campo v. Schofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), the Court explained that, “If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the laws demands.” It stressed that in several of the cases, a liability imposed only if the defect or danger be not ‘known’ or ‘patent’ or discoverable ‘by a reasonable inspection’, the absence of which would render fatal to the claimant’s cause of action (Campo v. Schofield 468). In another case, Murphy v. Cory Pump and Supply, 47 Ill.App.2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1964), the Court held that the manufacturer of riding power lawn mower had no duty to provide mower blade guard or shield lower than 8 3/4 inches from ground and was not required to anticipate or protect against a child falling in front of mower and getting a leg mangled in blade. The Court explained that the manufacturer is not required to contemplate misuse by any careless, ignorant, or incompetent person (Murphy v. Cory Pump and Supply 382). The alleged defect in this mower was not latent or concealed (Murphy v. Cory Pump and Supply 382). The manufacturer is under no duty to render a machine or other article ‘more’ safe-as long as the danger to be avoided is obvious and patent to all (Murphy v. Cory Pump and Supply 382). Defendant should not be required to anticipate or protect against any such accident as the one, which caused plaintiffs injuries (Murphy v. Cory Pump and Supply 382). In some other cases however, Courts stressed on manufacturer’s strict liability in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049, 1963). In another case, the Court cited the duty of manufacturer to warn of latent dangers inherent in its product goes beyond precise use contemplated by producer and extends to all uses which are reasonably foreseeable, Moran v. Faberge, Inc. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). Hence, the Court considers the case presented overall on a case to case basis and hence does not necessarily impose a judgment pointing to the manufacturer’s liability or the defendant’s conduct in case of accidents. The concepts of fault, wrong and cause still play a role in the modern product liability law. The notion of fault in the modern product liability is the manufacturers conduct of being blameworthy only where harm to the user reasonably can be foreseen (61 Tenn.L.Rev. 1277). Hence, in products liability, a defendant is “at fault” if his actions fall below the level of ordinary prudence or reasonableness (61 Tenn.L.Rev. 1277). Wrong in modern product liability is that in manufacturers manner of production or in his product.” (Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, supra, 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 363, 366.). Hence, a manufacturer or seller who deliberately places in the market a product known to be defective or harmful may be held liable for committing an intentional and wrongful act (American Law of Products Liability 1). The concept of cause, still play a role in terms of determining the liability of a manufacturer. For instance, once product is used in general field of danger which should have been anticipated by manufacturer, if manufacturers conduct in failing to warn of product dangers is an important factor in causing harm to another, and to which the manufacturer may be held liable (Moran V. Faberge, Inc. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). Hence, such concepts have been transformed as the needs of the society changes especially in terms of product liability. II. Such a claim that the current doctrine of broad enterprise liability on a defective product has an essentially populist, redistributionist, anti-business thrust is untrue as the purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049, 1963). It is not the intent to be anti-business but rather it is implied that if the product is present in the market, then it can be assumed that there was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products 57). III. Such claim that that there is an element of nobility in the judicial decision to throw out, every time the opportunity arises, consumer contracts designed to perpetuate the exploitation of the poorest class of buyers on credit is untrue as Courts uphold their decisions upon the relevant facts, issues and law of each case. Furthermore, there are safeguards developed by the courts, in refusing to apply the doctrine of unconscionability to commercial transactions and instead construe contracts as it is, unconscionability being exceptional in commercial settings (Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 153, 728 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1984). Courts have also refused to apply unconscionability to commercial transactions where both the seller and the buyer are merchants, having no disparity in bargaining power and absence of unfair surprise nor substantive unfairness (Brunsman v. Dekalb Swine Breeders, Inc., 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 751, 952 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Iowa 1996). However, in the case of Pittsfield Weaving v. Grove Textiles 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638, 32 UCC Rep.Serv. 421 (1981), the Court held that the contract was unconscionable considering that the arbitration and forum limitation provisions prevented the plaintiff from obtaining damages for defective yarn where the contract requiring that all claims against defendant for obvious defects be made within 15 days after invoice date and within 60 days for latent defects, but where record revealed that some defects could not be detected until after processing. Hence, there is an existence of the imbalance in bargaining power of the parties rendered the contract by which defendant sold its yarn so coercive and one-sided as to prevent the plaintiff from having voluntarily assented to its terms (Pittsfield Weaving v. Grove Textiles 344). Works Cited American Law of Products Liability 3d §§ 27:1 – 27:2. 2008. Brunsman v. Dekalb Swine Breeders, Inc., 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 751, 952 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Iowa 1996) Campo v. Schofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963). Messina v. Clark Equipment, 263 F.2d 291, C.A.2 (1959) Moran V. Faberge, Inc. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) Murphy v. Cory Pump and Supply, 47 Ill.App.2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1964) Pittsfield Weaving v. Grove Textiles 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638, 32 UCC Rep.Serv. 421 (1981) Price, Elizabeth. “A Symposium On The ALIS Proposed Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability.” Tennessee Law Review. 1994: 1277. Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 153, 728 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1984) Traynor, Robert. “The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability.” Tennessee Law Review. 1965: 363 - 366. Read More