The Utility of Force, by Rupert Smith - Essay Example

?Book Review: The Utility of Force, by Rupert Smith. This is an important book because it revisits the key ideas that underpin modern warfare. The author is a very senior British serviceman who has experience of diverse conflict arenas including Northern Ireland, the 1991 Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo. He relates his experiences in these contexts mostly by way of illustration for a sustained argument relating to the nature and particularly the purpose of war. In other words this is a theoretical rather than a historical narrative and it is intended to persuade the reader to think more deeply about war in general, rather than to be informed about one man’s personal experience. This is a refreshing change from some military history books written by soldiers, since these tend to glorify the actions of the combatants and idolise or demonise the leaders. The argument revolves around the changing context in which wars are conducted in the modern world. Smith traces a shift from the large scale industrialised wars which started with Napoleon and ended with the two World Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the spell of watchful nuclear tension in the middle of the century. He notes that the “Cold War” is a misnomer, because it was not a war at all, but rather, in Smith’s view “an extended confrontation.” (Smith, 2006, p. 183). It is interesting to see how an experienced general reflects not only on the “how” of war but also the “why” of war. This no doubt stems from his role as a senior member of the British, and latterly also NATO establishment, who is consulted by politicians on potential strategies in situations of escalating tension. The advent of nuclear weapons had the effect, somewhat paradoxically, of reducing the importance of armed conflict, and bringing to the fore arenas of political and ideological confrontation. This was an insightful analysis of the (non-military) reasons for Western supremacy and the ultimate fall of communism in Soviet Russia which changed the balance of power in the world significantly. The implications of this paradigm shift from industrialised wars between nation states to wars amongst the people are very far reaching, and Smith argues that many countries have not yet learned to adapt to the new situation. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of this kind of situation: military forces engage with some civilians in protection of other civilians, and there is no clear understanding of where the boundaries are or how to tell the one group from the other. In effect the insurgents have managed to negate the technological advantage of Western military might by shifting the battle to their territory on their terms. They refuse to present a consistent target, but instead pick out the location, type and context of each skirmish, often winning public relations battles by forcing the opposing troops into situations where civilians are bound to become involved. The traditional military leader would plan for an engagement and an end result, but so much of modern so-called “peacekeeping” does not allow this clean approach. Smith describes the situation of the UN involvement in Bosnia, in which some 20,000 lightly armed troops were stationed between two warring factions but not allowed to use force as “strategically unsustainable and tactically inept” (Smith,2006, p. 6). Against this background, it is not surprising that Smith pleads for a radical re-think on the part politicians, diplomats and international lawyers on the rationale for the use of force in the modern world. Too often it seems that politicians resort to invasions and pre-emptive attacks simply because they have run out of ideas on the diplomatic front and do not know what else to try. Once engaged in these manoeuvers it is then very difficult to find an honourable exit. If there is no clear goal, then it is hard to claim any kind of victory, and this rather messy engagement scenario is increasingly becoming the norm for modern international forces. The most useful part of the book is the third part, which turns to the current phase in global affairs which is characterised by what Smith calls “War among the people” (Smith, 2006, p. 269). The increasing involvement of non-state entities, whether these be insurgents, coalitions, or umbrella organisations such as NATO, the UN and the EU, heralds a very big paradigm shift. Smith argues that wars are no longer single, last resort interventions that can be activated in order to bring swift resolution to difficult problems. This view of military action is outdated, and politicians should learn to see military activity as part of an on-going state of political and ideological opposition. Many modern wars have very ill-defined objectives, with the consequence that victory is hardly ever achieved: “… even if military action is on a big scale, and even if it is successful, the confrontation will remain, to be resolved by other means and levers of power” (Smith, 2006, p. 375). The use of force should, therefore, be seen as just one of a range of potential options, and not a once and for all solution to an intractable problem. Unfortunately, this idea seems not to have penetrated into the cabinets and boardrooms where international affairs are debated. Despite this rather pessimistic evaluation of the effectiveness of traditional methods of war in the world today, the book is not a negative one. Smith advocates a revolution in the thinking of governments and military personnel, and one that recognizes the dilemmas that are posed by amorphous enemies who are embedded in the population, and multifaceted entities which govern international relations. In his view, political and military personnel need to work together and acknowledge that many confrontations will only be resolved through collaboration between their two domains. This collaboration should be long term, that is to say, measured in decades rather than weeks or months, and should be aimed as much at capturing the will of the people as suppressing insurgents and tracking down terrorists. This is a commendable conclusion from a man who has built his career on military activities and it shows that public perceptions about pro- and anti-war stances of different actors on the world stage may be quite wrong. Smith’s book shows that over and over again it is politicians, and precisely not the generals, who argue for the use of military force, thinking that it will solve some intractable problem. This book can be recommended as a textbook for academic study, because it gives a useful insight into the changing face of modern warfare, and the reasons why so many campaigns seem doomed to fail before they even start. There is a full index, which allows the reader to pick out information on particular conflicts. It is also useful for the general reader, because it is written in a matter of fact and clear manner, with few technical terms. All in all this book is an excellent description of the way that global politics has changed since the two World Wars. Large scale military action cannot ever be used quite in that same way again, since it has finally been recognised that wars do not resolve problems that are ultimately caused by factors that are political and economic. Globalisation has ensured that countries are more closely interlinked than ever before, with the result that military planning needs to be conducted in tandem with non-military planning at every step. If there is one main message that Smith leaves the reader with in this book it is this: most current military personnel have been trained for a war they are not fighting (Smith, 2006, p. 388). In other words, the point of the book is to highlight the mis-match between all the traditional military training modes and the reality of engagements in the twenty-first century. Boundary struggles between political and military personnel, and the confusion of layers of multi-state bureaucracy make it very difficult for any coherent plan to be worked out that is flexible enough to deal with fast-moving events on the ground. References Smith, R. (2006) The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin. Read More