Informative Synthesis - Essay Example

?Informative Synthesis Essay Nuclear energy is arguably one of the most dominant topics in the international front. The anticipated economic benefitsfrom the nuclear reactors are issues of global importance with the United States, Iran and other nations take special interest. However, the anticipated environmental concerns and possible health and life threatening effects are consistently increasing the international organizations’ condemnation on the eminent nuclear energy in Iran. Indeed, the nuclear reactors tragedy in Fukushima Japan brought severe and lifetime effects that proved to be dangerous and inevitable (Greenpeace 1). However, the significance of this critical subject hails from the fact that the host nation is a minority nation with more economical interests than human or global security concerns. Iran is indeed not in any way ready to compromise its quest in this project. Actually, the urge to make their dream for a nuclear source of energy has only grown more real. Additionally, Iran has been concealing a ploy to develop uranium enrichment in its territories. Indeed, Iran produced 215 billion kWh gross in 2008 generating a per capita consumption of about 2000 kWh/yr. Out of these production, 80% of its electricity was from gas and 16.5% from oil. In fact, the nuclear energy reactor started up in Iran on 8 May 2011 through September 2011 after many years of construction and many consistent efforts against ever increasing international opposition. With 75 % production capacity realized in March, the prospects of the project oversee the project entering commercial operation about April 2012 (World Nuclear Association 1). Subject to these developments, the international organizations like the UN Security council and international governments like the US institute sanctions, trade barriers, and diplomatic withdrawals against Iran with a hope of convincing or even coercing Iran to compromise on its pursuit for Nuclear energy (UN Security council 1-12). However, despite the stringent terms, Iran has not shown any signs of giving in to international pressure where they prioritize their economic interests on nuclear energy before international interests. This puts to question the mode of decision-making that Iranian leadership adopts on matters of global concern like the nuclear energy. The significance of international pressure on nuclear energy in Iran is a relevant issue on the University of Alabama student. I addressing this topic, I will focus on opinion articles, "Only Crippling Sanctions Will Stop Iran" of March 2, 2012 by Emanuele Ottolenghi and "Starving Iran Won't Free It” March 2, 2012 by Hooman Majd. The article, "Only Crippling Sanctions Will Stop Iran" of March 2, 2012 by Emanuele Ottolenghi is however more effective in that it draws the history of important Iranian decisions, how Iranians value sanctions, what drives the Iranians to change and the respect accorded to the Iranian government by the Iranians. This will help in analyzing the effect of the international sanctions against nuclear energy in Iran. Emanuele holds the opinion that the western allies assume that Iran’s leaders are rational actors, and rely on cost-benefit analyses to reach important decision (Ottolenghi 1). Hence, they assume that their continued gradual increase in the costs of Iran’s nuclear pursuit will lead to Tehran concession in the current nuclear standoff between the western decision makers and the Iranian decision makers. They expect the Iranian decision makers to behave rationally agree to a compromise and ignore Iran’s perspective on costs already incurred, the price of completing the journey and the advantages of turning back subject to the continued international pressure (Ottolenghi 1). The Iranian decision makers do not necessarily behave as assumed by the Western decision makers. History shows that the Iran’s decision makers are impervious to cost-benefit analysis and have never been isolationists. Hooman recognizes the fact that coercion, sanctions or exiles and their enablers cannot guarantee political change in Iran as the American politicians think (Majd 1). Indeed, Iranians only demonstrate economic hunger as they strive to meet their needs as they do middle class and less paying jobs. They have absolute no concern on the need for political change. The sanctions by the Western policy makers aims at coercing the Iranian government to return to the negotiating table by the assumption that punishment on the Iranian people will cause uproar against the government regime. However, as seen in the article by Hooman, this act will only keep the status quo in Iran and can only materialize if the Iran’s educated, sophisticated, and talented people are not deprived. In such cases, Hooman observes that only the normal functioning of the Iranian economy would empower ordinary Iranians to demand for more civil rights against the government (Majd 1). Political change in Iran does not depend on sanctions, coercion, or exiles and their enablers but will come when the Iranians are well fed and the government has no option but to guarantee people’s civil rights. Ideally, Iranians hate dictations from the western policy makers as it reminds them of nation’s weakness in the face of greater powers. Hence, the sanctions that negatively affect the Iranians livelihoods, business and communicate with the outside world, only weaken the citizens’ energy to question their government’s policies and to call for change. This proves that the success of the American pressure on Iran’s quest for nuclear program faces threatening jeopardy. As such, the Iranians will not blame their own government on the effects of the sanctions on the Iranian government by international forces. Hence, the international sanctions will not coerce the Iranian government to compromising its quest for nuclear energy. Emanuele notes that because of these factors, it is far more significant and rational for Iran to accelerate the nuclear program and reject any proposed international agreements seeking to compromise its position. The political aspect and rationality of the Iranian decision makers have more than often come to focus and assume consistency in relation to issues of international significance. They prove how Iranian leaders tend to make rational decisions after exhausting possible alternatives. For example in 1988, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini agreed to a cease-fire with Iraq. According to Emanuele, initially, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini refused to end war with Saddam Hussein though he had won much of the battle by 1982 and his army lacked the magnitude to overcome the vastly superior Iraqi army (Ottolenghi 1). He instead chose to sacrifice thousands of young lives in the World war1 with an aim of consolidating the fragile government and defeat all residual opposition to Islamic rule. However, he had to change his mind in 1988 after accruing huge damages, facing the collapse of the front, and the demeaning of his rule. A this point, Iran was at its lowest capacity and Emanuele observes that it is only then that the Iranian leaders made the rational decisional though even the decision in 1982 was also rational (Ottolenghi 1). Additionally, Paranoia accidental downing of an Iranian commercial airliner over the Persian Gulf by an American warship was turning point in the Iranian position in the gulf war. Out of this accident, the Iranian’s bore the conviction that the United States would do anything to secure victory over the Iran (Ottolenghi 1). As such, they did not have a choice but to comply with the American interests. Again, this proves how Iranian decision makers adopt rational decisions at their lowest level. Similarly, in 1997, the Iranian regime only made a rational decision to compromise its interests after rampant murders occurred, German court indicted Iranian hit men and Iran’s then intelligence minister, Ali Fallahian, and European countries withdrew ambassadors from Tehran and severely affecting diplomatic relations (Ottolenghi 1). These historical events prove the passion in Iranian strive to nuclear energy and the rational decision making after exhausting all the available chances. As such, the current sanctions against Iran will be of no significance to Iran’s endeavor to nuclear energy if they will not limit Iran’s opportunities and hence convince it to backtrack. Emanuele observes that for the sanctions to bear any affectivity the Western nations must avoid a military confrontation in the Persian Gulf and prevent a nuclear Iran (Ottolenghi 1). They should also institute stringent sanctions that will cripple Iran’s economy. This is achievable by instituting total diplomatic isolation and completing a United Nations-imposed oil embargo on Iran. Additionally, the Western policy makers should warn Iran on possible attacks in case it persists with its quest (Ottolenghi 1). Hooman on the other hand observes that ensuring a strong economy in Iran will tend to push the middle class to a more influential political role in society, hence challenging the Iran government to guarantee civil rights and hence the compromise (Majd 1). He notes that the middle class rose against the four years of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s rule in 2009 though they were well fed. Indeed, the protests are still alive to this date. Hence, sanctions will neither change the regime’s behavior where the Iranians are hungry and face threats of attack (Majd 1). In absence of these measurers, Iran’s leaders will make a rational decision to pursue their economic interests attached to the nuclear program instead of backtracking. Both articles highlight the inefficiency of the current sanctions and coercions in light of convincing Iran decision makers to make a rational decision aimed at compromising its nuclear program. In conclusion, I observe that the Iranian decision makers have a historical way of making national decisions. They will only make rational decisions where appropriate and mostly when the nation is at its lowest economic or social level. The Iranians only hunger for economic changes and have little concern on political changes. They hate dictations from the Western policy makers and will rarely blame their government on the effects of sanctions from the international front. Unless where the sanctions will jeopardize the economic position of the Iranians, sanctions cannot make Iranian leaders to compromise on their nuclear program stand. Therefore, there is a need for more stringent sanctions against Iran. However, economic empowerment on the middle class citizens of Iran will agitate them to seek more roles that are political where they will call for more economic and political demands. Ideally, the Iranian government remains focused on its cost-benefit analysis despite the increasing international pressure against its nuclear program. Self-Evaluation This essay has immense strength on understanding the issue of nuclear program in Iran. The essay equips us with the knowledge on the history, present and future quest for nuclear energy in Iran. It briefs us on the various challenges inform of international pressure that manifest in sanctions, coercions and murder on exiled Iranians. In making decisions to handling the Iran policy makers, the essay shows us the rational decision making style that America assumes on Iran. However, the essay equips us with the knowledge that the Iranian decision makers are rational, they demonstrate this in certain conditions that are not universal. The essay limits the making of rational decisions by the Iranian leaders only when the nation goes to its knees. Indeed, proves this fact by analyzing different historical occasions that profess rational decisions at crucial times on the Iranian government. The essay proposes how more stiff sanctions can lead Iran government to its knees and thus the compromise on its quest for nuclear energy. Additionally, the essay highlights how availing economic strength to the Iranian middle class will lead to a political awakening and thus a compromise to the pursuit for nuclear energy. More analysis on the recent effects of nuclear energy, the international position to Iran ignorance to the sanctions, and the future prospects of handling nuclear energy in Iran is necessary. Works Cited Greenpeace Fukushima nuclear disaster: a year later Greenpeace, 2012 Web 10, April 2012 < http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/nuclear/safety/accidents/Fukushima-nuclear-disaster/> Majd, Hooman. Starving Iran Will not Free It New York Times, 2012 Web 10 April 2012. Ottolenghi, Emanuele. Only Crippling Sanctions Will Stop Iran New York Times, 2012 Web 10 April 2012 < http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/opinion/only-crippling-sanctions-will-stop-iran.html> UN Security council Resolution 1929 (2010) UN Security council, 2010 Web 10, April 2012 www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf World Nuclear Association Nuclear Energy in Iran World Nuclear Association, 2012 Web 10, April 2012 < http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf119_nucleariran.html> Read More