For the entire extensive fact, it offers what the report cannot completely convey - specifically to a worldwide onlookers - is the approach that reinforced the laxity behind this tragedy. What ought to be acknowledged - very excruciatingly - is that the disaster was "occasioned in Japan." Rendering to ICANPS website, its essential roots are to be established in the entrenched customs of Japanese ethnicity: their reflexive obedience, their hesitance to question authority, their devoutness to abiding with the schedule, their groupism, and their insularity. The TEPCO and government were unsuccessful in preventing the tragedy not because a big tsunami was unexpected, but since they were unwilling to invest effort, money and time in shielding against a natural tragedy reflected as unlikely. The regulatory and utility bodies were excessively self-assured that events a far from the latitude of their suppositions would not transpire and were not conscious that assesses to avoid the severest situation were truly full of cracks. TEPCO had actually pondered in on an assessment concerning earthquake threat and inquired the government to essentially underplay the probability of a tidal wave in the area, an interim report said. The board's report criticized an insufficient legal structure for nuclear disaster management, emergency-command confusion triggered by the TEPCO and government, and conceivable excess interfering on the involvement from prime minister's bureau in the initial phase of the predicament. The board settled that a background of complacency concerning nuclear welfare and poor disaster management steered towards the nuclear catastrophe. This was according to ICANPS official website. Japanese officials overlooked the threats of a nuclear calamity since they believed in the 'myth of atomic safety', such as the idea that serious calamities do not take place at nuclear-powered enclosures in Japan. The essential problem falls in the point that functionalities, together with TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power), and the regime failed to perceive the risk as reality. The interim report also articulated that TEPCO and the government believed the 'idea that severe misfortunes do not ensue at nuclear enclosures in their country'. "Since the administration and the energy utilities, as well as TEPCO, were prejudiced by the security myth, reasoning they would certainly not ever encounter such a severe calamity, they were notable to apprehend that such a catastrophe might occur in actuality. The panel declared in its concluding report that this seemed to remain as the essential problem. TEPCO therefore failed to warm up for sufficient tsunami safeguards or disaster management measures to cope with a base blackout. The board's report revealed that the Fukushima catastrophe arose because persons did not grasp the effect of natural cataclysms seriously. Yotaro Hatamura, an engineer professor at the University of Tokyo who oversaw the commission, expressed in a news session that even although there existed new discoveries about the threat of a tidal wave, TEPCO might not have seen it since people are visionless to anything they do not plan to see. This was according to Asian News International article. The board proposed that post-Fukushima protection steps put in place
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A REPORT TO IDENTIFY OPERATIONAL RISK FAILURES OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER (Author’s name) (Institutional Affiliation) Abstract The quake and tsunami in 2011, March 11, were natural catastrophes of a scale that shook the whole world. Though caused by these catastrophic events, the ensuing misfortune at a Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima Daiichi) cannot be viewed as an environmental tragedy…
Given the total amount of radioactive material released since the nuclear crisis at Fukushima nuclear power plant began, the crisis has been rated a level 7 nuclear crises, the same level as the Chernobyl disaster (Black). Indeed, the Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission estimated the total amount of radioactive materials at 370,000 TBq and 630,000 TBq, respectively.
My research on Fukushima Nuclear Plant disaster is conducted in five stages; the immediate reasons behind the disaster, the possibility of any defect or shortcoming in the construction of the plant, the immediate effects of the disaster, and the long-term consequences of the disaster.
As with the calamities it succeeded, the nuclear disaster resulted in widespread loss of life, and has had numerous consequences that persist to this day. However, unlike the earthquake and tsunami whose long-term consequences revolve mostly around structural damage and psychological scars and trauma – especially where the survivors are concerned – the consequences of this nuclear disaster are much more disquieting.
This disaster revealed many issues inherent in Japan’s nuclear sector and crisis preparedness and emergency management. This essay discusses the possible causes of the nuclear meltdown, such as construction or design problems, how prepared the government is for the crisis, how it responded to the disaster, and its long-term environmental impact on Japan and the rest of the world.
The 14-m high tsunami caused damaged to all AC power in the Units 1, 2, and 3 within the Power Plant while at the same time it carried away fuel tanks, which were meant for backup diesel generators. The power plant workers put efforts by injecting water to try to cool the system but it was in vain as the hydrogen explosions caused harm to the plant and therefore radioactive material was released into the environment (Hamilton 2012, p.51).
The control of operational risk has been the object of much attention in recent years, for example in the 2004 Basle Two accord concerning the capital adequacy of banks and in the Turnbull Report in the UK. It has also led to changes in the regulation of financial institutions and the requirements for the listing of public companies.
These points include: a brief description of the plant’s design and its operation; a timeline of events that occurred leading up to incident and actions taken; an analysis of equipment damage, activity released, and
7 pages (1750 words)Essay
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