Problems that NASA Encountered during Its Decision-Making Process - Case Study Example

Case Analysis Question The U.S. government formed the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) in 1958 as a response to Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik. The initial rationale for the establishment of NASA was to offer civilian exploration services, but the program was later dominated by the military. Eventually, the government started using NASA to establish its dominance over the Soviet Union in the field of space exploration. After some time, NASA conceptualized the idea of a shuttle program. The rationale for developing a shuttle program was to facilitate the process of putting objects into the orbit at a low cost. Under the space shuttle program, NASA launched the Challenger and hired Thiokol to supply SRB (SRB). SRB was a fuel system consisting of a combination of both solid and liquid systems. It was cheaper, and NASA found it sustainable, in the long run. Below is an external environment analysis for NASA for the period between its inception and the time of the conference: A. Economic: NASA operated in a hostile economic environment because it experienced a reduction in budgetary allocation since its inception. Over the years, the government cut its budgetary allocation to the organization. For instance, the government reduced its budgetary allocation by 5.1 billion thus forcing NASA to seek alternative funding. Additionally, NASA was experiencing high costs of producing its shuttles thus the need to adopt SRB. Fortunately, NASA got the financial support of the U.S. Air Force, and it sustained its operations up to 1986. B. Political: NASA was formed by the government and enjoyed the full support of the government during its early times. It had the goodwill of the government because the U.S. government was using it to dominate the field of space exploration. Thus, it was a government project and its operations were influenced by government policies. C. Technological: NASA was operating its rockets using an all-liquid fuel system and was incurring huge costs of operation. Later on, the organization modified its shuttle design to reflect low costs. Consequently, NASA adopted the SRB fuel system. Question 2 Roger Boisjoly worked for Morton Thiokol as an engineer and was objected to the launch of the Challenger because of temperature issues. Morton Thiokol was one of the two organizations that were involved in the shuttle program along with NASA. Roger was against the launch of the Challenger because he believed that there were some unresolved issues about the O-rings technology. According to Roger Boisjoly, a past research study found out that the O-rings were rigid and could not seal at low temperatures. He found out that the O-rings has serious erosions that could result in safety risks during takeoff. He was concerned that launching at low temperatures would result in a hot leakage that could overwhelm the primary seal. Consequently, there was the danger that the O-ring would be eroded. Since the launch was to take place before noon, Roger was concerned that the launch would be a disaster because of the low-temperature conditions. On October 4, 1985, Roger Boisjoly wrote that Morton Thiokol was approaching the issue of O-rings in a casual manner. He also noted that the organizational structures were hindering his team from making appropriate changes. In an attempt to convince various stakeholders against launching the Challenger, Roger Boisjoly used three steps to convince others. First, he wrote to the Vice President, Engineering at Morton Thiokol informing him of the dangers of launching at low temperatures. Second, he presented his findings to members of both NASA and Morton Thiokol to support his idea that the launch should not go on. Finally, he met with members of the Thiokol team present at the teleconference and attempted to explain his point of view (Lewis 25). Boisjoly’s attempts to convince others were highly appropriate in this context for various reasons. First, he used formal communication because he was addressing individuals who were superior to him. Second, he used informal communication because he was addressing his peers. Finally, he presented summaries from his findings because he had little time to discuss the consequences of launching the Challenger at low temperatures. Boisjoly could have considered the following alternative approach: Stage 1: Brainstorming: Boisjoly and the entire Seal Team should have brainstormed ideas and list all possible solutions or options for the problem. It could have made it easier to convince NASA officials because he could enjoy the support of his colleagues. Stage 2: Gathering Information: Prior to presenting his findings to the NASA and Thiokol team, Boisjoly should gather all the relevant information (Saaty 20). Most of the NASA officials were reluctant to delay the launch of the Challenger because Boisjoly did not have adequate information to support his recommendation. Stage 3: Weighing the pros and cons of every course of action: Boisjoly could have considered the advantages and disadvantages of delaying the launch of the Challenger (Spiegler 30). Question 3 Bob Lund was the vice president of the engineering division at Morton Thiokol and was Roger Boisjoly’s boss. He suggested to NASA that they should consider delaying the launch of Challenger until temperatures were at least 53 degree Celsius. Lund was speaking on behalf of Morton Thiokol and suggested the representatives from NASA to look at a summary sheet from Thiokol. He was not entirely against the idea of launching the Challenger, but he was worried that launching the shuttle at low temperature was unsafe. He even noted that Thiokol was committed to the initial launch criteria, but the low levels of temperature were worrying. He played an integral role in the teleconference because he presented the findings of Thiokol regarding the recommendations to delay launching Challenger (Richter 100). Since he was the Vice President of Engineering at Thiokol, he had influence and could use his position to convince representatives from NASA (Shapira 19). Lund could have used the following approaches to do better: He could have pursued his points and persist if he believed that he had good information (Phillips and Gully 95). He could have involved all members of the seal team in preparing the sheet so that his recommendations could get the support of the entire Thiokol organization. Most of the engineers from Thiokol were against the idea of supporting a suspension of the launch (Ireland, Robert and Michael 87). Lund could have strived for the best answer instead of dealing with the symptoms to the problem. He should have thought in terms of cause-and-effects. Question 4 Larry Mulloy was the manager of MSFC Solid Rocket Booster. He was skeptical about the findings presented by Thiokol against launching Challenger and took the position of the NASA team. NASA decided that it would go ahead with the launch. He attempted to convince others by disputing the information from Thiokol and even citing past experiences. He also used his knowledge of engineering to questions some of the concepts fronted by Thiokol to discourage the launch of the Challenger. However, he could have considered the following alternative approaches: Mulloy should have listened to the words and rationale being offered by the Thiokol team. He was focusing on disputing the ideas from Thiokol instead of listening keenly. He should have added more facts to his arguments to enhance the credibility of his arguments because Thiokol was raising serious issues that have been ignored for a while. Involve representatives from NASA and even Thiokol in discussing the new developments (Parnell 59). Question 5 Some of the problems that NASA encountered during its decision-making process included: A. Anchoring bias According to the bounded rationality theory, managers encounter anchoring bias during the decision-making process (Daft 34). Such a bias results in the managers making decisions using the initial parameters. In this case, NASA officials were reluctant to delay the launch of the Challenger because initial parameters had indicated that it was safe to launch the shuttle. They ignored new parameters presented by Roger Boisjoly from Morton Thiokol. B. Representativeness bias NASA officials ignored important information from Roger Boisjoly because the suggestions did not match past events (Adair 44). The observations presented by Roger Boisjoly have happened in the past, and there was no single case of an accident. Therefore, they could connect the smoke and erosion of O-ring with safety. NASA can avoid such situations in its future decisions through the following approaches: Search for relevant evidence to support decisions Accommodate divergent opinions or suggestions and assess their validity to the decision Viewing the problem from a different angle of perspective Redefine the problem and avoid the initial issues to avoid the issue from escalating to the emergence of unnecessary commitments Develop a systemic review process that will promote commitment among members of the organization Avoid the escalation of emotions during the decision making process Works Cited Adair, John E. Decision Making and Problem Solving Strategies. Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page Ltd, 2013. Internet resource. Daft, Richard L. Organization Theory and Design. Mason, Ohio: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2010. Print. Ireland, R D, Robert E. Hoskisson, and Michael A. Hitt. Understanding Business Strategy: Concepts and Cases. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008. Print. Lewis, Pamela S. Management: Challenges for Tomorrows Leaders. Mason, OH: Thomson/South-Western, 2007. Print. Parnell, Gregory S. Decision Making in Systems Engineering and Management. Oxford: Wiley, 2011. Print. Phillips, Jean and Gully Stanley. Organizational Behavior: Tools for Success. New York: Cengage Learning, 2013. Richter, Christian. Bounded Rationality in Economics and Finance. Münster, Westf: LIT, 2008. Print. Saaty, Thomas L. Fundamentals of Decision Making and Priority Theory with the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Pittsburgh, PA: RWS Publications, 2000. Print. Shapira, Zur B. Organizational Decision Making. Cambridge [u.a.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002. Print. Spiegler, Ran. Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Internet resource. Read More