this regard, the 911 commission conducted investigations across the government’s security departments and presented its findings to the then president George Bush (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola, 2011).
The major findings/recommendations of the 911 commission were that the security intelligence failed to prevent the attacks. It emerged that the intelligence failed to disclose vital information obtained at the airports, before and after the attacks, to the military and police forces. This is because the commission realized that there were loopholes at the airport when the terrorists accessed the country to execute the attacks (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola, 2011). The commission also found that most of the attackers were Saudi Arabian citizens drawn from the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. The evidence was derived from video footages obtained from the airport control unit (Felzenberg, 2006). As a result, the commissioners recommended more funding to be added towards the security kitty to enable them to adequately prepare.
The Bush administration received grades from the commission on their efforts towards national security. For instance, the Congress performance was low because it failed to mark terrorism as a major policy to handle. The intelligence agencies were also ranked below average because of their failure to liaise with other security department for maximum protection (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola, 2011). It is apparent that the government did not consider threats from Al-Qaeda to be serious and ignored calls for tight security measures along the borders. The report grading also indicated that the citizens should be vigilant by cooperating with the security teams in case of threats or risks in their neighborhoods (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola, 2011). The grading provided a challenge to the US government to design new measures of approach the emergent terrorist extremism. This is because the occurrence of the 911 attacks exposed considerable challenges and