Foreign Object Debris at Airports - Coursework Example

? Risk Management Introduction Foreign object debris (FOD) at airports can yield to damage that cost airlines, airports, and airports tenants millions of dollars every year. Foreign objects at airports encompass any object found within an inappropriate location, and, as a result, can damage equipment or harm airplane or airport personnel. FOD incorporates a broad range of materials such as pavement fragments, loose hardware, building materials, sand, and rocks, pieces of luggage, and catering supplies, and sometimes wildlife. FOD can be encountered in places such as terminal gates, taxiways, cargo aprons, run-up pads, and runways. A successful debris-control problem can significantly minimize the cost of FOD damage, as well as the possibility for injury to personnel. The paper investigates risk of ground damage on airports, which is a significant cost for airlines and airport operators. Foreign object debris manifest in diverse forms and emanates from diverse sources and can be located within an airport’s air operations area (AOA). FOD can yield to aircraft damage in the form of punctured or torn tires, engine failure, and nicked turbine/propeller blades. A FOD prevention program highlights aspects such as facility inspection, maintenance, and synchronization between all affected parties can reduce FOD as well it impacts (Castro, 2011). FOD can yield to damage via direct contact with airplanes by cutting the airplane tires, or injuring people or damaging airplanes after being propelled by the jet blast. The resultant damage can cost the aerospace industry close to $4 billion every year. Airports, airport tenants, and airlines can minimize this cost by embracing steps to safeguard airport FOD. Risk Assessment FOD programs derive from three fundamental areas of emphasis: first, it eradicates diverse categories of FOD inclusive of “processing debris” and treat all FOD as avoidable and with equal significance. Second, it re-emphasizes the role and authority for FOD safeguard at the operations level. Third, it promotes the significance of comprehensive independent evaluation by contractors and the government. Risk assessment against ground damage on airports is a significant cost for airlines and necessitates analysis of hazard scenarios (Sadgrove, 2005). The risk assessment module typically might address hazard scenarios during approach and landing; and, assessment scenarios as per the runway physical status (current situation, measures to minimize risk, and compliance). Risk analysis necessitates calculation of quantitative risk based on the approach for all scenarios (Castro, 2011). Assessment scenarios encompass detailed specifications suitable for all hazards spheres such as the present situation vs. regulatory compliance; the impact of projected internal/external development; and, cases incorporating diverse intermediate, as well as other measures such as removal of obstacles off and on the field, and modification of ground operations (Patankar & Taylor, 2004). Safety Risk Management can be categorized into three elements, namely: hazard identification, risk appraisal, and risk alleviation. The core objective of risk management centers on ensuring that all risks remain at an acceptable level. Risk assessment has overtime been one of the most challenging aspects of the risk management process for aviation operations. This arises from the subjectivity engaged in determining the severity of the consequences of damage from foreign objects and the absence of quantitative information on the likelihood of this occurring. Hazard identification centers on collecting and analyzing safety data, which necessitates collection of safety data such as mandatory occurrence reports, safety reports, and safety surveys and audits. Hazard identification relates to collecting and appraising safety data, which is pertinent to spotlighting safety issues. Hazard identification avails the input for risk assessment. The analysis of risks entails probing existing controls and establishing whether they mitigate or eliminate the hazard risks. A program to mitigate airport FOD is most successful when it responds to four core areas, namely: training; maintenance; coordination; and; and, close inspection by airline, airplane handling agency personnel and airport. With regard to training, all airline personnel and tenants should be given training centering on spotlighting and elimination of FOD, inclusive of the possible consequences of ignoring it. Effective training should highlight safety to personnel and passengers, as well as the possible hazards to equipment, the direct costs linked with FOD damage, and the indirect costs linked with flight delays and rescheduling (Haslett, 2010). This should also include procedures for removing and eradicating FOD, as well as its source. With regard to inspection, airports staff should carry out daily airside inspection. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) demands a regular, daylight assessment of air operations areas and the elimination of FOD. Airport personnel are also expected to undertake to look for FDO amid their normal shifts. Maintaining control of FOD incorporates several methods such as sweeping, rumble strips, magnetic bars, and FOD containers (Patankar & Taylor, 2004). Other modes of safeguarding against FOD encompass the use of netting and wind barriers to limit the movement of airborne FOD. Coordination may necessitate formation for a FOD committee to respond to certain local conditions and problems. Composite risk management Composite risk management avails a structured approach to planning training and missions in a way that control risks and minimize risks of collision on the ground (Patankar & Taylor, 2004). Aircraft accidents emanate from below-standard performance of unit functions owing to human factors human factors, insufficient precautions for environmental factors, or material failure (Wittmer, Bieger, & Mu?ller, 2011). Hazardous conditions can be generated by deficiencies in a number of areas: support (failure to avail sufficient equipment, facilities, personnel, or maintenance); standards (failure to avail practical guidance and standards for task performance); training (failure to avail awareness of, or the critical skills and knowledge to undertake task to standard); leadership (failure to control risk effectively; and, individual (failure of the individual to track known standards). The objectives of FOD prevention program centers on spotlighting and correcting possible hazards and eliminating the sources of FOD. Training, motivation, work-site design, and follow-up on FOD accidents are prominent factors that shape a sound system (Frenkel, Hommel, Rudolf, & Dufey, 2005). Hazards should be probed based evaluated with the aim of spotlighting their origin and should be translated into risk levels/risk assessment codes (low, moderate, high, and extremely high) by emphasizing them with regard to probability of occurrence and acuteness of impact (Dorfman, 2002). Such a process should be employed to establish and recommend control options that eradicate unnecessary hazards at their origin, or minimize their residual risk to a tolerable level in line with successful mission attainment (Khan & Zsidisin, 2011). Evidently, FOD represents a true risk with considerable consequences to the aviation industry. FOD can impact on the safety of operations, as well on the bottom line of the airports or airlines. This makes it imperative for any airport to be alert of FOD and institute plans to detect and remove debris, as well as reduce the incidence of FOD on the AOA. The concept of integrated FOD team is pertinent to guaranteeing safety of the airport. Historically, airports conduct standard self-inspections to inspect for, detect, and remove FOD (Prather, National Research Council, Airport Cooperative Research Program & United States, 2011). Presently, there is a broad range of practices, techniques, and tools that airport operators utilize to conduct an inspection for FOD (Khan & Zsidisin, 2011). The methods employed range from simple visual inspections to persistent monitoring technologies. Safety risk assessment is pertinent to highlighting potential hazards for the automatic FOD removal system. Chit system represents a mode of controlling tools or parts by employing assigned identification numbers to person. There are a number of modes of employing chit system, whereby every individual ought to sign a chit for every tool or part taken, and every individual ought to sign his/her name to a check out sheet situated on every tool hook. FOD program control and implementation incorporate elements such as FOD prevention training, housekeeping, control of tools and personal items, handling of materials, early design consideration for FOD prevention, access controls, control of hazardous material, and self-verification audits (Castro, 2011). This entails an assessment of risk, irrespective of whether the FOD has been detected manually or via automated means. In practice, risk assessment within a FOD management programs entails a two-part process: at the instance of FOD detection, an immediate and possibly subconscious decision process undertaken by the person detecting the debris in establishing how to handle the FOD item (United States & National Research Council (U.S.), 1998). Conclusion A FOD risk assessment allows an airport to establish where unsafe FOD conditions exist. Safety management system necessitates: identification of the safety hazards to ensure implementation of mitigations to maintain a satisfactory level of safety, provide for regular assessment of safety level, establish and sustain a process for formally documenting highlighted hazards and rendering continuous enhancements to the airport’s overall level of safety. The sources of foreign object debris can emanate from numerous sources such as airport infrastructure, personal belongings, and normal airplane operations. The risk assessment process encompasses issues such as hazards highlighted for the existing runway system including general operational and construction hazards; the consequences emanating from the highlighted hazards; the probability of such events and their consequences occurring from sources; and, an analysis/assessment of risk issues highlighted. The objectives of risk assessment centers on deriving the values of probability and severity of consequence of every hazard, utilize that information as a way of prioritizing action, to identify mitigating features as deemed suitable for every hazard, and to forecast the efficacy of the features in minimizing the risk. References Castro, R. (2011). Corporate aviation management. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Frenkel, M., Hommel, U., Rudolf, M., & Dufey, G. (2005). Risk management: Challenge and opportunity. Berlin: Springer. Haslett, W. V. (2010). Risk management: Foundations for a changing financial world. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Khan, O., & Zsidisin, G. A. (2011). Handbook for supply chain risk management: Case studies, effective practices, and emerging trends. Ft. Lauderdale, FL: J. Ross Pub. Patankar, M. S. & Taylor, J. C. (2004). Risk mangement and error reduction in aviation maintenance. London, UK: Ashgate. Prather, C. 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