The Darker Side of Marketing - Essay Example

The Darker Side of Marketing Studies are utilized by advertising agencies to identify potential buying demographics. This information is then used to target specific markets and to learn about public attitudes, why they buy specific products and what sort of promotions would most appeal to their desires to purchase. To some companies, marketing is about generating sales, period. The tobacco industry has used such studies to target the young and uninformed. They have used deceptive advertising as a result of these findings in the form of marketing ‘low-tar’ cigarettes. They have also used cartoon-like characters to appeal to the youth consumer. To their delight, this strategy indeed generated sales as planned without an ethical thought as to the dishonesty of such practices or that this practice was particularly disgusting as it applies to youth smoking. The marketing of filtered and low-tar cigarettes were planned to comfort smokers worried about the health risks associated with the habit and to impart this new product as an alternative to not smoking. Promotional efforts of the 1960’s and 70’ were psychologically successful in deluding smokers to embrace the filtered and low tar cigarette products. Since then, tobacco corporation documents have been uncovered that reveal the companies, at the time, knew that these marketing practices were inherently deceptive. Philip Morris company documents have revealed that it has had a long-standing interest in the smoking activities of the young. At least as early as the 1960’s, this company requested studies which examined the smoking habits of young children. Uncovered documents also show that the Joe Camel campaign was conceived from an advertising suggestion to use comic strip characters that appealed to younger potential smokers. This was after a study which revealed that first-time smokers generally preferred Marlboro, a trend aided by the highly successful ‘Marlboro Man’ campaign. The vast marketing success of Joe Camel fostered similar ad campaigns such as the Kool penguin. Sporting sunglasses, ‘Willie the Kool’s’ design and marketing focus addressed young teenagers’ need to fit in, or be ‘cool’. Tobacco advertising has been banned from television viewers since the late 1960’s but has found alternative means by which to market. By sponsoring an extensive variety of youth oriented events such as rock concerts and sporting events, tobacco companies have continued to gain wide-ranging exposure for their harmful product by associating them with positive youth experiences. This discussion will use documentation from the desks of tobacco companies themselves to highlight their deceptive practices in marketing and also illustrate an even darker side of this industry’s advertising techniques, the marketing of a deadly substance to children. The marketing of nicotine ‘light.’ The scientific community began to conduct research and subsequently published articles that made a direct connection between smoking and lung cancer during the early 1950s. The tobacco industry quickly answered by terming these findings a ‘health scare’ designed to deflect the allegations of the possible lethal health threat. Tobacco companies initially responded to the ‘health scare’ by launching filtered cigarettes alongside marketing schemes that responded to these health risk assertions. “In time, the industry became aware that explicit health claims risked the undesirable effect of reminding consumers about health allegations and issues. To avoid this, motivation researchers and other trade analysts advised the industry to shift from explicit verbal assertions of health to subtler tactics using visual imagery and ad copy that implied healthfulness” (Pollay 1989). For example, in 1958, the makers of the cigarette Parliament announced its new product that boasted a ‘Hi-Fi’ filter. The ‘high filtration’ or Hi-Fi connotation was meant to identify with the popular, state of the art, high fidelity sound reproduction of the 1950’s. The company went to great lengths in its marketing technique in selling the intended imagery. The rollout campaign began with an elaborate press conference in New York. “In the foyers, test tubes bubbled and glassed-in machines smoked cigarettes by means of tubes. Men and women in long white laboratory coats bustled about and stood ready to answer any questions. Inside, a Philip Morris executive told the audience of reporters that the new Hi-Fi filter was an event of `irrevocable significance. The new filter was described as `hospital white.’” (Whelan 1984). Tobacco companies put much energy and money into molding the public’s perception that they were attempting to curb the harmful effects to their customer, that they were the consumer’s friend. The public wanted to smoke and the benevolent tobacco industry was making it safe to do so. The advantage of filtration was the perceived reduction, if not total eradication, of cancer and other health risks that were being publicized. Advertising jingles and slogans claimed or at least implied healthy smoking concepts such as “Viceroys ‘Double-Barreled Health Protection’, L&Ms ‘Just What the Dr. Ordered’, Embassys ‘Inhale to your Hearts Content’, Lifes ‘The Secret to Life is in the Filter’, and Parliaments ‘Extra Margin’ (of safety protection, implied by analogy to helmets, seat belts, and other safety gear). Other ad slogans, such as Viceroys ‘Thinking Mans Filter’ or ‘delivers more of what you smoke a filter for,’ were even more implicit yet still begged for health inferences by consumers” (Johnston 1966). This strategy had a marketing problem though. In a study conducted for Brown and Williamson (B&W), men who smoked low-tar cigarettes were suspect of being ‘weak’ in the viewpoint of many consumers. “This echoed their research finding in the 1960s that the men who smoke filters were apprehensive and depressive. They think about death, worry over possible troubles, are uneasy if inactive, dont trust others” (Oxtoby-Smith 1974). The 1974 advertising advisors to Lorillard, in an attempt to respond to this problem, launched an approach to advertising for the True brand that they felt had a more ‘masculine, macho tone. The cigarette Vantage was described by marketers as `laying it on the line in a bid for an aggressive and masculine image (DeGarmo 1974). As a result of utilizing low-tar advertising techniques, more people than ever before were changing brands, opting for a supposed healthy alternative. The reassurance of the deceptive lower tar claims led those who were health conscience to simply change brands rather than quit the deadly habit altogether. Trues advertising campaign in the 1970’s was directed towards the growing trends of consumers to stop smoking. The ad agency representing the company portrayed True as the equivalent, an alternative to quitting, evidenced by their own words. “It is useful to consider lights (low-tar cigarettes) more as a third alternative to quitting and cutting down, a branded hybrid of smokers unsuccessful attempts to modify their habit on their own. In point of fact, smoking an ultra low tar cigarette seems to relieve some of the guilt of smoking and provide an excuse not to quit” (Goldstein 1979). B&W expressed the two main goals of effective advertising, providing assurance about their product’s healthfulness without doing so forcefully in way and to provide a publicly appealing brand image. “Good cigarette advertising in the past has given the average smoker a means of justification. For some smokers reduction in physical performance risk is paramount, for others reduction in ‘ego/status’ risk comes first. All good cigarette advertising has either directly addressed the anti-smoking arguments prevalent at the time or has created a strong, attractive image into which the besieged smoker could withdraw” (Latimer 1976). Marketing cigarettes to ensnare children A survey commissioned by Philip Morris aimed at youths between 12–17 years of age who smoked more than a pack a day was the topic of a 1973 memorandum addressed to then vice president of Philip Morris, James Morgan (Holbert 1976). “When questioned about these studies during the Minnesota Medicaid trial, Mr. Morgan explained that these studies were ‘embarrassing anomalies’ for the company” (Johnston 1981). Evidence from the offices of Phillip Morris tells a different story unless Mr. Morgan defines the term anomaly as something well-known, well researched and much discussed. Company documents clearly reveal that during the 1970’s and 1980’s, Philip Morris was very aware of the fact that its Marlboro brand was the teenager’s cigarette of choice. A 1981 Philip Morris research report ‘Young smokers: prevalence, trends, implications and related demographic trends’, articulated the significance of understanding reasons that motivate children to start smoking. “It is important to know as much as possible about teenage smoking patterns and attitudes. Todays teenager is tomorrows potential customer, and the overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to smoke while still in their teens” (Johnston 1981). The review of tobacco company documents determined that its written references to minors began to fade beginning in the late 1970’s. The term ‘young adult’ steadily replaced the term youth. Several documents read much the same as a 1975 memorandum written by a Brown & Williamson executive which directs the recipients, “when describing the low-age end of the cigarette business please use the term `young adult smoker or `young adult smoking market’, and ‘that these terms should be used in all written materials in the future.’” (Hall 1980). However, this was not a call to end advertising to teenagers. It was simply a directive to alter the language for image purposes. For example, a division manager for RJ Reynolds issued a memorandum in January 1990 requesting that sales representatives for the company identify stores that sold cigarettes frequented by large numbers of young adults. He specified that “these stores can be in close proximity to colleges, high schools or areas where there are a large number of young adults frequenting the store” (McMahon 1990a). The purpose of the directive’s implementation was to “try to keep premium items in stores at all times” (McMahon 1990a). In May of that year, he supplied a retraction, stating, “I was wrong in identifying the specific age group of these young adults. It has always been this companys policy that we do not promote or sell our cigarette products to anyone under the age of 21” (McMahon 1990b). The apology was given for identifying a ‘specific age group’, not for the mistake of including ‘high schools’ in the first memo. Another of the many examples of a tobacco company targeting the young potential smoker is a document that speaks of the interchangeability of young adult smokers in a teenage smoking report authored by RJ Reynolds (RJR) marketing researcher Diane Burrows. This 1984 report ‘Younger adult smokers: strategies and opportunities,’ stated the importance of young smokers. “Young adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be important to brands/companies in the future for two simple reasons: (1) the renewal of the market stems almost entirely from 18-year-old smokers, no more than 5 percent of smokers start after age 24; and (2) the brand loyalty of the 18-year old smokers far outweigh any tendency to switch with age” (RJ Reynolds n.d.). Though the report was cautious to just mention smokers over18 years old, the reports appendix reveals that “more than two-thirds of male smokers start by age 18, suggesting that the term ‘young adult smoker’ is merely a euphemism used to define teenage smokers” (Burrows 1980). A marketing professor at the University of British Columbia reviewed tobacco industry documents on the subject of marketing to youth. His findings concluded that tobacco manufacturers “carefully and extensively researched the process of conceiving, developing, and deploying cigarette advertising targeted to youth. To recruit starters, brand images communicated independence, freedom, and peer acceptance and advertising portraying smokers as attractive, autonomous, accepted and admired, and athletic” (Pollay 2000). These documents demonstrate that cigarette marketing was geared toward creating a demand for cigarettes and not simply brand loyalty as the tobacco industry had repeatedly asserted. Many corporate documents from tobacco manufacturers make reference to the fact that success of a brand is with young smokers. A 1984 RJ Reynolds document attributed the success of Marlboro to its strong imagery that “was in tune with younger adult smokers enduring want to express their maturity and independence through smoking” (Burrows 1984). Winston attributes its success to the effective marketing to young people appealing to their sense of “‘peer pressure’, the ‘bandwagon effect.’ A 1973 RJR document outlined the advertising elements of a brand that would attract young smokers as including ‘participation, togetherness and membership in a group, a mechanism for relieving stress, tension, awkwardness, boredom adventurous, different, adult, something arousing, some curiosity and some challenge and must become the proprietary in thing.” (Teague 1973). Studies that were requested by tobacco companies revealed that teens aged 16 and 17 have especially strong social bonds to friends. It concluded advertising which emphasizes how the brand supplies added acceptance by ones peers would be especially successful with teenagers. A 1984 marketing research report by RJ Reynolds commented; “given younger adult smokers’ keen interest in peer acceptance/approval, it is likely that younger adult smokers would be interested in a brand which effectively addresses social acceptability and also provides the other smoking benefits they want” (Burrows 1984). The report went on to suggest that RJ Reynolds “make resources available to develop/improve its capabilities to thoroughly identify and track demographics, values/wants, media effectiveness, and brand performance within sectors of the younger adult smoker population” (Burrows 1984). Marketing research on perceptions of Camel cigarettes in the mid-1980’s referred to studies on young adult smoker. A 1984 memo analyzed young adult perceptions of Camel recommended that advertising for Camel “be positioned against young adult smokers who would like to be non-conformist” (Martin 1984). This memorandum includes a table of differing teenage social groups, including such labels as “Goodies’, ‘Preps’, ‘Rockers’ and ‘Punkers.’ Camel redefined itself by appealing to the ‘Rockers’, ‘Partiers’, and “Punkers.’” (Martin 1984). A 1986 memo recommended that Camel advertising be directed toward “using peer acceptance/influence to provide the motivation for target smokers (defined as 18–24 male smokers) to select Camel” (Caufield 1981). The memo goes on to suggest that the intention of the advertising be to convince “target smokers that by selecting Camel as their usual brand they will project an image that will enhance their acceptance among their peers” (Caufield 1981). The memo also notes that, “advertising will rely on clearly aspiration appeals, the me I want to be versus the me I am, and to provide the motivation for target smokers to select Camel” (Caufield 1981). Cigarette advertising is everywhere with the exception of media outlets. Sponsorship of sporting events is particularly common for cigarette marketers as it gives them a medium to connect their products with popular events and an opportunity to get their brand logos on television in violation of the spirit of the federal broadcast advertising ban (Philip Morris 1992). A 1987 Philip Morris report discusses the value of sponsorship of auto racing: “Marlboro 500 at Michigan International Speedway was highly successful in creating brand awareness and generating positive publicity. The PM sales force did an exceptional job in placing banners and point of sale material in the surrounding area, as well as conducting sampling activities at the track itself. The race was broadcast live on ABC-TV, and Marlboro signage was visible throughout the 4 hour telecast” (Philip Morris 1987). Tobacco companies have used a wide range of promotional strategies such as free samples, discount coupons, sponsorships of events, as well as buy one get one free, posters, lighters, T shirts and contests. “Tobacco manufacturers have fastidiously held to the position that these promotional efforts are aimed at established adult smokers, with the goal of capturing potential ‘brand- switchers.’” (Beasley 1998). Again, it has been shown cigarette advertising causes a consequent adverse effect upon adolescent smoking behavior. A research paper by Katz and Lavack examined the tobacco industrys use of bar promotions to market cigarettes. “While one might expect that bar promotions would have no impact on teenage smokers, tobacco industry documents reveal that such promotions help communicate product brand information indirectly through a diffusion process” (Martin 1984). “Since teens aspire to be older and more mature than they are, recruiting younger adults to smoke your cigarette brand is perhaps the best way to try to communicate to teens that your brand is the ‘in brand.’” (Zollo 1995). Philip Morris sponsored the ‘Marlboro Adventure Team,’ in the 1990’s with the expressed goal to “increase visibility and build Marlboro sales” (Philip Morris 1992). Though much of the items offered had an obvious youthful appeal, the company offered the disclaimer that “individuals must be 21 years of age or older” to participate. Many letters were found from parents that were sent to Philip Morris insisting that the names of their children be removed from the companys mailing list (Coach, Schulyer & Schulyer 1993). This signifies that the company was aware that their promotional program appealed to underage consumers. The RJR Company repeatedly and staunchly denied that Joe Camel was intended to appeal to teenagers, continuing that some of the teenager studies were byproducts of adult surveys and were never intended to be used for marketing strategies. “However, the companys marketing documents, some stamped ‘RJR Secret,’ demonstrate that it hoped to secure a new market of lifelong smokers whose fierce brand loyalty is formed early” (Lochhead 1998). Multiple studies have shown that smokers tend to purchase one brand and usually the first one they smoked as a young person. Companies find it difficult to increase sales by persuading them to switch brands. “Establishing brand loyalty at the outset of a smokers career, which usually begins before age 18, is therefore crucial in cigarette marketing” (Lochhead 1998). RJR marketing vice president C.A. Tucker, in a 1974 presentation to the board of directors, referred to “the growing importance of the young adult in the cigarette market,” defined as the 14 to 24 age group, saying they “represent tomorrows cigarette business” (Lochhead 1998). Tucker said that RJR competitors Marlboro and Kool brands enjoyed “strong young adult franchises and high cigarette brand loyalties” (Lochhead 1998). Failure by RJR to attract young adult smokers, Tucker said, would lead to “slow market share erosion for us in the years to come unless the situation is corrected” (Lochhead 1998). One RJR memo conceded that the effort was an attempt to ‘youthen’ the brand” (Lochhead 1998). Camel brands market share among teenagers increased from a negligible level of .5 percent to about 33 percent in the three years after the advertisements were launched according to a DiFranza and colleagues survey. This survey concluded that the Joe Camel advertisements appealed more powerfully to kids under 18 than to adults (DiFranza et al 1991). The Joe Camel campaign began in the first quarter of 1988. The Teenage Attitudes and Practices Survey conducted in 1989 indicated that 8 percent of youths aged 12-18 years smoked Camels in 1989, and 13 percent in 1993 (USDHHS 1989). In 1994, the three most highly marketed brands included the Marlboro Man, Joe Camel, and the Newport fun couples. This group alone experienced 35 percent of overall cigarette sales and an astounding and revealing 86 percent of the teen market. Joe Camel undoubtedly had an influence, even on the very young. One study showed that “nearly one-third of three-year-olds matched Joe Camel with cigarettes and that by age six, children were as familiar with him as with the Mickey Mouse logo on the Disney Channel” (Fischer et al 1991). “The cartoon camel catapulted Camel cigarettes from a brand smoked by less than one percent of US smokers under age 18 to a one-third share of the youth market and nearly one-half billion dollars in annual sales within three years” (DiFranza et al 1991). US smoking rates increased slightly in 1991 after declining every year for 25 years (US DHHS 1993). This statistic is a direct result of the tobacco industrys success at attracting young customers. “More than 3,000 US teens become regular smokers each day, with girls smoking at a higher rate than boys” (US DHHS 1993). Since the Joe Camel campaign began, smoking among US teens is up 10 percent (STAT 1991). “Teenagers buy the most heavily promoted cigarettes and 80 percent of teens consider advertising influential in encouraging them to begin to smoke” (Goldstein et al 1987). As a result of the aggressive advertising targeting women with the introduction of Virginia Slims in 1968, within six years, “the number of teenager girls smoking more than doubled” (Tye 1988). Conclusion Tobacco companies have routinely researched the smoking habits of teenagers and competed vigorously with each other to design products and their accompanying marketing strategies to ensnare a segment of the youth smoking market. When young persons see cigarette logos linked with their heroes, excitement, speed and triumph, they are likely to lose sight of the grim realities of smoking; death, disease and addiction. An addictive product doesnt take much to hook a new customer. For the tobacco companies, the expense of giving away free samples is negligible compared to the potential for long-term gains, especially from new young customers. These tactics may make sense from a purely commercial standpoint but ethically and morally, the tobacco industry is guilty of dark marketing perhaps more so than any other. Works Cited Beasley, Lynn. (April 20 1998). Testimony from the VP for Marketing at RJR in the Minnesota tobacco litigation. Youth and Marketing Collection Burrows D. (February 29, 1984). Younger Adult Smoker: Strategies and Opportunities. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Caufield, R.T. (March 12 1986). Camel New Advertising Campaign Development. [memorandum to D.N. Iauco]. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Coach T, Schuyler B, Schuyler M. (March 5 1993). Adventure Team Marlboro. Philip Morris Companies, Inc DeGarmo, Inc. Research Department. (August 1974). Conclusion and Implications of True Portfolio Research. Report prepared for Lorillard: Bates no. 03374671. DiFranza, Joseph R.; Richards, John; Paulman, Paul M. Paulman; Wolf-Gillespie, Nancy; Fletcher, Christopher; Jaffe, Richard D. & Murray, David. (December 11 1991). "RJR Nabiscos Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to Children." Journal of the American Medical Association. Vol. 266, pp. 3149-53. Fischer, P. M.; Schwartz, M. P.; Richards, J. W.; Goldstein, A. O. & Rojas T. H. (December 11 1991). "Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel." Journal of the American Medical Association. Vol. 266, pp. 3145-49. Goldstein/Krall Marketing Resources, Inc. (January 1979). A Qualitative Exploration of Smoker Potential for a New Entry in the Ultra Low Tar Market Category. [two focused group interviews]. Prepared for Philip Morris. p. 12. Goldstein, A.O.; Fischer, P.M.; Richards, J.W. & Creten, D. (1987). "The Influence of Cigarette Advertising on Adolescent Smoking.” Hall, L.W. Jr. (September 11, 1980). Younger Adult Smokers – Terminology. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Holbert, N. (May 18 1973). Incidence of Smoking Cigarettes. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. Johnston, M.E. Jr. (June 1966). “Market Potential of a Health Cigarette.” Special Report No. 248. Philip Morris document, p. 16. Johnston, M. (March 31 1981). Young Smokers – Prevalence, Trends, Implications and Related Demographic Trends. Philip Morris Companies. Latimer, F.E. (November 29 1976). Cigarette Advertising History. Brown & Williamson document, pp. 1-2. Lochhead, Carolyn. (January 15 1998). “Joe Camel Designed to Lure Teens: Internal Papers Reveal Cigarette-Maker’s Intent.” S.F. Chronicle Washington Bureau. Martin C.A. (October 18 1984). Younger Adult Smoker Perception of Camel. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. McMahon J. (January 1, 1990a). Young adult market. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. McMahon J. (May 3, 1990b). “Letter to Sales Reps.” R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Oxtoby-Smith, Inc. (August 1967). A Psychological Map of the Cigarette World. Report prepared for Ted Bates and Brown & Williamson, pp. 24-25. Philip Morris Cos., Inc. (November 23 1992). Marlboro Adventure Team Flex-Fund Promotions for Retail Masters: Full Participants Who Accept the MAT Promotion. Philip Morris Cos., Inc Pollay, R.W. (1989). “Promotion and Policy for a Pandemic Product: Notes of the History of Cigarette Advertising (US).” Tobacco Litigator’s Bookshelf. Pollay R.W. (2000). “Targeting Youth and Concerned Smokers: Evidence from Canadian Tobacco Industry Documents.” Tobacco Control. 2000, pp. 136–47. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (n.d.). “Camel Y&R Orientation.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. STAT. (Fall 1992). "Cigarette Advertising Increases Smoking." Tobacco Free Youth Reporter. Teague C.E. (February 2 1973). Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market. R J Reynolds Tobacco Company, Inc. Tye, Joe B. (Fall 1988). "Lusting After Children: The Tobacco Industrys Investment in a Profitable Future." Social Science Record. The Journal of the New York State Council for the Social Studies. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service (USDHHS). 1989. Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking: 25 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General. Washington, DC: U.S. General Printing Office. US DHHS. (April 2 1993). “National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion Study.” Wall Street Journal. Whelan, E.M. (1984). A Smoking Gun: How the Tobacco Industry Gets Away with Murder. Philadelphia: Geo. Stickley, p. 90. Zollo P. (1995). Wise up to Teens: Insights into Marketing and Advertising to Teenagers. Ithaca, New York: New Strategist Publications, Inc. Read More