War as a Strategic Tool of Policy: The Outcome of the 1991 Gulf War - Essay Example

An Analysis of the Outcome of the 1991 Gulf War Even though the Gulf War of 1991 was dominantly an American venture, it was approved as a United Nations (UN) operation, and its purpose or objective was stated by UN Security Council Resolution 678. It allowed the freeing of Kuwait and the rebuilding of Kuwaiti autonomy. Because it is a UN operation, “that was the only political objective that could have been authorised”1, and such was the objective taken up by the United States. If it allowed any bigger objective, like deposing the Iraqi regime, would have went beyond the directive mentioned in the UN Charter. This essay analyses the outcome of the Gulf War of 1991 and whether it served the political objectives of the principal participants, particularly the United States and the coalition. Wars are waged for political objectives. Policy defines the type of war to be waged and the degree of effort that have to be exerted to the realisation of its objectives. In other words, policy establishes the objective and creates the strategy; military tactic is the design to attain the chosen objectives with the existing resources. Seldom, though, can the exercise of military force alone accomplish all the objectives established by policy.2 Hence, military tactic should transform the political objectives into necessary and achievable military goals, secondary and favourable to the political objectives. Therefore, to evaluate the conduct and result of war, it is important, mainly, to recognise the naturally vicious character of military force and to understand what military force can and cannot accomplish. Overview President Bush, seeing the strange character of the wartime alliance he had formed, did not turn away from his initial and narrow objective of removing Iraq from Kuwait. Hence Bush’s policy was made up of the quest for narrow goals, but with limitless means proportionate to those objectives. Bush tried to fend off the temptation to slaughter more Iraqi soldiers and to apply a more intensive air and land military tactic to overthrow Saddam Hussein. U.S. officials expected Saddam Hussein to perish immediately after the disgrace meted out on him by Desert Storm. This assumption was incorrect. In 1992, President Bush had to run for re-election, and the surprising result of the national politics of the two nations was that Saddam lasted longer than Bush as president.3 Several of the detractors of Bush during the war claimed that the coalition should have hunted Saddam until his last breath and prevented the UN from taking over Iraq. Rather, the U.S. adhered to its original UN goal and abandoned the war with a large number of Saddam’s forces still in one piece and with his political influence and authority unbroken. On the contrary, by following his initial policy objective, Bush had sustained the odd assortment of political allies who took part in the military mission to emancipate Kuwait. Prolongation of war against Iraq until the complete collapse of its government would have been broadly detested by political blocs in the Muslim and Arab countries.4 This is still the case although Saddam’s attempt to symbolise his military crusade under the socio-political cover of Pan-Arabism was denounced by Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other allies. Removing Iraq from Kuwait did not evoke Western domination in a manner that occupying the Iraqi government with a U.S.-led military alliance would have.5 Nevertheless, it appeared that the judgment of Bush about policy objective was correct. He was able to avoid the error committed by Truman in Korea—letting positive military events affect war strategy. Within the framework of a narrow political objective, the U.S. and its partners had exercised merciless military techniques. Persistence of the air offensive until important enemies had been almost annihilated disheartened Iraqi forces and removed the national command-and-control structure from its forward units. Disabled by coalition bombardments on its air-defence structures, communications, and warning, Iraq’s power over the air totally collapsed in a matter of days.6 As regards the connection between military strategy and war policy as carried out by Iraq, several surprises were awaiting the U.S. and its partners. Saddam’s method of political leadership of his security personnel, armed forces, and other features of the government was tougher than pre-war intelligence agencies thought. In contrast, the capability of the Iraqi military in a setting of high technology was far weaker than the U.S. and its allies had assumed. Pre-war estimations recognised the Iraqi military as one of the biggest armed forces in the world, for owning advanced equipment for air and land operations, and for its apparently toughened features owing from a prolonged battle with Iran.7 It could be that the triumph of Iraq against the bigger but inadequately prepared and armed Iranian forces from 1980 to 1988 gave it a misperception about the form of war for which its military were directed to in 1990.8 Saddam expected a war of attrition from coalition forces. The disapproval of the U.S. and its partners to wage this type of war, alongside the early control of skies by coalition forces, revealed the value of technology, correctly used, for combat operations. Technology preferred offense over defence, in the theatre of operations wherein the distraught forces of Saddam aimed to delay coalition assaults. However, the most important error of Saddam was political, not military. His incompetent pre-war diplomacy pushed away possible allies and gave Bush the opportunity to organise a coalition that comprised almost all the powerful states in the Middle East. Disconnected in a diplomatic sense, Saddam was hence defenceless militarily from the retributive attacks of the United States. The withdrawal of its previous Soviet supporter should have been a sign to Saddam that a political strategy before 1991 was highly crucial.9 Rather, he steadfastly kept a weak and detached diplomatic spot from which he was effortlessly cornered by Bush through military force. Bush took advantage of the weak diplomacy of Saddam in other ways. Bush successfully acquired the permission of the UN to exercise force; with that, he took advantage of the authorisation of the Security Council for war to deal with his local political detractors.10 The political objective of the United States was fulfilled in the limited sense that the war effort and goal of Bush was carried out and achieved at a tolerable cost. The bigger concern, which was the consequence for post-war Iraq, was unclear even when the Bush administration ended in 1993. Iraq stayed under the supervision and monitoring of the UN as regards its capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction, and the Kurdish population in northern Iraq stayed under the defence of the United States its allies. The development of post-war Iraqi politics remained ambiguous while Saddam held on to power. The most evident regional champions, besides Kuwait, appeared to be Iran, currently much more important in the Gulf as political and military entity, and Saudi Arabia, which had further latched on to the military security of the United States without experiencing a more enduring and humiliating U.S. military intervention.11 The Political Objectives Among the four national political objectives developed by the government, just one—“the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait”12—may be, and was, completely achieved through forcible means. With regard to the other two objectives—“security and stability of Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf” and “restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government”13—military force could merely help the latter and support the former. The other proclaimed objective—“safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad”14-- was basically attained when the foreign captives were freed and the exposed threat of terrorism did not happen. A major explanation for the failure of the terrorist threat to happen was the aggressive pre-emptive responses by Western police forces and intelligence units. Simply put, by obliterating the major threat and weakening the capacity of Iraq to conduct war all over again, military force could create a situation more favourable to the achievement of the key political objectives of the United States. For that reason, the military goals for the 1991 Gulf War were determined along these lines: neutralisation of the Iraqi National Command Authority’s ability to direct military operations; ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destruction of Iraq’s offensive threat to the region, including the Republican Guards in the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO); destruction of known nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons production and delivery capability, to include Iraq’s known ballistic missile program; assistance in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.15 These established objectives were also transformed into theatre military goals, for completion by the military under the leadership of U.S. Central command. Hence, coalition armies were directed to “attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and control; gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy known chemical, biological and nuclear production, storage, and delivery capabilities; destroy Republic Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO), and liberate Kuwait City”.16 The inner stability, logic, and consistency are remarkable, as political objectives are transformed into achievable military goals and afterwards into necessary operational activities and measures. Similarly notable is the fact that the coalition waged war with unmistakably narrow objectives. Hence, the major objective was to terminate the capacity of Iraq to take part in or provoke war. Even though anticipated or desired, the crushing of Saddam’s administration was never declared as a political objective. Whether it ought to be is, obviously, another issue completely. To the extent that military activities planned and carried out for political objectives, their success can merely be assessed in terms of the goals they were intended to accomplish. The toppling of the adversary’s regime—and its supplanting of another, more favourable to the dominant objective of peacekeeping—is a political objective. Its attainment through military measures would have needed a political action to broaden considerable the range, length, direction and, most importantly, human cost of the mission.17 Such action was not carried out, apparently because the disadvantages or costs were thought to be inconsistent to the core essence of the objective. Military policy is limited not merely by what is militarily appropriate and achievable but by what is politically suitable as well, locally and internationally. Hence, a coalition policy is virtually always rooted in conciliation or finding the middle ground. 18 This is especially true of diverse coalitions, where differences in resources and capacities are reinforced by actual or assumed irregularities in dedication to the common objective. Moreover, sustaining unity usually becomes an objective in and of itself, surpassing the goals that were the original rationale of the coalition. Due to the shortness of the war, clashes stayed controllable and unity was not severely challenged. Early and crucial successes contributed much to the strengthening of the coalition. Nevertheless, its weakness and the unsound commitment of some of the allies required that the war be ended immediately, with a small number of Allied fatalities. In the same way, political sympathy opposed the humiliation of Iraq with demands of absolute submission. Nationally, the dual necessities of lessening fatalities and preventing a protracted, Vietnam-kind complication were crucial.19 The everyday barrage—from military scholars, journalists, critics, and policymakers—as to what will occur when dead bodies begin to pile up both revealed and supported the opinion that the national consensus was likely to crumble. This demonstrated that devastating force should be exercised early to create an almost instant immobilisation of the war-fighting potential of Iraq. These similar requirements were revealed in the duration and strength of the tactical air battle, and in the general dependence on technologically advanced weapons, to minimise casualties and collateral damage. Likewise, the last land attack—discharged just after the air operation had broken the determination and power to counterattack—depended on manoeuvre, ruse, surprise, and speed, and crushing military capability to defeat the Iraqi forces swiftly, decisively, and with very few fatalities. In the Gulf War of 1991, political objectives, both local and international, were in harmony with definite military goals.20 Therefore, military force was exercised successfully, powerfully, and with virtually absolute public approval. The Aftermath The main political objectives of removing the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and bringing back the rightful regime to Kuwait were achieved immediately and with very few coalition fatalities. The deployed military power of Iraq has been destroyed, and its capacity to wage war remains, until now, disabled. The terms of the negotiating period or the cessation of hostilities enforced on Iraq are among the most unforgiving in war history. Harsh economic policies stayed in place, putting the nation in a severely impoverished and ruined condition. Iraq is prohibited to export its plentiful supply of oil, except within the rules established by the Security Council. Particularly, Iraq is allowed to export oil, as long as the transaction is overseen by the UN and the payment channelled into a third-party account.21 The money from oil exports is used to fund war rebuilding efforts and settling up the cost of tearing down the weapons of mass destruction of Iraq and to purchase relief goods for distribution under the administration of the international community. Moreover, UN decisions exposed the land of Iraq to extraordinary invasive checks or inspections, with the objective of finding and demolishing its chemical, biological, nuclear weapons. In general, the cease-fire resolutions—supported by U.S. military power and international persuasion—successfully dispossessed Iraq of its autonomy. Hence, Iraq is not merely remote and excluded but absolutely at risk to whatever retribution the coalition forces might decide to dish out.22 However, the Gulf War was not able to remedy the main cause of the war-- Saddam’s violent and destructive actions. Several months after the stunning defeat, Saddam did not only survive but also remain assured to attempt to resist or challenge the cease-fire resolutions enforced by the coalition. In fact, military power was viewed yet again as a way of making sure Iraq will act in accordance with Security Council provisions. Moreover, Iraq was given the permission to engage in the combat zone with adequate military force in order to crush, at least for a time, domestic threats to the government and reinforce Saddam’s authority. In fact, after the ceasefire treaty was agreed upon, it required the armed involvement and punishments of the coalition to rescue the Shiites and Kurds from massacre by the Iraqi forces.23 Whether such remaining force is strong enough to work as groundwork for rebuilding a massive offensive threat is, until now, uncertain. Most threateningly, the character and magnitude of the biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons agenda of Iraq was hugely misjudged. Consequently, a major military objective of Operation Desert Storm, which was to “destroy Iraq’s known NBC potential”24-- has partially failed. Because in principle it is not possible to target unidentified sites, the duty to identify, locate, and tear down the remnants of Iraq’s armoury has been transferred to international inspection groups. Because of the traditional practices of Iraqi stratagem, and the evident limitations of Western intelligence system and international regulatory agencies, Iraq could successfully sustain a certain level of NBC capacity, or even to continue secretly its destructive acquisition agenda.25 Nevertheless, the possibility of a nuclear Iraq is still distant but not impossible. This assessment raises two questions: was the war ended prematurely, and was it practically likely to attain a more favourable result within the limited objectives of a restricted war? Primarily, prolonging the ground battle for several days more could have severely incapacitated the Republican Guard— the real foundation of Saddam’s power. In retrospect, letting some Republican Guard units to run off unbroken seems an obvious form of lost benevolence, especially as regards their later brutal operations against the Kurds and Shiites.26 Moreover, the distinction created by several experts between “marching to Baghdad” and “hundred-hour war” is false and deceptive.27 The former was not, and perhaps might not have been, an objective of the coalition. Nevertheless, likewise, there is nothing remarkable or surprising about the hundred-hour limit—aside from the clear impact on public relations. Hence, prolonging the ground war in order to counteract the Republican Guard would have been completely in agreement with the dominant objective of immediate and decisive triumph.28 In addition, there seems to be an obvious disagreement between the demands of the American public to Iraqis to overthrow Saddam and the move to end hostilities at the hundred-hour limit, with the consequent freeing of the Republican Guard. Even though the demands revealed the support of the American public for a rebellion, the move to end the war successfully crushed it from the very beginning. The later decision to give Iraq permission to use helicopters- hence obtaining considerable military capability advantage over the Kurds and Shiites—was very detrimental to the resistance movement. Such conflict in the coordination of US policy reveals the fundamental problem confronted by the Bush regime—its overwhelming need to eliminate Saddam was not embraced by the entire coalition, and it seemed in conflict with the established American objective of regional peace and order.29 As a result, the replacement of government in Iraq was never declared as a political objective, even though it definitely remained a wanted consequence. Hence, the Bush government found itself with few choices, each viewed as more dangerous than advantageous. Impeding the unexpected demise of Saddam and due to his remarkably competent domestic security system and the ban on assassinations by the U.S., the only option for transformation was a domestic uprising. Nevertheless, rebellions are very unstable and somewhat unmanageable. Provoking and maintaining a rebellion is a continuing, dangerous course of action, especially for an external force, with very few connections to and little control over the rebels. The outcome of the Gulf War of 1991 is not like those of the other wars. The coalition did not invade the opponent’s territory, govern the country, democratize the regime, or finance its infrastructure. It did not assign armed forces in the territory to prevent another war. Nor did the coalition completely abandon the country. Due to the partiality and biasedness of the military victory, success has been indefinable, with the main problem—Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait—unsettled. The conditions at the end of the Gulf War in numerous ways are not very dissimilar from their precursors. The consequence of the war continues in numerous ways. The Iraqi forces were not destroyed as widely believed. The massive number of Iraqi fatalities was only a small portion of the total number of combatants.30 Almost all of the members of the exceptional Republican Guard— owning most of the finest weapons and human resources in the Iraqi military—fled north and were neither imprisoned nor slaughtered. The arsenal was not severely exhausted in almost all ground divisions because few skirmishes took place. Incidents since the war have revealed that information about Iraq’s biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons potential was largely insufficient.31 Even though these weapons are under the supervision of the UN, they are much more far-reaching than was initially assumed and have neither been wiped out nor neutralized.32 Iraq was defeated militarily, but it was not defeated politically. Kuwait remains the 19th province of Iraq. Saddam remained in power. He was not defeated by not failing politically. He endured and has fewer local detractors after than before the Gulf War. With the war and the provisions, little has occurred to reform Iraqi politics or Saddam’s administration.33 The people, not the regime, have suffered the outcome. In the meantime, support and concern for the region has diminished significantly in comparison to 1990.34 The coalition was not victorious militarily or politically, because it achieved neither political nor military objectives. Saddam maintains control, and his formidable Republican Guard endured. The number of fatalities, extent of the destruction inflicted on the nuclear potential of Iraq, and the time needed by Iraq to rebuild its forces were all grossly underestimated. In short, the political objectives were not achieved. This was mainly because the war was ended one-sidedly and prematurely, without recognising the more valuable and crucial military goals and political objectives. Bush declared four objectives for the participation of the United States in the Gulf War of 1991: first is the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; second is the re-establishment of the rightful Kuwaiti government; third is the defence of the other Gulf countries against Iraq; and, fourth is ensuring the security or safety of American people overseas.35 The first two political objectives were achieved. The remaining two require a flexible dedication that should have to be shown once more. Conclusions The ultimate outcome of the Gulf War of 1991 relies on a broad array of aspects, numerous of them indefinable and, hence, hard to foresee, evaluate, or control. As a result, the termination of war is virtually always rooted in ‘subtle’ predictions, with numerous chances for mistakes, ruse, and self-misperception. Unless the political objective is complete destruction of the enemy and defeat of its territory, it is innately difficult to identify when and where to end the war. And, as the outcome of the war evidently shows, it is much easier to force an enemy to demand reconciliation or ceasefire than to change its actions in the aftermath. Hence, the mist of war solidifies at the end of the hostilities, impairing the attempt to transform successes in the battlefield into political certainties. Without air control and the Republican Guard, the Iraqi forces would have been defenceless against rebel attacks that would slowly weaken its determination, while punishments or provisions would result in greater economic decline and, therefore, increasing suppression by Saddam’s forces. In the Gulf War of 1991, military victory made the overthrow of Saddam appear achievable; control dominated in 1991. Nevertheless, toying with wider objectives made the achievement of the initial political objectives appear quite dull and unsatisfactory. Apparently, that wider political objective survived. Bibliography Bacevich, Andrew & Efraim Inbar. The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered. New York: Frank Cass, 2003. Diamond, Larry. Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq. New York: Macmillan, 2007. Engel, Jeffrey. Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf War. UK: Oxford University Press, 2012. Feith, Douglas. War and Decision. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. Finlan, Alastair. The Gulf War of 1991. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2008. Freedman, Robert Owen. The Middle East After Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait. Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993. Litwak, Robert. Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11. Washington, DC: JHU Press, 2007. Martel, William. Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Milakovich, Michael & George Gordon. Public Administration in America. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2008. United States. Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress. Newport, Rhode Islands: DIANE Publishing, 1991. Read More