War as a Strategic Tool of Policy - Essay Example

? WAR AS A STRATEGIC TOOL OF POLICY Military Sciences October 28, Introduction The political purposes of war vary; however they should all be clearly expresses, focussed and definite. According to Vego, they can vary from “preserving or restoring national territorial integrity and political sovereignty to preserving one’s own or breaking up the opposing alliance/coalition, or forcing the opposition to cease its support for a rebellion in one’s state”.1 For example, during the First World War, Entente and its associated powers had the political strategic objective of changing the central powers government. A political strategic objective can be definite or indefinite. The objectives should however be militarily attainable. Vego points out that a “political strategic objective should be articulated clearly, concisely and unambiguously.”2 Despite the fact that this usually seems as a fairly easy task for those tasked with making decisions, most often political objectives are poorly articulated and defined and also ambiguous, which makes it quite difficult to develop appropriate military strategic objectives. The main reason behind this is the fact that politicians opt not to be too specific as they worry that if there is failure for the objectives to be attained, foreign leaders and local opponents will regard the entire exercise as a failure. Due to this, rather than being defined as measurable objectives, foreign policy objectives are defined in terms of goals or aims. Unclear and ambiguous political strategic objectives are of little or no use to operational planners.3 In terms of expression, political strategic objectives can be articulated in broad or narrow terms. Broadly articulated political objectives are most of the time applied in situations that do not involve vital national interests. Through this, it becomes easier for the political leadership to admit to a compromise without losing international reputation or domestic support. Narrowly articulated political strategic objectives on the other hand need to be comprehensively accomplished, or then the political and additional costs for the political leadership might be exorbitant. Vego asserts that “yet, in a situation where vital national interests are at stake, there is usually no choice but to fight to the finish”.4 During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Syria, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the United States, who were the principal participants in the war, had various individual political objectives. The objective of Syria and Egypt were to recover their occupied territories, which were the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights region respectively. Although it did not initiate the war, Israel had the objective of preserving its national security, which was made possible by occupying the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. Maintaining control of the Tiran Straits located at the Sinai region was also crucial for Israel’s economic dominance. Palestine wanted to regain its territories from the Israel Jewish majority, who had for a long time prospered, as the Palestinian minority continued to suffer, with some of them living as refugees. Saudi Arabia had the objective of defending the union of the coalition among Cairo, Damascus and Riyadh; it therefore used the oil embargo as its political instrument during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Through this, Saudi Arabia could pressure Israel and the west to reach a fair agreement regarding the Palestinian issue. It could also be able to restrain the United States military support to Israel, as well as balance Israel’s military dominance. The United States was also involved in this war as it came in as an assistant to Israel. Its main political objectives were to; bring about a general extinction of the Soviet Union as a superpower in the Middle East and take its position; gain a political settlement with the ability to bring about a transformation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would change the conflict to a small territorial one and remove it from its ideological context; and provide Egypt with a well-established interest in stability through adjustments of territories and economic assistance, so as to guarantee its adequate removal from the Arab front against Israel. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War The 1973 Arab-Israeli war was as a result of the humiliating defeat on Arab in the 1967 Six Day, which is also known as the June War.5 For the second time, Egypt played a central role in the war, this time under Anwar Sadat’s leadership. Anwar Sadat was Nasser’s close confidant. The war began on 6 October 1973, when Egypt and Syria initiated a surprise attack on Israel, as they entered the nation through Golan Heights and Sinai.6 According to Bottaro, “the Egyptian and Syrian military preparations and the initial Arab attack that began on 6 October 1973 were carried out with secrecy.”7 Since the attack took place during Yom Kippur, which is a Jewish holiday that takes place during Ramadhan, the Muslim holy month, it has been speculated that the attack was scheduled to coincide with the festival. However, it has been argued that the day was chosen due to the good condition of the weather and the presence of tides supportive to the crossing of the Suez Canal, rather than its religious importance. On this day, the huge traffic experienced during normal working days was absent, while reserve soldiers were either in the synagogues celebrating this day or resting in their homes, and this greatly helped the Israelis. Several hours prior to the attack, Dayan was warned of an imminent attack by the Israeli military intelligence. According to Bottaro, “Israel did not launch any pre-emptive strike as it had done in 1967.”8 The reasons behind this were not to risk losing the support of America, as well as not to give Arab states the chance to claim that since Israel attacked first, they were acting in self-defence. As a result of proper planning, the attack by Syria and Egypt achieved great initial success. The Israeli army and the public were unprepared and as a result of this, they experienced great losses and had to retreat. Half of Sinai was recaptured, 300 Israeli tanks were destroyed, and at the same time, Israelis had to withdraw as leading positions in the Golan Heights were occupied by Syrians. It took the Israelis three days to adequately prepare themselves, and fight Syria and Egypt back. Despite being confused initially, the Israeli army reorganised itself and was able to launch a counter-attack. They were able to defeat some of the Egyptian forces and “in a major tank battle in the Sinai desert, hundreds of Egyptian tanks were destroyed”.9 This was after the United States provided Israel with military supplies that included tanks and jet fighters, giving it an advantage in the war. Within a week, Syria’s port cities had been massively destroyed and Syrian troops had been forced out of Golan Heights. The Third Army from Egypt on the other hand got trapped by Israeli troops in Sinai, and suffered lack of water and food. According to Stewart, “the United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger mediated an end to the conflict, keeping Israel from destroying the trapped army.”10 On 26 October 1973, the Arab-Israeli war ended. The Consequences of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War Despite winning a military victory, the losses incurred by Israel were much more than the nation had incurred in other wars. The war had serious psychological and political effects on Israel and negative effects on the nation’s economy. Problems were experienced in industrial production and agriculture, as a result of mobilisation of many civilians to serve as the reserve army during the war. Taxes rose after the war since there was need to repair damages in the nation’s infrastructure, regain production, and cover the military expenditure during the war. There was also need to commission a large proportion of the Israeli youth into the army. During this time, the rate of inflation stood at 40%, which was quite high.11 In order to cover continuing defence costs, the Israeli government initiated a tough austerity programme. Spending on welfare, housing, social security, education and health was reduced, value added tax was introduced, and taxes were raised. The war also caused domestic political consequences in Israel. For example, the failure by military leaders and government to anticipate the attack was questioned by many. Bottaro points out that “right-wing leaders such as Menachem Begin criticised the government’s handling of the whole crisis and its acceptance of the ceasefire.”12 According to them, rather than preventing future attacks from Arab, the actions would invite more attacks. In his criticism, Begin asked Moshe Dayan, who was then the defence minister and Golda Meir to resign. The government’s action was to appoint a commission of enquiry, known as the Agranat Commission, in order to investigate the charges in response to the criticism. Dayan and Meir announced their resignations in 1974, while senior officials in the intelligence and military departments were dismissed following the findings of the commission. After the war, there was also a change in the attitudes of many nations towards Israel’s role in the Middle East conflict. The oil embargo was part of the reasons behind this. As a result, Israel received more pressure from western nations, requesting it to sort out its differences with Palestine. According to Bottaro, “in November 1973, the European Economic Community (later the European Union) called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, and to recognise the rights of the Palestinians.”13 Despite the fact that Japan had taken a neutral stance all the while, it called for Israel to withdraw from all Arab territories and for the UN Resolution 242 to be implemented. While tension continued in the Middle East, Israel was viewed to be at fault by other nations, since it refused to accept a compromise solution, and this led to increased resentment in the international scene. This international attitude was evident in 1974, when Yasser Arafat was summoned to address the General Assembly and the Palestine Liberation Organisation members were summoned to attend the debate by the United Nations on the Palestinian issue. Despite the fact that Arab nations lost the war, the situation was not as disheartening as it had been during the 1967 Six Day War. The nations were to some extent happy to have taken the IDF by surprise, gained considerable initial success, and cooperated successfully. According to Bottaro, “in this way, the war destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility, and helped to restore Arab dignity and self-respect.”14 It can be argued that the victory was inconclusive, in spite of the IDF fighting back and managing to win. The stalemate that had existed prior to the war had been broken by Sadat. This is because through him, a change in American policy had been forced, as the United States became more willing to pressure Israel to undertake negotiations on the issue. A keener look into the Arab-Israeli war shows more involvement of the superpowers in the war compared to any other prior wars between Arab and Israel. The superpowers played a part in the war by pressuring their allies and supplying them with arms, although they did not get directly involved. Rivalry in the Middle East continued even after the war and this can be seen in the event of the Cold War. Bottaro points out that it was however not “an area of superpower confrontation in the same way that Korea, Cuba and Angola were.”15 The Principal Participants in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Extent to which the Outcome of the war served their Political Objectives The 1973 Arab-Israeli war is a clear illustration of how grand strategies formulated to achieve strategic objectives are influenced by political objectives.16 It is also a clear illustration of how the preparation and realisation of military strategy at the operational level of war and campaign plans are all controlled by policy objectives. Arab leaders adapted their policy objective to regain occupied territories into an ambitious strategy aimed at achieving the aim. Arab’s ambitious strategy considered little action by the military, pursued by political pressure to necessitate complete restoration of the occupied territories.17 The Arab leadership reasoned that their return to middle east conflicts would operationally oblige partial withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territories, and cause both internal and international political pressure on Israel to hand over other Arab lands for peace to reign in the region. Controlled repulsive campaigns against Israel to gain segments within the occupied territories were planned by the Arab military strategy.18 This made it possible for them to accomplish the military aspect of their ambitious strategy pursued by instant Arab retreat to the opposing side in order to aid the political facet of the strategy. The principal participants in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war included Syria, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, the United States and a number of other western and Arab nations. Egypt and Syria The political objectives of the governments of Egypt and Syria during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war were to trigger military action, in order to rescue territories that Israel occupied in 1967 despite Egypt and Syria claiming that the land was their own.19 Egypt’s primary objective in the war was to recover the Sinai region, while Syria’s primary objective was to recover the Golan Heights region.20 Despite the fact that Israel was able to fight back through the support of the United States, its victory was inconclusive. In fact, the nation suffered much more setback than it had experienced before. For Syria and Egypt, they were not able to recover their respective territories since they were pushed out of the Golan Heights and Sinai respectively. However, to some extent, the nations were happy to have taken the IDF by surprise, gained considerable initial success, and cooperated successfully. The myth about Israel being inconvincible was also destroyed at this time the international scene pressured Israel to settle its differences with Palestine and when it failed to do so, it was perceived to be at fault by other nations. Therefore, the war was not disheartening to Egypt and Syria despite getting pushed out of the Sinai and Golan Heights. Israel For a long time before the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, disputes existed between Israel and Syria and Egypt over the Sinai and Golan Heights territories. A number of wars had been fought over the issue including the Six Day War, but Israel always managed to emerge victorious. Despite the fact that the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was not initiated by Israel, the nation had political objectives related to the war. It is conventional wisdom that the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula are believed to be crucial for the national security of Israel. Ashton points out that “many Israeli’s believed that Sinai served as an ideal buffer zone with Egypt since Egypt would find it extremely difficult to launch a surprise attack against Israel.”21 The occupation of Sinai was also important for Israel because it provided them with the ability to control the Tiran Straits, and thus allow Israeli vessels to use it as they moved to and from Eilat. Any blockage to the Straits would therefore mean economic losses for Israel, since it would destroy its strategic posture and reduce its capability for deterrence during war. This is the main reason why Israel refused to make a settlement with Palestine, as well as Syria and Egypt. The nation suffered a great set back after the war and to some extent, lost its reputation in the international scene for refusing to reach an agreement with Palestine. Palestine Differences between Jordan and Palestine had existed for many years prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The clashes between Palestine and Jordan had a great impact on the involvement of Arab states in the conflict between Arab and Israel.22 The Palestine Liberation Organisation moved its command structure from Jordan to Lebanon in 1971, after the defeat of Palestine and the losses it experienced in later engagements with forces from Jordan. Conflicts had also previously existed between Palestinians and Zionists as they fought for the control of Palestine. Palestine had however disappeared from the scene as attention shifted to the tension between Arab states and Israel. Additionally, thousands of Palestinians had been transformed to refugees as a result of conflicts between Arab and Israel during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. According to Hastedt, “although it was not involved heavily in military action during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the PLO was central to three political developments that followed its wake.”23 The conflict between Israel and Jewish Palestine was on occupied territories. According to Peleg and Waxman, “compared with Israel’s Jewish majority, the Palestinian minority has always been and remains to this day inferior in many important respects.”24 This explains why Palestine supported Syria and Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Despite the fact that Palestine, as well as Syria and Egypt were unable to regain their territories, they managed to emerge victorious in the war and impacted western nations to put pressure on Israel to end its conflict with Palestine. Saudi Arabia During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, rather than getting into a confrontation with the Arabs, the Saudis joined Syria and Egypt against Israel. During this time, the Gulf nations together with Iraq were against Iran, the Mujahidin movements together with Pakistan were against Afghanistan’s invasion by the Soviet Union. According to Hussein, “in contrast to the 1950s and 1960s where the charismatic leaders of the republicans dominated Arab politics, the 1970s witnessed the influence of petro-power that helped consolidate Saudi-Arab alignments.”25 Hussein points out that “for Saudi Arabia, oil is instrumental in serving the security objectives of its regional alliances.”26 Since Saudi Arabia could be termed as a financially stable nation during the time, Syria and Egypt needed its financial support for procurements of arms for the war and for their domestic economies to be supported, so that they could be substantially stable. According to Hussein, “Saudi relations with Egypt and Syria between 1970 and 1973 were crucial to the political outcomes of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Ramadan (Yom Kippur) war of 1973.”27 The political objective of Saudi Arabia was to defend the union of the coalition among Cairo, Damascus and Riyadh, so it used the oil embargo as its political instrument during the Yom Kippur war.28 By doing so, Saudi Arabia was in a good position to pressure Israel and the west to reach a fair agreement to the Palestinian issue. It could also be able to restrain the United States military support to Israel, as well as balance Israel’s military dominance. Despite the fact that the outcome of the war was disappointing to Saudi Arabia, the nation emerged as a central player in the regional system of power. The Islamic prestige of the Kingdom in Arab and Muslim worlds was enhanced by the nation’s orientation during the war. United States Prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States had for a long time generated interest in Israel and oil in the Middle East. According to Aruri, “the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing oil embargo enabled Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to embark on a post-Vietnam war strategy in the Middle East.”29 By the end of the war, it was clear that the United States assumed to be the single superpower in the Middle East, from the way it acted. Three objectives were revealed from Kissinger’s mediation after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. First, was to bring about a general extinction of the Soviet Union as a superpower in the Middle East and take its position. Aruri points out that “the departure of some 20,000Soviet personnel from Egypt , a standing U.S. objective, as well as Sadat’s de-Nasserization program, began the process of reorienting Egypt away from nonalignment toward closer relations with the United States. “30 Secondly, the United States wanted to gain a political settlement with the ability to bring about a transformation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would change the conflict to a small territorial one and remove it from its ideological context. According to Aruri, “such an approach was inherently detrimental to the Palestinians and Arab nationalists, who viewed the struggle as one against settler colonialism and imperialist penetration.”31 Third, the United States wanted to provide Egypt with a well-established interest in stability through adjustments of territories and economic assistance, so as to guarantee its adequate removal from the Arab front against Israel. Therefore, “the overall aim of Kissinger’s diplomacy was to give the United States the necessary leverage not only to neutralise Egypt, but also to pressure Syria and the PLO to make significant concessions to Israel.” 32 This worked out in 1975, to the advantage of the United States, through the Sinai accord negotiated by Israel and Egypt under the United States sponsorship. Aruri points out that the accord “granted Israel time to consolidate the occupation and build up its offensive capability vis-a-vis the Arab states or the eastern front.”33 The accord also granted Israel a security guarantee by America. The Middle East Situation after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War After the war, an agreement known as the Sinai I Accord was reached upon. According to Bottaro, in the accord, “Israel agreed to withdraw from the western side of the Suez Canal; in an agreement with Syria, it also agreed to withdraw from part of the Golan Heights.”34 Consequently, Syria and Egypt decided not to use force against Israel in future, but rather resolve any differences among them in a calmer way. However, the occupation of Golan Heights, Gaza, West Bank and a large part of the Sinai, as well as the status and situation of the Palestinian refugees, which were the more serious fundamental issues, remained unresolved. Regarding the relationship between Egypt and other Arab states, Anwar Sadat and Kissinger developed a good working relationship. This was after Sadat’s realisation on the importance of the United States support in securing cooperation with Israel on any future peace deals. As a result of this and despite the fact that Egypt had previously relied on the Soviet Union to provide it with arms and support during war, Sadat proceeded to cut the ties between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Bottaro points out that “the shift from the Soviet to the western bloc brought economic benefits to Egypt.”35 As a result of this, an open door policy was encouraged by Sadat and this promoted and increased private investment in Egypt, consequently reducing the nation’s foreign debts and reviving its export industries. Since Israel had withdrawn from the Suez Canal by 1974, Egypt cleared it and reopened it for shipping operations. With time, the relations between Syria and Egypt became tense, since Syria refused to cooperate with the United States. According to Bottaro, “when other Arab states agreed to lift the oil embargo against the USA in March 1974, Syria backed by Libya refused to support this move.”36 Instead, Syria opted to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Bibliography Alnasrawi, Abbas. Arab Nationalism, Oil, and the Political Economy of Dependency. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991. Aruri, Naseer. Dishonest Broker: America's Role in Israel and Palestine. Cambridge: South End Press, 2003. Ashton, Nigel J. The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967-73. New York: Routledge, 2007. Bottaro, Jean. History for the IB Diploma: The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1945-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Hastedt, Glenn P. Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Hussein, Abdulrhman A. So History Doesn't Forget: Alliances Behaviour in Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1979-1990. Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2012. Jordan, Michael C. “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns.” GlobalSecurity.org. 1997. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Jordan.htm. Mattar, Philip. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts On File, 2005. Peleg, Ilan and Waxman, Dov. Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Stewart, Dona J. The Middle East Today: Political, Geographical and Cultural Perspectives. Oxon: Routledge, 2013. Vego, Milan N. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice. Newport: Naval War College Press (US), 2009. Read More