The Gulf Wars and the United States - Essay Example

? Gulf War Introduction The 1990 gulf war resulted when a coalition led by the US drove Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait after he invaded the country and claimed the country to be Iraq’s 19th province. The Gulf war was the first significant use of American military power since the Vietnam War; however, gulf war involved an assembly of large and numerous countries that contributed military assets although the US capabilities outstripped other nations. The gulf war in 1990-1991 was a reaction to Saddam’s threat to the region, which eventually caused significant changes in Middle East affecting economic, political and social conditions. Following the coalition war, the problem of Iraq against the west was not because the regime was undemocratic because no Iraqi regime has ever been democratic but because the country’s foreign policy came into conflict with western interests. In military terms, the campaign in the Persian Gulf was extremely successful because it stands out in the staggering low number of combat casualties. The coalition forces achieved complete superiority in air, at sea and on land with minimal losses; however, politically the outcome of the gulf war is specifically contentious. In the immediate sense, Kuwait’s stolen sovereignty was restored with the Al-Sabah family put back in power and UN’s aims being fulfilled. From the regional perspective, the impact of the war had profound strategic economic as well as political consequences; for instance, the strategic price of allowing the intervention of the US resulted in closer ties with some nations in the region. Deployment of Allied forces Following the coalition war and the associated deterioration in the economic and health conditioned in the country saw Saddam’s reputation suffer decline. Moreover, Saddam was concerned with his leadership because he was suspicious of not only the hostile elements within the country but also ambitious elements in his regime. The lesson learnt from the gulf war is those significant American foreign policies interests cannot always be safeguarded by unilateral US actions but also require multilateral and cooperative arrangements with other states1. After directing the military to apply force in attaining national objectives, governments usually seek to impose specific constraints in applying that force to achieve political objectives. Recent history is full of instances where in military terms politicians seek to power strategic outcomes wrongly like in the case of Grenada and Vietnam. However, in 1991 political leaders in that period seemed cautious of transgressing the mark from national to political meddling compared to their involvement in Vietnam. At the time the US president, George Bush together with the country’s secretary of defence Richard Cheney were determined to allow the professionals run the war and shun micromanagement of the battlefield. At the time of the war, it was essential for the US to convey messages that gulf war was never a US unilateral adventure. To show this, it relied in large part on making and maintaining the multinational coalition of troop from different nations especially the Arab states. Moreover, the accomplishment of intended defence for Saudi Arabia and later on the liberation of Kuwait were based on tangential coalition right of entry to Saudi’s territory on which to base the operations. However, there were noteworthy concerns of an Arab state acting as a staging base for the primarily western aggression against an Arab state. An Australian general played a supportive role to the mission of US’s secretary to Saudi Arabia to persuade the King at the time on the significance of defending the country against the Iraqi aggression. At the time, the Middle East political setting was undergoing dramatic change and accepting the easy way out in appeasing Saddam could alter it to the advantage of Saudi Arabia and its allies. Besides, to side with western powers against another Arab state was risky undertaking because it had the capability of feeding the deepest feelings of fundamentalist xenophobia together resentment. Nevertheless, the US was ultimately successful in eliciting the King’s consent in initiating a build-up of troops within the Saudi desert. The military coalition of the various nations saw the US take an unusual step of requesting nations to contribute financially to the cost and among the largest donors were Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Invasion of Kuwait was a surprise to the world and brought to an end the US policy that accommodated Saddam Hussein and forced the US to revaluate its policy toward Iraq. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait rallied almost the entire world community to oppose the invasion; hence, the US president had little difficulty in winning domestic support for forcible confrontation with Iraq. Nevertheless, the US had a hard time articulating single overriding reason for the war against Iraq because US had to grapple with opposing the aggression or even preserving the security of global oil supplies. Figure 1: Showing ground and air attacks in Iraq in 1990-1991 Gulf war2 Ruling elites in the Arab states at the time of war were conscious of their reliance on the west and were therefore willing to invest their wealth there instead of investing in their neighbourhood. The crisis that erupted in the region following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was quite distinct in nature because this time it was a multinational conflict. Moreover, resolution 678 of November 1990 offered the US administration authority of using ‘any means necessary’ in restoring peace and security throughout the region. The war to expel Iraq from Kuwait was thus allowed to be a lightning strike aimed at a clearly identified enemy who fought at first 28 and later on 31 nation strong coalition from various continents with seemingly clear, simple and demonstrably achievable war goals. President Bush at the time outlined the aims of the war that included immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, protection of American citizens abroad as well as the re-establishment of peace and stability in the region along the lines of US national security interests3. The subsequent resolutions that UN Security Council passed were interpreted as offering the US authority to carried operations in the conflict. If the international community declined to respond to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, the current world would probably be a much a dangerous place with little American interests and threatening to the people of Middle East and beyond. Saddam threatened to dominate a strategic region from which much of the world’s oil resources are known to exist4. Moreover, Saddam’s brutality toward Kuwait as well as his rhetoric to the rest of the region established an immense and restive ambition that was shown by his naked aggression that would have led to more aggression had it been untamed. Within Iraq, brutality of the regime preceded the 1991 conflict and unfortunately survived the war; however, the coalition did not have the authority to end Saddam’s tyranny over Iraq but the authority to prevent his regime from tyrannising other parts in the region. The operation was also essential because of what it offered to America; the war reaffirmed American’s faith in their armed forces and to an extend it allowed American’s to reaffirm their faith to their country’s performance, products, purpose and dedication. The success of the operation required creation of international coalition and multinational military cooperation like the UK, France, Turkey and Egypt among other nations as opposed to cooperation merely by nations in the Arabian Peninsula. A strategic element to the approach of frustrating Saddam’s efforts involved drawing Israel into the war, which eventually changed political features of the war. Efforts of the coalition were enhanced greatly by the previous military cooperation in NATO, combined exercises, and US preparing members of the Allied forces. The Persian Gulf War acknowledges the significance of building such efforts in a world where joint international efforts are significant both militarily and politically. The annexation of Kuwait offered the potential of Iraqi power over Saudi Arabia through either intimidation or invasion all of which presented significant threat to US interests; hence, the need for decisive response. Following talks with the King in Riyadh indicating the willingness of US to offer substantial forces in defending Saudi Arabia and that the forces would leave the country once the job was accomplished, enabled the King to accept and invite the US forces to the country. A decision was reached to deploy US military in response to the King’s invitation because it was the finest available option as well as a framework upon which to develop specific deployment plans. The key factors that aided the deployment involved US’ experience in the region as well as Saudi Arabia’s well-developed coastal infrastructure that supported military deployment. Most of the infrastructure was a legacy of past defence planning as well as bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries. Figure 2: Pie chart representing the military personnel from various nations5 The overall strategy for the operation desert shield was based on rapid deployment of forces in order to deter attack and if necessary support Saudis in defending their key facilities. The US and Saudi military objectives in operation desert shield included establishment of defensive capabilities in order to counter to extra Iraqi hostility and dissuade Saddam from continuing with aggression. However, precise military strategies to attain those ends changed as coalition forces grew to levels adequate for a robust regional defence. The scheme to protect Saudi Arabia at the onset of operation reflected limited forces available for deployment in the mission of defending Saudi Arabia as well as other western allies in the region. Arabs were firmly rallied the coalition’s efforts especially Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, and of course Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia paid just under $20 billion to contribute to the efforts while Kuwait offered a similar contribution to the coalition effort making the nations in the region contribute 60% of the costs associate with the campaign in order to return to the status quo. Other nations in the region like Egypt, Morocco and Syria offered a significant amount of military forces bin ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Other nations like Japan emerged as strong supporters of the coalition although in military terms the country was constitutionally hamstrung like the Germans; nevertheless, Japan pledged approximately $10 billion in aid of the overall operation6. Egypt played a significant role because it helped assemble the international coalition and deployed the third largest troop behind the US and UK in liberating Kuwait from Iraq. After the operation was over, Egypt assented to Damascus declaration together with Syria and other gulf nations in strengthening gulf security7. The Iraqi invasion violated the fundamental tenets that form the charter of UN and the UN played a dramatic and historic role in resisting the country’s aggression. Collaboration of the main members within UN Security Council was crucial and forthcoming and many nations participated in enforcement of economic sanctions against Iraq. Nations some of which were former members of Warsaw Pact offered forces to maritime effort while others offered equipment and economic assistance to front line nations and coalition countries. Foreign participation in US costs alone included promised transfers to the US of more than $50 billion, an amount that surpassed defence budget of any country at the time apart from the US and the Soviet Union. The amount covered the vast prevalence of the incremental costs the US incurred during the war the contributions were significant both financially and signifying international cohesion and determination8. One reason for the Persian Gulf crisis and the subsequent war was the breakdown of pan-Arabism and possibly even the collapse of Arab world with regard to it being a political entity. Therefore, when Saddam attacked Kuwait in 1990, he completed and to a certain extend formalised a change that had been in the offing for a long period. For the first time, in defiance of accepted norms in inter-Arab relations and violation of Arab League Charter, that precludes the resort to arms in inter-Arab dispute, one Arab state launched full-scale war against another. This resulted in an inter-Arab conflict where a group of Arab states together with western allies fought against another Arab state. The conflict was therefore a war between Arab Rulers where America reluctantly got involved in support of its allies as well as defending its perceived interests of a free world. These events ensured a formal abandonment of the long-cherished dream of pan-Arabism that aimed for a united Arab state or even a consistent Arab political bloc. However, as a matter of prevailing politics and foreseeable future pan-Arabism no longer counts as a political force although it survives among a diminishing group of intellectuals because it is not a factor in international or inter-Arab or even local Arab politics. Although the US was not an imperial power, the US government remained answerable to its people because the prevailing society was different from the past empires and with different perceptions, aspirations and policies. Nevertheless, the US sought to remain the predominant outside power in the Middle East because any involvement within the region would be bitterly opposed at home. Although there are rising powers in the east and south Asia that may seek political and military role that match their economic role within the countries of modern middle east, this is far from the immediate future because the use US remains the main power outside the region, after the 1991 gulf war and subsequent involvement in the region. The serious restraint to American administration remains to be the American public opinion and of the many mistakes committed by Saddam the worst of all was infuriating the American administration as well as antagonising the public option at the same time. The concern of American government at the time was the country’s interests; hence, the country had to devise policies that offered protection and advancement of the country’s interests. US led worldwide coalition under UN backing resolutely advanced the issue of Iraq’s attack of Kuwait. This inaugurated permanent introduction of the US ground and air forces in a region frequented only by the country’s naval forces; hence, the country’s foreign policy became entangled with relations as well as problems of the Islamic state in the region than ever before. US diplomacy at the time ran into complex problems in various levels like Arab states sending forces would only fight under Arab commanders; as well, there was the threat of Iraq firing missiles into Israel if attacked by Arab-Western coalition9. The Iraqi threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia lead to an alliance between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Syria, which generated security dependence on US. The growing power of revisionist forces in the gulf increased the dangers in the Arab-Israeli arena; therefore, the weakening of radical forces in Gulf reinforced the chances of progress in Arab-Israeli peace process. Meanwhile, the progress Arab-Israeli peace process weakens regional appeal for revisionists, while the slow-down of the process strengthens the regional influence. The linkage between the various parts of the Middle East was reinforced because of the technological advances in the power-projection capabilities of airplanes and long-range missiles. The Iraqi defeat in 1991 gulf war enabled commencement of the Arab-Israeli peace procedure, beginning with the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The defeat of Iraq weakened the radical camp in the Arab world and enabled the progress in the peace process under a US led coalition that was formed at the onset of the gulf crisis and after Iraq Jordan and Palestine, two nations that initially were allied to Iraq at the time of crisis, joined defeat. Without the victory of US in the gulf war of 1991, there would never have been progress in Arab-Israeli peace procedure. Besides, continued Iraqi control of Kuwait could have brought major deterioration in the regional stability. The peace process in mid 1990s weakened Saddam’s standing in the Arab world and made it easy to apply and maintain the sanction and inspection regime in Iraq and contain Iranian and Islamic Influence in the region10. Jordan’s position during the Gulf war, its refusal to join the US-led coalition and its harsh censure of its allies and US created a rift in the friendly relations between Jordan and US. However, neither of the two nations got interested in rupture despite relations reaching a low point when the leader of Jordan claimed that the US and its allies sought to destroy Iraq. Nevertheless, the end of the gulf war created a new strategic environment that provided opportunities for great stability in the region11. The US emerged as the predominant military power in the region; hence, acquiring a position of unprecedented influence, which has been employed in reshaping the basis for security and peace within the region. Regional power recognised the preponderant power of the US and sought the country’s good graces; moreover, friends of US in the region were strengthened by the outcome of the war and the enemies weakened. At the time, diplomacy in Middle East was subject to four balances of power and they concern the relationships between Israel and Arab states, moderate and radical Arab states, Arab States and Iran and between the two superpowers. Currently, the four balances are remarkably stable and favourable for maintenance of peace; although, not for rapid movement in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. The end of cold war eliminated the task preventing the Soviet Union from extending its influence in the region to the disadvantage of US position and interests of Israel and pro-western Arab nations. From the perspective of the US, the outcome of the Gulf war had a favourable impact on the balances because Iraq’s effort to change the balance between Arab states in an attempt to move toward a control position was thwarted. Even though Saddam survived, he could not attempt to recoup because other states backed by the US were in a strong position to deter him or any other individual who entertained similar aspiration. The US policy currently addresses this task through provision of substantial arms assistance to Saudi Arabia and other gulf states and by trying to arrange with some of the states to maintain a US military presence and military cooperation. Efforts following the gulf war to build up a combined defensive security arrangement by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria did not materialise. However, a potential Syrian danger to the equilibrium between Arab states appears to be remote within the predictable future. Adjusting to the loss of the Soviet Union to the dominant position of the US in the region, Syrian president found it advisable to move closer to the US for tactical treasons by adopting an accommodating diplomatic profile12. Figure 3: representation of nation’s military contribution to the coalition13 The balance between Arab states and Iran remains reassuring for the time being following the country’s realistic evaluation of its welfare in and after the war. The gulf war in 1991 alleviated the anxiety of other gulf states that Iran might move after the defeat of Iraq in establishing control over the gulf. The war left Israel in unusually favourable balance with the potentially hostile Arab states; hence, after the war Israel emerged with improvements in its security that still persists. Not only did Israel stay out of the war despite the provocative attacks by Iraq, other Arab states opposing Iraq gave the indication that during the conflict Israel had the right to retaliate if it chose to. For the first time since the World War II, moderate Arab states together with Israel faced a common and ruthless threat from a fundamental Arab state14. The altered strategic landscape in Middle East created great stability and decreased the likelihood of another war within the region. Not all Arab states that were involved in the coalition that defeated Iraq regarded the strategic environment after the gulf war to be unsatisfactory to require concessions for a peace settlement with Israel. Perhaps the nations did not view the post war situation in the region as unstable or capable of spawning substantial new threats to their well-being. The nations following the war most likely did not see opportunities for making significant gains at the expense of Israel through unilateral action or in concert with others; hence, to achieve this, the nation’s rely on US pressure upon Israel. Therefore, US dominance in the region has a quieting effect for the time being and on whatever impulses for an assertive policy by the Syrians. However, Syria believes it is shielded from undue pressure from US to agree to security and arms control initiatives that are against the nation’s interests because the country cooperated with US in defeating Iraq15. The gulf war in 1991 offered an opportunity to Turkey to demonstrate to the western allies that Turkey still preserved its geopolitical significance after the cold war. American political interests in the Gulf war were hard to extract from economic and strategic interest although local political interest involved two distinct areas of concern. The first area was the access to Gulf oil, which had a huge bearing on the global price of crude petroleum that in return determined the cost of gasoline and heating oil to millions of American consumers. Second area of concern was that Iraq’s power, political, military and economic threatened Israel, a country whose unique influence in US foreign policy made any threat to it a significant domestic political interest for American administration. While domestic political interests were hugely compelling by themselves, the global political interests associated with Gulf security were of equal significance. For instance, owing to the fact that Gulf’s energy resources were critical to the worldwide economy, guaranteeing safety and supply of those assets had a vital strategic, economic as well as political interest for the US international interests. From a regional perspective, the political stability of the gulf was significant for the strength of the Middle East together with south-western Asia. Altering the prevailing state system in the region and the collapse of balance-of-power involving, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and Turkey was a compelling regional and international political interest for the US16. Conclusion Although containment of Iraq was a preferred method over military assault, political determination established that Kuwait had to be liberated through military force. The military devoted to supporting national objectives in defeating the regional enemy of crucial US national interests; therefore, the coalition was committed in evicting Iraq from Kuwait to restore balance of power in the Gulf. After the 1991 gulf war, which was a huge victory for allied forces, US military role subjugated to political interests? From 1991, the subsequent US administration with regard to the gulf war considered strategic power based on the professional understanding of the military threats and deterrence was surpassed by political modalities. The significant involvement of US military in the 1991 gulf war helped rekindle US relations in the region since the defeat of Saddam enabled the US persuade several allies of Saddam while at the same time serving US interests. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was an apparent act of infringement of global law and US was vindicated by opposing the invasion by organizationing a coalition against Iraq. 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