Analysis of how Joint Warfare was applied during Operation Just Cause in Panama - Research Paper Example

?To Provide an In-Depth Analysis of How Joint Warfare Was Applied During Operation Just Cause In Panama Table of Contents List of Abbreviations 3 3 Introduction 4 Basic Description about Joint Operation 4 The Origin of Joint Concepts 5 Goldwater-Nichols Act 6 Planning of Operation Just Cause 8 Impact of Goldwater-Nicholas Act on Planning of Operation Just Cause 9 Application of Joint Warfare in Operation Just Cause 10 Lessons Learnt from Operation Just Cause 11 Conclusion 13 References 14 List of Abbreviations Department of Defense = DOD Secretary of Defense = SECDEF Chief of the Unified and Specified Command = CINC Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs = CJCS Joint Chiefs of Staffs = JCS National Security Council = NSC Introduction During the 20th century, United States (US) had concentrated on developing a military force which would be capable of thwarting the progress of communism in the world. In the 21st century, the US has brought in a new reality on future warfare. In today’s world, there is a possibility of increasing global instability not only for religious or cultural reasons, but also for diminution of natural resources such as land, oil and natural gas among others. Hence, the US military is trying to transform itself into such a military power which is able to function across a comprehensive range of actions. In order to tackle the future political challenges, there is a need for developing an army which is prepared for not only offensive and defensive activities, but also to maintain stability and to conduct supporting functions. The military operations in Haiti, Bosnia and Middle East demonstrate the requirement of joint forces in order to ensure better cooperation. The trends of joint operation in 21st century evidently reveal the fact that single military operations have become history. In order to rule in the rapidly changing environment, joint approach of military planning is considered as a critical success factor for any nation1. The research paper provides an in-depth analysis on application of joint warfare during ‘Operation Just Cause’ in Panama. The objective of the research is to analyze how joint operations were implemented during Operation Just Cause. Besides, the paper also aims at understanding how Goldwater-Nichols Act had affected the planning of Operation Just Cause. Basic Description about Joint Operation The term, ‘Joint Operation’ denotes military movements which are undertaken by joint military forces. Joint operation principle is established on a sound foundation of war philosophy, concept and practical knowledge. Joint operation principles identify the basic and the advantageous impacts of ‘unity in command’ and the cooperation which results from integration and harmonization of military operations. This cooperation can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of military force. The benefits of joint operation are spread beyond the operational background across the array of military actions2. ‘Joint Warfare’ is often used by the military forces of the US in conjunction with other countries and agencies. Joint warfare is required in order to create a decisive and a combined combat strength. In joint warfare philosophy, the military organizations incorporate and synchronize their air forces, land forces, navy forces and the special operation forces in order to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. The objective of joint warfare is to enhance the effectiveness of military assault3. The Origin of Joint Concepts The history of the US reveals the significance of joint operations. The war of 1812 in between the US and Great Britain provides a great example with regard to success of joint operation. However, the operation was criticized due to misperceptions, low level of cooperation and coordination. The first joint military board in the US was established in the year 1903. The joint board was aimed at planning joint military operations and resolving issues on common concerns. Yet, the joint board was provided with little right to solve issues which were provided by military branches. After the First World War, the US agreed to rebuild and revive the joint board in order to provide guidance for joint operations. In the year 1942, ‘united high command’ approach was implemented in reaction to the requirement of a coordinated workforce. However, the joint military commanders at that time performed joint operations without any judicial approval or even any formal executive definition. At the end of Second World War, the requirement for a proper construction of joint command appeared, which resulted in the development of ‘National Security Act of 1947’ by disbanding the joint board. This Act had placed the basis for a sequence of judicial and managerial alterations that shape today’s defense organization4. Goldwater-Nichols Act The US military had faced several problems in relation to management of joint military forces, which called for a most comprehensive organizational transformation in the DOD. On the basis of regulations in National Securities Act of 1947, the chain of command of military operation operated from President to SECDEF to CINC. Neither CJCS nor JCS had the authority to issue an order for any kind of military operations. The quality of recommendation of JCS to the President, SECDEF and NSC was also poor in nature. The CINC had only the power of operational command which was rather incomplete than a full command. There was a lack of cooperation in between different military departments. As a result, the joint military advice was also insufficient. There was misperception and confusion in the operational chain of command as well as in the role of service secretaries. The Armies, Navies and Air forces were reported about their operations mainly to the respective Commanders and head offices, which were ineffective to manage a strong joint military force. Furthermore, there was needless repetition of tasks in headquarters and military departments which used to reduce the effectiveness of joint operations. In practice, the military system of the US did not produce good outcomes on joint operations. The outcome of this confusion and conflicting interests in various military departments can be observed in the defeat of the US in Vietnam War against communism movement in the year 1975. The assault of the US in Grenada in 1983 also revealed its weak coordination in joint operation. The deficits of DOD had thwarted efforts towards establishment of a coherent and effective system of better strategic planning and improved warfare command. This requirement resulted in the restructuring of ‘DOD Reorganization Act’ of 1958 which is also recognized as ‘Goldwater-Nichols Act’ (GNA)5. GNA can best be stated as a regulation which was aimed at making logical change of power from individual military services to the joint establishments of defense institutions. In GNA, the CINC was provided with extra power on military services and was assured of a bigger role in planning of defense resources5. The regulation was aimed at transforming the military forces into an interconnected working team by redefining organizational relationships. On the basis of explanation to the regulation, the objective of GNA was to improve the military information provided to the President and other government agencies, place clear duty on CINC for success of military operation, ensure that the power of commanders-in-chiefs are fully proportionate with their responsibility, bring increased courtesy to the preparation of strategy and emergency planning, competently use the defense resources, improve joint administration policies and increase the efficiency of military operations. GNA attempted to reduce the size of control center components and attempted specially to reinforce the role of Service Secretaries in developing policies, making decisions and managing the finance in regular military operations. Prior to the enactment of GNA, CJCS was unable to make any decision on military operations. GNA had considerably reinforced the power of CJCS by permitting it to operate through a chain of command and to provide instructions directly to the President as well as to the SECDEF. GNA also inspired CJCS to consult with JCS and CINC. The CJCS was also provided to control JCS and develop strategic plans, develop principles for joint operation, guide the secretary on the priorities recognized by CINC and control the level of budget according to the priorities. The new regulation also minimized the administrative burden of DOD by elimination of obsolete, redundant and needless reporting requirements and authorized new, appropriate and effective periodic reports by addressing the concern of the nation. GNA had taken unprecedented steps towards development of a stronger Chairman. It had authorized CINC with more power and enhanced the command and the control of military forces. After the enactment of GNA, several joint operations have been conducted. The first experiment of GNA was ‘Operation Just Cause’5. Planning of Operation Just Cause In the year 1989, the US military had invaded in a small Central American nation named Panama. This military operation was known as ‘Operation Just Cause’. Operation Just Cause had taken the advantage of GNA and other experiences of joint operations fought earlier. Any kind of forcible entry requires a long operational reach. Operation Just Cause was the result of synchronized effort of Army, Navy and Air forces in order to accomplish clear and coherent objectives6. The US was always concerned about Panama due to the strategic significance of Panama Canal. Panama Canal was vital for the US for conducting international operations such as capitalist penetration in Latin American and Asian regions. During 1970s, the US had faced growing challenges from its Soviet opponents. The weakening of Soviet Union signaled a rapid deterioration of Soviet and Cuban power on Panama Canal area. Besides several new problems such as drug inflow from Columbia to America via Panama had also rendered the concentration of the US on Panama Canal. Thus, the US decided to exercise control on Panama Canal area which generated the commencement of Operation Just Cause7. Impact of Goldwater-Nicholas Act on Planning of Operation Just Cause The changes in the military system mandated by GNA were quite slow to take impact on Operation Just Cause. As CJCS was familiarized with the pre-GNA environment, he was quite unenthusiastic to make sweeping changes. After the conclusion of cold war in Eastern Europe, the political deterioration in Panama quickly forced the US to focus towards Panama Canal5. In the year 1988, the US had expected inmate situation and intrusion for the use of Panama Canal. Hence, in order to mitigate this problem, the US developed a contingency plan by using GNA, against the authoritarian named General Manuel Noriega, a military officer who ran Panama. The US General ‘Fredrick Woerner’, the ‘Commander in Chief of US Southern Command’ at that time developed an operation named ‘Blue Spoon’ in order to intimidate and takeover the rule of Noriega and ‘Panama Defense Force’ (PDF). However, his incremental approach of military operation was not effective; hence General Woerner was replaced by Maxwell Thurman. General Thurman operated in union with Chairman of Joint Chiefs, named General Colin Powell. General Thurman had reviewed the ‘Blue Spoon’ operation and quickly changed the plan of Operation Just Cause by accelerating the number of soldiers and reducing the scheduled time to move the joint forces comprising soldiers, air forces, marines and sailors from three weeks to five days. General Thurman wanted to take down authoritarian general Noriega by destructing military forces. General Thurman had taken complete benefit of CINC’s increased power which was provided by GNA in order to direct the operation of joint military forces. Due to the additional authority of CINC, it was free from any kind of interferences from other divisions which resulted in a robust military team with one unity of command and enhanced interoperability. In this way, GNA helped the US to accomplish the operational objectives in joint warfare rapidly8. Application of Joint Warfare in Operation Just Cause GNA helped to make the CJCS to give direct advice to the President. Hence, during the planning of the military operation, the secretary had performed through General which removed the time consuming discussion within JCS in order to gain their authorization. In the Vietnam War, it had been found that the ‘Secretary of Defense’ generally functioned exclusively through the Chairman in order to convey direction to the commanders. GNA made the Joint Staff to be directly accountable to the Chairman instead of JCS. Hence, it became unnecessary to postpone operational planning for the approval of JCS. Throughout the planning of ‘Blue Spoon’, Thomas Kelly, the Lieutenant General of Joint Staff and commanders were found to be informed about the operations directly through the Chairman rather than JCS. If the operation was performed under old system, the Joint Chiefs would spend much time on allocating the military to be employed in different regions, but with GNA put into action several redundant activities had reduced and JCS had successfully agreed to execute the operation rapidly9. GNA provided extra power to the commanders. As a result, General Carl Stiner, the tactical commander of General Thurman had been able to effectively perform the joint operation9. General Stiner’s intellectual scheme in conjunction with the operational situation and time had produced the preferred impact in joint operation. General Stiner’s experience on battleground afforded him an insight regarding the best utilization of military forces which had optimized the impact of the joint operation. Operation Just Cause had started on 20th December 1989 where the US military forces had invaded Panama and rapidly secured the US Embassy and took control of the headquarters of PDF. Operation Just Cause was publicly completed on 31st January 1990 after securing the election for government in Panama5. The critical shift of military strategy from National Securities Act to GNA demonstrates how joint operations changed from slow and thoughtful process to a rapid and aggressive process10. However, there are certain portions of the operation which was not performed jointly. According to the viewpoint of General Powell, the Secretary of Defense had always alternatives for functioning by JCS, by Chairman and by providing personal command to the joint operation. Furthermore, there was a lack of thorough attention to post combat processes. Thus, instead of JCS the civil affairs workforces required to conduct the post combat activities9. Lessons Learnt from Operation Just Cause Operation Just Cause was considered as a successful joint operation and it can be regarded as an evidence for the efforts of the US to evade repeating faults of military operations before the enactment of GNA. Operation Just Cause had demonstrated that how effective cooperation between different task forces can result in a significant progress in any joint warfare situation. In Operation Just Cause the Army, Navy and Air Forces had shown significant synchronized efforts. The operations were also marked by high level of accurateness and timeliness which had made the PDF ineffective against the forces of the US. Operation Just Cause was a joint warfare where collaboration among all the military services was exceptional. The success of Operation Just Cause was due to clear guidance, effective decision making authority and effective timeline. Without a successful arrangement, the ground military forces could never have accomplished Operation Just Cause8. The significant lessons learnt from Operation Just Cause are that without effective authority any joint operation can be unsuccessful. It can be observed that in Operation Just Cause, the SECDEF was capable of using CJCS and also to remove the time consuming discussion with JCS. Furthermore, appropriate coordination is required in order to gain success in any joint operation. In Operation Just Cause, the Army, Marine and Naval forces had well-adjusted their roles and services. The Air forces assisted in providing logistical support and destroying the antiaircraft fire weapons11. Conclusion Operation Just Cause was more successful than the previous missions of the US which were undertaken before establishment of GNA. The key for attaining success in any joint operation is to conduct an initial planning to form accurate goals and to provide satisfactory services. Operation Just Cause displayed a considerable development in joint planning and in performance of different military groups. General Powell was found to be providing clear and regular supervisions to the commanders. General Stiner and General Thurman had also demonstrated significant intelligences to direct and to administer the military groups. There was clear objective for Operation Just Cause i.e. to take down the ruler Noriega. ‘Unity of command’ is vital for any kind of joint operations. With one unity of command instead of many, Operation Just Cause had shown significant effectiveness of joint warfare. The Generals performed in conjunction with Chairman in order to strengthen the strategic performance. Operation Just Cause showed that how cooperation from different military departments can assist in stabilizing the situation in Panama and in re-establishing control through election of new government. Ultimately, it can be stated that Operation Just Cause had shown the capability of effective joint warfare with significant improvement in operation quality, leadership and competence during battle. References Besson, Paul M. 1998. The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Ten Year Report Card, Program on Information Resources Policy. Harvard University. Bohnemann, Edward T. 2002. Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force, School of Advanced Military Studies. United States Army Command and General Staff College. Cole, Ronald H. 1999. Joint Operational Reform. Joint Force Quarterly - Autumn-Winter: 57-75. Cole, Ronald H. 1996. Operation Just Cause: Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988-January 1990. United States: Diane Publishing. Department of Defense. Operation Just Cause. 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Joint Publication 3-0. http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/dod_joint_ops_doctrine.pdf (accessed October 1, 2012). Read More