Australian Security in the 21st Century - Essay Example

Australian Security in the 21st Century Globalisation, communication, technology, and new world economic realities have forged the nature of national security into a new definition, where old alliances and new security agreements race to keep pace. The post Cold War era has forced the evolution of the security needs of Asia, Australia, and the other trading partners that rely on the rising giants of India and China. While Asia faces a growing list of security threats to the region, no single nation can operate unilaterally or provide any adequate sense of national security or defence. Australia is a country that is almost a geographical and political orphan to the region. Its European ties and Western culture operates in the shadow of China's economic influence and the US hegemonic military might. Asia needs the defence force of the US, but has numerous internal and external tensions that make multilateral security agreements temporary and tenuous at best. As we move into the 21st century, the US will continue to provide a significant security presence in Asia, while Australia, faced with a rapidly changing political and economic landscape, will need to rely on an ever-changing series of ad-hoc multilateral security arrangements. The end of the Cold War finalized the polarized concept of two super powers with strict allegiances across the globe, and ushered in a new wave of security concerns that demand multilateralism. While the US is currently perceived as a hegemonic power, the nature of a global national security has diluted the resources of the US with their wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new threats to Asian security are terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the Korean issue, drug smuggling, piracy on the seas, illegal movement of immigrants and populations, and the looming threats of the ambitions of India and China.1 These security concerns demand multilateral cooperation and no single nation is capable of confronting these emerging threats. The movement of terrorists across borders necessitates the free movement of intelligence and military personnel. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dictates a coordinated external pressure to isolate and sanction a nation such as North Korea. According to Donnelly, "U.S. forces in East Asia must not only be capable of deterring a North Korean attack or a Chinese lunge across the Taiwan Strait, they must support the war on Islamic fundamentalist terror in Southeast and South Asia".2 In addition, China's role as a major world power, and its welcomed economic contribution, needs to be balanced against its military ambitions and intentions. Realist theorists have postulated the possibility that "the accompanying relative loss of power of the USA, and the possible decline in the importance of European nation states will lead to a renaissance in the power rivalries of great actors and possibly even to violent conflicts".3 All of these issues require a great deal of international cooperation and a series of evolving multilateral agreements. The need for a multilateral security umbrella for Asia, Australia, and the US has been hindered by history, tradition, and the current political and economic climate. Currently, most security concerns are constructed as bilateral agreements between the US and the interested country. Historically, the US has acted as a hub with a number of bilateral spokes, whose participation comes about through their interaction with the US. The history of Australia and Japan still lingers from the remnants of World War II and had created some issues of trust and cooperation. According Jain, "Until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, most links between Australia and Japan that concerned national security were largely indirect (via the United States, through the US/Japan Security Treaty and the ANZUS alliance)".4 In addition, Australia receives a tepid welcome from ASEAN where it remains isolated as a dialogue member. The North Korean threat has been made more difficult by the popularity of the Korean unification agenda in South Korea and reluctance to impose meaningful sanctions. However, the US has been able to act in the region as a facilitator to enable cooperation on these key issues of terrorism and the North Korean nuclear threat. Acts of terrorism in the last decade has forced the East Asian nations to abandon their traditional perspectives on sovereignty and non-intervention in favour of a multilateral arrangement. East Asia has a tradition of non-interference and "The ASEAN norm of non-interference limited Indonesia from engaging with other Southeast Asian states in significant counter-terrorism cooperation. Instead, bilateral cooperation with Western states like Australia and the U.S. has developed Indonesia's counter-terrorist capabilities".5 Indeed, Australia is a major player in a region that is experiencing great economic, political, and cultural change, which has presented the nation with an increased exposure to terrorism and trans-national extremism.6,7 ASEAN's non-interference norms left its effectiveness open to much criticism in the late 1990s.8 After the bombings in Bali in 2002, ASEAN members were motivated to make a greater commitment to collective cooperation to fight and reduce the threat of terrorism.9 The involvement of the US was critical to the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism between the US and ASEAN that called for the "development of effective counter-terrorism policies; legal, regulatory, and administrative counter-terrorism regimes; enhanced liaison among law enforcement agencies; strengthened capacity efforts through training and education; consultations among officials, analysts, and field operators, as well as joint operations; and cooperation in transportation and border and immigration control".10 This again placed the US in a leadership role in the multilateral agreements required to face the new post Cold War threats. Many of the fragilities that Asian foreign policy is subjected to, and the general failure of unilateral policies, can be viewed through the lens of the North Korean nuclear crisis. China, India, and the US subscribe to the same political philosophy and a classical understanding of power and sovereignty. According to Messner, "The idea that multilateralism is a concept for weak states, as neoconservative Robert Kagan tried to explain to Europeans in the Iraq debate, finds plenty of adherents in the rising Asian powers, too".11 However, "the Bush administration has maintained that its clear preference is for a multilateral diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis.12 The US does not have sufficient power on its own to encourage the cooperation required of Beijing or get adequate support from South Korea to exert sufficient pressure on the North and multilateralism is the best, if not only, realistic option.13 While Australia is not directly involved in the talks, it is in their best interest and is a policy supported by the Australian government. Cross-national terrorism and isolated threats such as North Korea have mandated a multilateral approach to the security of the region. The multilateral approach to negotiation and cooperation has also been reflected in the multi-national military operations in Asia. While the US has been the hub of the process through its ability to provide manpower, technology, intelligence, material resources, they have also brought several other nations into the military sphere. As an example of multi-national military operations is the recent Cobra Gold military operations in Southeast Asia. Cobra Gold was initially a bi-lateral US/Thailand exercise, but in 2006 it expanded and, "no less than 5 militaries (Thailand, US, Singapore, Indonesia and Japan) participated in this year's Cobra Gold, which were held in May and involved a combination of peacekeeping, anti-terrorism and drug interdiction components".14 Australia has also been instrumental in expanding the US military footprint and have participated in combined training operations, as well as opening opportunities for US B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers to regularly visit Australia.15 "Australian foreign policy likewise favourably views U.S. presence in Asia and the Australian Defence Department recently reported that the alliance has been "the foundation of the region's strategic stability and security since World War II, and is no less relevant sixty years on".16 Clearly, the US forms the backbone of a new spirit of cooperation and multilateralism in an Asia that encompasses Australia. China's influence on the structure of the security of Asia and Australia can be felt by the pressure it exerts as a major trading partner and by the tensions that arise over the situation in Taiwan. Australia is in a delicate situation, which demands walking a tightrope between the realities of China and the influence of the US. While it is generally accepted that China will be Australia's biggest trading partner in the near future, Australians overwhelmingly believe that the US will be its closest partner in regards to regional security.17 This same contradiction of allegiances is felt by other Asian nations and "most would rather avoid having to choose between these two regional heavyweights, preferring instead to cultivate a middle position between them. This current propensity of many Asia-Pacific countries toward 'hedging' strategies further explains their reluctance to publicly support or endorse a number of American multilateral initiatives".18 These same mixed feelings reverberate over the issue of Taiwan's independence and the unwillingness of many nations to aggravate China over the issue. The US support for Taiwan has resulted in significant tension between China and the US, and China views many of the US activities in light of this tension. The Japan-Australia-US trilateral is viewed with suspicion by Beijing and the Chinese government portrays it as "an adversarial act directed against China, calling Japan and Australia the two claws of the US containment strategy".19 However, a deep hostility towards China is not in the best economic and regional interests of Australia, Japan, or the other Asian nations.20 In the event of an outbreak of hostilities arising over Taiwan, it is doubtful that the multilateral arrangements that are in place would be able to withstand the pressure of the unwillingness to confront China. The US is even reluctant to provoke China, as it needs them as a regional partner on such important issues as North Korea.21 While there is a willingness to move towards a US led multi-national security agreement, the complex relationships of the nations in the area are problematic. The future of Australia's security in the region, as well as the East Asian nations, will be dependent upon a strong US military presence in the area. While multilateral agreements may be difficult, the Australian government has offered considerable commitment to becoming an integral part of the Asian community. The Howard government was a close ally of the US and pursued mutual interests "most significantly in defence and security matters, and especially since the Bush administration took office in early 2001".22 However, Rudd has called for participation in a greater Asian security mechanism that would include China, and has called for "an Asia-Pacific community engaged in the full spectrum of economic, political and security cooperation".23 This approach may be too fast and too soon as other government leaders have criticized it as improbable and inappropriate, saying that Rudd does not understand the dynamics of the region's security. Critics point out that while China has risen to the status of a major player, "its foreign policy still shows a side to it that is deeply concerning, for example its cheque-book diplomacy in the Pacific or its support for regimes such as those in Myanmar, North Korea and Iran".24 Without greater transparency, and a willingness to cooperate on issues such as exchange rate and human rights, China will continue to be held at some distance. Australia will continue to rely on the US military as its major security resource and will form US directed alliances as needed to face the ongoing political changes in Asia. In conclusion, the US military presence in Australia and Asia will continue to dominate and grow in the foreseeable future. They alone can fill the void that the other Asian nations cannot fulfil. Australia will continue to be a bigger part of the Asian community, but progress will be slow and measured against the intentions and actions of the Chinese. The wide variety and number of security threats in the region will demand that security arrangements are flexible and able to react in a timely fashion. This will continue to create multilateral agreements out of necessity and based on a mutual benefit for the parties, and not at the sole direction of the US. China's potential as a trading partner make it an unpredictable, yet highly important, variable. No nation in the region can afford to create hostilities with China, and the concerns of North Korea and Taiwan must be handed with diplomatic care and steadfast commitment. Australia, led by the US military, will continue to court China as it is drawn into the Asian Community. Bibliography Berger, Mark. Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century, (London: Routledge, 1997) Chau, Andrew. "Australia, the US, and ASEAN's Counter-Terror Strategy." Asian Survey 48, no. 4 (2008): 626-49 Donnelly, Thomas. "Realignment of Foreign Basing of U.S. Troops", American Enterprise Institute, (accessed October 18, 2008) Downer, Alexander. "Securing Australia's Interests-Australian Foreign Policy Priorities", Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no.1 (2005): 7-12 Fukuyama, Francis. "Re-Envisioning Asia." Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005) Jain, Purnendra. "Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its Challenges." Australian Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 4 (2006): 521-35. Lee, John. "Rudd's 'Security Community' Annoying Asia." The Jakarta Post, 30 June 2008, . http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/30/rudd039s-039security-community039-annoying-asia.html (accessed 19 October 2008). Messner, Dirk. "The European Union: Protagonist in a Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power in the Asia-Pacific Century." Journal International Politics and Society (2007): 11-27. Taylor, Brendan. The Bush Administration and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism - Unrequited Love'. Paper for Fulbright Symposium on Maritime Governance and Security: Australian and American Perspectives presented June 28-29, 2006, Canberra, AU: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. 1-6 Vaughn, Bruce. U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007): 1-34 Vaughn, Bruce. The U.S.-Australia Treaty on Defense-Trade Cooperation. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, (2007): 1-6 Read More