: Operation Market Garden - Case Study Example

?ii (your information) Table of Contents Introduction 2 History 4 Planning and Preparation 5 Deployment 6 Execution Action 7 After Action 8 Lessons Learned 8 Case Study: Operation Market Garden Case Study: Operation Market Garden Introduction The military operation that was titled Operation Market Garden was unsuccessfully attempted by allied military operations during September of 1944. The World War II operation was the largest airborne operation up to that point in time, led by Field Marshal Montgomery in order to push forward into Germany by crossing the Rhine. This was done in order to bypass several other options of entry that were far less hospitable or timely. The purpose of air support was to secure bridges that would provide for the least obstacle ridden entry into Northern Germany by armed forces. There was some success for the operation, but overall it is considered a failure. Initially several bridges were captured, but delays in demolishing those captured caused for the operation to be unstable. In addition, there were serious logistical problems including a supply line that was stretched too thin. In the end, the Allies could not cross the Rhine with enough power to achieve their objectives, the largest of which was to end the war in time for Christmas in 1944. The operation was the effort 21st Army Group led by Field Marshal Montgomery as he went up against Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model, but the battle was actually a series of battles that utilized hundreds of army groups from September 17 until the 27th in 1944. This operation was the consequence of Marshal Montgomery’s success during the Battle of Normandy which destroyed the Seventh Army and the Fifth Panzer Army, known as Army B in Hitler’s forces. In a belief that was based upon the defeat of Germany in 1918 which led to the surrender of German forces, Montgomery pushed to move forward toward Anhem to secure the same kind of surrender.1 There was no doubt that Germany would once again concede victory and end the conflict at the end of 1944. This was not to be the case. History The history that led up to the development of Operation Market Garden was the use of air support during the Battle of Normandy and the perceived success of Field Marshal Montgomery. Because much of the success was attributed to Montgomery, although some thought it was won in spite of him2, when he approached command with his ‘single thrust’ strategy it was received and well considered. At the Battle of Normandy, the use of air support had been extremely successful and had begun a belief that this was the way in which to win the war. Approaching the problem with the use of air support on a geographic trek that would push into Germany and force surrender, the strategy of Operation Market Garden was born. Montgomery defined his positions through being something of a strategist and was central to the strategizing during the Battle of Normandy. Although he had a great deal of failure in trying to punch through the German defenses, he was considered to have served a triumph when one of his strategies finally worked and created the Falaise Pocket. The many failures in trying to break through the defenses, however, serve to question whether he had a success or if he prolonged the failures that led up to a final success that was long overdue. Jarymowycz writes that “Montgomery’s great success is the set piece battle buttressed by a considerable superiority in men and material, total air supremacy, and an embarrassment of artillery”.3 What the Battle of Normandy provided, however, was its objective; to acquire operational maneuverability.4 One of the problems that can be seen in the history of the war is that Western democracies were unable to build armor and doctrine for the war that was on par with that of their enemies.5 The Battle of Normandy allowed for the use of a wide variety of military technologies, including airplane and tank usage that had previously not been a large part of the allied defense strategies. The Arracourt battles provide an observable maturity in US strategy and the use of tanks provided a much needed framework of how to use them in battle. Planning and Preparation On August 1st 1944 Montgomery first approached President Dwight D. Eisenhower about the strategy of a “single thrust advance by his own 21st Army Group” which would be supported by First US Army under Major General Courtney Hodges.6 This would advance through Northern France and on through the Low Countries and into Germany. Meanwhile, the American forces under the command of General Patton and through the direct authority of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley for the 12th US Army Group and Lieutenant General Jacob Devers for the 6th US Army Group were advancing in the south of France with a broad front that has begun with the opposition of the German defense that had withheld their advancement until the collapse which created the Falaise Pocket.7 As the 12th and the 6th armies continued to thrust to the south, moving farther and farther away from Montgomery’s troops, they were utilizing their own strategy in order to push into Germany. It was clear that the US Generals were not on board with the ‘single thrust’ strategy and this division pushed Eisenhower to take over all of the operations on September 1, now converting the ‘single thrust’ into a ‘double thrust’ initiative. Montgomery did not agree with this strategy, seeing this as nothing more than a continuation of the broad advancement strategy that had taken weeks to break at Normandy. A series of issues, both political and personal, had taken Eisenhower out of the direct line of communications with the troops during this time. Because of animosity with Bradley, Montgomery and Bradley failed to communicate well and were not working together to accomplish their objectives.8 Deployment One of the first problems with the necessary material for the operation was that there was a need for transport for three army groups to be deployed into the region. The stretch of armed forces covered over 300 miles, thus there was not near enough transportation to take them all along that route. Near the end of August the troops near the front of the thrust as they approached the entry into Germany were being halted because there was not enough fuel to keep the trucks moving. Air transport that was initially intended for airborne operations had to be diverted and put into service ferrying supplies to the 21st and 12th Army Groups.9 By August 23 Montgomery had convinced Eisenhower of the strength of his plan, to the point that Eisenhower decided to divert supplies to Montgomery’s forces rather than to the US movement of troops to the south. Although Montgomery took this to mean that his plan was the highest priority, Eisenhower was only willing to divert 1,000 tons of supplies per day, which considering the size of the operation was not nearly the amount that was needed to support the size of the force.10 Execution Action There was a two prong initiative that was the core of Operation Market Garden. ‘Market’ was defined by the airborne forces under the command of Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton for the First Allied Airborne Army whose objectives were to seize bridges and land through the direct command of Lieutenant General Frederick Browning. The second prong was that of ‘Garden’ which were the ground forces of the Second Army as it moved northward under the XXX Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks.11 The first day saw success as paratroopers landed on target with 84% of the 81st Airborne landing within 1000 meters of their intended target zone. By the end of that first day, however, allied forces had lost their first objective was to secure the Nijmegen Bridge. Smaller bridges had been secured, but this bridge was a larger bridge that was necessary for the operation. By day three the failure to capture the bridge meant that the operation was behind schedule, the troops held up at a point through which their passage was necessary. Failures at a series of points throughout the operation finally resulted in an ultimate failure of the objectives of the mission.12 After Action By the end of nine days of battle, the result was that Operation Berlin was put into place so that the withdrawal of troops could be achieved with as little revelation to the enemy as possible.13 The losses of the XXX Corps were conservative at about 1,500, but the losses to the airborne troops were extensive with an estimated 8,000 men having lost their lives. An additional 6400 were taken prisoner with many of them wounded. The airborne division saw the worst casualties, more than either the allied ground troops or the German troops, although figures on German casualties are not fully known as there are no known records.14 Lessons Learned According to the ideas of Johnson, the reason for the problems with Operation Market Garden was over-politicization of the problems at hand. He states that “Overt politicization occurs when policy makers deliberately pressure analysts to produce estimates that support their policies or to shape the intelligence cycle to confirm current policy or political preferences”.15 Policy makers may even provide analysts with information that will controvert their analysis, supporting their position without truth backing their claims. An example of this can be seen when British Major Brian Urquehart who was the Chief of Intelligence for the British I Airborne Corp reported that Nazi armored divisions were bivouacked in Anhem, which would be the last objective for Operation Market Garden, he was put on medical leave. If he had been heeded, it would have been seen that the whole feasibility of the mission was in question.16 This piece of information is vital to understanding how this mission was doomed from the beginning, the objectives which were leading to an end victory without support as their last target was beyond realistic success. This was a strategy that was developed on faith rather than on the intelligence that should have been used to create a better construct in order to provide success. The intelligence was being ignored because of the belief in history repeating itself and the success at Normandy led to the decision making process that provided faith in the ability of Field Marshal Montgomery in the face of indications that he could not succeed because of German movements. Two important lessons can be observed as crucial in the execution of a large scale military operation. The first is that intelligence should not be ignored, the efforts of the intelligence community aimed at providing the best possible information. To ignore what was being learned through information about German movements was counterproductive to the efforts during the war. Without attention to what was learned about the effects of opposition towards the execution of a strategy, the strategy is bound to fail. The second main lesson that can be observed is that when command decides to move in ways that are contrary to orders there is a sign that something is very wrong. As Bradley disobeyed his superiors and continued on the path that Patton had outlined for him, he was controverting the orders of his superior officers. Right or wrong, this action was outside the strategy of command and might be considered insubordination, which also may have some influence on whether or not the success of other missions occurring in other regions was affected. As Bradley moved farther and farther away from the 21st Army Group, he assured that his assistance to the group would be impossible, thus perhaps affecting the outcome of the operation. Notes Read More