Five Key Issues Encountered, and Lessons Learnt from Tour in Afghanistan - Essay Example

After Action Review From March to June I was deployed as military personnel to Afghanistan in the role of a theatre lead for my project manager (PM). I was tasked to lead a team of 13 contractors in providing sustainment operations for power, power distribution as well as environment control on small combat out posts (COPs) in the country. I herein review, present five key issues encountered, and lessons learnt from my tour in Afghanistan. The acquisition concept is based on the traditional outdated garrison operations rather than on the contemporary austere environment akin to Afghanistan or Iraq. My deputy and I often disagreed due to differing opinions concerning the point at which a product was supposed to enter sustainment phases. My deputy held that the personnel within the army unit would be ready to handle new equipment on their own soon after their training; however, this perspective did not consider other factors. For instance, this view overlooked the fact that we were fielding new equipment to soldiers with no experience in how they operation during wartime; similarly. This view was blind to the fact that Soldiers rotate to other FOBs (forward operation bases) or COPs and that they may get hurt or whatever the case me be, due to their inexperience with handling new equipment. Contrariwise, I believed in continuous retraining, which is why I had my contractors provide multiple training classes to different personnel of the same unit. I stressed the importance of the acquisition community taking responsibility to support the war fighter. I believed it was our obligation as the acquisition community to support the war fighter regardless of the number of training events. Therefore, it would take for every unit, army or marines to be capable of handling the generators on their own. The soldiers had to be thoroughly trained to ensure they were equipped with the competence needed to operate the new equipment in the field, even if it meant doing it repeatedly with different personnel. In that case, I supported the training for the army personnel for as long as it was needed, to ensure the war fighters were well prepared to operate our new generators. The command and Control (C2) issue cropped up as well, in the course of my deployment in Afghanistan; as expected in combat zones, where orders are given to carry out missions, there was always a strict chain of command that had to be observed at all times. A chain of command does establish clear lines or boundaries for officers in the field, who must act in accordance to the orders given by their commanders without question in the true sense of the army. This is crucial to maintain a single center of command and control, to avoid contradictions or miscommunications that might arise due to multiple centers of command and control. While I was deployed, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA (ALT)) had operational control (OPCON), which implies I was also bound to obey any orders from the ASA (ALT) like everyone else in the unit. However, in the capacity of the theatre lead for my project manager (PM), I was also obligated to support and promote the best interests of my Program Manager (PM) at all times while in deployment. I encountered numerous situations when the best interests of my PM directly conflicted with my orders from the (ASA (ALT)); on any of these occasions, I was asked to execute tasks that my PM organization did not agree with. I had a difficult time reconciling the conflicting interests of my PM and the (ASA (ALT)); that is, I was often torn between obeying my orders and ensuring my PM’s best interests are taken into consideration. In most cases, I was compelled to obey my orders not to offend the ASA (ALT) deputy GS 15 and a full bird Colonel, as well as my Colonel state side. In the course of this tour, I also learnt that the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) does not adequately describe all the support the war fighter needs; it requires more support personnel to provide adequate operational energy power requirements for several COPs and FOBs. In an Army battalion, support individuals are drawn from the Forward Support Company (FSCs), yet every FSC is only authorized 2 or 3 91 Delta’s generator mechanics, based on their MTOE. The incorporation of the FSCs into maneuver contingent has undeniably augmented the combat responsibility for logisticians, thereby enabling soldiers to in logistics military occupational specialties to work for maneuver, fire as well as effects (MFE) contingent. The FSCs are tasked with providing full spectrum logistics support to their specific maneuver contingent in order to sustain unified ground combat operations. In other words, the FSCs need to offer all the necessary support war fighters need to enable them to execute their combat missions effectively. From our previous experiences, fighting two wars for nearly more than 10 years, we have learned that two Soldiers per company is not enough to sustain operational energy power requirements for several COPs and FOBs. There is need to increase the number of support personnel per company, to provide adequate support for the war fighter in war time. For this reason, I had my contactors in the field providing multiple training classes because Operational Energy-Contingency Basing is not tied to MTOE/budgets solutions; in other words, the MTOE is ill equipped to adequately support the war fighter. Provision of multiple training classes aimed to provide the COP’s/FOB’s with the adequate support to sustain their heavy operational energy power requirements, so that they can function effectively. From my observation, the Operational Energy power efforts in Afghanistan are redundant due to a sheer lack of proper organization and regulation of operational energy power service providers. There are several different organizations contributing to the generator power distribution efforts including CECOM ESSC, BETTC, AC First, LOGCAP, prime power and rapid equipping force. However, there is no organization to the generator power distribution efforts since all these organizations are offering similar services without any sort of specialization. For instance, all the generator power distribution organizations named above provide power distribution for large power source 60kw to 500kw, medium power source 5-60kw, as well as small power source 5kw and below. Besides that, they also provide operational energy solutions (right sizing of generators), power distribution (tactical power), HVAC environmental control, as well as training support to Soldiers, and field services rep (FSR). In an ideal case scenario, there would be someone within the contracting command to monitor all open generator contracts in theater in an effort to reduce the cost of contractor support. However, that is far from the case in Afghanistan, where there are nearly 6-7 different generator power distributing organizations providing duplicate services without any sort of government oversight. Overall, I recommend that the acquisition Corp should take a hard look at how services are provided to the war fighter in present times. Given the gradually shifting war front landscape and a unique blend of the tactical and operational challenges faced by the war fighter, the acquisition Corp should be more expeditionary in order to fully support contingency basing. There is need for the addition of an extra line on the contract that will provide all PM’s the adequate flexibility they need to support the war fighter in the event of another conflict rather than waiting and requesting money from the program executive office. We also need more oversight when it comes to contracts since monitoring all open generator contracts in theater would most certainly reduce the cost of contractor support. Read More