Strategies to Address the Floola Terrorist Act - Essay Example

? Strategies to Address the Floola Terrorist Act This report is intended to assess the effectiveness and timeliness of both domestic and international responses to the terrorist attack on the military services residential areas in Floola, aka Floola bombing. The responses, in turn, constitute a strategy that could be adopted by the government of the United States in order to prevent similar terrorist acts or considerably decrease the probability of such occurrences in the foreseeable future. Being based on in-depth research and built into a set of multiple choices, the strategy would enhance the US’ counter-terrorist capabilities, both at home and overseas. Introduction Despite some unquestionable achievements of the over-decade-long US anti-terrorist campaign, insofar as al-Qaeda’s terrorist network and the Taliban have suffered heavy blows with the loss of many key figures from their senior leadership, most notably Osama bin Laden, the terrorism – the Islamist extremist terrorism in particular – is neither vanquished nor eradicated. Moreover, following 9/11, there was a wave of terrorist acts worldwide, including such against US military personnel and civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, etc.; while the tightened security measures, along with the intensified vigilance of the police, FBI and the intelligence community as a whole, prevented many terrorist plots to develop into violence on US territory (Mueller, 2011). Tragic occurrences such as the shootings at Fort Hood, where 13 people were killed and 32 wounded, allegedly by a radicalized Army psychiatrist, appear more or less an exception (King and Thompson, 2011). The terrorists’ bigger success abroad, measured in sheer number of both cases of materialized violence and, regrettably, American citizens being murdered or injured, infers that the overseas security efforts of the US government are hindered by certain inadequacies. The suicidal bomb attack on the residential area inhabited by service personnel of the US military base in Floola and their families, along with the attack on the USA’s embassy in Libya, which resulted in the US Ambassador being killed, is a fresh reminder of this painful fact. Terrorism – Trends, Tactics and Perpetrators As Chasdi (2012) points out, the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System /WITS/ of the US National Counterterrorism Center /NCTC/ has identified certain trends in the field of terrorism, emerging from global, regional and national developments (p. 67). The figures provided by WITS indicate that over 10 000 terrorist attacks occurred in 2011, which affected 70 countries worldwide and resulted in over 12 500 deaths (National Counterterrorism Center /NCTC/, 2012). While the total number of attacks has fallen by 12 percent and 29 percent, as compared to 2010 and 2007 respectively, the main foci of terrorist activities remain the regions of South Asia and the Near East; taken together, the two locations experienced almost two-thirds of the high-casualty attacks in 2009 and over 75 percent of 2011 total (NCTC, 2010; NCTC, 2012). Afghanistan, along with Iraq and Pakistan, bore the brunt of the reported attacks for the third consecutive year, both in terms of attacks’ number and ensuing death toll (NCTC, 2009; NCTC, 2010, NCTC, 2011). The number of terrorist attacks in Africa and related fatalities, mainly associated with the turmoil in Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo, oscillated between a rise of 140 percent (2 200 fatalities) in 2008, as compared to 2007, and a drop of more than 30 percent in 2010, as against 2009 – from over 3 200 fatalities to 2 131 respectively (NCTC, 2009; NCTC, 2011). The increase of 11.5 percent during 2011, however, is mainly attributable to the Nigeria-based group Boko Haram (NCTC, 2012). The situation in the Western Hemisphere could be also described as variable, insofar as the number of reported terrorist attacks fell by about 25 percent in 2008 and subsequently rose by 27 percent in 2009; while in 2010, both attacks and deaths declined by roughly 25 percent (NCTC, 2009; NCTC, 2010, NCTC, 2011). In 2011, however, the number of terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere increased dramatically – by nearly 40 percent – mainly due to the activities of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia /FARC/ (NCTC, 2012). The attacks and consequent death toll in Europe and Eurasia seemed to be on the decline – from 737 attacks in 2009 to706 in 2010, and 367 deaths in 2009 to 355 in 2010; the decline appeared much more marked in 2011 – 20 percent – with almost 70 percent of the terrorism-related deaths suffered by Russia and Turkey taken together (NCTC, 2011; NCTC, 2012). Most attacks in 2008, just as was the case in 2007, have been perpetrated by terrorists using conventional and less sophisticated tactics and methods, like armed attacks, bombings and kidnappings, along with a continued practice of coordinated attacks (NCTC, 2009). The number of suicide attacks in 2008 was 404; with almost 9 percent of all suicide attacks worldwide being attributed to female suicide bombers (NCTC, 2009). According to NCTC, diplomatic officials have been increasingly targeted by the terrorists in 2008, which is demonstrated by a large increase in casualties, namely 47 as compared to 12 in 2007 (NCTC, 2009). The terrorist methods and tactics in 2009 differed in no way from those in 2008, with the exception of the suicidal type attacks which appeared an increasingly common method used by Sunni extremists; nevertheless, the number of suicide attacks, including the attacks by female suicide bombers, significantly declined in 2009, which is largely attributed to the declining violence in Iraq (NCTC, 2010). During that period, police officers, government officials, employees and contractors were high on the terrorists’ targets list; with some 60 percent of all terrorist attacks and the highest number of suicide bombings being committed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan (NCTC, 2010). In 2010, armed attacks accounted for more than one-third of the overall number of terrorist attacks worldwide, thus being considered the most prevalent tactic, while bombings, including and particularly suicide attacks, were the most lethal type of attacks, causing some 70 percent of the terrorism-related deaths. For a second consecutive year, the number of suicide attacks was on the decline – from 299 in 2009 to 263 in 2010 – although these attacks resulted in almost 13.5 percent of all terrorism-related fatalities (NCTC, 2011). Kidnapping events also declined worldwide, but they jumped in the Gaza Strip due to the Hamas – Fatah conflict (NCTC, 2011). Police officers, paramilitary and private security staff continued to be primary terrorist targets, as in the previous year, while most of the terrorist victims were Muslims; more than half of those killed by the attacks were civilians and over 600 – children (NCTC, 2011). Having continued to be the terrorists’ major choice of tactics, the armed attacks and bombings constituted nearly 80 percent of all attacks in 2011; the suicide attacks accounted for only 2.7 percent of the overall attacks but also 21 percent of all terrorism-related deaths, which underlines their extreme lethality (NCTC, 2012). In turn, the Improvised Explosive Devices /IED/ appeared both the most frequently used and deadliest terrorist weapon employed; while the terrorism-related kidnapping events and deaths hit five-year lows (NCTC, 2012). Four notable examples of terrorist attacks should be mentioned here. The first is the bombing attack on the Presidential Palace in Sana’a, Yemen, which resulted in the President Ali Abdallah Salih and the Prime Minister Ali Mujawar being injured, and 16 more people – entourage members and bodyguards – being injured or killed (NCTC, 2012). The second is in Abuja, Nigeria, where Boko Haram extremists conducted their first attack against a foreign target – the United Nations’ compound – using IED and killing 12 UN staff members, along with 12 others, and injuring 115 persons; the third attack occurred in Kabul, Afghanistan – an IED had been detonated at the residence of the Peace Council Chief, killing 6 people, including the Peace Council Chief himself, and wounding several civilians (NCTC, 2012). In the fourth and most vicious attack, a truck carrying IED (VBIED) was detonated into a government compound in Mogadishu, Somalia, causing the death of 91 civilians and nine children, and injuring 164 civilians and children (NCTC, 2012). However, the number of civilians either killed or injured in terrorist attacks has gone down by 13 percent, in proportion to the total number of deaths, as compared to the 2007 high of 64 percent (NCTC, 2012). On the other hand, the number of government employees (including contractors) and government officials murdered in 2011 increased by 60 percent and 13 percent respectively, as against the figures from 2010 (NCTC, 2012). Additionally, considerable damages were incurred to infrastructure and facilities, of which the transportation assets – vehicles, buses and transportation infrastructure – and public places were the most frequently targeted (NCTC, 2012). The perpetrators of over 60 percent of the terrorist attacks in 2008 couldn’t be identified or determined from open source information; on the other hand, as many as 150 terrorist organizations, or groups, were connected to an attack in one way or another, whether as a claimant, the accused or confirmed perpetrator (NCTC, 2009). Despite the difficulties in pinpointing the attackers, which generally arise from extremist splinter groups, mergers, false claims, etc., the most active groups were the Taliban, with the largest number of attacks and the highest fatalities totals, and al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, which were considered the second deadliest group responsible for the seventh highest total of claimed attacks (NCTC, 2009). Additionally, al-Qaeda in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack on the US Embassy in Sana’a, which resulted in 10 people being killed and three others wounded (NCTC, 2009). About one-half of all terrorist attacks in 2009 were perpetrated by Sunni extremist groups, with almost 90 groups being associated with those attacks; once again, the Taliban were associated with the largest number of attacks that caused the highest death toll, while al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in Iraq were considered the second and third deadliest groups respectively (NCTC, 2010). As of 2010, Sunni extremists, involving the Taliban, al-Shabaab, the Islamic State of Iraq, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar i Jhangvi, etc., were responsible for 93 percent of all suicide attacks and nearly 60 percent of the terrorist attacks worldwide (NCTC, 2011). In 2011, actually for the third consecutive year, Sunni terrorists accounted for the greatest number of attacks and related fatalities – nearly 56 percent of all attacks and 70 percent of all fatalities; with the Taliban, al-Qaeda and its affiliates being the most active and deadliest organizations (NCTC, 2012). The most active of the other terrorist groups, i.e. secular, political, anarchist, etc., were FARC, the Communist Party of India – Maoist, the New People’s Army/Communist Party of the Philippines and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party /PKK/ in Turkey (NCTC, 2012). Counter-Terrorism Strategy to Address the Floola Bombing Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) write in regard to counter-terrorism strategies that the evaluations of both effectiveness and possible harm are necessary in order to avoid irrational thinking and hasty responses. Additionally, certain inadequacies of the adopted measures could result in everything being done piecemeal, much slower than needed, and eventually compromising the overall effort. Therefore, a well-balanced approach is preferable, which inter alia should take into account the above-mentioned dynamics of terrorism as consisted in the trends in its geography, choice of tactics and likely perpetrators. The proposed counter-terrorism strategy in regard to the suicidal bomb attack in Floola is revolved around both defensive and offensive measures. The defensive measures include three important components, as follows: strengthened physical protection of US assets, both domestically and internationally; psychological programs to prepare the service personnel, along with the civilians, for adequate reaction in the case of terrorist attacks; and a large set of anti-terrorist efforts. The latter should generally include: a reduction in “low-risk/high-gain opportunities for terrorists to strike”; hardened security measures in regard to critical infrastructures and potential sites where mass casualties could occur; application of the principles of situational crime prevention to the prevention of terrorism; countering the ideologies, indoctrination and propaganda of both secular and religious extremists; strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy and social justice; denying terrorists’ access to safe communication, travel and sanctuaries; interception of terrorists communication; and limiting terrorists’ fund-raising capabilities. (Schmid, 2012). Many of these defensive measures could cause social negatives, in terms of encroachments on certain civil liberties, like the freedom of expression, free travel, the presumption of innocence, etc. (Mueller and Stewart, 2012). The struggle against terrorist ideologies and propaganda could develop into anti-religious (Islam) propaganda and alienate those who profess the respective religious cult but do not support the terrorist activities, and even push them into embracing the terrorist credo. There are also possible harmful effects of exaggerating the threat of terrorist attacks, which could create an atmosphere of fear and thus to hamper the normal function of the society (Mueller and Stewart, 2012). Nevertheless, the possible gains in terms of the number of lives that could be saved are too substantial to be ignored. In turn, the offensive measures consist in: pre-emptive strikes against militants, terrorist groups and their leaders; efficient intelligence, including early detection and warning intelligence system against terrorism on the interface between organized crime and political turmoil, as well as infiltration aimed at disrupting and incapacitating terrorists’ preparations and operations (Schmid, 2012); and prohibition on militant recruitment activities. The pre-emptive strikes can be carried out via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which, as general rule, offer numerous advantages, especially in the case of dangerous tasks (Sauer and Schornig, 2012). The “targeted killing” program, in turn, is aimed at the “destruction of an increasingly decentralized and fragmented terrorist network”, such as al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and other terrorist organizations worldwide (Kessler and Werner, 2008, p.289). While the pre-emptive strikes have proven extremely successful in eliminating key figures of terrorist groups’ leadership and destroying the infrastructure and logistics of such organizations – for example, in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan – the unwanted effects could be measured in collateral damages, alienation of actual and probable allies, an outbreak of war, etc. Therefore, having conformed to three crucial notions of the law of armed conflict, namely “discrimination between military and civilian targets, proportionality of violent means applied, and attributable responsibility for actions in war” (Sauer and Schornig, 2012, p.368), the government of the United States should use this effective tool in order to prevent future acts of terror. On the other hand, the drones could serve a very useful purpose as a deterrent to terrorists, keeping them much more engaged on their own security rather than plotting and carrying out a deadly attack. However, given the terrorist organizations’ preference – including and especially that of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas, etc. – for suicide attacks (Pape, 2003), the drones should not be considered a panacea for all ills. The efficient intelligence process, as consisted in communications interception, infiltration, identifying places where terrorists dwell or conduct training, their routes and sanctuaries, fund-raising activities, etc., as well as encouraging defection of terrorists, and early detection of radical individuals or groups that would become extremists, is considered extremely important part of this counter-terrorist strategy. In regard to Floola bombing, the efficient intelligence could not only identify the group and/or individuals responsible for the attack and their whereabouts, but also will help the government to prevent similar events from occurring in retaliation for the implemented counter-measures. There are also flaws, most notably in the case of infiltration, insofar as the agent could be forced to commit crimes in order to prove his loyalty to the group. However, the infiltration is indisputably valuable source of intelligence, so should the opportunity arise, it’d be unwise to get rejected. Finally, the prohibition on militant recruitment activities would appear rather controversial if not supported by a considerable improvement in the quality of life in those countries that provide terrorists with their most important weapon – the manpower, including suicide bombers. This objective could be achieved via better social, economic and political environment. The funds and investments, however, could fail to reach the original goal mainly due to corruption, especially in the case of the so-called ‘failed states’. Conclusion The proposed counter-terrorist strategy, intended to address the US response to Floola bombing, undoubtedly has both its cons and pros. If it’s implemented holistically, however, with special attention for the details, the strategy could successfully address the issue and avoid phenomena like irrational or irrelevant responses. Thus, the government of the United States will not only increase the protection of the American citizens all over the world, but would also achieve political stability in regions and countries, which are traditionally prone to turmoil and terrorism. References Chasdi, Richard G. (August 2012), Trends and Developments in Terrorism: a Research Note, Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (3), 67-76 Kessler, O. & Werner, W. (2008), Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management, Security Dialogue 39 (2-3) 289-308 King, P.T. & Thompson, B.G. (December 7, 2011), Homegrown Terrorism: The Thread to Military Communities inside the United States. Majority Investigative Report, One Hundred Twelve Congress, US House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC Lum, C., Kennedy, L.W. & Sherley, A.J. (January, 2006), The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Campbell Systematic Review, Retrieved from http://www.rutgerscps.org/publications/Lum_Terrorism_Review.pdf Mueller, John. (2011), Terrorism since 9/11: the American Cases, Mershon Center, Ohio State University Mueller, J. & Stewart, M.G. (2012), Civil liberties, Fear and Terrorism, Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law, 282-288 National Counterterrorism Center /NCTC/, (30 April 2009), 2008 Report on Terrorism, the United States: Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terror_08.pdf National Counterterrorism Center /NCTC/, (30 April 2010), 2009 Report on Terrorism, the United States: Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.riskintel.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/10/2009_report_on_terrorism.pdf National Counterterrorism Center /NCTC/, (30 April 2011), 2010 Report on Terrorism, the United States: Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://eib.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/2010_report_on_terrorism.pdf National Counterterrorism Center /NCTC/, (March 2012), 2011 Report on Terrorism, the United States: Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2011.pdf Pape, Robert A. (August 2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, American political Science Review, 97 (3), 343-361 Sauer, F. & Schornig, N. (2012), Killer Drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare? Security Dialogue 43 (4) 363-380 Schmid, A.P. (August 2012), Twelve Rules for preventing and Countering Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism, 6 (3), 77 Read More