Tet Offensive through the Eyes of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese - Research Paper Example

The "Tet Offensive" through the strategic eyes of the Viet Cong and North Viet se The "Tet Offensive” is an attack that occurred on the 30th January to February of 1968, coming up as a surprise attack that was not expected, mainly because, the Viet Cog and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), planned and attacked the South Vietnamese and the USA armies, as well as their allies without a hint. The attack did not only stop at attacking the military, but also targeted the civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam, thus inflicting more damage than expected (Anderson, 198). The attack came as a surprise to many, since there was a prior agreement between the North and the South Vietnamese at the Tet conference; that there would be a two-day ceasefire to allow for the celebrations of the New Year. However, the communist north decided to stage an offensive in what came to be regarded as the biggest attacks ever, since the Vietnamese war began. During this attack, the communists attacked major towns of the South to a tune of more than 100 towns, including the southern capital, while also spreading the attacks to over 36 provincial capitals of the south, using a brigade of more than 80,000 troops (Donaldson, 161). Despite the South Vietnamese and the USA army being caught by surprise, they responded to the offensive and eventually overcame the communists, although the whole scenario took two more months, with the worst occasion being the Battle of Hue, where the whole of the city was destroyed and thousands of residents, to a tune of 7600 executed by the communists, in what came to be referred as the Hue massacre (Collins, 42). There are three main aspects that have made the Tet Offensive stand out, in the whole episode of the Vietnamese war. First, the Tet offensive was launched by the North Vietnam against South Vietnam by surprise, allowing the communists to inflict more damage on the South, on the initial face of the offensive. Secondly, the offensive stands out as the largest military operation that was ever conducted by either the north or the south in the Vietnamese war. Thirdly, it stands out as the worst attack on the civilians, since the offensive did not only aim at the Southern Vietnamese and the USA armies, but also extended its attacks to the civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam, culminating with the horrific Hue massacre that left over 7000 civilians dead (Anderson, 183). Such a massive attack operation could not have just come on board, without efficient and effective planning and execution of the attacks. The Tet Offensive occurred at a time when the pressure was mounting on the USA military and government to consider dropping its involvement in the Vietnamese war, considering that close to 45% of the Americans believed that the war was not worth being pursued, mainly due to the losses it had inflicted on the USA, in terms of the number of the casualties of its soldiers, the increment in taxation to the citizens, and the lack of a slightest indication that the war was coming to an end (Robbins, 12). With such disgruntling within the public, and even some sections of the government and intelligence, the military command needed to act decisively in bringing the whole issue to a halt. The USA military command therefore reacted by mounting the success offensive in 1967, where it sought to assert to the public that the USA would win the war, and brings it to a speedy end. This was achieved through media propaganda where the army generals misled the American public on the capabilities of the Northern Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong, by asserting that they were losing ground and therefore were not in a position to launch any major attack. To curb it all, and give more confidence to the people, the US army General called on the communists to try something, because the USA was actually looking for a fight (Donaldson, 155). Therefore, the anti-war sentiments by the American public, coupled by the underestimation of the communists ability and the confrontation by the USA military command to have them try something, prompted the Northern Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong to react, by planning the largest operation that could send a message that the USA military was in fact losing the war, and the strength of the communists was formidable, as opposed to its underestimation and the misinformation of the public. The planning of the operation started in late 1967, and culminated with its launch on the morning of 30th January, 1968 (Schmitz, 52). In addition to this, the allies of the North, who were both Soviet Union and China, supported the move by the communists to launch a major attack on the south, so that the war could eventually get to the path of termination. Those who were opposed to the conventional military attack, and instead supported negotiations and guerrilla warfare, were arrested to pave way for a well planned attack, which would have minimal tampering. This created an environment for launching a major successful attack. Riding on the fact that the south was tired of the existing government, and that the USA intervention in the war was unpopular to the southern population, a strategy that would affect the whole populace was to be devised, which would prompt them to oppose the USA and the southern government, bringing a decisive end of the military deadlock and the perceived unsuccessful negotiations (Collins, 44). Therefore, the offensive was planned on the October of 1967, with a follow-up meeting on December of the same year to affirm the decision. The operation was slotted on the Tet Holidays, since there was less expectation of war during such a period, and therefore the USA and the southern military would be caught by surprise, in addition to the fact that they would not launch a retaliatory attack effectively. The conventional military attack was to be combined with guerrilla warfare, and thus the role of the Viet Cong became vital in this war, since they would launch minor guerrilla attacks which would distract the attention of the USA and the southern Vietnamese military, while a massive attack would follow by surprise (Anderson, 195). The diversionary attacks were to be launched on the border areas of the south to distract the American and the southern military from the major cities, so that North Vietnamese Army could launch a simultaneous attack on the major towns, allied southern military bases and the USA command base at Khe Sanh (Robbins, 10). The general Offensive was to be launched throughout the south, so that the action would influence the Southern Vietnamese public, and thus weaken the Southern military and government through popular revolt. The attack on the USA command base at Khe Sanh was just a mere distraction to allow for countrywide attacks in the major towns and cities of the south, and thus elicit public revolt towards the USA military, the southern military and the southern government. Such an action could effectively bring the war to an end, and thus re-unite Vietnam. Thus, by mid 1967 the logistical plans got underway, culminating to the effective build up of 81,000 tons of supplies and 323,000 troops, by January 1968 (Donaldson, 159). To allow for a convenient logistical operation and execution, the North launched a flurry of diplomatic negotiations to distract the USA and the south, so that the attack would remain unanticipated. To achieve the inactivity of the American and the southern military during the offensive launch season, the Northern Vietnam requested for a seven-day truce, during which a ceasefire would be observed, effective from 27th January to 3rd February (Willbanks, n.p.). The northern Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong were equipped with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, to afford them a superior firepower over their opponents (Collins, 41). The supplies were mainly from the Soviet Union and partially China. The military command had the general at the top, with his commanders of the units under him, to organized and place the troops in their units to attack their assigned regions simultaneously. The communication with the Viet Cong, who were a distractive guerrilla warfare unit were made, to ensure that they had effectively attacked the designated regions, so that the North Vietnamese Army will eventually find the American and the southern military already distracted from the towns, cities and command bases (Anderson, 192). The attacks occurred subsequently from the 30th of January 1968, with the last of the attack, planned under the initial offensive occurring on 10th February. The major lesson that can be learnt from the war is that; it is most dangerous to underestimate the ability of the opponents in a war, just because they have turned to a state of inactivity. Another vital lesson that is learnt from the Tet Offensive is that, the voice, sentiments and reaction of the general public is key to the progress that a war takes, since their disapproval has the negative implication of distracting the military from its main course, to try and prove a point to the public, at the expense of faithful pursuit of the military objective. The value of alertness is yet another valuable lesson learnt, since the military should always be alert despite the season or the inactivity of the warring season. Another lesson is that, the effective use of intelligence in a war can help avert a major war drawback. Finally, a valuable lesson that is learnt from the war is that; propaganda is a vital war tool, which if well executed, can result to unanticipated turnaround of the war. Works cited Anderson, David. The Columbia History of the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Print. Collins, John M. Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002. Print. Donaldson, Gary. The Making of Modern America: The Nation from 1945 to the Present. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. Web. http://chomikuj.pl/nursejackie2011/01+-+USA/Gary+A.+Donaldson+-+The+Making+of+Modern+America*2c+The+Nation+from+1945+to+the+Present+%282009%29,708196264.pdf Robbins, James S. This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive. , 2012. Print. Schmitz, David. The Tet Offensive: Politics, War, and Public Opinion. Westport CT: Praeger, 2004. Print. Willbanks, James H. The Tet Offensive: A Concise History. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 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