Strategic Plan for Next Irregular US Coalition Conflict - Essay Example

A Proposed Strategy And Methods To Address Any Difficulties In The Next (Theoretical) US Irregular Conflict (2020) Involving Allies (Coalition)." Irregular conflicts present a wicked predicament due to contrasting and varying needs, numerous stakeholders, endless interdependencies and problems that evolve day by day. In order to keep the predicaments at bay, efficient resolutions and strategies that may generate results in spite of low motivation, capacities and methodologies. Strategies used by the United States have in the past presented challenges in their implementation, as well as in bringing about the desired results. In order to bring about strategies that eliminate the challenges for the U.S irregular conflicts, a mixture of collaborative, competitive and authoritative approached are necessitated to bring about effectiveness and flexibility (Keravuori para 2). Formulating strategies that result in war effectiveness require critical understanding of the numerous actors, and their conflicting ideologies, as well as applying a multiphased approach in war. Above all, a careful examination of the economic effects and actions of the irregular conflict should be given precedence, and negotiations should be employed to the maximum. Irregular conflicts are hard to describe, and knowing how to respond to irregular conflicts is inherently intricate for an outsider like United States (Kramer para 3). Efficient strategies demand that strategists should take into account evolving, mutually dependent and multistakeholder nature of irregular conflicts. The United States defeat in the Vietnam War, setbacks in various battles like Somalia, Bosnia and Lebanon, coupled with military and political complexities in Iraq and Afghanistan underscores the limits of United States military traditional supremacy. The supremacy has not in the recent past yielded any influential success against non state actors practicing protracted welfare. America has based its military supremacy on firepower that has been counterproductive. This is a problem that is founded on the country’s military and political culture (Keravuori para 5). The counterinsurgency wars that America engages in are mostly political in nature, rather than being jus ad bellum. This implies that the American government risks the lives of its citizens and that of citizens in countries like afghan and Iraq when national concerns and interests are not at stake. The pentagon’s aversion to counterinsurgency is soundly rooted in the American manner of welfare. Since the early 1940s, the army has trained, outfitted and planned for large scale predictable operations for large scale adversaries, and it has traditionally utilized military operations even against irregular conflicts. Barring a philosophical change in the United States’ armed and political culture, America runs a noteworthy risk of failure whenever it goes into irregular wars of choice. The reason is that great power involvement in small wars is nearly always a subject of preference. Such wars do not involve central United States’ security interests, other than placing the confines of American military on display. The war in Iraq is the latest illustration of the confines of America’s power. Observers argue that sending American renowned generals like Rommel Erwin in the operation Iraqi freedom was an incompetent move. The reason is that Iraqi forces were not difficult to deal with as they were poorly trained, incompetently led, demoralized and badly equipped. Thus, sending massively armed troops in Iraq underscores achievement of America’s military. Neoimperialist Boot Max praised America on its Iraq invasion as one of the signals of military success in American history. These words were one sided as they anticipated a win situation for America. However, this was not the case as America not only lost in its political objective, but also in eliminating insurgency that was erupting day by day. Three years after Iraq incursion, boot expressed his concerns over unfathomable failure to undertake sufficient preparation for running Iraq after the fall of its leader Saddam Hussein. This is a clear indication of the limits of America’s power. Just like in Iraq, other states like Somalia and Vietnam have also made America discover its constrained utility of its conservative military superiority against a resolute and skillful insurgent foe. The Vietnam War attracted a lot of attention with regards to how great powers fail in small and irregular wars. Small wars are all operations other than those where both sides are made of regular troops. The universal agreement is that the weaker side beats the stronger side through possession of excellent fighting skills. Superior fighting power is the mental attributes that make armies fight. Insurgence victory over great powers like United States too has attracted attention on aspects that result in their success. The most cited reason is that insurgent’s interest being in the outcome of the war thus, they put an excellent political will, as well as a greater commitment to fight. Apparently, insurgents wage total war, while foreign troops fight a partial war. Superior strategy is also cited as the most noteworthy reason why insurgents succeed in wars against great nations like United States (Holcomb & Cerami 121). Insurgents employ lingering guerilla strategy against politically intolerant and strategically traditional enemy. Another reason put forward for insurgents’ success is that great powers lack the moral and political will to bloody wars against irregular adversaries, unlike in dictatorships. Failure to isolate insurgent access to external aid, democratic governance, political will and inferior strategy are among the reasons why great powers are unable to overcome insurgents. America has a tendency to view the war as an end in itself and ignores the purpose of the war as a component of foreign policy. In addition, America’s military also has a profound repugnance to counterinsurgency. These two features resulted in the army using force in limited wars involving protracted hostilities against irregular opponents. Gray Colin presented some insights on the strategic culture that characterize American way of war. One characteristic of us war is apolitical. The U.S involves in war because of specific aspects and not because of reasons that are particular to a situation. The army is also known to fight on grounds of garnering victory, ignoring the repercussions of its operations for the sake of peace that will follow. Astrategic is another characteristic of American war, where preemptive strategy was used. American war is an independent activity without regard to peace and politics. For instance, operation Iraqi freedom did not take a reactive strategy, but it took a proactive strategy (Record 6). America suffered a great deal as a result of Astrategic characteristic. Less than the required plans were made when operating on Kosovo and Somalia, and this led to American failure. American war way is culturally ignorant and does not respect the beliefs and habits of other cultures. As a result, the country suffers self inflicted damage due to its failure to understand its adversary’s culture. Technological dependence is another characteristic that is manifests in war. Most of the American troops consider human skills as essentially significant during war. However, the country employs its technical might to compensate for its perceived numerical military inferiorities. United States has also been firepower focused. Centering on firepower has been an ages-old armed objective that has been effective in destroying the adversaries’ forces. In addition, United States generally seeks global approval and cooperation in its military operations. For instance, in the Iraqi incursion, America obtained support from other nations such as the Great Britain. The subject of distance has also proved a hard nut for United States to crack. America has experienced difficulties in accessing areas of irregular conflicts. This is partly attributable to natural geographical difficulties and diplomatic challenge. For instance, in the operation Iraqi freedom, U.S experienced difficulties in accessing some parts of Iraq (Gaffney 13). The Turkish government did not approve U.S to transport its ground forces for the operation. Another feature of American war is impatience since operations tend to be under tight political control. Warfare situations tend to be settled in fairly short time. United States should use a strategy that is economic considerate in its irregular conflicts. The strategists should embrace various methods in developing their irregular war strategies. The reason is that war is costly in almost all aspects. War involves both quantifiable such as financial costs and non-quantifiable costs such as loss of lives and emotions (NAWC 15). Since resources are always a constraint, it is wise for United States to evaluate its available resources to drive strategy. This involves walking in a fine line, paying for conservative force healthy enough to daunt aloof state acts while maintaining a force that can deploy and resolve a multitude of problems created by nonstate actors participating in irregular warfare. For instance, Iraq incursion direct costs are around two trillion dollars, yet the war has resulted in numerous fatalities for Iraq civilians and American soldiers. Moreover, the sole purpose of democratizing Iraq has not yielded considerable fruits. It is essential for the United States political class to evaluate the economic benefits of waging irregular wars. This would help minimize the budget on foreign policy. Special troops that are cost efficient may be assigned in irregular wars; if at all the country has to wage such war. The reason is that unsustainable costs tend to erode the gains and usefulness of the military as a deterrent to its adversaries. Another strategy that America can embrace is the use of soft power, rather than using its hard power to show its hegemony in the world. Initially, United States was perceived as the world superpower, but it has been overtaken by China, or if that has not happened, experts hold that China will soon be the world’s superpower. The reason is that, when United States is engaging in costly foreign policy to exercise its hegemony, China is using soft diplomacy to extend economic gains in different parts of the world. This was manifested during the time of the 2010 global recession that affected America and other developed nations. China and India however did not experience the slump. While America’s relative power shrank during the 2010 global period, China’s relative power increased (MCshane 76). The international monetary fund anticipates that the purchasing power parity of China will exceed that of America soon. Countries like Germany and Japan rank China as being an economical superpower as compared to America. Another essential strategy is to ensure a balance between research and development and expensive acquisition for major wars, and irregular warfare capacities. While the cost for Iraq and afghan operations continue to strike America, other countries like China are focusing on economic growth and development of long-range weapons, which could pose as threats to the United States hegemony and power projections. America has to ensure it conducts a profound research and development to equip its soldiers with tricks and tactics that insurgents employ to counter its soldiers. The country also needs to grapple with long range weapons to ensure upcoming threats like China and North Korea are put under check. China is proving its technological might in various ways, including its space war with United States. Other states like Russia also pose a challenge to the U.S hegemony, and its unipolar moments are coming to an end. The current crisis in Syria says it all on the emergence of Russia as a rival to United States. Syria has experienced a humanitarian crisis for more than one year, with the Assad regime slaughtering its own people. United States and United Nations have been silent to this, and are entirely absent in protecting citizens of Syria. Great power politics some into play, as U.S and UN intervened in Libya in 2011, yet Libya had less humanitarian crisis. Russia has continually assisted the Assad’s regime in killing its people while the whole world watches. This is a clear manifestation that united states unipolar moment is coming to an end in the 21st century because Russia would not have defied United States in that manner in the 1990s. Therefore, it is high time that United States and its political class balanced research and development on major world threats like Russia, China and North Korea and irregular conflicts. An excellent balance between the two will enable the country win wars against irregular warfare and insurgency, as well as great wars (Murray para 2-5). America should adjust its realist approach to international relations and embrace a softer approach, in a bid to reduce of its foreign policy and the country’s growth. United States is known for its radical approach of its foreign policy using a realist approach. Realism view of international relations holds that states are rational actors and competitors in the international system. As such, states perceive each other as threats, and therefore, a state must use force to subdue other competitors who present as threats. U.S has continuously used a realist approach in its operations. As such, it is essential for U.S to adopt another strategy such as liberalism and constructivism in its foreign policies and military operations. This way, the country will have eliminated its monotony on realism, and this can be beneficial as the adversaries may not anticipate what kind of strategies is employed in the irregular war. Another strategy that United States should adopt is the use of the jus ad bellum philosophy when going into war. The Just war theory highlights a military and moral hypothesis for welfare. Just War or jus ad bellum implies justice towards the war, where moral and legal basis are given for employing military force. The jus ad bellum concepts provide the ethical authority of waging war in certain situations. The Just War criteria entail a fair cause, fair intentions, last option, public assertion, legitimate authority and reasonable hope for success. Just in Bello stresses that fighters show respect for morality and distinguish between soldiers and non combatants when they wage war and employ force with proportionality. The force should not inflict greater damage than that essential in accomplishing rightful ends. In the Iraq incursion, United States has been accused as fighting a preemptive war that is not just. Its energy policy is viewed as the key explanation why it went to fighting with Iraq, in order to obtain the rare commodity. Most energy companies in United States became privatized in the mid 2000, and most have established their bases in oil rich areas in Iraq. This reason is selfish on the United States part as it does not fulfill the just ad bellum principle of war. Furthermore, Iraqi combatants were not as mighty as America’s troops, yet United States used military force against such a weaker force (Kime 19). This is unreasonable use of power. As such, United States should have a war strategy highlighting the aspect that it should not put its resources to waste until it has been provoked. That way, the country will have obtained moral legitimacy to go to war, as well as respect the sovereignty of other nations. In conclusion, the United States has been known for war characteristics that are readily identifiable. These are such as lack of a grand war strategy while going to war, which has led to massive economic costs, as well as under achievement of the war goals. Its preemptive strategies, inadequate planning, impatience, cultural intolerance has resulted in several defeat in small wars, such as the Iraq and afghan wars. The defeat arises because the adversaries are able to exploit the weaknesses in America’s forces, even without the military strength that U.S soldiers possess. Coupled with the realist approach on foreign policies; United States adopts war strategies that may be anticipated by the adversary forces. As such, it is essential for America to make war strategies that result in win situations. One of the strategies is to embrace a resource driven strategy to ensure that it is economically sustainable and, military efficient. Another strategy is to employ liberal and constructivism approaches while making war strategies. Creating a balance between economic benefits of waging war, as well as the balance between irregular wars and great powers threat is also a useful strategy towards addressing challenges in irregular conflict through 2020. Works Cited. Murray, Robert. Syria as proof of the unipolar illusion. Web 9 May 2013 < http://www.e- ir.info/2012/06/21/syria-as-proof-of-the-unipolar-illusion/>. Gaffney, K.K. The American way of war through 2020. Pp 1-25. Web 9 May 2013< http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/way_of_war.pdf>. MCshane, Thomas. Military review. The professional journal of the U.S army Pp 1-101. Web 9 May 2013< http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/267976.pdf>. Holcomb, James and Cerami, Joseph. U.S army War College: guide to strategy; pg 1-282. Web 9 May 2013< http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00354.pdf> 2001. NAWC. Strategic plan for a challenging and dynamic future. Pp 1-22. Web 9 May 2013 from< http://www.navair.navy.mil/nawcad/businessfiles/00%20NAWCAD%20Strategic%20Pla n%20%202011%2011%2023_signed.pdf>. 2011. Keravuori, Rose. Lost in translation: the American way of way. Web 9 May 2013 from< http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lost-in-translation-the-american-way-of-war> Kramer, Franklin. Irregular conflict and the wicked problem dilemma: strategies of imperfection. Web 9 May 2013 from< http://www.ndu.edu/press/strategies-of-imperfection.html>. 2013. Record, Jeffrey. The American way of war: cultural barriers to successful counterinsurgency. Pp 1-20 Web 9 May 2013 < http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa577.pdf>. 2006. Kime, Steve. Return to the American way of war. Proceedings magazine may 2011 137(5). Web 9 May 2013 < http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/return-american- way-war>. Read More