The Military Design Planning Process - Research Paper Example

?Importance of Tacit Knowledge to the Military Design Planning Process Introduction Tacit knowledge refers to knowledge which is informal and is not codified; it is the type of knowledge which is difficult to transmit to another person through writing or even verbalization. Such tacit knowledge serves various purposes and is relevant based on its applications. This paper shall discuss the importance of tacit knowledge to the military design planning process. It shall cover the impact of tacit knowledge on military leadership, to civil-military relationships, to the positive impact on operational variables, on the benefits to diversity within the military, and on ensuring ethical conduct. Body Tacit knowledge is the kind of knowledge which has been considered relevant in shaping actions relating to real-world goals. This kind of knowledge covers three basic qualities. First, it is procedural; second, it is significant in the achievement of goals which individuals value; and third, it is gained with limited assistance from others (Hedlund and Sternberg, 2000). Knowledge including these elements is considered tacit as it must often be interpreted from actions or statements. The inference must be gained from the individuals who want to establish tacit knowledge in work and school and from the researchers wanting to evaluate these individuals (Hedlund and Sternberg, 2000). In effect, tacit knowledge is usually implied, not explicit. Since tacit knowledge can more or less be measured and because such measured knowledge has been known to shape job performance in various domains and in numerous performance standards, the tacit-knowledge approach must have practical application in the evaluation, selection, and training of leaders (Taylor, 2007). Research implies that tacit knowledge is gained with experience, however individuals may also differ in how they improve from their experiences. Much interest in the handling of knowledge in organizations has directed attention on the management of tacit knowledge, and on how such knowledge can be kept within the firm as a basis for possible competitive gain (Coff, et.al., 2006). The idea of tacit knowledge is generally appealing and is likely something that would be understood as the information which individuals would have in their heads, not information which would be recorded (Koenig, 2003). In most instances, tacit knowledge seems to be the term which encompasses any knowledge which has not been formally written down (Styhre, 2004). However, as noted by other theorists, such simplistic notion of tacit knowledge triggers the expectation that tacit knowledge can easily be transmitted with the sender of the information reflecting and expressing the knowledge. In fact, the primary understanding of tacit knowledge is ambiguous as researchers use the term for various meanings and characterizations. In effect, much confusion and debate is seen over the actual nature of tacit knowledge and whether it can actually be articulated (Tsoukas, 2003). Tacit knowledge for military leaders seems to be a better predictor of leadership effectiveness as compared to verbal prowess or experience (Horvath and Williams, 1994). Experience as evaluated by months on a specific job, manifested no relationship with leadership efficacy. Tacit knowledge for military leaders did not show any relationship to effectiveness, except for Battalion commanders who had better tacit knowledge and who were more efficient in managing subordinates (Hedlund and Sternberg, 2000). Finally, verbal ability had a moderate relationship with leadership effectiveness within platoon and company levels. However, when an evaluation of verbal ability was assessed based on hierarchical regression, tacit knowledge consistently manifested efficacy beyond verbal ability (Hedlund and Sternberg, 2000). Tacit knowledge therefore supports the fact that it assists in ensuring leadership efficacy and seems to do so beyond the old predictors. Studies on tacit knowledge and leadership sought to understand what leaders knew which was not expressly taught to them; studies do indicate that their tacit knowledge is relevant to their success (Hedlund and Sternberg, 2000). Tacit knowledge was based on stories and advice which leaders shared about their experiences; these offered provided lessons learned on how they could be successful leaders. Stories and tacit knowledge items served as resources in understanding how and the conditions whereby tacit knowledge is gained and how it is used to ensure the growth of effective leaders (Horvath and Williams, 1994). Implied from work on the identification and assessment of tacit knowledge is the idea that some people are better than others, especially in learning from their experiences. Sternberg and Horvath (1999) discusses that practical knowledge provides support for practical intelligence. Practical intelligence is an element of the theory on successful intelligence which indicates that success in various domains involves the recognition of one’s strengths and using these in the management of personally valued aims (Horvath and Williams, 1994). Practical intelligence is the capacity to change, select, and manage the environment the achievement of personally valued purposes. To adapt is to make changes in order to fit the existing environment; to shape is to adapt the existing environment to fit oneself; and to select is to choose an environment more fitting than the present setting (Taylor, 2007). Measures for tacit knowledge can evaluate any or all of these elements of practical intelligence. For instance, tacit knowledge on management can cover a leader’s ability to adapt to one’s surroundings, and tacit knowledge for leadership can assess the ability of a person to shape one’s environment. Practical intelligence can be understood more in relation to academic intelligence. The difference between academic and practical intelligence first indicated by Neisser (1976) and by Sternberg (1997) is founded on the belief that various abilities support the successful manifestation of academic and practice issues. Academic challenges are usually established by others and contain all the necessary data available; and they are divorced from an individual’s daily activities. They are also usually well-defined and have one type of solution (Wagner and Sternberg, 1985). Practical issues on the other hand are usually unformulated and do not have sufficient information and are also poorly described. These practical issues are usually personal in interest and are crucial to one’s daily experiences (Wagner and Sternberg, 1985). Tacit knowledge supports an element of practical intelligence and is ensured through practical problem solving applications. It also indicates the ability to gain from poorly-defined and practical activities which do not necessarily include clear solutions. In effect, assessing the processes which support tacit knowledge must be carried out within the real-world setting. Leaders in the military learn about leadership as they carry out their various responsibilities in the field, in the barracks, and even in the motorpool (Horvath and Williams, 1994). On the job learning provides opportunities for leaders to understand how they can apply leadership managed within the doctrine and transmitted in the Army school system; they also provide a context for gaining new information on leadership knowledge which is not supported by formal training. As leaders gain their knowledge from operational tasks, understanding what they are learning and how they can ensure successful learning is one of the primary goals of related studies. The tacit knowledge approach in understanding leadership considers knowledge which is founded on experience, which is practical and relevant, as well as acquired beyond the formal settings (Hedlund and Sternberg, 2000). Based on a multi-year study assessing the application of tacit-knowledge, tacit knowledge for military leadership is based on the role of operational tasks in the shaping of effective leaders. The goal is to apply such knowledge in order to improve leadership via web-based instructions and self-development (Hedlund and Sternberg, 2000). In an interview of 81 colonels and LTCs, stories and advice on lessons learned about leadership were evaluated. Wagner (1987) established that tacit knowledge for military leaders scores was generally a better indicator of leadership efficacy when compared to verbal ability, rank, and experience. Experience even with months into the job indicated no relationship with leadership efficacy. Verbal ability was only moderately related to leadership efficacy (Wagner, 1987). However tacit knowledge indicated better efficacy. Implied from the study on identification and assessment of tacit knowledge is the idea that some individuals perform better than others in learning from their previous experiences. As civilian leaders usually apply both leadership and management tools to perform their functions, the framework by Williams and Sternberg (1986) provided an initial point in the structuring of tacit knowledge related to successful leadership. Moreover, the elements and categories for this framework referred to the military’s understanding of leadership. For instance, the military considers leadership to be an interpersonal influence process. Williams and Sternberg’s (1986) discussion includes the category interpersonal tacit knowledge with subcategories like influencing as well as controlling others and cooperating with others. In effect, these categories would provide an initial point in the search for tacit knowledge on military leadership. In managing the self within military leadership settings, there are various knowledge items which are considered important (Sternberg and Wagner, 1993). One is being prepared to disobey orders under extraordinary circumstances. When there is a need to disobey orders, leaders must be prepared to do so. Deciding to disobey must increase, not decrease an individual’s personal and professional risk (Sternberg and Wagner, 1993). Moreover, the principle of minimal divergence must also be followed. This principle there is a need to differ as little as possible from a leader’s commands, even during times when there is a need to disobey some orders. There is also a need to focus on what is important, not what is urgent. Military leaders who deviate from their priorities may sometimes be more preoccupied with quelling the effects of their actions and therefore be neglectful of their progress towards their more significant goals (Wagner, et.al., 1999). Strong leaders decide on what would be considered important and what would not be important; and they would also plan their time accordingly. This would sometimes imply that the deadlines for tasks of less importance would not be met or that some activities would be assigned to subordinates (Wagner, et.al., 1999). For instance, company commanders who prioritize the care of soldiers would likely ensure first that pay inquiries would be managed well so that the salaries of these soldiers would not be delayed. The leader would not relent from such task and would not be distracted by other tasks. Part of tacit knowledge applied to leadership includes not spending most of a leader’s time on the worst soldiers (Bass, 1985). It is important that the weakest soldiers do not take more time and attention as compared to the strong and deserving soldiers. Issues must still be resolved, however, at some point, the weak soldiers should not take more time from the leaders. There are soldiers who enjoy negative attention from leaders (Bass, 1985). In the military, these individuals are not worthy of leaders’ attention. For instance, a soldier who is often AWOL would likely often take too much time from the leaders in having to explain why they were AWOL (Horvath and Williams, 1994). Time rendered to listen to these explanations is time away from the soldiers who deserve more attention from the leaders. Tacit knowledge in military leadership also implies the importance of learning to be straight with oneself with the end goal of securing one’s career. There would likely come a point for military leaders when they would have to ask themselves if they really care about something other than themselves (Bass, 1988). Most individuals seek career success, however the purest form of leadership calls for a willingness to rise above one’s career concerns in order to ensure the greater good of the organization (Horvath and Williams, 1994). In fact, military leadership would likely call for the soldiers to sacrifice their life for the greater good. In order to ensure selflessness for action, it is important to consider the ways by which individuals would often “talk” to themselves (Horvath and Williams, 1994). In discovering self-centered tendencies, diversion of such thoughts can be considered. This self-monitoring process can ensure character building. A soldier for example may discover that he usually judges events in relation to how these would advance his career. This filtering process would likely prompt overreaction to some incidents, especially those which would help him advance, and hardly react to other incidents, most likely those he would not consider relevant to his career advancement (Jacobs and Jacques, 1987). As the soldier considers this tendency, he can then evaluate events in terms of how important these may be to his unit’s mission, not according to how they would advance his career. Part of tacit knowledge in military leadership includes finding opportunities to stay quiet. Most people would often find opportunities to speak out, even when speaking is not needed (Yukl and Van Fleet, 1992). Individuals may speak in order to feel like they are contributing to the conversation, or they may just want to manifest how much they know and how well they understood the discussion. As individuals stop looking for these moments, they can also become more sensitive to their weaknesses as listeners; and they can then assist their subordinates in becoming more confident (Yukl and Van Fleet, 1992). For instance, it is often important to hold questions which may be raised while subordinates are talking. As the subordinate is still talking, he may end up already answering any questions the listeners may have, making the question moot. In these cases, interruptions may not even be necessary while the speaker is talking. It is also important to find challenges and control. Tacit knowledge elements are important in finding challenges and ensuring control (Horvath and Williams, 1994). One of these suggestions is to consider role ambiguities as opportunities to expand responsibility. Organizational functions are often not clear. Job descriptions also cannot possible encompass all responsibilities; therefore, all responsibilities must be based on inferences (Sternberg and Frensch, 1992). By actively considering aspects where there is ambiguity, individuals occupying leadership roles can fill in unclaimed responsibilities and therefore increase organizational efficacy. Individuals not possessing such knowledge may sometimes make do with the perception that someone else is taking care of specific tasks; consequently, opportunities for leadership would be missed (Sternberg and Frensch, 1992). For example, even as the administration of drunk driving education programs are tasks appointed to commanders, many sergeants are carrying out these functions and have sometimes owned this task, convincing their leaders that the task is an NCO task (Horvath and Williams, 1994). It is important to understand that the above tacit knowledge examples are not complete when they would be compared with what is known to effective leaders. It is also significant to indicate the topics which would be in accordance with common perceptions of what would make a strong leader (Landauer, et.al., 1997). Leaders are individuals considered of upright character and maximum effectiveness. The tacit knowledge cited above includes the setting of responsibilities, the development of character, and taking responsibility. These elements match the perceptions relating to strong and effective leadership. In evaluating how intrapersonal knowledge relates to army leadership principles, the mandate “know yourself” promotes self-knowledge of strengths as well as weaknesses. It prompts military leaders to self-assess and identify who they actually are, who they think they are, and who others think they are (Horvath and Williams, 1994)). The intrapersonal tacit knowledge discussed by Williams and Sternberg (2000) highlights not too much on self, and more on the knowledge of strategies in the management of oneself. These strategies are not adequate features demonstrating doctrinal specifics of what leaders are called to know (Williams and Sternberg, 2000). In general therefore, the knowledge that practitioners share with others on how to build character and how to set priorities seem to close a gap in the army doctrine. In comparing intrapersonal tacit knowledge in military practice literature with the discussions of Williams and Sternberg (2000), a major difference is seen in terms of the significant amount of tacit knowledge related to the recognition of personal weaknesses. This is prevalent in the military literature. There is no such element in the Williams study. This absence may indicate a cultural limitation in the military against discussions on weaknesses (Horvath and Williams, 1994). It may also indicate a prohibition of discussions on personal weaknesses in the military write-ups and researches. Williams and Sternberg (2000) also gathered tacit knowledge via literature search, including interviews and personal observations. Tacit knowledge covering the management of personal weakness may be seen later in stages of the efforts towards knowledge-acquisition. Finally, there has been sufficient basis in detecting intrapersonal tacit knowledge in the practice literature based on organizational levels (Horvath and Williams, 1994). In effect, although span control and range of discretion can improve successive levels, the strategies in managing self seen in practice literature seem to be applicable in various levels. Interpersonal tacit knowledge includes knowledge which is utilized in interactions with others as individuals. Various applications cover such tacit knowledge. One of these applications includes influencing and controlling others (Smith, et.al., 1997). Under these conditions, it is important to use the least amount of military jargon in order to make a point. It is also important to listen to soldiers, to contradict rumors with information, to use team punishment to reform difficult team members, to not think aloud when soldiers are around, to be creating in acknowledging favorable actions, to consult with predecessors what to expect during the first few months as a leader, to train applying standards, to communicate orders from higher leaders as one’s own, to use old survival stories when advising and counseling soldiers, to place battalion chaplains in prominent roles, to refer soldiers to other soldiers for help, to make safety a priority, and to gain opinions of junior leaders in writing (Horvath and Williams, 1994). In influencing others, it is important to use as little technical jargon as possible in order to communicate a point. Technical language can provide exact terms for individuals who belong to a specific field. They can also give a person a sense of belongingness and of power (Lau and Shani, 1992). Leaders however need to be effective in their use of jargon, especially because jargon may interfere with the communication process. An officer does not need to use technical language when speaking with arms personnel. Most communication issues can be understood to be issues in maintenance, coordination, supervision, and technical jargons which often cause confusion. It is also important for leaders to listen well, prompting leaders to speak carefully and clearly. Listening to soldiers includes the importance of giving one’s undivided attention to the speaker and asking clarificatory questions where necessary (Lau and Shani, 1992). Where soldiers are aware that what they will express is carefully understood, they would likely make a stronger effort to express their words and feelings clearly. For instance, soldiers who report about finding a weapon in a bed needs to be questioned more about when he saw it, in what bed, and if anyone else saw it (Mumford, et.al., 1985). The soldier would likely expect their questions and would be prepared to express answers clearly. It is also important to contrast rumors with actual information. Where soldiers are often ill-informed about certain things, the orders issues may sometimes be vague. Keeping soldiers ill-informed leads to rumor-mongering within the unit and during missions (Mumford, et.al., 1985). Such rumor mongering can lead to low morale and suspicion. It is important therefore to be open with the soldiers, to explain the situation to them, what they are expected to do, and the importance of their actions. Questions would likely be raised and it is important for these questions to be answered. For instance, a commander may mark a certain territory using red paint in order to provide guidance during the training process (Horvath and Williams, 1994). By explaining such action to the soldiers, the soldiers would not likely speculate about the relevance of the red mark. Team punishment can also be used to discipline difficult soldiers. Team punishments must only be applied during instances when identified members are clearly being difficult or lazy (Mumford, et.al., 1991). In these cases, team punishment would pressure the difficult members into complying and cooperating. For instance, a leader may confine a team to a specific area until the recalcitrant members are identified. This type of punishment creates an environment where the difficult members become unpopular in the group, prompting the members to police each other’s actions, especially when they are carrying out their functions (Horvath and Williams, 1994). It is also important to recognize favorable actions and performance. Leaders must find opportunities to acknowledge the good work of soldiers. Letters of congratulations, including impact awards, and time off granted are just some of the ways by which such recognition can be expressed (Nanus, 1992). It is also important to ask predecessors what is expected during the first few days or months. The first 90 days are crucial to the establishment of effective relations with one’s commanding officer. Leaders may express their preferences, however, predecessors can provide a clearer perspective of leader preferences (Horvath and Williams, 1994). Leaders self-report of preferences are not reliable because they only show a subjective perspective, and they do not manifest clearer pictures of leader preferences. In learning from predecessors, adjustments can be made early and surprises can be avoided. Trainings must also support standards of the practice, not as fillers of time (Rost, 1991). Where trainings are carried out in order to fill time, soldiers may sometimes try to expand their trainings just to fill in time. In order to motivate soldiers to efficiently use their time and resources, leaders must indicate specific goals for each activity and ensure that the soldiers have understood these goals and activities. Where the goals are met before completion time, the soldiers can be given the extra time off to reward their efforts (Horvath and Williams, 1994). This indicates the existence of tacit knowledge relating to the application of training doctrine to actual applications. It is also important to communicate orders from higher superiors as though they were one’s own orders. Although some leaders may not agree with the superiors’ orders, leaders must not differentiate themselves from the order when they are delivering these to the subordinates (Sternberg, et.al., 1993). This would prevent instances when subordinates would believe that the task would not be performed within the acceptable standards. Such knowledge includes environmental support and is tacit; still the fact that it is emphasized in the practice literature would indicate that it is often violated. Old war stories must not be used all too often during counseling of soldiers. These stories may indeed be relevant, however, these stories may not be helpful to soldiers (Horvath and Williams, 1994). Soldiers may not see the parallelisms drawn from the stories and instead they may detect that the leader may simply want to talk about himself and not actually listen to his story. It is therefore important to listen to the soldier and what he wants to actually talk about. Battalion chaplains can also play important roles in the unit. These chaplains can help establish cohesive units, allowing the institution to relate to the soldiers’ concerns and to counsel those who may find themselves in difficult circumstances (Sternberg, et.al., 1985). It is also important to ensure that chaplains do not spend most of their time at the leader’s headquarters; he should instead spend more time with the soldiers. This would make the soldiers more open to the chaplain, and not feel wary about what the chaplain may be saying to the leaders at the headquarters. In applying tacit knowledge within the context of the military incidents, the Syria development and use of military weapons can be cited as an example (Stein, 2013). On the 21st of June 2012, Syrian pilot Hassan Hamada took off via a MiG-21 from a military airport in al-Dumair destined for the King Hussein air base across Syria’s southern border; after which, he then sought political asylum(Stein, 2013). In contrast with previous defections, Syria pressured Jordan to return the aircraft used. The aircraft was considered to be highly modernized and modified as a military resource. Various claims on the military capability of Syria as well as Iraq were triggered by this incident. The issue with these claims is that the sensationalized reports do not consider the explicit and tacit knowledge needed to design and rebuild military weapons (Stein, 2013). Syrian engineers had the technical knowledge to convert a MiG-21 into a remotely controlled aircraft. Syria therefore had the explicit knowledge of the task. However, the technical elements of managing the program and gaining tacit knowledge cannot be gained overnight. Iraq supposedly modified its military aircraft technology but could never develop a way of making such system work. In effect, claims on Syria’s conversion of a MiG-21 and other issues including the potential for rebel groups to manage chemicals to use as chemical weapons must be considered with much caution (Stein, 2013). Although explicit knowledge indicates significant advancement and military capability, tacit knowledge does not necessarily support similar conclusions. In relation to civilian-military relations, tacit knowledge more or less improves with experience and the more civilian and military relations are built or improved, the better the understanding of tacit knowledge is (Taylor, 2007). It is important for the parties to utilize their experience as well as use tacit knowledge. Such tacit knowledge would likely predict the success of civilian and military relations. Tacit knowledge also provides cues on academic performance and adjustments within the civilian setting. Such knowledge can also indicate positive relations, aligned with general intelligence. Tacit knowledge also seems to be a separate entity from elements like personality or cognitive stylings (Taylor, 2007). It also does not associate much with confusing elements, however the civilian and military elements do relate to each other in terms of goals and related interactions. Conclusion Tacit knowledge refers to knowledge which cannot exactly and easily be defined. It includes information which is founded on knowledge gained from experience or data detected from informal evaluations. In the military setting, tacit knowledge provides guidelines on how leaders should act and react to situations and to the management of military personnel. Their reactions are based on experiences and implied from information available to individuals involved. In general therefore, tacit knowledge provides more informal but very much crucial information which can be used in order to improve military actions and decisions. Tacit knowledge converts intuition as well as insight into tangible and measurable knowledge which can then guide leaders towards clear and effective solutions and decisions within military as well as civilian settings. References Bass, B. M. (1985). Leadership and performance bevond expectation. New York: Free Press. Bass, B. M. (1988). Bass & Stogdill's handbook of leadership: Theory, research and managerial applications. New York: Free Press. 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