The crux of this interpretation of science, particularly the development of hypotheses about and models of hypothetical generative mechanisms of cognition is that, although unobserved by investigators, such mechanisms are necessary for the production of the observed phenomena (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988, 3-71).
To find out the logical basis of these hypotheses about unobserved generative mechanisms, scientists have taken the help of the physical sciences. In physical sciences, the hypotheses are not the result of blind guesswork or the unfettered imagination. They are created by the invention of models or hypothetical representations of what such mechanisms may plausibly be in reality. The invention of adequate and plausible models is constrained by the requirement that the nature of what is proposed should conform to the basic type hierarchy that expresses the beliefs people have about the nature of the world. Hypotheses about cognition can be evaluated only by testing their predictions regarding the effects of various environmental manipulations on behaviour (McCloskey, 1991, 387-395). These theoretical entities are said to provide a functional characterization of the central nervous system. This is built on the assumption that the same cognitive process could be implemented or instantiated in a variety of different neuroanatomical structures or neurophysiological processes. In other words, this characterization of cognition is materialist, but it does not assume a simple one-to-one mapping between cognitive and neural states and processes. Thus the definition of the cognitive processes can further be modified into a process...
There is a startling similarity with present day computational models where this has been a natural mode of computation for widely interconnected computer networks of active elements. The generalization of these ideas to the connectionist view of the brain and behavior is that all important encodings in the brain are represented in terms of relative strengths in the synaptic connections. Connectionism can explain this by assuming that individual neurons do not transmit a large amount of symbolic or representative information, instead, they compete by being appropriately connected to a large number of similar units, and the prevalent and conventional computer model fails to incorporate this in the present understanding of cognitive psychology. Conclusion: However, this realization is important in that connectionist theories of cognitive psychology may with adequate research come out with a newer, modified, and more sophisticated model that explains all or the computer scientist may create a developed computer that can have a cognitive psychology of its own. There are, however, certain troubling questions that need to be answered before one venture into this area. Human cognition involves the management of meaningful signs according to standards of correctness. In developing a computer model according to connectionist theory, there is the probability that one might lose the two main features of human cognition, intentionality, the meaningfulness of signs, and normativity, conformity to standards.