Australian Responses to the Decline of Britain as a World Power in the Twentieth Century - Essay Example

Australian Responses to the Decline of Britain as a World Power in the Twentieth Century The dawn of the twentieth century saw the birth of a new identity for Australia. On the 1st of January 1901, the six British colonies of New South Wales, Queensland, Southern Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia were unified into a federation—the Commonwealth of Australia—with a constitution of its own, but with dominion status. The relationship between the mother country, Britain, and her dominion, Australia, has been and still continues as a love-hate one. And like the USA, Australia too is a nation separated from Britain “by the same language”1 a language that has evolved and accommodated delicious (for the Australian)—and to some extent prompted by a feeling of affection—invective like ‘Pommie’ to describe the ‘native’ of Britain! This is in spite of (or should one say, because) of the fact that, ethnically, the majority of Australians are British, mainly penal settlers; the original habitants of the country—the aborigines—constitute a mere 2% of the present population.2 Although some Australian writers of the early twentieth century, perhaps as a reaction, have gone to the extent of denying British influence on Australian life and institutions in general, this is a denial of the truth. The relation between Britain and Australia, “both official and sentimental”3 is complex, and “till 1914, Australia depended on Britain for much of its prosperity, by choice.”(the emphasis is mine)4 As Keith Hancock said, it was “not impossible for Australia, nourished by a glorious literature and haunted by old memories to be in love with two soils.”5 The imbroglio over an independent defence for the dominion was the chief political issue between Britain and Australia during the pre World War years of the twentieth century. In 1899, 16000 Australians had voluntarily served in the Boer War. Neville Chamberlain, who later became Prime Minister of Britain, enthusiastically pushed for the formation of colonial armies (India, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) that would fight anywhere across the Empire. Although New Zealand was agreeable to providing soldiers for this force, both Canada and Australia balked. Australia wanted an army for its own protection and not for being deployed to Europe. Political events of the time, like the Boer War, which undermined British supremacy worried Australia. It felt that it could be attacked in its position as a colony of Britain. When Japan defeated Russia (Russo-Japanese War, 1905) and showed inclinations to spreading out militarily into Asia, Australia worried that it might also divert its covetous eyes to acquisitions on Australian territory. Britain did not initially encourage Australia to develop itself militarily, because it did not take the idea of a defence force for its dominion seriously. Besides, it was felt that should any enemy commercial ship defeat an Australian gunboat in an engagement, it would reflect on Britain, as a defeat of Imperial forces.6 However, the increasing threats to British supremacy, and the spectre of a Germany strengthening its military spurred Britain on to urge its colonies to develop their own military. In 1906, the Imperial Admiralty proposed the establishment of a separate navy stationed at Melbourne, and was generous in funding this as well.7 Alfred Deakin, Australian Prime Minister, wrested a concession from Britain—that the personnel from the Australian navy could be interchanged with those of the Imperial. This would give them (the Australian navy) the necessary expertise. Admiral Sir John Fisher of Britain also provided, by default, an impetus for the development of the Australian navy. Fisher believed that if a flotilla were developed, such that the British Isles instead of being defended at her borders (by battle ships) could have torpedo ships that prevented enemy vessels from setting out from their shores, it would be in the larger interest of Britain.8 This led to the addition of ships to the Australian Navy, and an enhancement of its strength. It was the events of the First World War that resulted in the development of a national Australian identity, one that was separate from that of a Western Australian or a New South Wales-ian, for instance, and definitely removed from that of being a loyal subject of Imperial Britain. It must be remembered that Australian soldiers had voluntarily joined the fighting forces. (In the other dominions there was conscription)9 At Gallipoli (Turkey) a large number of these Australians lost their lives. This tragedy drew them together. (Even today, Australia commemorates Gallipoli.) However, from the point of view of Britain, the events at Gallipoli were not decisive, and did not affect the course of the war.10 To the Australian soldiers, the familiarity with Britain only bred contempt. British society was seen by them as ridden with class differences and snobbery. And they were, in turn, seen by the British as rough and undisciplined. Britain did not acknowledge that Australia had specially contributed to the war effort; they maintained that the other dominions had contributed more.11 They were therefore not willing to share war reparations generously with Australia, despite the efforts of Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister (from 1915 to 1923). At home, however, Hughes was seen as toeing the British line. Britain steadfastly refused to take care of Australian interests by recognising her fears of the threat from Japan. The end of the First World War thus marked a clear bisection between British and Australian interests and identity. In the interwar period, Australia became more acutely conscious of the need to develop her defence strategies in case of an attack from Japan. This is evident from the Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of Principal Delegates to Imperial Conference, where Archdale Parkhill (Australian Minister for Defence) is extensively quoted by Sir Samuel Hoare, as reiterating the need for strengthening the Australian Navy as a precaution against Japanese aggression in the Pacific.12 During the Second World War, Britain and the US did pretty much what they wanted, as far as directing the War effort was concerned, though, not in any sense, ignoring Australia. They could not, as Herbert Vere Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, aggressively argued the Australian case at every opportunity. The Australian viewpoint was, of course, that Japan should be dealt with expeditiously, as she presented a threat not only to Australia but also to Britain. Evatt, though quite a nationalist, however made statements like, “If I have to choose between my country going under and England going under, I should want my country to go under. (!) For England is the bastion of us all.”13 Such statements may have been inspired by a wish to keep Britain happy. But, as Carl Bridge says, perhaps “ … a corner of Evatt’s psyche, as with many Australians was instinctively, if at times, ambiguously British.”14 Despite Evatt’s strong arm diplomacy (a lot of it was done to gain political mileage with the electorate back home) Britain and the other Axis powers continued with the policy of “Beat Hitler first”.15 It was only much later in 1943, after Singapore had also fallen, that Churchill and Roosevelt decided that the Japanese needed as much attention from them as Hitler was receiving. The refocusing of the target—Japan and Germany, instead of only Germany—was done without consulting or informing Australia, though both Evatt and the Premier, Curtin, took credit for this before the Australian public.16 When the attack on Pearl Harbour occurred, Australia realised how dangerously close she had been to having war erupt on home ground. And had this happened, she would not have had the military infrastructure or might to withstand the attack. After the Second World War, Australia realised that complete dependence on Britain for Australian security and safety would not work. This was the view expressed by the ruling Labour Party, with Chiefley at the helm. He held the view that economic strength was important, and preceded and strengthened the political-strategic position.17 He also strongly supported the United Nations, as it was felt that only such a body could ensure the security of countries like Australia. Evatt, who also served as President of the General Assembly of the UN, put forward the official Australian view of opposition to the veto power by members of the Security Council, as this would give inordinate power to the major players in international politics, and could hamper the process of halting skirmishes. Chiefley did not subscribe to the view held by Britain and the US that Communist Russia posed a major threat to world peace.18 In other words, although in matters of foreign policy, Australia was amenable to British and other international influences, in the matter of defence, the outlook was primarily regional. Australia felt that security considerations for her own self differed considerably from the perceptions that Britain had of the matter. Britain’s loss of global power and influence in the post-War world prompted Australia to pursue a more independent foreign policy than hitherto. Australia did contribute more to the Commonwealth budget for defence, but her contribution was allocated more towards regional defence expenditure in the South Pacific. It must be mentioned that all of this was the official policy of the Labour government. The Liberal-Country opposition in Australia, however, held the opposite view that a more rigorous alignment of the country’s foreign policy with that of Britain was in the interest of the former. It was RG Menzies, former Prime Minister and leader of the opposition at the time, who strongly advocated this stand. In 1949, Menzies regained Premiership after a gap of eight years, and was free to fully pursue the goal of aligning the country’s foreign policy with that of the UK and the USA, based on his conviction that such strategic alliances were vital to the security of Australia. However, it was quite a balancing act deciding which power to follow—UK or the US when they pulled in different directions, as it happened when, in 1956, both disagreed over the Suez issue. “Follow the UK and USA, and when they divide be dismayed, ”19 Alan Renouf, a dissenting Australian diplomat had remarked to Evatt, describing the policies under Menzies.19 Eventually, Menzies realised that it was necessary to follow the lead given by the US, if it was a choice between the two powers, in foreign policy matters concerning South East Asia. In the war against Communism, Australian soldiers had fought side by side with the Americans, in Korea in 1950. In fact, Australia was the first country from the UN to pledge its support for the US action in Korea. In 1951, the tripartite ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, US) alliance was forged, primarily for maintaining the security of the Pacific area; however, according to this agreement soldiers had to be deployed across the world if the need arose. Thus Australia secured the protection of the US nuclear umbrella.20 The ANZUS continued till 1984, when disagreement over the presence of American ships in the Pacific, compelled New Zealand to opt out of it. However, the agreement still continues between Australia and each of the other two partners separately (between Australia and New Zealand, and Australia and the US). The veering towards America culminated in Holt’s “All the way with LBJ”(American President Lyndon Baines Johnson)21 on the issue of the Vietnam War. The Labour Opposition, however, made it clear that even on these issues (Vietnam or Malaya) it need not be assumed that Australia would always toe the US line, though the US policy would be a general guideline. 22 One of the principal features of the Australian cultural identity, till the 1960’s was the “British race patriotism” which came easily to them. Typifying this are three Prime Ministerial declarations—Andrew Fisher, in 1914 that Australia would “stand beside our own…to the last man and last shilling”; Stanley Melbourne Bruce’s appeal to Britain in the 1920’s for “men, money and markets”; and Menzies that he was “British to the bootstraps.”23 This British race patriotism influenced all economic, political and cultural activity in Australia—immigration, education, the arts, law, trade and external affairs. Australia both demanded special favours from Britain and in turn gave it preferred status in matters of trade. This mutual exchange of benefit was expected to continue solely on the basis of cultural identity and sentimental attachment. Britain too held on for sometime to this attachment to a Commonwealth identity in the sphere of trade. However, her own weakened economic position, and new European alignments compelled Britain to apply for a permanent membership in the EEC in 1961. Britain’s membership was vetoed by the French President, De Gaulle, in 1963, but this was seen as a temporary hurdle, and did not, in any way, signify a return by Britain to a pro-Australia position. Australia made a doomed attempt to regain Britain as a preferred trade partner, or at least get a slice of the European trade pie by sending McEwen, head of the Country Party and Deputy Prime Minister, on a trip to America, Britain and Europe for negotiating and gaining a place for Australia in the trade negotiations. He failed; he was told by President Kennedy of the US that strategic alignments for the maintenance of regional or global security did not necessarily imply partnerships in trade. Australia truly felt alone at this juncture. Economic considerations had overcome and transcended cultural identity. The British race identity was slowly but decisively being edged out by a more pragmatic Australian nationalism. Australia looked more to Asia for trade negotiations. Trade agreements were drawn up with Japan, which became for Australia ‘the Britain of the East.’ When Gough Whitlam became (Labour) Premier in 1972, since there was no coalition, it was naturally assumed that there would be a wide departure from the earlier policies of looking to either the US or the UK for a direction in foreign affairs. Labour proved true to this expectation. Conscription was abruptly stopped, and the last remnants of Australian military presence in Indo-China were removed. The Prime Minister and other Ministers in the government publicly denounced America’s discredited war, especially when the US recommenced the bombing of Vietnam in December 1972. Whitlam also gave official recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.24 With regard to Cambodia, though, Whitlam followed a slightly different policy, remaining silent over US action there. Steps to recognise the People’s Republic of China were taken a few weeks after the election. This was meant to be a marked rejection of the US policy. However, the US itself was secretly holding a dialogue with Mainland China, with visits by Richard Nixon, her President, and Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, to China. Australia’s decision to recognise the People’s Republic of China, thus became less controversial at home, with the Opposition. In any case, it was evident that Whitlam would have made this move towards China, and US policy be damned! The Taiwanese Mission in Australia was also closed.25 Whitlam supported the move for peace in the area by favouring the formation of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was to replace the US inspired SEATO. The US inspired Cold War vis-a-vis the USSR was also rejected by Whitlam, who took further steps to recognise the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 26 In 1974, Whitlam declared ‘Advance Australia Fair’ as the national song, and referred to the Australian, rather than to ‘Her Majesty’s Government.’ In the UN, Australia started voting not as previously, in accordance with the US and UK policies, but as an independent entity. Australia also took actions against Rhodesia and South Africa, which were not in alignment with current US and UK policy towards these countries.27 However, at no time, did Australia choose to be completely independent of US and UK influence. Australian independence was asserted within the broad framework of the US/UK policies towards the countries of the Region. (the US was given more importance) Australia continued to support US installations on her land under the ANZUS Agreement. This was what prompted Premier Indira Gandhi of India to remark to Whitlam, that it was difficult to take seriously Australia’s protestations of wanting peace in the Region, when it permitted the US to have installations within its borders, expressly for the purpose of spying on Australia’s neighbours. 28 The Labour Government under Whitlam maintained an equidistance from the Non-Aligned Movement (of which India was an important member) and the US interests. The Howard Government has issued two ‘White Papers’, one in 1997 and the other in 2003 on the ‘National Interest’.29 In the first White Paper, they maintain that although the US is the most powerful country influencing events in the Region, and influencing Australia as well, the importance of Australia’s Asian allies cannot be over-emphasised. The 2003 White Paper, however, does not mention any particular country to which Australia has a preference or leaning. The paper discusses all major international issues, including political, trade and cultural issues, the Iraq War and the danger of the terrorist threat in the Region. It celebrates Australia’s identity as a multicultural nation, its history shaped by unique circumstances. As far as Australia’s ties with Britain go, in the 1999 Referendum, the Australians rejected a proposal to become a republic, and replace the British monarch with a President. This referendum was rejected by a 54% majority of those voting. This does not mean that public opinion is against the idea of a Republic. It only means that the Australian public is a little conservative in bringing about such changes, and more importantly, that the issue is not one of black and white; there are several nuances to it. The psychological umbilical cord binding Australia to Britain has not been completely severed; to some extent, it continues to nourish the Australian psyche. To sum up, we may quote from the White Paper of 2003: “Australia is a Western country, located in the Asia-Pacific region with close ties and affinities with North America and Europe and a history of active engagement throughout Asia.”30 Bibliography Primary Sources 1) Neale, R.G. (ed.), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Volume I: 1937-38, Canberra, 1975-2001, pp. 84-90, 101-16. Secondary Sources 2).Andrews E.M. The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War I, Barclay, Glen and Siracusa J.M. (eds.), Australian American Relations Since 1975: A Documentary History, Sydney, 1976, pp. 23-33. 3) Bridge, Carl, ‘Impossible Missions: H.V. Evatt in Washington and London in 1942 and 1943’, in D.Day (ed.), Brave New World: Dr. H.V. Evatt abd Australian foreign policy 1941-1949, St. Lucia, 1996, pp. 30-46. 4) Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993, pp. 213-25. Australian War Memorial, Encyclopaedia, Gallipoli, 1997-2007, retrieved 8th Aug 2007 5) The Columbia Encyclopaedia, Australian Aborigines, 6th edn, 2001-05, retrieved 8th Aug 2007, < http://www.bartleby.com/65/au/Australab.html 6) Frost, Frank National Interests, ‘Global Concerns: the 2003 Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper’, Current Issues Brief No. 23 2002-03, 7) Lambert, Nicholas ‘Sir John Fisher, the Fleet Unit Concept, and the Creation of the Royal Australian Navy’, in D. Stevens and J. Reeve (eds.), Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rrise of Australian Naval Power, Crows Nest (NSW), 2001, chap. 14. 8)Lee, David The Debate Over Australian Foreign and Defence Policy : Liberal Internationalism Vs Anti-Communism, 1945-1949’ in Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy, Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, RSPAS, ANU, Canberra, ACT, 1995, chap. 3. 9) Pemberton, Gregory ‘Whitlam and Labor Tradition’, in David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds.), Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 1997, pp. 136-41. 10) Rees, Nigel Quote Unquote, Revised 8th August 2007, retrieved 8th Aug 2007 < http://www1c.btwebworld.com/quote-unquote/p0000149.htm 11) Ward, Stuart ‘Sentiment and Self Interest: The Imperial Ideal in Anglo-Australian Commercial Culture’, Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 32, No. 116, April 2001, pp. 91-108. 12)Wilcox, Craig ‘Relinquishing the Past: John Mordike’s An Army for a Nation’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1993, pp52-65 Read More