Security Planning and Assessment: The Myriad Political, Social, and Economic Forces - Term Paper Example

Security Management, Planning, and Assessment In Today's Political Environment Security of a location or an individual is a direct function of the degree and type of security threat that it is exposed to. As the political and social landscape changes, the threats to security also change. Targets may take on new meaning to terrorists that are seeking to inflict harm on the greatest number of people possible. While law enforcement or other government agencies may respond to an attack, it is incumbent upon the corporation to provide their own private security. Cyber attacks may be directed at institutions such as banks and financial institutions where criminals gain access to money and bank accounts. Geographical location may become important if the firm is situated in an area that is subject to political or social upheaval. Corporations with offshore facilities must constantly reevaluate and reassess their security requirements and vulnerabilities. Retail and wholesale outlets may take on additional threats if they sell or store materials that may be useful in the manufacture of explosives or weapons of terror. As the cost of goods changes over time, items that were once considered unattractive may take on new value. Dealing with these constantly changing environments requires a program that regularly reassesses security based on the current economic, political, and social climate. This paper will examine the myriad political, social, and economic forces and how they impact the management, planning, and assessment of security for private firms, and the methods that form the most appropriate response for these situations. Americans that are employed overseas for US corporations may become particularly at risk as the political climate changes or the social structure breaks down into lawlessness. Journalists may be kidnapped and held for either political ransom or financial ransom. Terrorists may kidnap high profile executives with the belief that they could be used as a bargaining chip to gain the release of terrorists held in the US or other foreign prisons. In assessing the threat level the political climate of the country should be considered. Questions need to be asked such as; does the country tolerate terrorism and terrorist groups Have these groups threatened the US or US interests If there is a cause for concern, the best assessment tool is intelligence. Geopolitical regions that are at a high risk of terrorist activity that is unfriendly to the US will often have a pattern of previous terrorist acts. If there been any changes in US policy that may initiate a terrorist kidnapping, then this will heighten the risk of future activity. High level and visible personnel working overseas are usually the ones that are most at risk. Countering a personnel threat begins with thorough planning. One of the most critical actions that the person can take is to keep a low profile and remain as anonymous as possible. In addition, "be cautious of local officials in many regions, minimise your profile in order to minimise your risk" (The Cavell Group, n.d., p.1). Living and working locations should be gated with a guard at the entrance, and have video and audio monitoring capability. Routes and routines should be kept private and unpredictable. Personnel should be closely guarded by trained professionals, preferably from the region. If traveling in a private car, plans and escape routes should be planned ahead of time. Planning should also include contingency plans for the worst-case scenario. Family, staff, and colleagues should be trained in the proper response to any type of attack. It should be remembered that in the case of a kidnapping for ransom on foreign soil, the local government might not be helpful. The legal, cultural, and political disparities among nations, as well as the constraints on intelligence and expertise, "all point to the fact the prospects for effective action at the state level are not promising" (James & Goldstaub, 1988, p.75-76). Individuals and corporations operating on foreign soil should do a complete level of planning, without relying on local or national law enforcement participation. While controversial or highly visible personnel are at risk overseas from terrorists or criminal kidnappers, in the US the security concerns are often somewhat different. Security concerns for corporations often focus on the security of a location or material assets. Though there are always exceptions, such as doctors that perform abortions or animal researchers, corporate executives are generally at less risk in the US. However, facilities and goods face the same potential for criminal and terrorist attack as they would anywhere else in the world. It is important that the private corporation maintain an ongoing security assessment that continually evaluates any risk from social opposition, as a terrorist target, or a target for criminals seeking high value material. An important part of the assessment is to determine whether the facility has value as a target for terrorism or if the material stored there has some economic value to criminals. Terrorists, including domestic terrorists, may find facilities that are controversial or symbolic to be a high value target. Examples would include animal research facilities, abortion clinics, weapons facilities, and nuclear reactors. These types of firms continually come under a threat from extremists and social activists that may wish to call attention to their cause. This needs to be regularly evaluated, as social attitudes change over time, and activist groups may become active in a short amount of time. These facilities need a high degree of physical security to protect the staff and the clients, as well as the facilities. Entrances should be monitored and have a system for controlled entry. The cost of security rises dramatically as the level of security becomes tighter. Attackers that target facilities that are socially controversial will generally be amateurs, and not trained pari-military units. While it is the goal to remain safe, there is no need to provide an unnecessary level of security. Two of the most effective methods that serve as an inexpensive first line of defense are signs that deter intruders and adequate lighting (Ortmeier, p.96-97). Often these sites are attacked at night when there are fewer staff or clients to confront, and adequate lighting and perimeter alarms can often discourage a property attack. Chemical plants have been recognized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as high value targets for terrorists, and according to Shea and Tatelman (2008), "Securing chemical facilities is considered a key component of protecting the nation's critical infrastructure" (p.CRS-1). The recommendations made by DHS for chemical plants are also applicable to many other corporate concerns. Many industrial sites, such as chemical plants, have value as a terrorist target. In regards to large-scale industrial sites that have value as a terrorist target, the DHS suggests forming a Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP). The BZPP "contributes to reducing specific vulnerabilities by developing protective measures that extend from the critical infrastructure site to the surrounding community to deny terrorists an operational environment" (Fact Sheet: Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure, 2005). In addition, the DHS recommends enhanced physical security that includes fences, barriers, and web based video monitoring. In addition to a facility having value as a political or social terrorist target, many facilities manufacture and store material that has either an economic value or value as a weapon. Firms should continually assess what they are storing on their property and provide adequate security for it. Items that have value for terrorists may include the precursors for making explosives or other types of weapons. Poisonous chemicals can be used as a chemical weapon. Pesticides and herbicides that are routinely stored as farm products have the potential to inflict widespread human damage if released. Medical clinics may have devices that use radiation for medical procedures that could have value as a dirty bomb. There is a long list of manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers that fall into this category. As an example, sodium fluoride is a common chemical used as a pesticide, toothpaste ingredient, and is also used in metals processing. However, it also has weapons value as a precursor to making G-series nerve gas (Ellison, 2008, p.53). Planning includes listing the amounts on hand, their location, and the potential attackers. In some cases it may be advisable to designate a special high security storage area that is isolated from the staff and general public. Many of the scenarios presented thus far in this paper have related to the potential attack for the purposes of domestic or foreign terrorism. However, firms and their facilities may come under the increased risk of attack based on the economic value of the material that is stored there. Items may increase in economic value due to scarcity or regulation. For example, some of the precursors to making methamphetamine have come under tighter government regulation and have made pharmacies the target of a new class of criminal. Metals and materials may suddenly escalate in value and become more desirable to criminals. The materials that are stored at a facility, or used as part of the manufacturing process, should be regularly evaluated for their potential economic value. In addition, bad economic times increase the possibility of products becoming the object of theft. Copper wiring has recently been targeted by criminals for its scrap value. In addition, the list of metals that have been reported stolen include aluminum guardrails, brass fittings, bronze plaques, aluminum siding, sprinkler fittings, catalytic converters, bronze urns, storm drain grates, street signs, and copper downspouts (Berinato, 2007, p.2). Because of the wide variety of materials and sources, physical security is often economically impractical. Once again, intelligence is a helpful first line of defense against this activity. News reports, industry news, and law enforcement bulletins can all help to keep the firm informed. According to Berinato (2007), "Wherever there is metal-copper in particular but also aluminum, zinc, nickel and bronze-there is someone stealing metal to sell it for a little cash to support themselves or their drug habit. For CSOs who have any inventory of metal, it is the most significant physical security concern today" (p.1). Awareness programs are helpful, and a network that promotes communications between metals users and scrap yards can help discourage theft. This strategy could be employed by other industries that become the targets of economic theft. The level of threat, whether political, social, or economic, will be contingent on the value of the target and the number of active threats in the area. Depending on the level of the threat, there may be a need for passive defense or an active defense. Passive defense would include chain link fences, vehicular barriers, alarm systems and similar devices. Active systems would include a "K-9 presence; mobile human monitoring of site perimeters by vehicular or foot patrol; the installation and operation of electronic surveillance countermeasures, personal [biometric] identification security systems, and physical security computer defenses, such as restricted access to sensitive areas" (James & Goldstaub, 1988, p.90). The physical methods required used to protect a target are usually the most expensive and inconvenient phases of the security operation, and "it should not be employed without first considering alternative approaches to addressing the risk" (International Foundation for Protection Officers, 2003, p.204). Alternative methods can include enhanced intelligence and cooperation with local law enforcement when possible. Networking with similar industries can keep security departments advised of trends and impending threats. In conclusion, corporations and business concerns have the responsibility of providing the bulk of the security that protects their personnel, facilities, and assets. Depending on the location, the political, economic, and social climate will affect the security threat and will dictate the proper response. Overseas threats will differ from domestic risks and require a different approach to security. As the political landscape changes, so will the threat. Domestic threats may be directed at US firms that come under fire from extremist or activist groups wishing to protest social policy. A constant reevaluation is needed to keep apprised of the level of risk as well as the potential attackers. Economic conditions and geographical location may bring on an increased level of risk from criminals seeking economic gain. While physical security may have limitations in many cases, intelligence and networking can help to unite industry leaders to stay alert of security concerns and discourage criminal activity. At the end of the day, the most valuable security steps involve good information, adequate planning, and a constant reassessment of the current conditions of the ever-changing threats. References Berinato, S. (2007, February 1). Red gold rush: The copper theft epidemic. Physical Security, 1-5. Retrieved April 11, 2009, http://www.csoonline.com/article/221225/Red_Gold_Rush_The_Copper_Theft_Epidemicpage=1 Ellison, D. H. (2008). Handbook of chemical and biological warfare agents. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis Group. Fact Sheet: Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure--Chemical Security (2005, April 27). Retrieved April 11, 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0671.shtm International Foundation for Protection Officers. (2003). Protection officer training manual (7th ed.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier Service. James, P., & Goldstaub, J. (1988). Terrorism and the breakdown of international order: The corporate dimension [Electronic version]. Conflict Quarterly, 69-98. www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/CQ/vol008_3summer1988/james.pdf Ortmeier, P. J. (2005). Introduction to security: Operations and management (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Shea, D. A., & Tatelman, T. B. (2008). Chemical facility security: Regulation and issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. The Cavell Group. (n.d.). Executive and business travel risks. Worcestershire UK: Author. Retrieved April 10, 2009, www.thecavellgroup.com/downloads/Executiveandbusinesstravelrisks.pdf Read More