A critical response to Donald Davidsons views of self-deception - Essay Example

A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO DONALD DAVIDSON'S VIEWS OF SELF-DECEPTION (Who is Fooled) "There is nothing worse than self-deception - when the deceiver isat home and always with you" Plato One of the most widely held notions of self-deception is that of Donald Davidson which makes the effort to elucidate the paradox through the view that there are simultaneous divisions within the mind itself -- that for self-deception to be plausible and become apparent, the mind must be fenced-off or walled-off to achieve semi-independent structures where at least one of them will take the role of the deceiver and another that of the deceived. Such event, according to the theory, will "permit" the idea that an individual may at any given time cling to incongruous viewpoints and ambiguous judgments about her/him or about a given state of affairs. The concept, Davidson contends, is that if parts of the mind are, to some degree or level, independent, we can comprehend how they are able to entertain and embrace inconsistencies, contradictions and variations, and to intermingle and cooperate on a causal level. This, I beg to disagree. If we take a cursory glimpse, Davidson's account offers a fascinating depiction of self-deception. It seemed to naturally and readily settle the absurdity and the irony of the concept. Nonetheless, if we investigate seriously the sketch of this phenomenon on the "divided-mind" paradigm, grave doubts and opposing protestations will come to our mind. However, before explicitly elucidating my disagreement, let me first discuss another angle that runs parallel to Davidson's idea of the divided-mind occurrence - Freud's embodiment of the human mind consisting of an ego, super-ego, and id. To the Freudian picture, the ego matches up with the conscious part of the mind, while the super-ego and the id, to the unconscious. The id is steered by impulses, cravings and desires; as the super-ego flushes out the "undesirables" conceived by the id, the ego puts things into action. A Freudian version of self-deception, then, would justify for the absurd possession of diametrically opposed beliefs. The unconscious id discerns and understands that p, but is compelled by a desire to believe that not-p, so it "cooperates" or "works together" with the super-ego to deceive the ego. In this scenario, the agent may deliberately and knowingly assumes a belief this same agent instinctively knows to be false, but the fact that this belief is false is one way or another "concealed" from such agent. In this manner, self-deception becomes unequivocally comparable to interpersonal deception, with two agent-like structures misleading/deceiving a third into believing something they know to be false. Though desisting to succumb to the Freudian concepts of ego, super-ego and id, Davidson concurs with Freud that particular facets of the mind must be put forward in order to explain self-deception or absurdity of any kind: [First,]the mind is to be regarded as having two or more semi-autonomous structures. [Second, we assign] a particular kind of structure to one or more subdivisions of the mind: a structure similar to that needed to explain ordinary actions. [Third,]certain mental events take on the character of mere causes relative to some other mental events in the same mind. [I]n order to accommodate [this feature] we must allow a degree of autonomy to parts of the mind (Davidson 1982) As Davidson puts it, one psychological event can be a cause of but not a sufficient reason for another mental event. Certainly, this framework can be a probable occurrence in interpersonal interaction. For instance -- I yearn for Mr. X to be inside my bedroom, so, I positioned a hundred scented candles of different sizes and colors in strategic places, allow some erotic music to reverberate inside the room and open the door a few inches apart just enough for Mr. X to have a wondrous peek of what's inside and what he can expect if he gets in. As he saw what's in store for him inside that room, he then craves to enter and will want to "experience" the delight of what I have prepared for him. My yearning, then, causes his desire but is not a reason for the desire. In like manner, Davidson contends that a mental event can cause or trigger another even within a single mind without being a sufficient reason for it. With this, self-deception can come about. However, Davidson is quick to point out and remind everyone that the mind needs to be "partitioned," this way they can hold inconsistencies and interact on a causal level. Assessment of the Divided-Mind Supposition Though Davidson asserts that the idea of a quasi-autonomous division is not one that demands a little agent in the division, it is imprecise and extremely doubtful as to how these "mental compartments" can relate and work together without acting subjectively, that is, with regards to which portion wins out over the others. If this is the situation, it would appear that the agent is not in control of her/his mental life, and thus cannot be viewed as a judicious and rational agent. As a result, though Davidson appears to solve the paradox, he cannot account for the moral responsibility of an agent in his/her own self-deception. Therefore, all divided-mind accounts of this kind are utterly unacceptable. All the same, we are apt to consider a person who is self-deceived as one way or another "divided," or "in conflict" with him/herself. An adequate and a reasonable account of self-deception cannot eradicate this sense of anxiety and pressure in the individual. If we are to clarify self-deception, we must account for this inkling of "dividedness" against oneself without succumbing to postulations on the unnecessary divisions within the mind. A Fresh Understanding of Self-Deception Davidson stresses the "fracas" the self-deceived individual go through within him/herself. This tension is an attribute of what it is and how it is to engage in such act. In contrast to the static state that Davidson assumed it to be, I contend that self-deception is a process. One is not self-deceived, except insofar as one engages in what can be known or what I call the "scheme of self-deception." Here is a classic example -- Charlotte loves and adores Ryan, her husband of 15 years, more than anything or anyone else in this world. With this affection for him, it is a fact that his love is exceedingly valuable to her, that his fidelity to her and to the marriage is a reflection of that love. Charlotte has had no reason to doubt his faithfulness in the past; however, recently she noticed a drastic change in his behavior. He comes home very late at night smelling of perfume that Charlotte is certain does not belong to her or him; she also found him to be making incredible alibis for his being late in coming home; likewise he has shown very little or no interest at all to have sex with her; and other tell-tale signs of infidelity that one usually sees in movies tackling issues of conjugal unfaithfulness. In addition, some friends have intimated to her seeing Ryan having candlelight dinner with a smart-looking vivacious lady in a very expensive restaurant. With all these, Charlotte has more than enough proof to arrive at a conclusion that her husband is having illicit relationship with another woman, and of course, she begins to suspect him of just doing that. Her opinion that Ryan is extremely faithful to her stands on a very unstable position and it is obvious that she should consider rejecting it, thinking instead that he is unfaithful. Nevertheless, as any aggrieved wife would, she also has a strong desire that he not be cheating on her. It is at this point that the idea of self-deception emerges. Instead of changing her belief, Charlotte works double time in fulfilling her desire. However, there has to be some sort of recognition that she cannot do so, because of the evidence presented. Thus, she must take measures to uphold and sustain her present opinion in Ryan's fidelity. Take note that her implicit disclosure that her opinion is wrong makes her at least unconditionally conscious of what she is doing and therefore her end in doing so is without doubt, deliberate and intentional. Self-deception is in place and absolutely working. At this stage, Charlotte's proof of Ryan's faithfulness now becomes twisted or distorted. Unfortunately, she then now justifies the previous evidence collected by declaring that Ryan is working very hard, the reason for his tardiness, that the smell of perfume was something he tried at a department store, she can also veer away from the lipstick on the collar episode as if she didn't see anything at all and will refute her friends' report and saying that they have not been very accurate on what they saw. This goes to show that she ventures into all kinds of acts of turning away from the terrible distrust of Ryan's faithfulness to her. This process, I contend, is not the process that leads up to or permits her to enter self-deception; rather, it is self-deception, or better still, a vigorous absorption and engagement in self-deception The question is - will Charlotte ever triumph in absolutely believing that Ryan is faithful to her I believe, it is vital to consider at this point that there are degrees or levels of belief. I think one does not have to have full-scale certainty for it to count as belief-to-a-degree. Therefore when Charlotte had an idea that her husband is cheating on her, this may not represent full conviction, and likewise as she advances further toward her goal of thinking and believing in Ryan's faithfulness, she may not be absolutely convinced. In consequence, as Charlotte continuously utilizes these self-deceptive acts, the degrees or levels to which she believes that Ryan is unfaithful and that he is faithful may shift. Certainly, it is probable that her self-deceptive devices will ultimately become less grueling and more customary, in which case, she is liable to become more convinced in her belief. Every proof of her husband's infidelity become integrated into an intricate narrative about his continued faithfulness, if they are not deliberately or intentionally ignored altogether. Nonetheless, this does not respond to the question of whether or not Charlotte can succeed in believing only that Ryan is faithful to her. It is absolutely plausible that she might actually become fully convinced of Ryan's fidelity but if ever this really happens, the process of self-deception has been completed. Charlotte is not now self-deceived, rather she has become delusional She will consider this belief as an irrefutable conviction and her conduct will prove this. Proof to the contrary will not need to be appropriated, rationalized, or distorted. Rather, it won't even count as evidence-not even for a second. This is delusional conduct, not self-deception, as we understand it, and only some sort of dramatic intervention can lead to upsetting the belief that underlies it Self-deception is something that is steadily being worked on, sustained, and otherwise engaged in, and this isn't so if Charlotte truly and absolutely believes that Ryan is faithful to her. Hence, the endpoint of the process described is definitely not a condition of self-deception, but that of delusion, which I think is worse than self-deception, per se. As a deliberate and intentional act, we then can see how self-deception, can remain free of the uncomplicated contradiction in terms without putting forward divisions in the mind or lack of intention. Further, I also believe that the process of self-deception need not take a long time, or could continue for years and the intensity of the act may likewise differ. Moreover, self-deceptive acts are flexible. They can increase or diminish in significance and intensity, depending on the agent's present state of affairs. In fact, they can sometimes lead to the generation of other supportive acts if the significance of a particular belief to a person necessitates that other beliefs be changed in a self-deceptive manner. Thus, one can devise a web of deceit that persists to grow based on the importance of the beliefs one needs to obtain Self-Deception as Irrational and Blameworthy This matter is of great significance to having an accurate and adequate account of self-deception. What makes the act of self-deception that makes it irrational Can we hold people responsible for engaging in such an act The vigilant reader may have noticed that the account of self-deception depicted here appears to elucidate the phenomenon as a reasonably undemanding case of practical (i.e. means-ends) rationality. This is not an unwarranted provenance. Nevertheless, this is not to say that self-deception is wholly rational. As stated previously, self-deception is generally viewed as a token case of irrationality, and I do not wish to depart from philosophical (and common-sense) tradition on this point, nor do I see a need to do so. When an agent has a desire that p, where p is contrary to what she knows (believes, suspects, has an inkling) is the case, she may opt to undertake on an act of self-deception. However, if she had as her end the belief that p, and takes action toward that end in the self-deceptive manner described above, she at the same time places undue value on this end. "Undue" word is used because this value is directly in conflict with another value the agent usually holds dearest of all, namely the value she places on truth. Without valuing truth, the agent cannot take her beliefs seriously in the first place, if she can even be said to have beliefs at all. The self-deceptive agent has two conflicting ends-that of acquiring or maintaining a false belief and that of, whenever possible, pursuing the truth. Thus, in the case of self-deception, an individual has at the outset two completely incommensurable acts before herself, and it is here that irrationality may emerge. When the agent chases her self-deceptive act over her bigger and more important act of pursuing truth, she basically challenges the value and consequence of her whole belief system, and can therefore be tagged as irrational. Certainly, it would not astonish me if most of what philosophers generally consider to be token cases of irrationality like weakness of will, wishful thinking, etc. take a form of this sort, i.e. of an agent's having incommensurable acts, in which she fails to engage in her commitment to truth by pursuing an act which opposes with this commitment. Now, many, if not all philosophers, suggest that irrationality goes hand in hand with moral culpability. What is rational is to be acclaimed above all else, they assert, and therefore what is irrational is to be blamed. This palpably misleading view is not unexpected, given that philosophers take it as their job to search for the truth. Anything that conflicts with the truth, then, is not to be sought, and naturally not to be acclaimed. However, this idea does not always hold water in everyday existence, especially with regards to self-deception. I have briefly examined how and why this is so. I will put forward the notion that the ubiquity of self-deception necessitates us to accept it as part of what we commonly do, and that philosophers ought to think twice before condemning all its instances. In this treatise, attention is centered chiefly on one example of self-deception, namely that of Charlotte, who deceives herself about her husband's fidelity. This example was chosen not only because it so wonderfully illustrates I take to be going on in self-deception, but also because it is one which many can understand. We get why Charlotte engages in the kind of self-deception as she does, and might be able to imagine ourselves acting in the same way to avoid being hurt by someone we love dearly. However, the case of Charlotte appears to be an example on the extreme side of the spectrum. With any luck, it is unlikely that we will find ourselves in such a situation all that often. But there are other, more humdrum circumstances of self-deception in which we all likely engage at some time or another. Self-deception is much more ubiquitous than we often realize. Indeed, if I am right, most of us are engaged in some acts of self-deception much of the time. We deceive ourselves most often, I believe, with regards our own character. It is all too common to see someone who insists that they are in some way better (more compassionate, prettier, highly intelligent, etc.) than they really are. Naturally, these are simple scenarios of mistaken beliefs-illusions, we might call them. Likewise, they can be instances of pure pretense, in which one is trying merely to appear better, rather than be better. However, most of the times, we recognize in people just the kind of twisted behavior pinpointing to self-deception-this kind of overly sincere and assured, yet somehow not quite resolute, behavior. Now, the query is, why do we blame people for this, and sometimes not I believe the answer lies not in the irrational process of self-deception, but in its expected and/or observed outcomes. Self-deception can have quite beneficial results in certain situations, and in these scenarios we are apt not to put blame on the individual for deceiving him/herself. Studies have shown that AIDS patients who do not "realistically accept" their condition actually live longer than those who do. We can imagine an overly optimistic AIDS patient, who engages in an act of the self-deceptive kind (by showing hope for a cure, disproportionate confidence in the effects of AZT, etc.), whom we would not necessarily blame for his self-deception. In fact, we might encourage it, so long as it had observable positive effects on the patient himself. In the same way, we have all given ourselves pep talks in an attempt to convince ourselves that "we can do it!" A player, who undertakes (though short-lived) an act of self-deception to convince himself that his last-place team can beat the first-place team will likely result in his actually playing better. And, again, we do not tend to blame people for engaging in such acts. Why not The answer, it seems to me, has everything to do with the outcome of the self-deceptive exercise. If the agent can, in some socially-agreed way, gain, we usually do not find fault with her for it. If not, we are often more than ready to hand out blame. However, it is not the case with the AIDS patient. If his health is fast deteriorating, and he needs to be hospitalized, and still he persists on refusing to admit that his disease is very serious, we might start accusing him of being irrational and assign fault to him for deceiving himself. Likewise, if the sports player above is playing so hard in the fourth quarter that he appears to be on the verge of collapse because he still seems to think his team can win (even though they are 20 points behind), we might tell him to "take a reality check" or "be reasonable." Thus it seems that not only do we tend to assign blame to self-deceived individuals only when the consequences of their self-deceiving behavior are unpleasant, we often don't even consider the "constructive" kind of self-deception to be unreasonable. Granted, this is merely a socio-psychological point, but that does not mean it ought not to have any implications for how we view self-deception, and perhaps irrationality in general. Philosophers are quick to condemn irrationality in any form, and tend to view it as a sort of "deviation from the norm," i.e. rationality. But it appears that self-deception and other varieties of irrationality are quite obviously fundamental to human experience, and in many instances can actually promote human flourishing. Therefore, perhaps we should take a cue from what we do in everyday life, and recognize that with the capacity to be rational humans, comes the capacity to be irrational animals, and that this is not all bad. PRINT SOURCES / READINGS Davidson, Donald. "Paradoxes of Irrationality," in Philosophical Essays on Freud, ed. by R. Wohlheim and J. Hopkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982 Mele, Alfred. Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001 Read More