Politicians must, as a result, maintain equilibrium between information exposure and the preservation of the incentives of the bureaucrats in order to exert efforts. The tradeoffs can easily be explored with the help of a model of agency decision-making under partial information. It involves an employee's effort which determines a project's type, and a manager which opts whether to approve the project and regulate the employee. With the help of whistle-blowing, an employee unleashes the type to a politician, who may supersede the manager's decision. While whistle-blowing always increments the transmission of information, its influences on employee effort are dependent on the managerial preferences. A key finding states that stronger whistleblower securities reduce effort when the manager is aggressive and may commit more Type I faults than the politician would, however, would increase efforts otherwise. Whistleblower protections, therefore, definitely benefit the politicians if an agency is oriented to make Type II errors (Ting, 2006:2).
Whistleblowers have chronologically played influential roles in passing critical information from lower gradations of the organizations to higher grade officials. An informal survey of American organizations in recent years delineates that this trend has not subsided. In the year 2002, the Federal Bureau of Investigation staff attorney Coleen Rowley went communal over the bureau's investigation of the suspected 9/11 accomplice Zacarias Moussaoui (Ting, 2006:2). Her account of the way FBI headquarters stifled attempts to examine his activities build assistance for the reorganization of its anti-terrorism attempts. Further, in the year 2004, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) researcher David Graham gave evidence before a Senate committee that the agency had paid no attention to the warnings about the heart disease menaces posed by Vioxx prior to its endorsement (Ting, 2006:2). Such exposures caused crucial destruction to the credibility of the FDA, thereby, generating the demand for both the stricter drug approval processes and improvised the post-approval monitoring. Such incidents have not been confined to the public sector. In the year 2002, Sherron Watkins of Enron and Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom gained acknowledgement for their roles in unleashing the managerial irregularities in their respective corporations (Ting, 2006:2). Instantaneous with its practice, whistle blowing has enjoyed both the political as well as legal protection. In the United States, the rudimentary securities were first enacted by the Continental Congress, and a centralized entity of the contemporary legal framework dates to 1863, when Congress passed the False Claims Act so as to combat the Civil War profiteers (Ting, 2006:2). The law enabled the citizenry to bring about a suit against an alleged offender on behalf of the government, thereby, sharing in a percentage of the damages awarded. In 1978, the Civil Service Reform Act criminalized the vengeance against the whistle blowers by creating procedures for altering the terminations of their employment. The Whistle blower Protection Act or WPA of 1989 ensured confidentiality of the whistleblower