Skinner shared this "aversion to free will, to homunculi, to dualism" proving that a person's will is determined by the environmental interactions that control his behavior... He went so far as to suggest an ideal social environment (Skinner, 1948), controlled by behaviouristic principles and learning incentives in the hope of reducing the injustice brought about by the schizoid split between body and mind; between what we do and our will; between applicable rights and theoretic responsibilities. "The mind" he said, "is not empty, and it cannot be adequately treated simply as a black box" (Killeen, p.233).
Neuroscience goes beyond traditional behaviourism and describes the cognitive, inside-the-box mechanisms, with an enormous collection of experimental data of information-processing mechanisms (Stich, 1984 p. 649). The recent development of machines that "think" proves that functional programming of digital computers is possible, confirming what Hobbes described, back in 1651 in his Introduction to Leviathan, as the mechanistic principle of reasoning "... that is nothing more than reckoning; that is adding and subtracting, the consequent names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts" (p. 49).