Threats to Commercial Airlines - Essay Example

Introduction September 11, 2001 dramatically increased the urgency of aviation safety in the United s and around the world. The success of a group of terrorists in hijacking several airplanes by utilizing seemingly innocuous cutting tools as weapons stunned the world. This seminal event made it glaringly clear that greater attention must be paid to considering ways in which terrorists might circumvent existing security measures. This involves analyzing every detail of the current system, trying to think like a terrorist, and imagining any possible methods by which the system could be thwarted. Success in this endeavor is defined by the extent to which aviation security personnel remain one step ahead of terrorists. When the "Shoe Bomber," Richard Reed, was able to board a transatlantic commercial airliner following 9/11, it marked a monumental failure of aviation security. Since then the sight of airline passengers in security checkpoints removing their footwear has become commonplace. Obviously, adjusting security to account for methods of terror that have already been attempted is essential. However, the real success of security happens when those threats are predicted and guarded against before anyone actually carries them out. Among all such threats that have been contemplated, there is one that stands out as a glaring risk about which shockingly little has been done. That is the potential for checked luggage and cargo loaded into the hold of an airplane to be rigged with explosives. To date, no airline or airport routinely screens checked bags and cargo for explosives. Some small scale pilot projects are in the works to test methods of doing this. Nevertheless, it is quite surprising that five years after 9/11, a terrorist could go to an airport and check through a bomb-laden suitcase that very likely would make it aboard a commercial airliner. This paper will define this threat in some detail, then will go on to discuss a safety program designed to address it effectively. The Threat Less than two months following September 11, 2001, the threat posed by unscreened luggage became a major focus of the United States government. On November 8, 2001, the Associated Press reported that "Sen. Herb Kohl, chairman of the Judiciary Committee's antitrust subcommittee, faulted airlines for not ensuring that a person who checks luggage actually gets on the flight, already the practice in Europe. At the same time, he noted, checked bags are not routinely screened for explosives." The AP went on to quote Senator Kohl stating, "On a given day, a group of saboteurs could load up 12 different airplanes across the country with explosives, go home, and we would have a disaster." The airline industry responded that it would be impossible to match luggage to passengers given the structure of the U.S. air travel system; and even if it were possible, such an undertaking would not thwart a terrorist who was willing to die by boarding the flight on which his/her checked bags contained a bomb (Associated Press, 2001). Donald Carty, President and CEO of American Airlines, asserted that a bag to passenger matching system would ultimately lead to reduced flights and layoffs. Senator Kohl described a two-pronged problem with aviation security. The first, and arguably the key, issue is that checked luggage makes its way on board commercial airliners without being screened for explosives or other potential threats. Secondarily, the failure to ensure that those who check luggage actually board their flight makes it possible for someone to place a bomb aboard a flight with no risk to him/herself. Arguably, if the former problem were adequately addressed, then the latter one would not be nearly as great a concern. Many would consider it shocking that even before 9/11 checked luggage was not screened. The procedure of going through airport security checkpoints, scanning carry-on items and going through metal detectors fostered a false sense of security in many people. Surely, many would think, if such precautions were taken with those boarding flights and carrying bags on planes, then it would be counterintuitive to think that checked luggage loaded on planes would not be similarly screened. That was five years ago. Today, checked luggage routinely still gets loaded aboard commercial aircraft without being screened. As surprising as it was that such measures were not taken before 9/11, five years after 9/11 it is arguably appalling that the situation has yet to be rectified. Further, cargo is routinely transported on commercial passenger-bearing airliners; and it too has not been routinely screened. The latter issue had only recently been addressed through a pilot project in San Francisco. Nevertheless, a full-blown program for screening cargo loaded aboard aircraft has not yet been implemented. In November of last year, the Government Accountability Office released a study regarding the threat posed by failure to screen cargo that is loaded aboard planes (Vaughn & Oldham, 2005). "Although airline passengers go through extensive and sometimes invasive security screening, the cargo in the hold beneath their seats is barely checked." According to the study, 23 billion pounds of cargo are shipped by air annually. "About half of the baggage hold on a passenger jet is allotted to unaccompanied cargo." Particular concerns outlined by the report involved the placement of explosives within the cargo hold of commercial airliners, and the potential hijacking of cargo planes by terrorists. "Since the Sept. 11 attacks, several stowaways have been found hiding in cargo aircraft, leading security experts to consider such planes as potential terrorist weapons. In late 2003, Homeland Security officials said intelligence indicated that Al Qaeda might hijack cargo planes to attack nuclear plants and other facilities." The GAO study outlines a very clear threat to aviation security that should have been addressed long ago. While the prospect of scanning all luggage and cargo loaded aboard airplanes is daunting considering the effort would start from scratch, there is no other choice than for the U.S. commercial aviation industry and the federal government to rise to this challenge. While the costs will be steep, and the adjustments for travelers and operators painful, continuing to sweep this obvious peril under the rug because of reluctance to change and to spend money is simply not acceptable. The safety of the public is at dire risk, and something needs to be done about it immediately. "The potential cost and delay of stepped-up cargo screening is what has most concerned shippers and air carriers. But on the other side of the issue are pilots' groups and some members of Congress who want to see 100 percent of cargo screened, especially when it's 'bellyload freight' on commercial passenger flights" ("Lawrence Livermore," 2006). In recognition of that reality, a pilot project is being launched at San Francisco International Airport by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory which marks the beginning of an effort to address this problem. The effort will try all TSA certified screening systems currently in use for passenger and luggage screening to see how well they work for cargo ("Lawrence Livermore," 2006). These methods include x-ray machines, air puffing trace portals, and bomb sniffing dogs. "LLNL expects to come up with the quantitative data on system performance that TSA policymakers can use in making further system enhancements or applications." The technology does not yet exist to screen 100% of cargo loaded aboard passenger flights; so the objective of the San Francisco pilot project is simply a substantial increase in cargo screening. In addition to the Lawrence Livermore project, new, long overdue cargo regulations have finally been released by the TSA. The new rules will "consolidate about 4,000 private industry Known Shipper lists into one central database managed by TSA; require background checks of for about 51,000 employees of freight forwarders (who bring packages from customers to air shippers); extend secure areas of airports to include ramps and cargo facilities by requiring an additional 50,000 cargo aircraft employees to receive criminal history background checks; use TSA employees and equipment to screen cargo that is delivered to airline ticket counters; and expand the use of canine explosives detection teams in air cargo facilities" ("Better Late Than Never," 2006). Although these regulations mark significant progress and a major step forward for aviation safety, there remains room for improvement. The TSA's announcement regarding the new rules failed to mention "such hotly contested issues as what proportion of air cargo would have to be checked or whether the rules would be more restrictive for cargo sent on passenger planes versus all-cargo planes. There also was no official word of TSA's partnership with private industry in developing a program that identifies "elevated risk" cargo for the most intensive screening." Certainly, these issues need to be settled in order for the threat posed by unscreened cargo to be thoroughly addressed. Another major problem that needs to be addressed is the high rate of turnover among screeners. Even if sufficient resources are deployed, inexperienced screeners or those with poor job satisfaction will continue to pose a substantial risk. "The often backbreaking work . . . offers a small starting salary, a glacially slow hiring process and little time for training because of staff shortages" (Anonymous, 2006). The TSA faces extreme difficulty hiring and keeping personnel, largely because of low salaries. "Transportation security officer salaries start at $28,000 per year, which is unchanged since 2002. A 3 percent annual raise is all employees can expect." Part-time screeners are paid $10 to $12 per hour with no benefits. This has led to an attrition rate of 23 percent for full-time screeners and 50 percent for part-timers. Furthermore, the physically demanding work has led to a high rate of disability absence due to injuries resulting from lifting heavy luggage. "TSA estimates it will pay $57 million In workers compensation claims in 2007" (Anonymous, 2006). This retention crisis has meant that training has suffered, as new hires are rushed onto the job to fill vacancies, calling into question the quality of screening that is done. The threat posed by checked luggage is somewhat less severe that that posed by cargo, as significantly more has been done to address the former problem in recent years. That being said, still more needs to be done. The TSA has placed explosives detection systems for checked luggage in 441 airports across the United States in response to a December 31, 2003 deadline that was set by Homeland Security Act. There are two types of these systems that are used, and both have some serious shortcomings. "Explosive Trace Detection Machines (ETD) - ETD machines are roughly the same size as a common laser printer and cost only a few thousand dollars. ETD machines can detect minute traces of explosive residue, which may have been transferred to baggage surfaces through direct or indirect contact. While the ETD machines themselves have extremely high detection rates and very low false-positive rates, the process for collecting trace samples is slow, very labor intensive, and highly susceptible to human error. Currently, there are over 7,400 ETD machines deployed. Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) - EDS machines, on the other hand, can be as large as a family minivan, weigh up to 17,000 pounds and cost between $322,000 and $1.2 million each. EDS machines can be highly automated and networked and some can scan up to 500 hundred bags an hour. They use computer tomography (CT) to scan objects and compare their density to the density of known explosives. EDS machines can also have higher false-negative rates than ETD machines in part because many common objects have densities similar to commercial and military grade explosives. EDS also require the presence of a sufficiently large mass of explosive to function correctly" ("Airline Baggage Screening, 2006). With the overwhelming majority of airports utilizing these technologies, it is virtually impossible to accurately screen 100 percent of checked passenger luggage that is loaded aboard commercial airliners. Both systems are prone to error, and risk missing luggage that may have to be rushed to a flight due to a late passenger arrival because they are not integrated into an airport's automated baggage system. To be sure, a would-be terrorist who knows how the system works might attempt just such a rushed, last minute check-in in order to maximize the chance that his/her luggage would make it aboard a flight without being screened. Nevertheless, better technology does exist that would ameliorate these shortcomings. "Manufacturers have produced versions of their EDS machines that can be integrated in-line and can be configured to have higher explosive detection capabilities, on-screen alarm resolution, better false-positive rates, fewer staffing requirements, lower maintenance costs, and less out-of-service time" ("Airline Baggage Screening," 2006). The problem again is one of resources, as implementation of such technology would require wide-ranging modifications to airport terminals. Such modifications would involve "reinforced flooring, IT networking, electrical upgrades, new conveyer systems, new facilities, etc. Airport officials estimate the total cost for in-line integration of EDS nationwide to be $4-5 billion." Convincing stakeholders that the threat warrants such expenditure is the real challenge. As with cargo, the continued threat posed by checked luggage can be addressed as long as the resolve is there among passengers, airlines, and the government. Effective solutions will involve sacrifices by all of these parties. Costs will escalate and flights will be delayed. As long as the perceived benefits of proposed solutions outweigh these costs, the United States is capable of deploying the most effective system of cargo and luggage screening in the world. The Solution The problems described in the previous section raise some clear opportunities for improving aviation security. A plan of action that focuses on making sure one hundred percent of cargo and checked luggage loaded aboard passenger airliners is accurately screened is required. Anything less would do a disservice to the flying public. Such a plan needs to concentrate on the following areas: 1) technology, 2) personnel, 3) cooperation between the federal government and the airline industry. As for technology, one-hundred percent adoption of integrated in-line explosive detection systems should be mandatory. These systems become part of an airport's automated baggage system, thereby making it virtually impossible for checked luggage to escape their scrutiny, even for rushed, last-minute check-ins. These integrated systems would increase screening of checked luggage to one hundred percent, perhaps with a fraction of a point margin for error. The costs of installing these integrated systems would be steep, and implementation would be a complex project as discussed in the previous section. The federal government would have to earmark substantial funds, while airlines would also have to kick in their share of the costs. Passengers should expect increased ticket prices as a result of this cost. Such price increases, if communicated to passengers as a specific charge for implementing a system that will greatly improve their safety, would likely be palatable to the vast majority of those affected. Perhaps the charge can be listed as a separate surcharge for safety enhancements. The kind of integrated explosive detection technology that exists for airports should also be developed for airplane cargo holds. As a fail-safe measure, any luggage or cargo that passes through the entrance of an aircraft cargo hold should be re-screened for explosives. This kind of doubling up of security precautions should start to become standard operating procedure in aviation security, as a way to eliminate any residual risks associate with small margins for error. Turnover among screeners is another major problem that can be addressed with more money. The attrition rate among baggage screeners is so high primarily because of poor compensation. It is simply not a job by which someone can make a living long-term, especially considering the back-breaking nature of the work involved. Nevertheless, turnover poses a major security threat because there simply are not enough screeners to handle the volume of luggage and cargo that needs to be screened. Moreover, those who do the job are often not adequately trained because they need to be rushed into the job to fill vacancies. This is an ancillary quality problem that exacerbates the overall security threat posed by high turnover among baggage screeners. The solution to this problem lies simply in putting together a compensation structure of salary and benefits that makes people want to stay in a labor-intensive job with high risk of injury. A person simply cannot provide for a family on $28,000 per year. That starting salary needs to at least be doubled, with healthcare and vacation benefits that reflect the nature of the work involved. Starting transportation security officers at $55,000 with 2-weeks vacation per year would dramatically reduce the rate of turnover almost immediately. A further impact could be had by offering seniority bonuses associated with time on the job. For example, someone who stays on the job for at least a year should earn a $1000 bonus; 5-years should earn a $2500 bonus; 10-years a $5000 bonus, etc. This would give these employees a sense that they are striving toward something, and that their long-term service is truly valued. The resulting reduced turnover should result in better quality training, as there would no longer be a need to rush people with inadequate training into the job. Once again, this solution involves substantial increased funding, some of which would be shouldered by tax payers while the rest would be paid by airlines and by passengers in the form of surcharges on airfare. The correct balance between these sources of funding should be determined by cooperative agreements between the airlines and state and federal governments. Therefore, the final part of the plan to address the aviation safety threat posed by unscreened cargo and luggage would be the formation of a National Aviation Security Committee with representation by airlines, passenger groups, and state and federal government officials. Such a committee would be charged with assessing these kinds of threats, determining appropriate responses and associated costs, and determining the allocation of those costs to the various parties represented. Such a cooperative approach is the only way to ensure that security threats are not swept under the rug simply because nobody wants to shoulder the funding burden. The unfortunate reality is that a lot more money needs to be pumped into the system to solve these kinds of problems. A committee whose responsibility is to figure out ways to deal with threats and work out funding among various potential sources would ensure that problems are fully addressed, rather than addressed in a half-baked way in order to avoid spending money. In today's world, the country has many competing priorities for funding, both domestically and internationally. The opportunity to pay whatever it takes to make sure America is protected by the best aviation security system in the world is an opportunity that many would find worth the cost to seize. Conclusion There are many issues, problems and threats in aviation security today. Nearly five years after 9/11, it is still possible for unscreened cargo and luggage to be loaded into the belly of a commercial passenger airliner. This constitutes one of the most significant and urgent of these threats. Even today, a terrorist could arrive last minute for a flight and his/her luggage may not be screened. Furthermore, cargo is regularly transported aboard passenger airliners without being screened. There is a very high probability that any given passenger flight today is carrying material that has not been screened for explosives or other threats. The scope of this problem is so great that it is tempting to have the attitude that dealing with it is impossible; thsat we should just take our chances and hope for the best. The technology for fully addressing the problem is not completely developed, and costs of implementing the technology that does exist would be exorbitant. Moreover, human resources are plagued with a substantial turnover problem, resulting in an inadequate number and quality of people to operate screening equipment and conduct manual screenings. The extensiveness of the U.S. air travel system combined with these challenges could make it seem like an insurmountable obstacle to achieving aviation security. Nevertheless, with the right technology and sufficient, well trained security personnel in place, it is possible to solve this problem. Very simply, there has to be the political will to spend the large amount of money that it would take to close this major hole in airline security. Implementing integrated explosive detection systems in airports and in cargo holds of aircraft, and compensating screeners at a level that makes them want to stay and do a good job, would solve the problem. Fairly allocating the cost of these measures involves extensive cooperation among all the stakeholders, which can be achieved by government, airlines and passengers coming to do what is right and spend what it takes on behalf of public safety. Works Cited Airline baggage screening. (2006, June 26). US Federal News, 12. Anonymous. (2006, June 1). High turnover for baggage screeners. National Derfense, 90(631). Associated Press. (2001, November 8). Senators challenge airlines to improve flying safety. 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