Law Equity from Zizeks View - Essay Example

Question Number Zizek's, view that "we are far from being a post ideological society now" can be traced to his adaptation of ideologies of Marx andSloterdijk. He recapitulates a cynical perspective when he said that "they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it". Thus, ideology in this wise, is identified in what we do and not in what we know or are our beliefs. Our belief in an ideology is thus placed in advance of our taking into account that belief in "belief machines". An example of this is Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses. (Tom Myers, 2006) It is therefore imperative that a distinction between an ideological society and a non-ideological or post-ideological society should be made for purposes of discussing Zizek's view. In the former, politics is subjugated by the exploration for ultimate societal goal, the ideals and aspiration to realize a particular conception of the better society. It is a society where a dominant view of the better life is dispersed through society and influences people's consciousness. This process assumes different category, ranging from the totalitarian societies of fascism and Stalinist communism to liberal societies where concepts of ideological hegemony is sought. However, in present day society, the issues of political debate can no longer be fixed within the parameters of any single ideology. Over the centuries, society evolved to a much liberated system from a massive framework. Nevertheless, there is a clash between the politics of identity and the politics of ideology: the former explores in political action the recognition of the particular interests and goals of the individual, or cultural group. Ideological politics, on the other hand manifests in a collective manner of public action. The domain of ideological politics is geared towards total social transformation. However, modern political life does not operate anymore in like manner, but of fragmented or piecemeal basis, i.e., particular groups working its way for recognition, special interests claiming that governments take action to their demands (John Schwarzmantel, 2004). To these, Zizek view of the shape of politics in the contemporary society is anything but ideological. That the apparent fact of the perils of ideological politics in their totalitarian form paves way to a disparate reaction which receives the politics of difference and diversity is easily contested by Zezik. If ideologies would lead to the destruction of pluralism, then a healthy and diverse society has no place in a myriad of ideologies which seek to manipulate such diversity into one ideal. Ideologies seeks to present one ideal of a better society and attempts to reorient or direct different aspects of life towards one goal. Thus, an ideological movement is a collective movement, which stimulates people's loyalty, influences their emotions through the employment of myth and symbolism. It seeks to captivate state power to oblige that goal on the whole of society. Hence, the proponents of what Zezik's opposes acknowledge that ideological movements are not recognizable entities in the present society. (Tom Myers, 2006) Thus, its proponents insist that we have moved to a different kind of society which can be appropriately termed as post-ideological. However, Zezik's views differ on this as may be perused in his views as discussed below. Points de Capiton The question thus Zizek asks about ideology is that what maintains an ideological field of meaning consistent This is because of the fact that signifiers are dynamic and are prone to take its meaning to variousninterpretation. So how does ideology maintains its consistency The answer to this question is that a given ideological field is "quilted" by what he terms a point de capiton or the "anchoring point". Zisek argues that a point de capiton is a signifier which averts meaning from moving about inside the ideological quilt. A point de capiton provides identity to an ideological field and unifies it. An example of this is the ideology of Freedom, the meaning of which can vary about depending on the context of its use. One interpretation of the word might be taken to be the freedom to speculate on the market, whereas another idea would associate the word to freedom from the inequalities of the market. The word therefore does not always maintain its meaning such that it would be considered as universal. This is where the point de capiton takes it work. It prevents ideologies from vacillating. Hence the conflict of ideologies can be traced to its point de capiton ("communism", "fascism", "capitalism", "market economy", etc.). (Tom Myers, 2006) The Spectre of Ideology Zizek differentiate three moments in the narrative of an ideology. Doctrine - ideological doctrine concerns the ideas and theories of an ideology, i.e. liberalism partly developed from the ideas of John Locke. Belief - ideological belief designates the material or external manifestations and apparatuses of its doctrine, i.e. liberalism is materialized in an independent press, democratic elections and the free market. Ritual - ideological ritual refers to the internalization of a doctrine, the way it is experienced as spontaneous, i.e in liberalism subjects naturally think of themselves as free individuals (Tom Myers, 2006). These three aspects of ideology constitute a kind of narrative. The first stage can be considered as the pure state of ideology. In this aspect, ideology assumes the form of an apparently truthful proposition or set of arguments which, in reality, conceal a vested interest. The second aspect takes on the material form which generates belief in that ideology, most potently in the guise of Althusser's State Apparatuses. Third, ideology assumes an almost spontaneous existence. It becomes instinctive rather than realized either as an explicit set of arguments or as an institution. The prime example of such spontaneity is, for Zizek, the notion of commodity fetishism (Tom Myers, 2006). Ergo, a doctrine materializes in the form of belief and its manifests in spontaneous ritual, i.e., when we think we have taken a position of truth from which to deplore the lie of an ideology, we ourselves are back in ideology again. The reason for this is because our understanding of ideology is based on a binary structure, which differentiates reality with ideology. Zizek suggests to analyze ideology using a ternary structure. Hence, in his view, the only non-ideological position available is in the Real - the Real of the antagonism. The antagonism of the Real is a constant that has to be assumed given the existence of social reality (the Symbolic Order). Since antagonism is part of the Real, it is not liable to ideological mystification; rather its manifests in ideological mystification. Here, ideology takes the form of the spectral supplement to reality, concealing the gap opened up by the failure of reality (the Symbolic) to account fully for the Real. While this form of reality does not allow us a position from which to assume an objective viewpoint, it does presuppose the existence of ideology and thus authorizes the validity of its critique. And if ideology exists we must be able to subject it to critique. This is the aim of Zizek's theory of ideology, namely an attempt to keep the project of ideological critique alive at all in an era in which we are said to have left ideology behind (Tom Myers, 2006) "We are far from being a post-ideological society." Zizek qualified the concept of ideology in contemporary society. He states that if our concept of ideology is one which anchors on knowledge, then today's society must appear pos-ideological. But at present, the prevailing ideology is that of cynicism. People no longer believe in ideological truth at its face. The paramount level of ideology is that of fantasy structuring our social reality. He argues that cynicism is just one way "to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy." And on this, he continued, "we are far from being a post-ideological society." (Sublime, 33) Thus, ideology exists even if we don't grasp what exactly it is. He identifies ideology "as a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence." (Sublime, 21) Zizek proposes in the alternative that in order to comprehend contemporary politics, one need a different concept of ideology. Zizek's argument that the present-day consensus that our world is post-ideological gives rise to what he termed as the "archideological" fantasy created quite a stir in his field. Ideology since Marx has paved the way to a pejorative sense, not a single person who was influenced by such an ideology has ever believed that they were so duped, Zizek comments. If the term "ideology" has any meaning at all, that meaning is relevant only to what people impute to Others. This is because the ideology must have been presented to subjects as nonideological, like True and Right, and what anyone sensible would believe, before they even start to believe in in such. Moreover, Zizek is quick to the insight of realists that for a political gesture to be effective, it must declare some contestable matter on top of political contestation. Zizek argues that ideologies are packaged by their proponents as being discourses about Things too sacred to be desecrated by politics. Hence, Zizek's intrepid opening in The Sublime Object of Ideology is to claim that the present day ideology is still in existence and did not for a while, disappear from the political landscape as come into its own. Because of this success, Zizek maintains, that ideology has also been rebuffed in today's political and theoretical opinion. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) Zizek contends that the formula describing the operation of ideology today is not "they do not know it, but they are doing it", as it was for Marx. It is "they know it, but they are doing it anyway". Zizek's position is that this cynicism show signs of the in depth efficacy of political ideology per se. Ideologies therefore, as political discourses, are in existence precisely to secure the voluntary consent. This is what is termed by La Boetie as servitude voluntaire of people about contestable political policies or arrangements. However, Zizek goes on that, for subjects to voluntarily agree to follow one or other arrangement, it has to be in a state that they believe in it. This will then be their expression of their free subjectivity, and might have done otherwise. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) Zizek considers this false sense of freedom as a political instance of what Hegel called an essential appearance. In this line, Zizek contests Althusser's stand that ideological identification profers that an individual is wholly "interpellated" into a place within a political system by the system's dominant ideology and ideological state apparatuses. Zizek draws on his argument from Lacanian psychoanalysis. He insists that the idea that political position needs to effectively brainwash people into thoughtless automatons to win their support is farcical, to say the least. Instead, Zizek argues for "ideological disidentification", i.e., successful political ideology always permits subjects entertain a conscious distance towards its explicit ideals and prescriptions. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) Bringing forth the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan to work on in political theory, Zizek maintains that today's ideological cynicism takes the form of the fetishist's attitude towards a subject's fetish, and thus reveals the position of subjects towards authority. For Zizek, the stance of political subjects towards political authority manifests a logical form which runs in this line: "I know well that the market does not always act justly, but I still act as though I did not know that this is the case". It is noteworthy to contrast the famous "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" of Althusser from Zizek's point of view. The former presented a form of primal scene of ideology the instance when a bearer of authority (a policemen perhaps) blurts "hey you!" to an individual, and the individual recognizes himself as the addressee of this call. By recognizing this Other who has addressed him, the individual becomes a political subject. On the other hand, Zizek's idea of the "big Other" closely resembles to that extent but that it is not structured on Althusser's notion of the Subject in the name of which public authorities can legitimately call subjects to account within a regime. Ideologies for Zizek, operates to identify individuals with important political terms which Zizek terms as "master signifiers". According to him, the strange yet decisive thing about these important political words, is that nobody knows exactly what they mean, or has ever perceive with their own eyes the sacred objects which they seem to name (eg: God, the State, or the People). Thus, Zizek maintains that the most important words in any political doctrine are "signifiers without a signified". (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) It is worthy to mention that this claim of Zizek is thus connected to two central concepts in his work to wit: Zizek adheres to the psychoanalytic notion that individuals are always divided between the levels of their conscious awareness and the unconscious, i.e., they are always divided between what they consciously know and can say about political things, and a set of more or less unconscious beliefs they hold concerning individuals in authority, and the regime in which they live. Even if people cannot say clearly and distinctly why they support some political leader or policy, for Zizek no less than for Edmund Burke, this fact is not politically decisive. He professes a crucial distinction between knowledge and belief. Because subjects do not exactly know what is the essence of their ideals or aspirations, then the scope and nature of their beliefs on such matters is politically decisive. Zizek's view on political belief is modeled after Lacan's understanding of transference in psychoanalysis. That is, the supposition of the analysis and in psychoanalysis is that the Other (the analyst) knows the meaning of his symptoms. Obviously, this is a false belief, at the outset. But it is only through clinging on to this false belief about the analyst that the work of analysis can proceed. As a result, transferential belief can become true. Zizek contends that this also true in peoples' political beliefs, however strange intersubjective or dialectical logic of belief in clinical psychoanalysis is. He maintains that belief is always "belief through the Other". This means that subjects do not know the exact meaning of those "master signifiers" to which they political identify. This is because their political belief is mediated through their identifications with others. Although they each themselves "do not know what they do" (Zizek, 2002), the most profound level of their belief is held through the belief that there are Others who do know despite they themselved do not know. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) Zizek claims that the pivotal political function of holders of public office is to take up the position of what he calls, "the Other supposed to know". An example of this is a scene where a priests recites mass in Latin. The laymen, does not of course understand the language, but because they believe that the priest knows the meaning of the words, then this is sufficient for them to keep the faith. For Zizek this scenario shows the universal rule of how political consensus is formed. Moreover, he contends that political authority is primarily "symbolic" in nature. This means the roles, masks, or mandates that public authorities presents is more important politically than the true nature of the individuals in question. A prime example of this, according to Zizek is the liberal criticisms of George W. Bush, the man is of no importance in evaluating his political power. Rather, it is the office of that the individual occupies in their political system (Big Other) that manifests political force of their words, and the belief of subjects in his authority. This is why Zizek maintains that the employment of a political leader of war of aggression is tantamount to a confession of its weakness of his political regime. Zizek maintains that people believe through the big Other, or that the big Other believes for them, however contrary the people might inwardly think or cynically say. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) Jouissance as Political Factor Althusser's emphasis on the "materiality" of ideology as an embodiment of institutions and peoples' everyday practices and lives, was subsequently undertaken by Zizek. He believes (Zizek) that all ideals and aspirations will not impress a lasting political effect unless they come to inform institutions and subjects' day to day lives. Blaise Pascal's advice that doubting subjects should get down on their knees and pray, and then they will believe was cited by Zizek in his The Sublime Object of Ideology, According to Zizek, Pascal's position is not any kind of simple proto-behaviorism, ratherm the deeper message of Pascal's directive is to present that a subject will retrospectively realize that he got down on his knees because he always believed, without knowing it , once he (subject) have come to believe through praying. Zizek can then be considered as a consistent critic to the significance of knowledge in the creation of political consensus and also of the value of "inwardness" in politics per se in the convention of Carl Schmitt. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) Zizek asserts that prior political philosophy has placed too little emphasis on communities' cultural practices that involve what he calls "inherent transgression". Zizek calls these cultural practices as jouissance which is sanctioned by a culture that allows subjects to experience of what is usually exceptional to or prohibited in their everyday lives as civilized political subjects, e.g., sex, death, defecation, or violence. This term Jouissance is normally translated from the French as "enjoyment". As opposed to what is known in English as "pleasure". Even so, jouissance is always sexualized and always transgressive enjoyment, only within the bounds of what subjects can experience or talk about in public. Zizek argues that the subjects' political culture forms its particular relations to jouissance wherein they may experience events and practices such as for example, specific sports, types of alcohol or drugs, music, festivals, films. But this practices are as close as they will be in getting to know the profound Truth professed for them by their regime's master signifiers - "nation", "God", "our way of life", etc. Zizek, contends that these apparent nonpolitical and specific practices defines them as a nation even though the subject does not know their Nation, yet they enjoy (jouis) their nation as themselves. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) Sublime Objects of Ideology To Zizek, almost all successful political ideologies necessarily refer sublime objects posited by political ideologies. These are what the subjects take as the regime's ideologies core words such as God, the Fuhrer, the King, in whose name, the people will contravene the boundaries of moral laws and lay down their lives. Zizek argues that when a subject adheres to a political ideology, this does not necessarily mean that the subject percieves the Truth. That a subject's disloyalty or abnormality does not, in any way, relate to his inability to explain the nature of what the subjects political beliefs. Political ideologies operates precisely with a way of allowing subjects in seeing the world according to which such an inability as a as testimony to Pervasiveness or Greatness of his Nation, God, or Freedom is, which stand out from the mundane things of the world. (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) To this, Zizek agrees with Ernesto Laclau and Chantale Mouffe that each political ideology aims to elevate their particular political perspective where it can assert to represent the political whole (the State). In order however successfully achieve this political feat, Zizek maintains that each group must present its perspective with extra-political sublime objects that is within the culture as giving form to this whole such as the "national interest" "the dictatorship of the proletariat", etc. Otherwise, such political ideology must replace a previous ideology's sublime objects with such new objects. For Zizek's, Stalinism brings upon the thought that "the Party" had this sublime political status. This is why, according to Zizek, class struggle in this kind of society did not end, despite Stalinist propaganda. It was only dislodged from the clash between two classes to one between "the Party" as representative of the people and all those who opposed with it, the latter being branded and politically positioned as "traitors" or "enemies of the people." (Matthew Sharpe, 2006) In this wise, the proposition that we live in a post-ideological age is more apparent than real. Today's liberal-democracies are highly ideological. They are governed by the ideology of vulgarized liberalism, which packages itself as non-ideological. As discussed above, all successful ideologies present themselves as 'common sense', to the subject. They assume the colors of everyday life. The present day dominant liberalism manifest ideas of difference and gives significance to the personal realm; but this is a private sphere which is governed by ideas of personal experiences, thus the supposed impoverishment of political life and a limited range of substitutes in the ideological arena. (John Schwarzmantel, 2004) Indeed, Zizek pointed out in a peculiar manner that today's society does not even come close in achieving that post-ideological state. Rather, when we believe that we do not take ideologies as the encompassing truth, we instead posits a form of ideologies which we are guided, though masked in a subtle way, through the belief in particular Thing. True, the dominant political ideologies of the 19th century is only academic, to say the least, but this is not to say the we do not in anyway believe in any form of ideologies such as not to manifest itself in our daily lives. Bibliography Tom Myers, 2006, Slavoj Zizek - Key Ideas http://www.lacan.com/zizekchro1.htm), accessed on Feb.6, 2008 John Schwarzmantel, 2004 Hegemony and Contestation in Post-Ideological Society, from http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/uppsala/ws3/Schwarzmantel.pdf., accessed on Feb.6, 2008 Matthew Sharpe, 2006, Slavoj Zizek (b. 1949) from The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/z/zizek.htm, accessed on Feb. 6, 2008 Read More