The Effects of Feedback Self-Consistency - Essay Example

Collins, D.R.andStukas, A.A. (2006, August).The Effects of Feedback Self-Consistency, Therapist Status, and Attitude toward Therapy on Reaction to Personality Feedback.The Journal of Social Psychology146(4): 463-484. It is a proven fact that people seek verification of their identities in the responses of other people. Available research on the self in an interpersonal context have demonstrated that people often prefer to have others see them as they see themselves. Collins and Stukas (June 2006) deemed that in order to maintain such consistency, people seek feedback from others that is self-consistent. Also, people are more likely to notice consistent feedback more than inconsistent feedback and to interpret ambiguous feedback as consistent with their own self-conceptions. However, sometimes people receive self-inconsistent feedback. According to Self-Verification Theory (Swann 1987, as cited by Collins and Stukas), people are likely to reject such feedback. Nevertheless, there are some situations in which self-change is promoted and self-inconsistent feedback is meant to be taken seriously and scrutinized. In particular, the therapeutic clinic is a context for such change, which is often set in motion by the delivery of self-inconsistent feedback. However, Self-Verification Theory had already demonstrated that people in need of therapeutic change (e.g., depressed people) may show a preference for negative (self-consistent) feedback over positive (self-inconsistent) feedback. Indeed, in the setting of therapy, clients may be more willing to accept self-inconsistent feedback, although other factors--such as therapists' statuses and clients' attitudes toward therapy--may moderate acceptance. This is why Collins and Stukas (2006) tried to study the effects of experimentally manipulated personality feedback that they--in the guise of therapists--e-mailed to participants on the degree of their acceptance of the feedback. Consistent with Self-Verification Theory (Swann, 1987), participants accepted feedback that was consistent with their self-views more readily than they did feedback that was inconsistent with their self-views. What they did was to randomly assign participants in receiving self-inconsistent or self-consistent feedback, and they simply returned their evaluations of the feedback to us by e-mail. Collins and Stukas (June 2006) hypothesized that (a) participants would be more willing to accept self-consistent feedback than self-inconsistent feedback, (b) participants would be more willing to accept self-inconsistent feedback from a high-status therapist than from a low-status therapist, and (c) participants with positive attitudes toward therapy would be more willing to accept self-inconsistent feedback than would participants with negative attitudes toward therapy. Although Collins and Stukas (June, 2006) obtained results that are consistent with past researches, the thing is that they chose a very minimal operationalization of the therapeutic context, one that allowed us to manipulate both therapist status and feedback without concern for the potential influence of other variables that are normally found in this setting (e.g., dynamics of an actual interaction, appearance of the therapist and therapist's office, actual psychopathology of the clients). They also used a very short measure to assess participants' self-concepts. This reductionistic approach worked well from both a practical standpoint and an ethical one, but doing research in the real setting might prove more difficult. This research from Collins and Stukas (June 2006) might be helpful in terms of the modern methodologies used in this study. We could use similar approach in determining Self-Feedbacks by electronic mail to our respondents. Schmitt, D.P. and Allik, J. (2005, October). Simultaneous Administration of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale in 53 Nations: Exploring the Universal and Culture-Specific Features of Global Self-Esteem, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 89(4): 623-642. In Schmitt and Allik's study (October 2005), they delved on global self-esteem by using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) translated into 28 languages and administered to 16,998 participants across 53 nations. Among the many devices for assessing global self-esteem, the self-report version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg 1965, as cited by Rosenberg and Allik) remained to be the most widely used measure. The popularity of the 10-item RSES has been due, in part, to its long history of use, its uncomplicated language, and its brevity (it takes only 1 or 2 min to complete). In addition, the RSES displays a transparent one-dimensional factor structure, though some studies have found underlying subfactors within the RSES. What Schmitt and Allik (October 2005) did to address their study is to simultaneously administering the RSES, alongside other questionnaires, to college student and community samples from 53 nations. More specifically, they had formulated five main objectives. First, they evaluated the structural equivalence of the RSES across cultures, focusing on internal reliability and factor structure invariance. Second, they examined the external equivalence of the RSES by looking at its universal links with personality traits and attachment styles across cultures. Third, they determined whether positive self-evaluation (i.e., an average score above the midpoint of the RSES) prevailed across all cultures, particularly non-Western cultures. Fourth, they tested for differential responding to positively and negatively coded self-esteem items and investigated the possibility of a negative item bias across cultures. Lastly, they explored whether cultures systematically differed in the self-competence and self-liking facets of global self-esteem. Because of the language barrier, the RSES was translated into 28 different languages. The 10 items of the RSES assess a person's overall evaluation of his or her worthiness as a human being (Rosenberg, 1979). Responses were coded on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The RSES contains an equal number of positively (e.g., people feeling satisfied with life) and negatively (e.g., people feeling they are failures) worded items. To characterize the RSES more completely, they computed the mean score, standard deviation, Cronbach's alpha, and other indicators. The Metatraitedness Index was defined as the inverse value of the inter-item variance of each respondent. They also computed separate scores for the five positively worded and the five negatively worded items of the RSES. The absolute value of this difference index, Pos-Neg, provided a measure of whether answers to positively worded items were congruent with answers to negatively worded items. The larger the difference, the larger the discrepancy between positively and negatively worded items. Finally, they computed the respondents' scores for the self-esteem subcomponents of self-competence and self-liking based on the work of Tafarodi and Milne (2002, as cited by Schmitt and Allik). Self-competence consists of the first five items of the RSES (e.g., people feeling they do things as well as most people); self-liking consists of the last 5 items (e.g., people saying they take positive attitudes toward themselves). Although their study was quite intensive, Schmitt and Allik (October 2005) had proven that the internal reliability and factor structure of the RSES is psychometrically sound across the many languages and cultures of the ISDP. They found that both within and across nations, RSES scores correlate in expected ways with the key personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion, as well as with the model of self dimension from attachment theory. The robust nature of these findings would seem to support the structural equivalence of self-esteem as measured by the RSES. However, the authors warned against this universalist conclusion: First, some cultures possess a negative item bias. Without correcting for cross-cultural variability in responses to negative items, comparisons of national mean values on the RSES remain somewhat problematic. Second, the variance in responses to the RSES shows systematic patterning across cultures, with higher standard deviations present in more individualistic, power differentiated, and wealthier cultures. This suggests that there is a tendency for people from collectivist cultures to exhibit a neutral response bias and avoid the extreme ends of self-esteem rating scales. Third, solid evidence suggests that the subcomponents of global self-esteem (i.e., self-competence and self-liking) systematically vary across cultures, again showing links to individualism-collectivism. In our proposal, Schmitt and Allik (October 2005) could contribute dearly in their methodologies in using RSES to determine cross-cultural key personality trait measurement tool. Locke, B.D. and Mahalik, J.R. (2005, July). Examining Masculinity Norms, Problem Drinking, and Athletic Involvement as Predictors of Sexual Aggression in College Men, Journal of Counseling Psychology. 52(3):279-283. One of the most common personality changes in males is their sexual aggression against women. Sexual aggression prevalence rates are known to vary greatly across cultures, with certain cultural beliefs and values contributing to "rape-prone" cultures (Sanday 1981, as cited by Locke and Mahalik). Thus, male sexual aggression can be conceptualized as a combination of sexually aggressive behaviors (e.g., harassment, rape) and the cultural beliefs that support such behaviors, including rape myths, such as rape results from uncontrollable male passions. Because of the dearth of studies that examine masculinity as a multidimensional construct in relation to sexual violence, Locke and Mahalik (July 2005) sought to find dimensions of masculinity (i.e., restricting affection to other men) predicted college men's sexual aggression in correlation to other masculinity factors (e.g., pursuing success). They extended this type of multidimensional approach to understanding masculinity as it relates to sexually aggressive behaviors and rape myth acceptance. They assumed, first, that masculinity is a singular global construct ignores the multiple dimensions of masculinity identified in U.S. society. For example, gender theorists posit and previous studies confirmed a large number of cultural beliefs about masculine gender roles (e.g., be a winner; be emotionally controlled; have power over women; disdain gay men), with as many as 11 distinct masculinity norms identified. Second, using a multidimensional conceptualization of masculinity allows for the potential of a more complex, interpretable, and practically applicable relationship between the components of masculinity and sexual aggression. The study was done on college men as the authors examined masculinity in the context of other variables identified as predictors of men's sexual aggression in the college population. One such variable is alcohol use, which is reported to increase men's perception that female behavior is sexual in nature, decrease the perception of risk involved in sexual aggression, and increase the likelihood of sexual aggression. The purpose of this study is to extend previous research by examining how sexually aggressive behavior and endorsement of rape myths are predicted by masculinity as a multidimensional construct, along with previously demonstrated predictors of sexual aggression in a college population. Specifically, Locke and Mahalik (July 2005) predicted that greater conformity to masculinity norms, higher levels of problematic alcohol use, and greater involvement with college athletics would relate to higher levels of self-reported sexual aggression and greater endorsement of rape myths. Given the findings about masculinity and problematic alcohol use, Locke and Mahalik's study (July 2005) could be used as part of prevention efforts that might address the most salient masculinity norms identified in this study-in particular Power Over Women, Dominance, Playboy, and Disdain for Homosexuals-along with problematic alcohol use. Cognitive therapy techniques could be used to help men identify and challenge particular masculinity norms (e.g., patriarchal attitudes or devaluing women) that may constrain their own well-being as well as contribute to sexual aggression. This study will be very helpful to help us determine the changes of personality in adolescent males. Eisenberger, N.I.,Lieberman,M.D. andWilliams, K.D. (2003, October 10). Does rejection hurt An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion..Science302(5643):290-294. One basic feature of human experience is to feel soothed in the presence of other people and to feel distressed when left behind. Many languages reflect this experience in the assignment of physical pain words ("hurt feelings") to describe experiences of social separation. However, the notion that the pain associated with losing someone is similar to the pain experienced upon physical injury seems more metaphorical than real. Nonetheless, Eisenberg, Lieberman and Williams (10 October 2003) suggested that there is evidence that some of the same neural machinery recruited in the experience of physical pain may also be involved in the experience of pain associated with social separation or rejection. Because of the adaptive value of mammalian social bonds, the social attachment system, which keeps young near caregivers, may have piggybacked onto the physical pain system to promote survival. This is why they conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of social exclusion to determine whether the regions activated by social pain are similar to those found in studies of physical pain. In fact, in their research they found a pattern of activations very similar to those found in studies of physical pain emerged during social exclusion, providing evidence that the experience and regulation of social and physical pain share a common neuroanatomical basis. Understanding the underlying commonalities between physical and social pain will be very helpful in psychological perspectives on issues of acceptance because physical and social pain are affected similarly by both social support and neurochemical interventions, and this explains it "hurts' when people could not accept us for who we are. Gateley, G.(1999, Winter). Escaping from the Self-Esteem Trap.ETC.: A Review of General Semantics56(4):440. Our relationships with ourselves hold that we require self-esteem. Advocates of this perspective believe that lack of this trait underlies just about every category of human failings: school failure, juvenile delinquency, depression, self-hate, divorce, child abuse, domestic violence, even sin in general. Consequently, many helpers today try as best they can to enable their clients to increase self-esteem. Some clients fail to do this and may wind up blaming themselves for one more weakness: their inability to esteem themselves. Gateley (1999) deemed that attempts at developing self-esteem in others sometimes fail because of the nature of self-esteem: to have it you must take full credit for your accomplishments and total blame for your failures: thus you have to achieve almost all of your goals. William James (1950, a cited by Gateley) said that self-esteem is equal to your accomplishments divided by your pretensions [provided that you take credit and blame for your successes and failures]. This is why a person can work on developing self-esteem by increasing accomplishments or by giving up pretensions. In Gateley's article, he suggested tips on how to escape self-esteem traps. As long as you give yourself credit for your accomplishments and blame for your failures, to develop self-esteem, you have to reduce frustrations. Consequently, to develop self-esteem in clients, therapists must help them increase their accomplishments or reduce their pretensions or probably do both. Another reason why the search for self-esteem creates self-contempt is that this quest causes seekers to compare themselves to others. These people can nearly always find someone who seems more successful than they are. All accomplishments are relative. Comparing one's self to others can lead to envy, jealously, hatred of others, competitiveness, and various degrees of demoralization. This study by Gateley (1999) could be used primarily in our proposal because it has viable recommendations on how to develop our personality in order to get the acceptance of other people. Tafarodi, R.W.andVu, T. (1997, Jnue). Two-Dimensional Self-Esteem and Reactions to Success and Failure.Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin23(6): 626-636. It has been found before that people with low self-esteem tend to persist less after initial failure than those with high in self-esteem. However, it is still vague whether this motivational vulnerability is attributable to low self-competence, low self-liking, or both. To address this question, Tafarodi and Vu (June 1997) studied the persistence and performance of students with distinct self-esteem composites were examined using an anagram task. The persistence results revealed that low self-liking was independently associated with decreased effort following performance failure, suggesting that it is this dimension of low self-esteem that is of primary importance in accounting for the previously demonstrated phenomenon. Differences in performance, although less pronounced, corresponded roughly with differences in persistence. They compared the behavior of students with distinct self-esteem composites with the intent of revealing the differential significance of self-liking and self-competence for motivational vulnerability associated with low self-esteem. Because those low in self-liking tend to be similarly low in self-competence, stringent selective recruitment was used to make self-liking an self-competence orthogonal in a contrived sample, allowing tests of their independent contributions to any group differences in behavior. The results obtained by Tafordi and Vu (June 1997) using this strategy revealed that participants low in self-liking suffered a greater decrement in persistence following failure feedback than did participants high in self-liking. This difference fits with previous findings using gross self-esteem as the classification variable. At the same time, it was found that participants low in self-competence did not suffer a greater decrement in persistence relative to those high in self-competence. In fact, a modest but significant difference was evident in the opposite direction. The significance of this particular study to our proposal is that we could use the two-dimensional model of self-esteem to determine key personality traits that is required to gain acceptance. Balcetis, E. and Dunning, D. (2006, October). See What You Want to See: Motivational Influences on Visual Perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 91(4): 612-625. Most researches in psychology tend to undermine the assumption that what people see or hear is an exact replica of what is out in the world, in two different ways. First, perception is selective. People are not aware of everything that is going on around them. Consider, for example, recent studies of attentional blindness. For example, Balcetis and Dunning (October 2006) cited that undergraduates asked to monitor how many times people in a videotape pass a basketball among themselves, 40% failed to see the woman in a gorilla suit sauntered into the middle of the group, turn to the camera, beat her chest, and then walk out. Second, perception is often biased. For example, hills are not as steep as they appear to be and distances are not as short as they look. Moreover, perception is malleable. It is responsive to top-down influences that flow from the perceiver's cognitive and psychological states or from environments. To be sure, much of perception is bottom-up, with sense organs and perceptual systems working inflexibly and automatically to form a representation of a stimulus that the perceiver passively accepts. On the other hand, substantial volume of psychological research revealed that top-down influences also inform perception. This is why Balcetis and Dunning (October 2006) explored one possible top-down influence on perception that has been shown to have a profound and ubiquitous impact in other arenas of social cognition. That influence is the perceiver's motivational states-more specifically, the motivation to think of one's self and one's prospects in a favorable way, to believe that one will achieve positive outcomes while being able to avoid aversive ones, and to enhance self-worth and esteem. This motivation in the psychological literature has several names, such as motivated reasoning, self-affirmation, wishful thinking, and defensive processing, and has been shown to have a widespread influence in shaping how people think about their world, that is, how they interpret information of which they are consciously aware. This motive has been shown to influence such higher order tasks as judging other people, evaluating the self, predicting the future, and making sense of the past. Balcetis and Dunning (October 2006) gathered data using 5 studies. One of these was done where participants were shown an ambiguous figure (e.g., one that could be seen either as the letter B or the number 13). Participants tended to report seeing the interpretation that assigned them to outcomes they favored. This finding was affirmed by unobtrusive and implicit measures of perception (e.g., eye tracking, lexical decision tasks) and by experimental procedures demonstrating that participants were aware only of the single (usually favored) interpretation they saw at the time they viewed the stimulus. These studies suggest that the impact of motivation on information processing extends down into preconscious processing of stimuli in the visual environment and thus guides what the visual system presents to conscious awareness. This study revealed that people fail to recognize such self-serving biases if those processes remain outside of conscious awareness, monitoring, or control. If those processes take place preconsciously, before any content of perception and cognition reaches consciousness, people can construct pleasant thoughts yet remain unaware of the construction. The only content that would be available in consciousness would be the product and not the process of motivated reasoning. Read More