Accordingly, the primary focus should be to improve the quality of the police and other security forces, strengthen government institutions, and separated the populace from the insurgents. Contemporary counterinsurgency methodologies introduced in the Philippines, Malaya, Algeria and Vietnam prove when the government accomplished these tasks, it defused the insurgency's political and ideological premise, discredited their cause, and created a political environment unsuitable for an insurgency to thrive.
DISCUSSION: Intelligence reports show clashes between Taliban and coalition forces have increased significantly in 2008, highlighting the Taliban's resurgence and complicating NATO efforts to stabilize the country. Taliban, Hekmatyar, and Haqqani militants have expanded their influence in rural regions where NATO/ISAF and the Afghan government cannot provide sufficient security. Violent attacks have tripled in these areas - particularly against civilian non-combatants perceived to be in support of the government. Consequently, the U.S. planners must convince NATO and commanders to employ specific counterinsurgency approaches to reverse these trends.
1. Secure the Afghan-Pakistan border. ...
Thus far, US/NATO strike operations along the border and inside Afghanistan have not curtailed militant force infiltrations and security forces have been unable to pursue retreating insurgents across the border. In order prevent these incursions, a more audacious containment strategy must be implemented. Measures include increasing security force levels in select border regions, formalizing intelligence cooperation activities with Pakistan, and erecting barriers along major infiltration corridors. First, NATO must expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Afghan National Army (ANA) presence in the remote border regions where infiltrations and armed attacks most often occur. Diligent law enforcement activities should be the primary focus in populated areas and villages to disrupt support sanctuaries and networks logistics networks. ANA forces should occupy security checkpoints and border encampments to interdict hostile incursions. In the meantime Afghan and Pakistani officials formally demarcate the Durand Line by establishing a mutually recognized border, then erect a series of defensive fences along known infiltration corridors to deny militants access into Afghanistan. Technology based surveillance systems and interdiction platforms must be employed in tandem with physical structures. French counterinsurgents successfully employed similar fencing startegy in Algeria when they built the Mortice Line to contain the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) insurgents. Within a year of construction, the eight foot electrical fence proved to be a decisive counterinsurgency additive. The combination of static defenses and mobile border forces had killed over 6,000 would-be intruders and intercepted