A Clear Chapter by Chapter Synopsis of The President as Leader by Erwin C. Hargrove - Essay Example

A Clear Chapter by Chapter Synopsis of "The President as Leader" by Erwin C. Hargrove Following a distinguished career as a scholar f the American presidency, Erwin C. Hargrove in The President as Leader offers his capstone appraisal f presidential leadership. He builds on the theories f Richard Neustadt by stating that, in addition to bargaining and persuading, a president must be a moral leader in the mold f Aristotle who uses rhetoric to teach the ideals f the American experience. Case studies f real-life leaders help clarify Hargrove's complex model: Franklin Roosevelt, whom Hargrove regards as the model modern president because he used rhetoric to gain support for such significant policies as social security and an end to isolationism; Lyndon Johnson, who, although he inspired the public on civil rights, was frustrated by Vietnam because f his obsession with control; and Ronald Reagan, who connected with the public on values but faltered because he failed to verify the accuracy f his rhetoric. Primarily f interest to political scientists, the book is recommended for larger public and academic presidential studies collections. The chapter one of the book, Power and Purpose in Political Leadership, Hargrove defines characteristics of political leadership. As the title suggest, the chapter discusses as examples powers used by some American presidents. Hargrove argues that Carter's approach eschewed political advantage as a criterion for formulating policy, but that compromise might be necessary. The second chapter, Conceptions of Leadership, explains leadership qualities. The power f the policy to sustain itself is strengthened by comprehensiveness, which implies a long-term view rather than a quick fix. The importance of culture is discussed in the third chapter of the book, Cultural Leadership, where Hargrove has discussed cultural background of many American presidents. For Carter, political leadership was not so much doing what's right instead f what's political as it was doing the political in the right way. Consequently, existing theory is hard-pressed to classify the Carter administration on the basis f a predisposition for or against centralization. As a Democrat and political leader following a public goods approach to governing, it would not be unreasonable to expect a tendency toward centralization f policy making in the White House, especially on domestic priorities. This would allow Carter to control the content f policy important for his substantive approach. On the other hand, like most presidents, Carter entered office with an eye toward cabinet government and a reliance on expertise as a guiding force for policy making. Carter's public goods philosophy led him to choose experts to head governmental departments. This foreshadowed an approach to governance based on specialization and on a willingness to formulate substantive policy addressing major problems. Neither politics nor the strategy f politicization had much to do with cabinet appointments. Nelson Polsby notes that the Carter cabinet in particular was characterized by curious neutrality...toward the vast stew f interest groups...that make up the traditional Democratic coalition. In sum, using Carter as a case study presents a theoretical paradox. On the one hand, his theory f governing leads to the expectation that policy making, especially on domestic priorities, would be centralized. On the other, he valued expertise, which leads one to expect that he would place a high value on policy developed by civil servants in the bureaucracy. Thus, the analyst f presidential administration can learn much by examining the Carter experience. The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters of the books, tiled Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson and Ronald Reagan, respectively, have discussed three great presidents of the United States as case studies. In these chapters, the writer has explained leadership, decision making and some other qualities of these president. One successful case and an unsuccessful one were chosen from each strategy (i.e. centralized, mixed, decentralized). The chosen policies were non-crisis domestic priorities because these provide a generalized base from which to examine policy making in the White House and to begin searching for sources and patterns f continuity and variation in presidential policy making. The policies that were determined to fit the categories are: the Youth Employment initiative (YE) and the creation f the Department f Education in the centralized strategy; the second energy proposal (Energy II) and welfare reform in the mixed category; and civil service reform (CSR) and national health insurance (NHI) in the delegated strategy. Further, a policy in each category was chosen for its "success" and the other for its "failure." The criteria for judging success and failure are laid out below. The cases, along with their concomitant strategies, are illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, all cases considered were presidential priorities as set by Carter himself and later confirmed by empirical work. Definitions follow previous work on this debate. "Neutral competence" is defined as substantive policy information, normally originating in the departments and agencies f the bureaucracy or by experts providing advice. I take the view that neutral competence is policy competence and thus primarily long-term, policy specific, and making little reference to affected political constituencies. In short, it seeks to aid the president in achieving his goals and leaves politics to others. The president's responsive agents are charged with guarding his professional prestige which in turn serves to protect his public prestige. Consequently, it might be better for the president to fight and lose on an issue f importance to him while the content f that issue remains faithful to his perception f political imperatives than it is for him to win on an issue that is sound in terms f policy substance but does irrevocable damage to his professional or public prestige. In the later chapters f The President as Leader Hargrove discusses successes and failures f successive presidents f the United States. When examining specific policies, the analysis takes a presidential perspective regarding what is deemed a success or a failure. "Success" is determined by the degree f cooperation and coordination among the various actors. The criterion f presidential satisfaction, defined as getting what is feasible from the process and accurately perceiving the politics surrounding an issue, is the measure f that degree f cooperation. f course, it is difficult to measure these in any quantitative sense. Determinations are made by impression, and impressions were checked against both the primary and secondary historical record. My analysis will argue that successful cases are characterized by such cooperation and coherence. Less successful cases, or "failures," are characterized by a breakdown or unevenness f cooperation and a faulty perception f the political possibilities surrounding the individual policy. The seventh and the last chapter of the book, Leadership of the Polity, is conclusion. The perception f the political possibilities surrounding an issue is defined as the degree to which the actors succeed or fail to assess the parameters f political feasibility. When referring to a policy process, "coordination" refers to at least two (and usually more) organizational entities providing information and advice with one f those entities (e.g. DPS) playing a mediating role by synthesizing for the president all relevant arguments and, where necessary or explicitly requested, advocating one or another f these perspectives. A "smooth process" is one in which each actor plays a role defined either by convention or by presidential direction, does not covertly seek political advantage, and the responsive agent acts as an "honest broker," i.e. bringing all relevant issues to the president's attention, giving equal weight to the importance f each. Given these parameters, I now turn to the empirical section. Welfare reform was a major goal f the Carter administration. Initially the policy formulation phase was split between the Departments f Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Late in the process the strategy turned to one f mixing, but it was too late to impact the outcome effectively. One reason the DPS did not step in sooner and develop a more forceful role was that Carp, with Eizenstat's support, wanted Califano and Marshall to forge their own agreement. Initially, there was a standoff between HEW and DPS. Interestingly Califano let it be known that the staff was not to interfere and dilute his control f HEW, that is, not to treat cabinet secretaries as he had when he was in charge f domestic policy development for Lyndon Johnson. Carter felt that welfare reform should be managed by bureaucrats and officials in the agencies f the executive branch, with Califano and Marshall as the key players. However, it soon became obvious that someone would have to take the lead in brokering disputes, and DPS was selected for this function. The role f Carp and the staffers was to make clear to the agencies the president's intentions in the welfare debate. They were to mediate between the departments and guide the debate into political feasibility. Works Cited Hargrove, Erwin, C. 1998. The president as leader: Appealing...University Press f Kansas Read More