Care of Child: A Prominent Need of any Society - Assignment Example

Care of Child - A prominent need of any society It was the evening of the Sunday night, when dropped in my home a young, depressed girl with her essential guardians. Her name was Angela. She was greatly attached with her two-step sisters, namely Belle and Carla. Angela told me that Belle was hardly two years old and Carla was three. Angela, who was 15 years of her age, was quite mature to realize the focus of her love and feelings towards her two younger sisters. Its all in the human nature, love can project its presence anywhere and everywhere. It has been several times that real sisters do not respond to the need of each other. As seen in the case of Helen Keller, her very own sister did not really care a bit and paid no fruitful attention to her health and need. Nevertheless, here the story was different in existence and practice. Angela was so much concerned about her younger sisters and was so very depressed with the thought of departing from them for lifetime. I sincerely appreciate both the concern and attachment as endorsed within the personality of Angela. Angela was in need of desperate help at the hour of her contact with me. She was interested in the knowledge and exposure of the important English laws as practiced in UK in the relevant matter. I paid keen attention and moral belonging to the queries of Angela and thought to put in my best efforts to guide her. Some bits were already in the shelter of her knowledge regarding the existent laws in UK. She was right when she pointed from the depths of her learning that there was reason that she could be allowed to be in connection with her sisters. She expressed them as human rights. In addition, she knew she could exercise freedom of incorporation of decisions into her life as per her own choice. Thus, she acknowledged the law's positive aspect by stating that she had an absolute right to stay connected with her family members. Until then I had just expressed my contribution with a faint yet prominent smile. "You are an intelligent girl," I pointed with confidence. Moreover, this was something that transferred my smile to her face but with superior prominence. "I learnt this all in school," she smiled even more real. As if, hope of connecting with the dear ones was gaining development in her conscious and subconscious mind. I thought of gaining first the essential information about Angela. Angela was born and brought up in Middlesex, UK. She was educated in a convent school in UK. By birth, she was thus holding UK citizenship. There had been no incidence of migration as evident from the information presented by her. She therefore was under the benefit of complete set of laws as engraved for the UK citizens by the British law. We therefore thought to proceed further in the matter and I opted to discuss the in-depth feelings of the innocent looking young Angela. She told me that she had seen few child abuse cases as a school-going girl. The adopted children were inflicted with huge amount of stress in some instances after the practice of adoption. She wanted to be sure that her loving sisters were well treated in their home. "I agree with you but the child abuse cases are no more restricted to the practice of adoption alone, they have spread to stigmatize even real parents," was the most appropriate remark I endorsed during my discussion with the young lady. I just made her look how intensely the children were abused. I made her realize the case of Maria Colwell (1973), age 7 died, death of Jasmine Beckford (1984), age 4 years, in the same year Tyra Henry, age 21 months, Kimberley Carlile(1986) age four, yet another girl Lauren Wright(2000) age 4, in the very same year Victoria Climbie eight years; all were victims of child abuse. I advised Angela that she certainly should approach the authorities of law for provision of justice to her in the most efficient fashion. Since this can also help assure further that, her guardians are practicing a better quality of dealing towards her. "It is essential to note that for this you might essentially require the support of your guardians," I added. You see the child abuse cases are increasing in UK and a child protected by the penetration of relative's love can certainly be assured better survival. I re-mentioned the case of Victoria in which the child had faced more than 200 injuries on her body and had been inflicted by such high level of physical abuse that all her internal organs had completely failed. I wanted her to realize how her connection with her two younger sisters can also be fruitful in assuring the absence of child abuse practice on them. This is also true because the two younger sisters could communicate better with their elder sister and could therefore present better chances of living happily with their guardians. I have included my advise to Angel in different facets by direct and indirect correlation to law and other discussions throughout the essay. The advise was to make the young girl realize the existent law and order and the prevalent situation of ethics and moral in the British society a the present time. It was also essential to mention to the young lady that maximum amount of child abuse cases were taking place with girl children. Thus, protection of law was all the more required for her and her younger sisters. We need to discuss the issue in greater depth was my most important suggestion in our meeting. To be true, I was desperate in helping her out and placing a permanent smile on her young face. Rarely do we see youngsters exhibiting such superior quality of love and concern for their siblings. With Angela I shared my believes and thoughts, readings and ideas, knowledge and intelligence and all other that I could for a confirmed benefit in her life. We brought back to knowledge that children are not only the innocent most stratum of a society, but also the future builders of a nation. Their proper upbringing, nourishment, protection, education and training are the duty of a welfare state. Therefore all the welfare states devise schemes and introduce laws for the protection, upliftment and betterment of the children. Care and protection laws have also been made keeping in mind the matters related to children. I told her that The Children Act 1989 was introduced for this purpose. Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 clearly states that local authorities have a general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need. Hartnell Chanot has defined the term Care Proceedings in the following words: "Social Services have a duty under the Children Act to protect vulnerable children and if any report is made to them that a child has suffered harm or is likely to suffer harm which is significant they are duty bound to investigate and, if they consider appropriate, will start what are termed "Care Proceedings". This can be a very frightening and intimidating process for parents who may well be deeply upset by any injury their child may have suffered or who may dispute the allegations made about the safety or welfare of their child." (Hartnell Chanot: Care Proceedings and Child Protection Procedures). The Children Act 1989 has determined the procedure under which the local authority can take steps for the welfare of the children. The local authority, under the rules prescribed by the state in law, can appoint guardian(s) for young children as well as administrator(s) for their property if they contain any. Section 1(2) of the Act states: In a proceeding in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child. I told Angela that the words here emphasized on children's rights in respect of their welfare and protection. So much so, the delay in determining the question while giving decision is declared as "prejudice." It shows how state is conscious in providing the children with kind supervision and attention. Not only this but also other parts of the Law reveal the very fact framed for child protection. The main objective before the Law is to give the children proper shelter and care to make them useful citizens for the future years to come. I thought it essential to even bring to Angela's knowledge the present advantages of Devon County Council, the Children Act 1989. I introduced this law to her by stating that this act was brought to the presence of established laws of UK by keeping in mind the following matters: Under the Children Act 1989, Local Authorities, have a general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need. Local Authorities must assess a child's needs and promote the upbringing of children by their own families if safe to do so. Local Authorities should work in partnership with parents. While the Local Authority will seek a Court order when compulsory action is in the best interest of the child, the first option must be to work with the parents by voluntary arrangement unless to do so would clearly be placing the child at risk of significant harm. The Court will only make an order if it is better for the child than making no order. Consideration of the welfare checklist assists the Court in making this decision. In all cases when the Court determines any question with respect to the child's upbringing, the child's welfare shall be the paramount consideration. The Children Act introduces the principle that delay in Court proceedings is harmful to the child. The Court has the power to draw up a timetable and give directions as to the conduct of the case and will invariably exercise this power. There is however a general principal that there will be some occasions where delay is beneficial. (Quoted in Devon Council web page) I explained to Angela how the above-described points explain the concepts with regard to children's care who are in need. According to this, the first and the foremost purpose of this Act are to protect and safeguard the needy children. I also mentioned that, the court/local authority has jurisdiction to give a child in need under the supervision of his own family. The local authority may provide financial aid in this respect. And, the family must be consulted while submitting a child in need to some other guardian's protection. And therefore, the family reserves the rights to have contacts with the child under care of some other guardian. I made Angela realize that all the above points have been determined keeping in view the welfare of the children in need. Child Care Act, 1989 defines a child in need in these words: A child is defined as being a child in need if: They are unlikely to achieve or maintain, or have the opportunity of achieving, or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for them of services by a Local Authority or Their health or development is likely to be significantly impaired or further impaired, without the provision of such services or They are disabled. (Sec. 17/10) Children Act 1989) "Angela your case comes under the provisions of the law," I gave assurance to the young girl. In the above case, law not only gives Belle and Carla into safe supervision of a guardian other than their family, but also it gives right to their family to have continuous interaction with the young children. The law gives right of the guardianship under the following grounds, which support the reason that child, is in need: If a child lacks normal standards of health, If a child lacks proper chances of development, The child's development looks impaired, The child is undergoing any kind of disability, There exists some reason, based on sound grounds that court thinks that the guardian be appointed for a child. In case of one or more of the above reasons, the local authority/court can issue orders to appoint guardian for the upbringing of a child. The guardian can submit his own suggestions before the local authorities/court of law about the education and training of the children under care. The authorities take decisions keeping in mind all the circumstances whether the suggestions are beneficial for the child or not. I further enhanced the applicability of our essential discussions by adding that there are several private child-care centers including private schools and recreation centers, which offer their services for the upbringing of the children. The government agencies also provide the child-care services. These child-care centers are responsible for the interactions with the children, parents, guardians, and potential customers. The courts take decisions whether the child is going under right protection or not. However, the government, as well as private agencies has their own rules and regulations regarding the upbringing of the children, yet there are equal rights of the family to differ with the rules as in the case with Angela and her two-step sisters. "The case of yours and your two step-sisters of Angela named Belle (aged 2 years) and Carla (aged 3 years) under consideration, and the appointed guardian along with the local authorities who decided to terminate the contact of the two young children with their family i.e. their parents and step sister Angela, as they think it better for the upbringing of the two could take a turn with the aid of this knowledge" I explained. The local authority, under the Child Act, has authority to investigate that is there any children in need are in their area, and how they should perform their obligation as the local authorities. In the words of the section 17 of the Law: Duty to Investigate the Children in Need 1-It is the general duty of every Local Authority to: Safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need and So far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children's needs 2-In order to undertake this task, the Local Authority will provide a range of services which will also help children in need to continue to live with their families and which are designed to help prevent abuse and neglect. 3-The underlying philosophy in the provision of services is to work in partnership with parents and children to prevent the breakdown of family relationships and minimise the need to have recourse to Court or emergency protection. 4-The keynote to achieving this aim is careful joint planning and agreement in the provision of services within the family home, assisting and enhancing the parental authority. 5-The Local Authority is required to make such provisions as it thinks appropriate to provide the following services to children in need: Advice, guidance and counseling Occupational, social, cultural and recreational activities Home help (including laundry facility) Facilities or assistance with travel to and from any services provided under the Act or similar service 6-Assistance to enable the child and the family to have a holiday Explanation: The above provisions of the statute law describe the duties and rights of the Local Authority towards the children in need and their parents. The following points come from the above section of the Law: 1. Searching and serving the children in need. 2. Save them from being abused or neglected. 3. Prevent the breakdown of family relationship. 4. Assisting and enhancing the parent authority. The above provisions do not forbid any member of the family from interacting and communicating with his or her family. Here Angela had absolute right to meet her young sisters, and she can submit her request before the Authority that the guardian has no right to stop her from her stepsisters. It was thus an essential step to direct Angela's attention about the benefits as imparted by the Local Authority. I thought it would be advantageous if Angela was made to realize all the essential rules and briefings of the Local Authority since this shall help provide her confidence in her future dealings. In addition, I wanted to revise the knowledge of Angela's guardians about the law as pertinent to local authority. Further, the section 17 of the Child Care Law gives you the right to see and meet your sisters. However, there could be some specific time, (holidays or some other days for meeting), but the termination of the meetings in not under the custody of law. Angela is under 18 years of age, and thus is minor according to Majority Act of the British Law. Therefore, she cannot sue her case. She can suit file through her guardian or representative according to the Majority Act. The Act allows a minor to sue his case at the Court of Law for the protection as well as for seeking legal rights. According to the Majority Act: A minor can sue for his rights at the court of Law through his: Guardian, Representative, Any other person appointed by the court or legal authority. A minor is a person who is: Yet to attain the age of majority (the age of majority is usually 18 years, but if a guardian has been appointed for a minor to look after his matters, the age of majority would be 21years). Lunatic Mentally disabled person I made Angela realize that she could certainly benefit from each of these potential sources of help protruded by law. Then I mentioned to her that she should be required to address to her condition and requirement with the support of her guardian. "This is because you are under protection of a guardian, so you shall reach the age of majority at her 21st birthday," I further explained. "But the good thing is that Angela human rights allows you to submit your request for not terminating your interaction you're your younger sisters", I added to her knowledge. This is because no one not meeting the law-stated age for practice of human rights can just take it for granted. As per the law holding its prevalence in UK there were two things that I made Angela realize and they were that: 1. She was 15 years old and therefore had not reached the age of majority, 2. She was living under the supervision of a guardian appointed by the Local Authority. Thus, by the support of guardians alone can the interaction with the younger sisters is possible was an essential point of our discussion. Understanding the important role that her guardians need to play for the realization of her desire to be in touch with her sisters, she looked at her guardians with deep respect and support for required consideration. Her guardians, who were silent for so long, did hold her hands and smiled with a confirmation for granting supreme support in the matter. The person, named Michael said with a confident voice, "why not, we would be most happy to seeing Angela being in touch with her two younger sisters." I was very happy with the confirmation form the Angela's guardians and therefore started to collect all the guardians in and around me that were scattered as references for the authentic discussion. I also gave some Xerox material to Angela by virtue of which she could contact the officials and with their permission start, exercising the benefit of UK law granted human rights. It was essential to mention here some relevant cases and some such important cases are the Regina v. London Borough of Barnet (Respondents) ex parte G (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte W (FC) (Appellant). I made Angela realize these essential cases and presented the same in the form of the papers I had downloaded from the website. She gained better confidence from reading the authentic material from authentic website. Hardly few if any questions were there to be asked after being expressing her complete picture of the law and order essentials in UK and the important aspects as included therein. The papers that I had presented in front of her for gaining her insight and complete understanding in the matter have been included as an appendix a the end of this essay. I want to mention that care of child and prevention from abuse can be helped by taking steps of care by the siblings, or relatives. The cases of child abuse are multiplying in their own existent right of domination. There remains little hope for the joy of children of future time, if laws do not support the origin of attachment and love. I discussed this with Angela even in greater depth and then she left me with my own thoughts of child care to rehearse again, may be essential for a quality guidance to yet another youngster. I hereby, end the details of my short acquaintance with Angela, with a prominent believe that steps to invest the knowledge of law to the children and youngsters shall be taken with due concern for all. I respect the law of UK, which provides so much provision and potential to exercise happiness in entirety in UK. I am grateful to the social workers who have invested their time in the precious task of educating children and bringing to their knowledge the presence and practice of human rights. The teachers and the guardians can potentially promote the concept of practicing human right and being enlighten about their presence to the younger generation people. I hope Angela shall help authenticate the good dealings with her two-step sisters by their guardians by practicing and promoting the concept of attachment even after adoption. These attachments amongst human beings can certainly engrave fear in those how hold the cruel face to even harm the innocent children. I had repeatedly advised Angela to seek the complete support of her guardians in taking all the essential steps and feel that it is the foremost duty of any advisor to direct the child first to the practice of gaining confidence of their guardians. Lastly, I will also like to thank you for giving an ear to the existence of the available laws in the UK and realizing their potential to grant protection. I thank you once again. Bibliography Care Law. Available at: http://nchacti01.uuhost.uk.uu.net/carelaw/ [Accessed on : 20th Jan'2006]. Devon County Council. Available at: http://www.devon.gov.uk/index/socialcare/children-and-families/child_care_law.htmDevon County Council [Accessed on : 20th Jan'2006]. Arthurs, Y. and Ruddick, J. (2001) An Analysis of Child Protection 'Part 8' Reviews Carried out over a Two-Year Period in the South-East Region of the NHS. South East Regional Office, Department of Health: London Corby, B., Doig, A., Roberts, V. (1998) Inquiries into child abuse. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 20, p. 377-95. Dingwall, R. (1986) The Jasmine Beckford affair. Modern Law Review, 49, p. 489-507. Stevenson O (ed.) (1989) Child-abuse inquiries and public policy. In Child Abuse:Professional Practice and Public Policy. Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead. Allen, T. and Thomas, A. (eds.) (2000) Poverty and Development into the 21st Century. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Munro, E. (1996) Avoidable and unavoidable mistakes in child protection work. British Journal of Social Work, 23, p. 193-808. Munro, E. (1999) Common errors of reasoning in child protection work. Child Abuse & Neglect, 23, p. 745-58. Munro, E. (2002) Effective Child Protection. Sage: London. Peterson, V. and Runyan, A. (1993) Global Gender Issues. USA: Westview Press Inc. Radford, L. and Tsutsumi, K. (2004) Globalization and Violence against Women-inequalities in risks, responsibilities and blame in the UK and Japan. Journal of Women's Studies International Forum, 27 (1) p. Reder, P., Duncan, S. and Gray, M. (1993) Beyond Blame: Child Abuse Tragedies Revisited. Routledge: London. Sanders, R., Colton, M. and Roberts, S. (1999) Child abuse fatalities and cases of extreme concern: lessons from reviews. Child Abuse & Neglect, 23, 257-68. Sinclair, R., and Bullock, R. (2002) Learning from Past Experience-A Review of Serious Case Reviews. Department of Health: London. Sweeney, B. (2004) Trans-ending Women's Rights: The Politics of Trans-inclusion in the Age of Gender. Journal of Women's Studies International Forum, 27 (1), p.77-80. Rosow et al (eds). (1994) Reginas in International Relations: Occlusions, Cooperation, and Zimbabwean Cooperatives in The Global Economy as Political Space. London: Lynne Rienner publishers. Appendix (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/) Judgments - In Re B (A Minor) (Respondent) HOUSE OF LORDS Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Hoffmann Lord Millett Lord Rodger of Earlsferry OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSE IN RE B (A MINOR) (RESPONDENT) ON 17 DECEMBER 2001 [2001] UKHL 70 LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD My Lords, 1. This appeal concerns an adoption order, sought by one natural parent (the father) with the consent of the other (the mother). The child is a girl, now three years old. Bracewell J made the adoption order: see [2000] 2 FLR 717. The Court of Appeal, comprising Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P and Potter and Hale LJJ, reversed her decision: see [2001] 1 FLR 589. The father has appealed to your Lordships' House. At no stage has the mother taken any part in the proceedings. The story 2. From August 1997 the mother and the father, neither of whom is married, had a sexual relationship. This ended in April 1998. Early in 1998 the mother became pregnant, although she did not realise this until some months later. The child ('A') was born on 19 October 1998. The mother was then aged 28. Without looking at her baby the mother told the hospital staff that she wanted to have the child adopted. This was the mother's second child. Her first child, also a daughter, was born in 1993. On that occasion, and in accordance with the mother's wishes, the child had been adopted. 3. So A, when four days old, was placed with foster parents with a view to adoption. Since the birth the mother has never met A nor, save at a distance, seen her. The father, then aged 25, was not aware of the mother's pregnancy or of A's birth. Purely by chance the local social services authority learned of the father's whereabouts. They contacted him, and he quickly expressed his desire to look after A. The mother then co-operated with the father in making arrangements for A's care. On 27 November 1998 they registered A's birth together, with the father's surname. On 7 December 1998 they entered into a parental responsibility agreement, whereby the father was to have parental responsibility as well as the mother. On 19 December 1998 A was placed with her father, and he has looked after her ever since. He gave up paid employment in order to do so. Child A is thriving. The issue in the case is not whether the father should continue to care for A as a single natural parent. That is not in doubt. The issue is whether he should become her sole adoptive parent. The adoption proceedings 4. The father made his adoption application to his local Family Proceedings Court on 26 April 1999. His understanding was that the mother was willing to agree. Subsequently her views wavered. The proceedings were transferred to the High Court because of their unusual nature. 5. The father is seeking an adoption order primarily because he is anxious to secure A's future in his sole care. He feels insecure, and believes he will feel more secure knowing that the mother's parental responsibility for A has been removed. This can only be achieved by an adoption order. The mother has said repeatedly she does not wish to play any part in A's life. But the father is concerned that, without an adoption order, it will remain possible in future years for the mother to pose a threat to A's continued placement with him. He is concerned that the mother may marry and, with her new husband, ask to have A to live with her. The court might look favourably upon such an application. His vulnerability to an attempt by the mother to reclaim A is something which has caused him great anxiety. He is adamant in his wish for an adoption order, although whatever order is made will not affect the strength of his commitment to A. He does not, in principle, exclude the possibility of future contact by the mother with A, provided the placement with him is secure. He is willing to adhere to his arrangement with the mother to provide an annual progress report and photograph. The mother has a similar arrangement with the adoptive parents of her elder daughter. 6. In his report to the court the Official Solicitor, acting as A's guardian, opposed the application. The sole consequence of an adoption order would be to end the mother's relationship with A. This was not an order which could be said to safeguard and promote A's welfare. There was nothing in the history of the case to suggest that the mother would be likely to seek to disrupt the security of A's placement with her father. But any attempt by her to do so would not necessarily be to A's disadvantage. Further, the court has to be satisfied, before making an adoption order, that there is some reason justifying the exclusion of the mother, as required by section 15(3) of the Adoption Act 1976. There was no sufficient reason in this case. A's placement with her father should be secured by a residence order, suitable prohibited steps orders, and an order requiring the mother to obtain permission from the court before making any application for an order under section 8 of the Children Act 1989. 7. After this report had been prepared the Official Solicitor was able to meet the mother. Her response to the Official Solicitor's report was that, although she considered the application was premature, she could understand the father's reasons and was not going to stand in his way. She made clear she would never seek to interfere with the lives of A and her father. She was not seeking direct contact with A. While she could not say this would always be her position, as a first step she would obtain legal advice. She would not simply turn up on the father's doorstep. She wished to maintain indirect contact with a yearly photograph and progress report. She then signed, in the presence of the Official Solicitor, the prescribed form of consent to the making of an adoption order. That was on 20 June 2000. The decision of the Judge 8. The application proceeded before Bracewell J on 29 June 2000 on the basis of affidavit evidence and reports. There was no oral evidence. The judge concluded that the welfare of A 'demands' there should be an adoption order 'in order to promote her welfare throughout her childhood'. To comply with the requirements of section 15(3) of the Adoption Act 1976 the circumstances must be exceptional. That was so here. The reasons for the exclusion of the mother were that she had rejected A from birth and played no part in her care or upbringing, and she had consented to the adoption and wished to play no part in A's life in the future, other than to have indirect contact. The judge said: 'This is not a case in which the mother has hesitated and weighed in the balance what she can provide for the child and what the father can provide. She has no interest in having any direct contact with A or participating in her upbringing. She is an intelligent, reflective woman, who has been able to consider the position and has reached a reasoned position of not wanting to play a part in A's life.' The decision of the Court of Appeal 9. With the leave of the judge, the Official Solicitor appealed from her decision. Hale LJ gave the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal. She considered that Bracewell J had misdirected herself on the requirements of section 15(3)(b) of the Adoption Act 1976. Section 15(3), as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, section 49(5), Schedule 4, paragraph 4, provides: 'An adoption order shall not be made on the application of the mother or father of the child alone unless the court is satisfied that- (a) the other natural parent is dead or cannot be found or, by virtue of section 28 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, there is no other parent, or (b) there is some other reason justifying the exclusion of the other natural parent, and where such an order is made the reason justifying the exclusion of the other natural parent shall be recorded by the court.' Hale LJ noted that this provision is directed at sole adoption applications by natural parents. She continued, at p 598, para 34: 'It requires of this already very small and unusual group that there be some reason, comparable to the death, disappearance or anonymous sperm donation of the other natural parent, 'justifying' his or her exclusion, not only from parental responsibility for but also from the whole life and lineage of the child.' 10. Hale LJ found reinforcement for a restrictive interpretation of section 15(3)(b) ('some reason comparable to the death, disappearance or anonymous sperm donation of the other natural parent') in the need to read and give effect to this statutory provision, so far as possible, in a way which is compatible with the rights set out in article 8 of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Article 8 provides: '1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.' 11. Hale LJ noted that an adoption order is an interference by a public authority, in the shape of the court which makes it, with the exercise of the right to respect for family life. There are three components in the exceptions permitted under article 8(2): the intervention must be 'in accordance with the law', in pursuit of one of the legitimate aims defined in article 8(2), and 'necessary in a democratic society'. There is no difficulty with the first two components. The Adoption Act permits adoption in the circumstances of child A, but only if there is reason to exclude the mother. The intervention by the court is to protect the interests of the child. As to the third component, the interference must meet a pressing social need and be proportionate to that need. Hale LJ said, at p 599 in paragraph 40 of her judgment: ' it is difficult indeed to argue that there is a pressing social need to deprive A of all legal relationship with one half of her family of birth. she already has a full and secure legal and factual relationship with her father. If there is any need to give her more, it can be provided for in a package of orders along the lines discussed. In my view, it would be a disproportionate response to her current needs to turn her from the child of two legal parents, with two legal families, into the child of only one parent, with only one legal family. Section 15(3) has to be given effect in such a way as to avoid that result.' 12. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P and Potter LJ agreed. The Court of Appeal set aside the adoption order, and substituted a residence order in favour of the father and an order prohibiting the mother from making any application under the Children Act 1989 relating to A without the leave of a High Court judge, any application for such leave to be made on notice to the Official Solicitor but without notice to the father unless the court directs otherwise. The grounds on which the Court of Appeal intervened 13. The essence of the reasoning of Hale LJ in paragraph 40 was that she formed a different view from the first instance judge on whether it was in the best interests of this little girl that the court should make an adoption order. Using the structure of article 8(2) of the Convention as a framework, she expressed the view that adoption was not in A's best interests. Adoption by her father would be a 'disproportionate response' to her current needs. 14. Unquestionably, on the facts in the present case this assessment of the course which is in the best interests of A was a possible view. But before any question can arise of the Court of Appeal making its own assessment of the requirements of A's welfare and substituting this for the judge's assessment, it must be shown that the judge erred in some relevant respect: by misdirecting herself on the law or the evidence, or by being so plainly wrong that she must have misdirected herself. 15. This principle is so well established as scarcely to bear repetition: see, for instance, the observations of Lord Scarman in B v W (Wardship: Appeal) [1979] 1 WLR 1041, 1055 , and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] 1 WLR 647, 650-653. On the instant appeal leading counsel appearing for A's guardian submitted that, since this is not a case in which oral evidence was heard, it was more readily open to the Court of Appeal to substitute its view for that of the trial judge. He submitted that in so far as the Court of Appeal differed from the judge's evaluation of the inferences to be drawn from the primary facts, the Court of Appeal was in as good a position as the judge and, therefore, it was entitled to form its own independent opinion. In the light of this submission I must elaborate a little on this point. 16. In cases such as the present the first instance judge decides which order, if any, he considers is in the best interests of the child. When doing so the judge is often said to be exercising his 'discretion'. In this context this expression is descriptive of the judicial evaluation and balancing of a number of factors from which an overall conclusion is reached on a concept whose application in any given case is inherently imprecise. There is no objectively certain answer on which of two or more possible courses is in the best interests of a child In all save the most straightforward cases, there are competing factors, some pointing one way and some another. There is no means of demonstrating that one answer is clearly right and another clearly wrong. There are too many uncertainties involved in what, after all, is an attempt to peer into the future and assess the advantages and disadvantages which this or that course will or may have for the child. 17. Hence the rationale underlying what I may call the principle in G v G. Courts of appeal exist to remedy mistakes in the first instance process. The Court of Appeal is not intended to be a forum in which unsuccessful litigants, where no error occurred at first instance, may have a second trial of the same issue by different judges under the guise of an appeal. The mere fact that appellate judges might have reached a different conclusion had they been carrying out the evaluation and balancing exercise does not mean that the first instance judge fell into error. That fact does not, of itself, require or entitle the Court of Appeal to intervene. 18. Frequently a judge at first instance will exercise his discretion as described above in proceedings where he will also have to evaluate witnesses and their oral testimony. Depending on the circumstances, this feature may be an additional reason why an appellate court should be slow to intervene. But the presence of this additional feature is not an essential ingredient of the circumstances in which the principle in G v G is applicable. The principle in G v G applies irrespective of whether the evidence before the judge is oral or written, disputed or agreed. This principle is applicable in the present case even though the evidence before Bracewell J was wholly in written form. 19. The matters discussed above are not peculiar to cases relating to children. There are many types of case where the principle in G v G is applicable, with greater or less force. In his valuable observations in In re Grayan Building Services Ltd (in liquidation) [1995] Ch 241, 254-255, my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann, then Hoffmann LJ, pointed out that the standards applied by the law in different contexts vary a great deal in precision: 'generally speaking, the vaguer the standard and the greater the number of factors which the court has to weigh up in deciding whether or not the standards have been met, the more reluctant an appellate court will be to interfere with the trial judge's decision.' Cases relating to the welfare of children tend to be towards the edge of the spectrum where an appellate court is particularly reluctant to interfere with the judge's decision. 20. It goes without saying that in the present case the highly experienced members of the Court of Appeal had these principles in mind. Application of these principles is part of the staple diet of judges in that court. Two strands of criticism of the judge's judgment are discernible in the judgment of Hale LJ. The first, already mentioned, is that the judge materially misdirected herself on the proper interpretation and application of section 15(3) of the Adoption Act 1976. If she did, the Court of Appeal was bound to carry out afresh the exercise of deciding whether, overall, it was in the best interests of A that an adoption order should be made in favour of her father. But if the judge did not err on this point, her decision must be allowed to stand unless, and this is the second criticism implicitly made by the Court of Appeal, her decision was plainly wrong. Section 15(3): 'some other reason' 21. The Adoption Act 1976 requires the court, when deciding whether to make an adoption order, to have regard to all the circumstances. First consideration is to be given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood: section 6. An adoption order in favour of one natural parent alone will have the effect of excluding the other parent. In the present case an adoption order will mean that A is treated in law as if she were not the child of her mother: section 39(2). 22. On its face this permanent exclusion of the child's mother from the life of the child is a drastic and detrimental consequence of adoption so far as the child is concerned. How serious this loss is likely to be depends on the circumstances of the case. In deciding whether to make an order having this consequence the court must always be satisfied that this course is in the best interests of the child. There must be some reason justifying the exclusion of the other natural parent. The reason must be sufficient to outweigh the adverse consequences such an order may have by reason of the exclusion of one parent from the child's life. Consent of the excluded parent is not of itself a sufficient reason, but it is a factor to be taken into account. Its weight will depend on the circumstances. 23. In so far as the Court of Appeal construed section 15(3)(b) more restrictively than this, I am unable to agree. Section 15(3) imposes a prerequisite to the making of an adoption order on the application of the mother or father alone. One or other of the exceptions set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) must be satisfied. The three exceptions listed in paragraph (a) are instances where the other natural parent cannot have, or is unlikely to have, any further part in the child's upbringing and life. But these three exceptions are not an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which a natural parent is unlikely in practice to have a further role in a child's life. Further, there may be other situations when the welfare of the child justifies the exclusion of a natural parent. Abandonment, or persistent neglect or ill-treatment of the child, could be instances. 24. It is not surprising, therefore, that the exception stated in paragraph (b) is altogether open-ended. No doubt this was a deliberate choice of language. I can see no ground for importing into this exception an unexpressed limitation whereby 'some other reason' must be comparable with the death or disappearance of the other natural parent. What is required by paragraph (b), and all that is required, is that the reason, whatever it be, must be sufficient to justify the exclusion of the other parent. Whether any particular reason satisfies this test depends on the circumstances. This is a matter left to the decision of the court. On this question of interpretation I respectfully consider the Court of Appeal was unduly restrictive in its approach. 25. An adoption order in favour of a single natural parent alone will also have the effect of permanently extinguishing any parental responsibility of the other natural parent: section 12(3)(a) of the Adoption Act 1976. This will afford the adoptive parent a measure of additional security. But it is important here to keep in mind the wide range of powers the court now has under the Children Act 1989 to restrict the possibility of inappropriate intervention in the child's life by the other natural parent. Adoption is not intended to be used simply as the means by which to protect the child's life with one natural parent against inappropriate intervention by the other natural parent. 26. Another consequence adoption has in this type of case is that after adoption the child will be treated in law as if she had been borne to her adoptive parent in wedlock: section 39(1)(b) of the 1976 Act. The significance of this benefit today should not be overstated. The social and legal status of children born outside marriage has changed greatly in recent years. The social stigma and legal disabilities attendant upon 'illegitimacy' have now largely gone. Two children in every five born in this country are born outside marriage. Unless a contrary intention appears, statutes enacted after 1987 are to be interpreted without regard to whether a person's parents were married at any time. So also are wills and the existing statutory provisions relating to intestacy: see sections 1, 18 and 19 of the Family Law Reform Act 1987. 27. Having regard to all these matters, the circumstances in which it will be in the best interests of a child to make an adoption order in favour of one natural parent alone, thereby, in Hale LJ's words, taking away one half of the child's legal family, are likely to be exceptional. Bracewell J regarded the circumstances of the present case as exceptional. She said so. The father's case was that the mother's continuing status as a parent with parental responsibility for A would perpetuate insecurity for him and that this would potentially affect A's stability. The judge accepted this. This is clear from the tenor of her extempore judgment, although she did not expressly so state. The chance circumstance which brought A's father into A's life and upbringing was bound to add to his anxieties. Given the mother's attitude to A from the moment of A's birth, and her consent, adoption by the father was in A's best interests. Adoption was in A's best interests even though this would have the consequence of excluding the mother. 28. In my view, on the evidence before her this conclusion was open to Bracewell J. I can see no indication that she misdirected herself on the proper interpretation or application of section 15(3). Nor do I consider her decision can be said to be manifestly wrong. That an adoption order as sought by A's father will safeguard and promote A's welfare is a wholly tenable view. A residence order, together with an appropriate prohibited steps order, may not suffice to allay the father's genuine anxieties. In this type of case explicit analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of adoption must always be desirable. But I do not think the absence of such an analysis from Bracewell J's judgment vitiates, or casts doubt, on her conclusion. The reasoning implicit in her judgment is sufficiently apparent. Article 8: the right to respect for family life 29. In reaching the contrary conclusion the Court of Appeal was influenced by its interpretation and application of article 8 of the Convention. In considering this point it is important to keep in mind that in the present case the individual whose right has to be respected is the child. The mother has freely and unconditionally agreed to the making of an adoption order, with a full appreciation of the consequences. So there is no question of adoption being a violation of her rights under article 8. 30. As to child A's rights, I agree with the Court of Appeal that the relationship of mother and child is of itself sufficient to establish 'family life'. I agree also that section 15(3) has to be given effect to in such a way as to avoid the result that a court might make an adoption order excluding one natural parent from the life of the child when this would represent an interference disproportionate to the child's needs. Where I part company with the Court of Appeal is that, unlike the Court of Appeal, I think this undesirable and unacceptable result is already precluded by the Adoption Act itself. There is no discordance between the statute and article 8 on this point. There is no need to 'read down' section 15(3)(b) so as to avoid incompatibility which otherwise would exist. There is no need to have recourse to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 31. My reason for holding this view is as follows. Take a case, such as the instant case, where the natural father alone seeks an adoption order. The court hears evidence and representations from all concerned, including the child's guardian. The mother consents to the application. The court considers the advantages and disadvantages adoption would have for the child. The court decides that an adoption order is best for the child in all the circumstances. I do not see how an adoption order made in this way can infringe the child's rights under article 8. Under article 8 the adoption order must meet a pressing social need and be a proportionate response to that need: see, for example, Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347, 376-377, paragraph 97(c). Inherent in both these Convention concepts is a balancing exercise, weighing the advantages and the disadvantages. But this balancing exercise, required by article 8, does not differ in substance from the like balancing exercise undertaken by a court when deciding whether, in the conventional phraseology of English law, adoption would be in the best interests of the child. The like considerations fall to be taken into account. Although the phraseology is different, the criteria to be applied in deciding whether an adoption order is justified under article 8(2) lead to the same result as the conventional tests applied by English law. Thus, unless the court misdirected itself in some material respect when balancing the competing factors, its conclusion that an adoption order is in the best interests of the child, even though this would exclude the mother from the child's life, identifies the pressing social need for adoption (the need to safeguard and promote the child's welfare) and represents the court's considered view on proportionality. That is the effect of the judge's decision in the present case. Article 8(2) does not call for more. 32. I would allow this appeal and restore the order of Bracewell J. LORD MACKAY OF CLASHFERN My Lords, 33. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. I agree with him that this appeal should be allowed and the order of Bracewell J restored for the reasons that he has given. LORD HOFFMANN My Lords, 34. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. I agree with it, and for the reasons he gives I too would allow the appeal and restore the order of Bracewell J. LORD MILLETT My Lords, 35. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. I agree with it, and for the reasons he gives I too would allow the appeal and restore the order of Bracewell J. LORD RODGER OF EARLSFERRY My Lords, 36. I have had the privilege of reading the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, in draft. For the reasons which he gives I too would allow the appeal and restore the order of Bracewell. J. Appendix (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldjudgmt/jd031023/barnet-1.htm) Judgments - Regina v. London Borough of Barnet (Respondents) ex parte G (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte W (FC) (Appellant) HOUSE OF LORDS SESSION 2002-03 [2003] UKHL 57 on appeal from: [2001] EWCA Admin 540 [2002] EWCA Civ 613 [2002] EWCA Civ 1624 OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSE Regina v. London Borough of Barnet (Respondents) ex parte G (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte W (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte A (FC) (Appellant) ON THURSDAY 23 OCTOBER 2003 The Appellate Committee comprised: Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Steyn Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Millett Lord Scott of Foscote HOUSE OF LORDS OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSE Regina v. London Borough of Barnet (Respondents) ex parte G (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte W (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte A (FC) (Appellant) [2003] UKHL 57 LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD My Lords, 1.These three appeals concern the responsibilities of local authorities for the accommodation of children who are in need. The first and principal legal issue relates to the nature and extent of the duty imposed on local authorities by section 17 of the Children Act 1989. The claimants' case is that section 17(1) requires a local authority to assess the needs of a child who is in need and to meet his needs when they have been assessed. The defendant local authorities refute both limbs of this claim. A second issue is whether a local authority may insist on providing accommodation for a child alone, as distinct from a child and his mother, when a child is in need of accommodation and it would cost no more to provide accommodation for both of them. 2.In two of the cases the accommodation problems of the claimants have been resolved since the proceedings started. In the third case, involving two disabled children, there is an issue between the parties on the quality of the accommodation currently provided for the children and their family. I must first outline the facts and history of the three cases. In each case the claimant was a mother as a single parent. The three claimants are G, A and W. The three cases 3.The first case, in chronological sequence is G's case: R (on the application of G) v London Borough of Barnet. G is a person from abroad who, until recently, was not eligible for housing assistance. She is a Dutch national of Somali origin. She has a son, born in May 1999. She entered this country on a Dutch passport. She claimed she left the Netherlands because of social ostracism encountered there in the Somali community on account of her child's illegitimacy, and that she came to this country to look for the child's father. An application for income support, and an application to the London Borough of Barnet for assistance with housing, were refused because G did not satisfy the habitual residence test. She then sought assistance from Barnet council as the local social services authority. The council assessed the child's needs as best served by the return of both mother and child to Holland where they were entitled at once to accommodation and other benefits. The council did not accept the mother's account of her reasons for coming to London. By a decision letter of 9 October 2000 the council told her that her weekly payments for accommodation and subsistence would stop in a week's time. 4.G applied for judicial review of this decision. It was common ground she was suitable to look after her boy, and that it was not in the boy's best interests to be removed from her care. It was also common ground that if, as happened, the mother refused to return to the Netherlands, the council intended to place the child with foster parents, and to provide no accommodation for the mother. In the event interim relief was granted in the judicial review proceedings. On 18 January 2001 Hooper J quashed the decision of 9 October 2000: see [2000] EWHC Admin 5, (2001) 4 CCLR 33. The child was in need, and it was in the best interests of the child to live with his mother. Given the duties imposed on the local authority by section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989, and the powers granted to it by section 23, the local authority 'has no alternative' but to place the child with his mother assuming it is reasonably practicable to do so. This was so even though the mother was, in the view of the local authority, acting unreasonably: see para 18. 5.The council appealed. On 11 April 2001 the Court of Appeal, comprising Ward, May and Rix LJJ, allowed the appeal and dismissed the judicial review application: [2001] EWCA Civ 540, (2001) 4 CCLR 128. Ward LJ said the duty imposed by section 17(1) was met by providing financial assistance for the return of the mother and child to Holland. The local authority did not act unlawfully in refusing to provide assistance in cash or in kind to assist in the provision of accommodation for the mother and her child. Section 17(3) and (6) imposed no such duty on the local authority. Section 20 imposed a duty to provide accommodation for the child, not for the parent and the child. 6.The second appeal is A's case: R (on the application of A) v London Borough of Lambeth. This concerns a family who have been housed but whose accommodation is not suitable for the children's needs. A is the mother of three children. Unhappily two of the children, aged 9 and 7, are autistic. They have severe learning difficulties and require constant supervision. The family's accommodation is a ground floor two bedroom local authority flat, rented from the London Borough of Lambeth. The flat has no garden or outside play area. The two disabled children are prone to run out of the front door and climb through the windows. This is dangerous because the flat is very close to the road. The accommodation poses severe disadvantages to the children's health and wellbeing. Core assessments of the needs of the children under the Children Act 1989 were to the effect that the family need to be re-housed away from the road, to have a safe outside play area and to have four bedrooms 7.A challenge by the mother to the decision of the council as housing authority was abandoned. The mother now seeks, against the council as local social services authority, a mandatory order compelling the council to find and provide suitable accommodation in line with the children's assessed needs. Both the judge at first instance, Scott Baker J, and the Court of Appeal, comprising Chadwick and Laws LJJ and Sir Philip Otton, held the court has no power to intervene even though, even in the words of Scott Baker J, the family have been 'less than satisfactorily treated' by Lambeth council: [2001] EWCA Civ 1624, (2001) 4 CCLR 486. 8.The third case is W's case: R (on the application of W) v London Borough of Lambeth. W had become homeless intentionally within the meaning of that expression in the homelessness legislation. She has two children, aged 16 and 7. She sought assistance for accommodation from the London Borough of Lambeth as local social services authority. This was refused. Maurice Kay J dismissed an application for judicial review of the council's decision. The decision of the Court of Appeal in A's case obliged him to do so. By a further assessment, dated 9 April 2002, the council decided it should explore placing the children with extended family members as a short term measure while the mother sought alternative accommodation. Should the need arise provision could be made for the children alone under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. 9.On appeal the Court of Appeal, comprising Brooke, Laws and Keene LJJ, dismissed an appeal in respect of the council's decision of 9 April 2002: see [2002] EWCA Civ 613, [2002] 2 All ER 901. The court considered there were not sufficient grounds for interfering with the council's decision. Section 17 imposes a 'target' duty on the council, but in relation to individual children the council only has a power. The council had given intelligible and adequate reasons why it was not willing to exercise its power in this case, given all the other pressures on its resources. Where all else failed the local authority has power to help under section 17, but it is entitled, if it sees fit, to reserve this power for extreme cases which the instant case had not yet become: [2002] 2 All ER 901, 926-927, para 83. Allocation of resources 10.Behind the legal questions arising in these appeals is the seemingly intractable problem of local authorities' lack of resources. Local authorities discharge a wide range of functions, from education to housing, upkeep of roads to disposal of waste. All these activities call for money, of which there is never enough to go round. Often there is also a shortage, sometimes acute, of other resources such as trained staff. 11.The financial resources of local authorities are finite. The scope for local authorities to increase the amount of their revenue is strictly limited. So, year by year, they must decide what priority to give to the multifarious competing demands on their limited resources. They have to decide which needs are the most urgent and pressing. The more money they allocate for one purpose the less they have to spend on another. In principle, this decision on priorities is entrusted to the local authorities themselves. In respect of decisions such as these council members are accountable to the local electorate. 12.The ability of a local authority to decide how its limited resources are best spent in its area is displaced when the authority is discharging a statutory duty as distinct from exercising a power. A local authority is obliged to comply with a statutory duty regardless of whether, left to itself, it would prefer to spend its money on some other purpose. A power need not be exercised, but a duty must be discharged. That is the nature of a duty. That is the underlying purpose for which duties are imposed on local authorities. They leave the authority with no choice. 13.The extent to which a duty precludes a local authority from ordering its expenditure priorities for itself varies from one duty to another. The governing consideration is the proper interpretation of the statute in question. But identifying the precise content of a statutory duty in this respect is not always easy. This is perhaps especially so in the field of social welfare, where local authorities are required to provide services for those who need them. As a general proposition, the more specific and precise the duty the more readily the statute may be interpreted as imposing an obligation of an absolute character. Conversely, the broader and more general the terms of the duty, the more readily the statute may be construed as affording scope for a local authority to take into account matters such as cost when deciding how best to perform the duty in its own area. In such cases the local authority may have a wide measure of freedom over what steps to take in pursuance of its duty. 14.Towards one edge of this spectrum are instances such as section 23(1) of the Children Act 1989. Under this subsection it is the duty of a local authority looking after a child to provide accommodation for him while he is in the authority's care. This is a duty of an absolute character. An example of the opposite edge of the spectrum, taken from the field of education, is the broad duty imposed on a local education authority by section 8 of the Education Act 1944, now section 14 of the Education Act 1996, 'to secure that there shall be available for their area sufficient schools .. for providing primary education'. In R v Inner London Education Authority, Ex p Ali (1990) 2 Admin LR 822, 828, Woolf LJ described this as a 'target duty'. 15.Often the duty is expressed in more specific terms than this, but the terms themselves give the local authority an area of discretion. Paragraph 9 of schedule 2 of the Children Act 1989 imposes upon every local authority a duty to provide such family centres 'as they consider appropriate' in relation to children in need within their area. Another form of words apt to give considerable latitude to a local authority is where the duty is 'to take reasonable steps' to achieve a stated object. Paragraph 4 of schedule 2 of the Children Act 1989 is an illustration of this. A local authority is required to take reasonable steps to prevent children within its area suffering ill-treatment or neglect. Again, although not explicitly stated, a statute may implicitly afford a local authority considerable latitude. Section 18(1) of the Children Act 1989 provides that every local authority shall provide such day care for pre-school children in need within its area 'as is appropriate'. In deciding what is appropriate the local authority may properly take into account a wide range of matters including cost. 16.The primary question raised by these appeals is the proper interpretation, in this context, of section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989. Part III of the Children Act 1989 17.Part III of the Children Act 1989, comprising sections 17 to 30, concerns the provision of local support for children and their families. Before the passing of this Act child care law was widely criticised as confusing, unnecessarily complex and in places unjust. The responsibilities of local authority social service departments towards families with children were set out in two different sets of legislation. Child care law provided for children to be supported within the family in certain circumstances. Thus, section 1 of the Child Care Act 1980 imposed on local authorities the duty to make available such assistance as might promote the welfare of children by diminishing the need to receive children into care or to bring them before a juvenile court. Section 2 of the same Act imposed a duty on local authorities to receive a child into voluntary care in certain circumstances. Quite separate from this child care legislation, health and welfare legislation made provision for services for children as part of local authorities' responsibilities for particular groups of people of all ages, such as those who were mentally handicapped or physically disabled. The principal statutes were the National Health Service Act 1977, the National Assistance Act 1948 and the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. 18.One object of Part III of the Children Act 1989 was to unify these two sets of legislation. The intention of the government was to ensure that in all cases the children concerned should receive the standard of care and protection and professional review appropriate to their needs. Local authorities were to be given a broad 'umbrella' power to provide services to promote the care and upbringing of children. The government white paper, 'The Law on Child Care and Family Services' (1987) (Cm 62), explained that broadly speaking all existing powers and duties to provide services to children were to be maintained and amalgamated, sometimes with modifications. This would involve the amalgamation of sections 1 and 2 of the Child Care Act 1980, and the addition of provisions from the health and welfare legislation: see chapter 2, paras 14 to 19. 19.I turn to the relevant legislative provisions. Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 is the first section in a small group of sections concerning provision of services for children 'in need' and their families. A child is taken to be in need if he is disabled or if, without the provision of local authority services, he is unlikely to achieve or maintain 'a reasonable standard of health or development' or his health or development is 'likely to be significantly impaired': section 17(10). A child without accommodation is a child in need: R v Northavon District Council, Ex p Smith [1994] 2 AC 402, 406, per Lord Templeman. Section 17(11) defines disability, 'development' and 'health' in wide terms. 20.Section 17(1) prescribes the 'general duty' of local authorities regarding children in need. The general duty of every local authority is to provide a range and level of services appropriate to the needs of such children: 'It shall be the general duty of every local authority (in addition to the other duties imposed on them by this Part)- (a)to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need; and (b)so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families, by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children's needs.' 21.This general duty is augmented by a motley collection of 'specific duties and powers' set out in Part I of schedule 2: section 17(2). Local authorities are given these specific duties and powers principally for the purpose of facilitating the discharge of the general duty imposed by section 17(1). Some of these specific duties and powers are general in their impact on children, such as the duty to produce and keep under review plans for the provision of children's services under Part III of the Act (paragraph 1A). Others relate to the circumstances of a particular child. Two examples will suffice, one of a power, the other of a duty. A local authority is empowered to assess the needs of a child in need under the Children Act 1989 at the same time as any assessment of his needs is made under other enactments, such as the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 (paragraph 3). A local authority is under a duty to take such steps as are reasonably practicable to enable a child who is not living with his family to live with them or promote contact between them if that is necessary to safeguard or promote his welfare (paragraph 10). 22.Two other provisions in section 17 call for mention. Both are enabling powers in respect of any service provided by an authority in the exercise of functions conferred on the authority by section 17. If provided with a view to safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare, the service may be provided for the family of a particular child in need, or any member of his family: section 17(3). The service may include providing accommodation and giving assistance in kind or, in exceptional circumstances, in cash: section 17(6). The reference to accommodation in this subsection was inserted by section 116 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 to lay at rest doubts arising from the Court of Appeal decision in A's case. 23.Section 17 covers a wide range of services. Section 20 is focused more narrowly. It is concerned specifically with the accommodation needs of children in need. Section 20 obliges every local authority to provide accommodation for children in need who appear to need accommodation: '(1) Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need within their area who appears to them to require accommodation as a result of - (a)there being no person who has parental responsibility for him; (b)his being lost or having been abandoned; or (c)the person who has been caring for him being prevented (whether or not permanently, and for whatever reason) from providing him with suitable accommodation or care.' 24.'Prevented for whatever reason' in paragraph (c) is to be interpreted widely. It includes a case where the person caring for the child is intentionally homeless. A child is not to be visited with the shortcomings of his parents. A similarly wide interpretation was given to the comparable provision in section 1 of the Children Act 1948 the predecessor to section 2(1) of the Child Care Act 1980: see Attorney General ex rel Tilley v Wandsworth London Borough Council [1981] 1 WLR 854. Section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989 25.I turn to the interpretation of section 17(1). Section 17(1) is not just a statement of general principle, important though it is in that regard. Nor does it merely confer a new or enlarged function on local authorities. It imposes a duty. It imposes a duty expressed to be additional to the other duties imposed by Part III of the Children Act 1989. By definition, the additional obligation thus imposed on local authorities is enforceable by the court in appropriate circumstances on the application of a person with sufficient interest. The crucial issue is to identify the content of this additional duty. 26.At first sight section 17(1) does not seem to impose a duty in respect of the particular needs of an individual child. The duty is expressed in general, overall terms regarding the collective needs of children in need in the local authority's area. It is not expressed by reference to the needs of any one child. This generality, however, is not conclusive. The generality of an obligation regarding children in a local authority's area is not of itself inconsistent with the obligation being a duty in relation to the needs of individual children in the area. An obligation in respect of the general may include an obligation in respect of the particular. A duty in respect of an entire class or group as a whole may include a duty in respect of the individual members of the class or group. It all depends upon the language read in its context. 27.So I turn to the language of section 17(1). The starting point is to note the statutory description of the duty as a 'general' duty. Read in context, this description is not, of itself, of much value as a pointer on the issue now under consideration. This description is used by way of contrast to the 'specific' duties and powers mentioned in section 17(2). The latter duties and powers are specific because they relate to particular, limited aspects of the general duty imposed by section 17(1). The purpose of section 17(1) is wider. The purpose is to set out, at the very forefront of Part III and by way of contrast to the specific duties and powers, a primary additional duty of a more comprehensive character. 28.Next, the nature of the general duty imposed on a local authority by section 17(1): this is twofold. The duty is to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within its area who are in need, and to promote the upbringing of such children by their families. 'Safeguard' and 'promote' are broad terms; necessarily so, in the context of the welfare of a child. There is nothing in the use of these terms to suggest the duty is not a duty in respect of each child within the local authority's area who is in need. The phrase 'children within their area who are in need' refers to all the children in need within the local authority's area. But the duty to promote the welfare and upbringing of all such children makes little sense unless it is a duty in respect of the welfare and upbringing of each such child. Indeed, if this were not so section 17(1) would be a poor sort of additional general duty. Section 22 is another example of a duty, described as a general duty, to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. A local authority 'looking after any child' is obliged 'to safeguard and promote his welfare'. It cannot be doubted that this duty under section 22(3), although described as a general duty and although expressed in broad terms, is a duty which relates to the individual child and is enforceable as such. 29.Section 17(1) then proceeds to state the means by which this duty is to be discharged: 'by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children's needs.' This, again, is the language of generality. But, here also, the language could hardly be otherwise, given the comprehensive nature of the obligation imposed. Section 17(1) deliberately eschews references to particular types of services. Section 17(1) is intended to be wide in its scope because the needs of children vary widely. So local authorities must provide an appropriate range and level of services, whatever those services may be. Section 17(3) and (6) make clear that the types of services mentioned in those two subsections are among the services a local authority may provide in carrying out its duty under section 17. 30.Thus far I am broadly in agreement with the interpretation urged by the claimants. But I stop short of the conclusion submitted by them. In my view section 17(1) does not impose an absolute, or near absolute, duty on local authorities to meet the specific needs of every child who is in need, whatever those needs may be. There is no place for absolutes in such a wide-ranging duty regarding the welfare of children. Nor would that be consistent with the qualified nature of some of the specific duties imposed in Part I of schedule 2. The 'needs' of a child for services is itself an inherently imprecise concept. 'Needs' are open-ended. Some limit can be placed on what are to be regarded as the needs of a child for the purposes of this legislation if the legislation is read, as it should be, as a reference to reasonable needs. Even so, this leaves much scope for differing views. Questions of degree will often arise. Likewise, the statutory obligation to provide a range and level of services 'appropriate' to the needs of children in need gives a local authority considerable latitude in determining what is 'appropriate' in an individual case in all the circumstances. In some cases the type and level of service provided may properly fall short of meeting all the child's needs as assessed. The extent of the latitude in each case depends upon the circumstances, prominent among which are the nature of the service in question and the nature and extent of the needs of the child. Cost is also an element which may properly be taken into account in deciding what is 'appropriate' in a particular case. The extent to which cost, and hence the resources of a local authority, may be taken into account depends upon all the circumstances including how basic is the assessed need, the ease or difficulty with which it may be met, and the consequences of not meeting it. In a word, despite this latitude the council must act reasonably. Read More