Russia 1917-1941. Rise of Nazism in Germany, World War II - Essay Example

Section B Answer only ONE question. 2 This question is about Russia 1917-1941. (a) Why did the February Revolution take place in 1917 Admittedly, many of the problems in Russia leading to revolution can be linked directly and indirectly to the nature of Tsarism and the effects it had imposed on the country. The comprehensive causes of the revolution, however, are more complex than Tsarism alone. When the autocratic rule of Russia crumbled in the revolution of 1917, it was due to a variety of underlying and systemic causes that were rooted deep in the empire's history. These economic, social and political problems were reinforced and exacerbated mainly by the First World War (1914-1918), but also by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, that created and resulted in the same kinds of problems and revolts experienced in 1905. The policies imposed by Nicholas II, his predecessors and his ministers mostly served to aggravate rather than to alleviate the discontent of the Russian people. These policies and resulted in the riots and strikes that led to revolution in 1917. The situation in Russia around the turn of the century was complicated and the nation was difficult to rule. There existed a huge diversity of ideologies and identities within the Empire, making it hard for the Tsar to keep his authority and control. The influence that his two most recent predecessors had on the empire was contradictory; Alexander II was known as "the Tsar Liberator", and he introduced many reforms, such as the Emancipation Edict; and, Nicholas I, known as the "Reactionary Tsar", with his counter-reforms. Tsar Alexander III, who was crowned Tsar in 1894, wanted to "uphold the principles of autocracy" like his father, meaning the three reactionary principles: autocracy, orthodoxy and nationalism. Tsar Nicholas II was a weak and indecisive leader, unable to delegate his tasks and he generally cared too little for his people. One might argue that the only loyalty the Tsar had was to God, due to the orthodox belief that he was chosen and guided by God himself. Article One of the Fundamental Laws of the Empire stated that: "God himself commands that this supreme authority be obeyed". The causes of the 1917 revolution included Russia's social, economic and political problems. Socially, Tsarist Russia stood well behind the rest of Europe in its industry and farming, resulting in few opportunities for advancement on the part of peasants and industrial workers. The discontent came from centuries of oppression of the lower classes by the Tsarist regime, and their considerable lack of rights. The rapid industrialisation of Russia also resulted in urban overcrowding and poor conditions for urban industrial workers. Economically, widespread inflation and famine in Russia contributed to the revolution. These economic stimuli originated in Russia's outdated economy and the Tsar's failure to modernize it. The rural agrarian economy struggled to produce enough food to feed the cities each year, and despite the vast expansions under Sergei Witte of the railway systems, they also lacked the ability to effectively transport the food into the cities. Factory workers also suffered as Russia's young and undeveloped industrial base sought to catch up with the rest of Europe. They had to endure terrible working conditions and low wages. The sporadic riots did not create a calm context in which to develop an industrial foundation peacefully or methodically. Politically, the people of Russia resented the autocracy of Tsar Nicholas II. Most segments of Russian society had reason to be dissatisfied. They had no representation in government, and the Tsar remained out of touch with the people. This was seen on the "Bloody Sunday" of 1905 where his people came in peaceful demonstrations to his palace, which he had left, and were shot at by his army. Ultimately, a combination of these three factors, coupled with the development of revolutionary ideas and movements, laid the foundations for the Russian Revolution. This discontent of Russia's people culminated in the "Bloody Sunday" massacre; as a result, an excessive amount of strikes erupted. The Tsar then released his "October Manifesto", promising a democratic parliament, the State Duma, to appease the people. The reforms of Prime Minister Stolypin were also to contribute here. However, the Tsar effectively abolished his promises of Democracy by dismissing the first two Dumas. These unfulfilled hopes of democracy led to the strengthening of revolutionary ideas and violence targeted at the Tsarist regime. One cause of the revolution involved the severe effects on the economic, social and political situation with the onset of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. The First World War affected the situation in Russia on an economic, political and military level as well. As the Tsarist regime focused their attention and funding on the war, the economic difficulties only grew, thus also causing greater discontent and disturbances on the social level. In the military, the morale among the soldiers was low; they were fighting under extreme conditions with little food and poor equipment. There was great dissatisfaction among the troops when the Tsar himself took control over the army in August 1914, this, to a large extent, led to the loss of the soldiers' loyalty to the Tsar. Defeats in the war hit the morale of the army; soldiers became more and more increasingly reluctant to fight. The Tsar's decision to take control of the Russian army in September 1915 was a huge mistake. He was personally blamed for the army's defeats. When gone he had put the Tsarina and Rasputin in charge of Russia. This damaged his credibility; the Tsarina and Rasputin removed able ministers from government and replaced them with friends. The Tsar refused to let the Duma govern while he was gone which further caused problems with his 'public image'. By the middle of the war the middle class came to the realization that the government was incompetent and plead for a more representative government. The war left a devastating economic impact on the countries cities. Inflation, unemployment, and shortages of food, fuel, and raw materials were but a few of these impacts. The peasants were hit by a loss of animals to the army and a loss of sons in the war. At this point almost all support for the Tsar had depleted and revolution was the best alternative. Hence, in February of 1917 the Russian public launched the February Revolution. Certainly, the nature of Tsarism has put its mark on Russian history, and as has been experienced in most other European countries in various contexts. a revolution was needed to obtain democratic rule. Seen from today's perspective, Nicholas' policies and strong autocratic beliefs are to blame for the difficulties of the Russian situation during the revolution. However, triggering factors such as the First World War and Stolypin's reforms also caused the revolution of 1917. [12] (b) "Trotsky's leadership was the most crucial factor for the Bolsheviks' success in the Civil War." How far do you agree with this statement Explain your answer. I agree to a large extent that Trotsky's leadership was the most crucial factor for the Bolsheviks' success in the Civil War. However, there also other contributing factors for the success of the Bolsheviks. During the Russian civil war, Leon Trotsky played a major role. He was commander and chief of the red army, which fought on the side of the communists. As a much experienced and brave commander he won many battles against the white armies through smart tactics and keeping the moral of his troops high. He was seen as a heroic figure in the eyes of his fellow troops as he accompanied them on frequent occasions to the front lines of battle. One such case of this happened in Petrograd were the white armies came within a mile of the city. Although the red army was completely out numbered they successfully defended the city while being spurred on by their commander Trotsky who stayed with them for the duration of the battle an extremely rare occurrence for a man of his rank. Trotsky also introduced conscription into Russia for men aged 18 to 40. He was also a great user of propaganda. Using an armoured train equipped with a printing press he travelled through Soviet Russia spreading leaflets encouraging people to turn against the white army. Another smart move the Trotsky took during the war was to force former Tsarist officers into the Red army often taking their family hostage. Commissars were employed to watch over them. Although having on pervious experience Trotsky proved to be a great tactician and inspiration. He inspired loyalty and devotion to the cause through his rigid implementation of discipline. He had chosen to abandon the policy of a rankless militia' in favour of the return of insignia reminiscent of the old Tsarist army. All of these actions led to the Red army's victory and as David Thomas states 'the Red army proved to be well drilled, possessed of a purpose and infused with determination that was lacking in the white armies'. Another key factor in the success of the red army was the control of strategic routes of communication and transportation. Russia was huge, having 1/6 of the world's land, covering two continents with many climates. Communications and transport were difficult as there were few paved roads and the only thing connecting East and West Russia was the Trans-Siberian railway. The Reds had control of the railway system and had a special train (led by Trotsky) that could effectively coordinate attacks and tactics and send out troops where needed. The Reds also had control of the main industrial parts of Western Russia and was close to the cities. The Whites however were mostly scattered all around and did not have very good communication, if the leaders wanted to communicate at all. The Reds with their geographical advantage were able to deal with the White opposition one defeat at a time, and deal with the troops led by White leaders Deniken and Yudenich one small group at a time. A major contributing factor to the Bolsheviks' success was Lenin's policies. One of the policies that turned the tide was War Communism. Lenin introduced War Communism a policy where by all agriculture and industry is geared solely towards a war effort. War Communism provided the basis that allowed the government to provide the troops with the necessities to win the war. In the policy, surplus grain was taken and food detachments were sent into the countryside to seize it. The grain was then used to feed the solders on the front lines. The rest of the food was rationed among the Russian people and was given depending on each person's contribution to the economy. Although War communism achieved its aims of winning the civil war it caused great suffering among the Russian people. Cut backs in grain production by peasants who resisted the policy led to a famine which killed 5 to 7 million people. Another policy introduced by Lenin was the setting up of the Cheka, an organisation to protect communism in Russia. It suppressed any resistance to the communist government to ensure its continuation. Any person accused or even suspected of co-operating with the white army was shot or sent to prison camps in Siberia. They used systematic terror and infiltrated schools along with many other areas of society to get information on anyone who had negative views of the communist party or Lenin. The Cheka was led by Felix Dizerhinisky and by the end of the civil war it was estimated to have tortured and killed between 15,000-80,000 people. Lenin encouraged the organisation although he always tried to distance himself from it. To conclude, Trotsky's energetic, inspirational leadership boosted the Red Army soldiers' morale and created unity. The Reds soldiers were very well-disciplined and had an effective organisation. White leaders, by contrast, were cruel and ruthless- many of their soldiers mutinied and morale was low. There was no incentive to fight, especially since they would not get their land back anyway. In addition, with the control of strategic routes of communication and transportation, the Reds had an advantage over the Whites who were scattered throughout the country. Lastly, Lenin's policies were also crucial in deciding the fate of the Civil War. In the final analysis, the Reds possessed and maintained a superiority over the Whites from a range of factors (aims, geography, foreign intervention, leadership and support). Consequently, they ultimately had the most important advantages in the Civil War. [13] 3 This question is about Rise of Nazism in Germany, 1919 - 1939. (a) Why did Hitler become Chancellor in 1933 There were a series of events that led Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor on January 30th of 1933 - the effects of the economic depression, his appeal to the people and to the Reichstag, the growing power he was wielding through terror, and the miscalculations and the ineffective plotting of others. One of the main reasons for Hitler's rise to power was because of the Great Depression. The Wall Street Crash in October 1929 had a terrible effect on Weimar Germany. The German economy collapsed after the US withdrew its loans from the banks of Weimar Germany, and soon, unemployment was rampant. In 1928, before the Depression, unemployment levels were at 2 million people, or 8 percent of the population. However, only 3 years after the advent of the Depression, 1932, unemployment was at 6 million people, or about 29.9 percent of the population. This shows the rapid decline of conditions in the Weimar Republic. Because of their desperate situation, the German people turned toward Hitler, who seemed to them to be a beacon of change and an end to the democracy the public hated so much. As two chancellors had been appointed by 1932, von Papen and Schleicher, and neither had done much to combat the growing numbers of unemployment, the public was more than ready for a change in leadership, and hoped it to be found in the person of Adolph Hitler. He presented himself as the salvation for the German people, and the German people accepted that illusion. It is extremely significant to note that the people were not the ones that elected Hitler into chancellorship--rather it was the President at the time. However, Hitler's support from the people was nevertheless a factor in his rise to power, as President Hindenburg noted that Hitler's popularity with the public would spill over into support for him if Hindenburg displayed to the people that he was taking Hitler under his wing. Hitler's personal decisions and powers also helped him gain the chancellorship. Hindenburg saw the public's and the Reichstag's attraction to him, Hitler became a contender for Hindenburg. His speeches and oratorical powers of persuasion and convincing were legendary in the political circles, and Hindenburg and his aides took note of his influence in speech-making as well. He was aware of the people's problems and what they craved to hear, and how best to craft his policies and present them so as to have the maximum effect upon his audience. It must be taken into account that in 1928, the Nazis held a mere 2.6 percent of the vote in the Reichstag, but because of their merging with other parties in the following years, the Nazis were brought into a socially influential right-wing coalition, as a result making connections with wealthy financial backers. His propaganda was also a great factor in his growing influence in the political sphere. His Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels began an intensive media campaign that continued to focus on the points that Hitler was pushing in his 25-point plan: eradication of the Jews because of their usurping of jobs and money, and Germans over all. Through their intense campaigning, the entire public spectrum was appealed to, and this made Hitler a strong presence in the political field, in terms of public support. This public support also helped him gain votes in the Reichstag, even though he never had a majority in it, he still had a substantial percentage--44% in 1932. He especially had the support of the right-wing conservative members in the Reichstag. All these factors made Hindenburg realize Hitler's influence with the Reichstag, specifically with the anti-democratic right-wingers, and contemplate his value. Hitler's personal decisions and powers such as his oratorical gifts, his use of propaganda, and his reformation of the party all served for Hindenburg to take note of Hitler's expanding political presence. Hitler's path to chancellorship was also marked by his use of terror to achieve his aims, and the President's decision to fight that. At the creation of the Treaty of Versailles, one of the conditions placed upon Germany was the limitation of the Weimar Republic's army to that of 100,000 men, a miniscule military. As Hitler expanded his Party, he created sub-organizations such as the SA, SS, and the Gestapo. He called them his bodyguards, his stormtroopers, and his secret police, but in reality they served him as his own private army. Hitler used his army to strike terror into the hearts of his opponents--he sent them out to carry out ruthless killings of opponents. In total, his personal military numbered at around 2 million men, more than twenty times greater in numbers than the official governmental military. Furthermore, because of Hitler's financial support, arming his men was possible. In short, Hitler had a massive, fully-armed military at his disposal. If Hitler were to create trouble with his SS and SA, the official military did not have enough power to suppress it. Additionally, Hitler's army would be extremely effective in crushing Communist revolt, especially if in collaboration with the governmental army. President Hindenburg was able to see that if Hitler were to start a revolution with his men, there would be chaos and terror presiding over all. With this in mind, Hindenburg realized that if Hitler were in the chancellor position, his army would be under control and even more effective when crushing the Communists, who Hindenburg despised. Because of Hitler's use of terror and force to advocate his party, the President came to realize Hitler's use in the chancellorship position. As Hindenburg closely watched Hitler's political movements, and anticipated his usefulness if appropriately harnessed, he collaborated with his aides to plan a method to control Hitler, which was the reason for his final appointment to chancellorship. Von Papen was the chancellor in 1932, but the Reichstag gave him next to no support when he tried to pass legislation. He had the support of Hindenburg, however had no rapport with the parliament. Therefore, General Schleicher, a fervent anti-republican, convinced Hindenburg to dismiss Papen. In December of 1932, Schleicher formed a new government, but lost Hindenburg's support within a month. Finally, the decision came to offer the position of chancellorship to Hitler. This was the culmination of Hindenburg's tracking of Hitler, and his ulterior motives to giving Hitler the chancellorship were numerous. Firstly, he had noted Hitler's popularity with the people, and had noticed that this popularity had given him significant influence within the Reichstag. Even though Hitler did not have majority support in the parliament, the support he did have was much weightier than that of the two previous chancellors. Secondly, Hindenburg considered Hitler's power over his multitudinous army, the SS and the SA. If Hitler were to initiate a revolution with his military at the head, Hindenburg would be powerless to stop it. He then realized that if he brought Hitler on his side, he could "tame" him by providing him with governmental responsibility, and in doing so, Hitler's popularity in the Reichstag would transfer to him. Furthermore, if Hitler were harnessed, his army could be utilized to combat Communist uprisings, and there would be no danger of Hitler using the SA and SS against the government itself. Von Papen and Hindenburg listed these apparent benefits in giving the chancellorship to Hitler, and therein lays the truth to Hitler's ascent to power. Most importantly, Hitler did not take power per se, but was handed it by others in authority. Nevertheless, certain factors such as his popularity and his terrorizing helped him into power, but overall Von Papen and Hindenburg provided Hitler with the chancellorship--through their plotting and miscalculation. In conclusion, the main reasons for Hitler's appointment as chancellor were the political and economic chaos of the 1920's and the 1930's. These series of events joined forces with German culture that enabled Hitler to rise to power. Both played an equal part. Together, both created a unique situation for Hitler's rise. Hitler was in part a product of German culture. German culture at the time stood out as particularly aggressive and racist. The values and ideas found in this culture's history inspired Hitler to do many things that he did and can explain, in part, why he felt the way he did on certain issues. For example there were talks of the master race in the past history of Germany by the German philosophers, which might have given Hitler his ideas on the Aryan race. Many people believe that German culture is by nature racist, militaristic, and anti-Semitic. Germany was an opportune place for Hitler to come to power. German people, feeling confused by the social and economic chaos of the 1920's and 1930's could do nothing but gravitate towards someone like Hitler. [12] (b) "Majority of the German people conformed to Nazi rule because of Hitler's policies." How far do you agree with this statement Explain your answer. I agree to a large extent that a majority of the German people conformed to Nazi rule because of Hitler's policies. However, there were also other important reasons, such as the use of propaganda and terror. The main reason why a majority of the German citizens conformed to Nazi rule was because of Hitler's policies. The domestic policy of the Nazi party was closely related to its foreign policy, which provided successes that are very important in understanding why the majority of Germans conformed to Nazi rule. The majority of Germany believed that the Treaty of Versailles was a great injustice, and many, including Hitler, believed Germany had only lost because the army had been 'stabbed in the back' by the Jews and politicians of Germany. After Hitler assumed complete power over Germany the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were overturned one by one, and each was greeted with overwhelming public support of Hitler's actions. In 1934 Hitler publicly announced that the German army, limited to 100 000 by the treaty, had already expanded to 240 000 and would grow to 550 000 in less than three years. At the same time he made public the existence of a German air force, forbidden under the terms of Versailles. In 1936, while France had no government in control, Hitler ordered German troops to march into the demilitarized Rhineland. Next, in October 1939, German reoccupied first the Sudetenland and then, in a surprise tank invasion, the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. These bloodless successes overjoyed the German populace, as shown by the wild, enthusiastic crowd scenes seen around Germany after each foreign policy success. The outbreak of war brought even greater success. Quickly defeating both Poland and France, and beating Britain back to her Island, then pushing far into Russian territory, the Nazi Government appeared to be well on the way to completely dominating the continent. Now at the peak of its power, the vast majority of Germans not only conformed to Nazi rule but actively supported it. Almost all youth, male and female, were enrolled in Hitler Youth, as the competing youth associations (even the illegal gangs) had been removed, their leaders sent to concentration camps. Unemployment was essentially nil, with the German army and Germans arm production assuring employment for anyone that wanted it. The SPD (Social Democrats) in exile sent agents to gauge popular opinion and found that the Nazis were almost uniformly supported throughout the country. The contrast between Nazi rule and that of the Weimar Government that preceded it is vital in understanding why the majority of Germans conformed to Nazi rule. One historian describes how many Germans believed that the liberal Weimar Republic was a degenerate society, and that their country was on the road to ruin. Newspapers were filled with stories regarding crime, drugs, murder and the activities of organized gangs. Crime had risen steadily between 1927 and 1932, the rate of some crimes in large cities almost doubling. The death penalty, a popular punishment, was bestowed 1141 times from 1919 to 1932, of which only 184 were executed, a figure which infuriated many German citizens. "Hitler and his party", on the other hand, promised to restore some semblance of the normality for which they [the majority of Germans] longed. Hitler gave the police far greater powers than they had had previously, which they immediately began exercising - even petty criminals such as swindlers and con-artists were sent to concentration camps without trial. Death sentences under Hitler increased in number and 80% were actually carried out, a huge increase from Weimar's 16%. Exaggerated stories of crime and punishment were sent to the press so often that they became constituent parts of Nazi mythology. The Nazi party's emphasis on the rebuilding of the German state, an idea spread primarily through propaganda, was exceedingly popular. The Nazis also linked crime to Jews, homosexuals and gypsies, which heightened the homophobia and anti-Semitism already prevalent in German society, which meant that the more radical aspects of Nazi ideology were more accepted in society. The image of Hitler as a radical proponent of cleaning up the streets, banishing offenders, and purifying the race and the stories about swift justice all fuelled the populist myths about the regime as a crime fighter, and thus earned it considerable support, which helps explain why the majority of Germans conformed to the Nazi regime. Apart from the domestic and foreign policy success of the regime, the use of terror in Nazi society is also important in understanding why the majority of Germans conformed to Nazi rule. The orthodox view of the role of the Gestapo, represented by such historians as Jackel and Hillgrber, is that the German secret policy pervaded every aspect of society, and that most Germans were so afraid of being arrested and interrogated that they were terrorized into submission. Recent research, however, has proven this judgment false. "The terror was ... not the blanket, indiscriminate terror of popular myth" (Johnson). In the Cologne region, for example, the Gestapo had only one officer for every 10 000 to 15 000 inhabitants (according to Johnson). Nazi terror was instead targeted only at opposition groups and those condemned by Nazi ideology. When an average, non-Jewish, heterosexual German was under Gestapo scrutiny, they were generally treated leniently and almost never punished. When a Jew or opposition of the state was interrogated, however, they were treated brutally and almost always sent to a concentration camp. The majority of Germans did not conform to Nazi rule because of the terror instilled by the Gestapo; they conformed because of the attractions of the regime as shown by its domestic and foreign policy success. On the other hand, the minority groups that were either targeted by Nazi ideology and those that were not won over by success were actually forced to conform to Nazi rule. The minority groups were primarily uncovered, according to both Johnson and Gellately, through denunciations. Many ordinary Germans were so won over by Nazi ideology that they would report to the Gestapo any suspicious behaviour, such as homosexuality or sympathy for the plight of the Jews. In fact, almost anyone who did not openly support the regime was denounced by at least one neighbour. This made the Gestapo a highly effective unit, despite its small numbers, when tracking down ideological enemies of the state. The Gestapo also proved highly effective in tracking down more serious opponents of the state. Through "forced confessions, reports from informers and paid spies, house searchers, police raids, information supplied by Nazi Party officials, SS and SA storm troopers, and police auxiliaries, long-existing police registers of political opponents and known criminals, and other official sources" (Gellately) the Gestapo tracked down and removed all serious opposition to the Nazi regime. In this way the Gestapo is vital to an understanding of why the majority of Germans conformed to Nazi rule - because those few who might harbor doubts about the regime could never voice them for fear of persecution. The most dubious elements of Nazi policy - the systematic murder of huge numbers of people based on race or sexual preference - were grounded in deep-seated prejudices that proliferated German society. The prejudice against homosexuality was extremely, so it is not a stretch of credibility to surmise that many Germans supported the imprisonment of confirmed homosexuals. Hitler's advertisement of Rhm's sexuality as justification for his murder is indicative of the strength of homophobia in Germany. Anti-Semitism in Germany (indeed, Europe) stretches back well over a thousand years. Again, it seems certain that most of the German population would have personally approved, to varying levels, of the persecution of the Jews. This is not to say that the majority of Germans supported the Nazi atrocities, but that the majority of Germans supported the principle of discrimination (if not the extremes to which it was carried). While virtually all balked when presented with Nazi war crimes (although Kershaw argues that the systematic gassing programme was largely unknown, not all can have been sincere given the direct participation of Germans in many parts of the process), the principle behind the killings was appreciated by many Germans. By building on existing prejudices that Nazis ensured that most Germans could find something to support in Nazi ideology. Finally, one of the most important factors in explaining German conformity is in the foundation of the Nazis' unity - the most stunning propaganda success the regime enjoyed, the establishment of the Hitler myth. This propaganda helped create a population that did not just conform, but willingly conformed. Kershaw argues that while ultimately most of Nazi propaganda failed in their objectives, Goebbels succeeded in depicting Hitler as a dynamic, active, visionary leader who would lead Germany to greatness. Kershaw states that "Hitler was seen as the representative of 'popular justice', the voice of the 'healthy sentiment of the people', the upholder of public morality, the embodiment of strong, if necessarily ruthless, action against the 'enemies of the people' to enforce 'law and order'". Before the war Hitler was portrayed as both a statesmen and as "the future military leader, taking muster of his armed forces" (Kershaw). When the war began this image was broadened and "the image of Hitler as supreme war leader and military strategist came to dominate all other components of the 'Fhrer myth'". The decline of the Hitler myth followed the military reversals of the war, when the population realised Hitler's personal responsibility for the catastrophe of Stalingrad. But until then the myth formed a significant part of the reasons why Germans conformed to Nazi rule. Accompanied by the early successes of the Nazi regime, this created a very persuasive regime regardless of the attractiveness of its ideology. Without an attractive ideology, a majority of Germans would have willingly conformed to Nazi rule at least as long as they didn't have to make sacrifices to do so. Combined with the Nazi ideology, which was attractive to a broad cross-section of Germany, the high level of conformity exhibited in Nazi Germany does not seem remarkable. Germans conformed to Nazi rule primarily because of the dual positive and negative pressures exerted by the regime. The Nazis designed and aggressively propagated a programme likely to be attractive to most of the community and backed this up with an apparatus of terror to silence those not convinced. The successes of the party within the country assured widespread support. Hitler's foreign policy, that overturned the Treaty of Versailles and secured Germany a great deal of territory even before the war, garnered him unparalleled popularity. The few opposition groups, and those groups targeted by Nazi ideology, were sent to concentration camps and a vigorous secret police assured that no opposition, especially not vocal, remained in Germany for long. Even when the atrocities of the Nazis became somewhat known Germans continued to conform to Nazi rule, primarily as a result of the anti-Semitism and bigotry prevalent in German society, effectively fostered by the Nazis. Finally, the Hitler myth is vital in understanding why the majority of Germans conformed to the rule of the regime. [13] 4 This question is about World War II. (a) Why did Britain and France follow a policy of appeasement Britain and France chose the path of appeasement in hopes that this would satisfy Hitler and not drag Europe into another world war. Appeasement came from the desire to make amends and prevent war at all costs. It was born out of the feeling of the need to revise the Treaty of Versailles. Britain regarded the Treaty as harsh and unfair, particularly in terms of the amount of reparations and territorial losses. Britain at the time produced about one-third of all the world's goods and Germany had been the biggest market for British goods before the First World War; after the Treaty of Versailles, however, massive reparations were introduced and the German economy slumped. This, in turn, brought down the British economy; this led to the increased feeling of a need to revise the nature and the amount of the reparations. A number of assumptions, some reasonable, though some in hindsight seem almost incomprehensible, were made. One of the main assumptions was that Hitler's foreign policy was strictly limited to achieving a justice for Germany, by removing the "dictated" injustices of the Treaty of Versailles, another that by removing these injustices, war could be avoided. These assumptions seemed to be reasonable until March 1939, when Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia, a non-German state that went against his claim. Hitler was appeased by Britain and France more than twice: when Hitler rearmed the German army in March 1935 he broke the treaty of Versailles, and France and Britain appeased him by letting him enforce his army because they were convinced that the treaty of Versailles had been too harsh on Germany. The main reason that Chamberlain and France used appeasement towards Hitler was to keep peace in Europe. Both countries didn't want a war with Germany again. The state of Britain's armed forces also encouraged appeasement policy. The devastation of the First World War contributed to the constant appeasing. Britain was in no shape to fight a war. Even France which had the largest peacetime army was declining in relation to Germany. The French air force was obsolete and bomber production was almost negligible. Above all, the French military strategy was entirely defensive. WWI cost UK most of their able-bodied men, in some urban areas up to 40%. They didn't have enough soldiers to defend both their Empire (which stretched across the globe) and Europe (which they were forced to police because of the League of Nations). Great Britain was forced to choose one. World War I haunted Europe and there were always constant reminders of how horrible it had been, the trauma and horror never left. The United Kingdom and France especially were reluctant to fight. Britain was more interested in using their money to rebuild homes and infrastructures. No one wanted to use the money on weapons. Rearming Britain cost far too much and it was money the British government didn't have. Rearmament meant high taxes and Chamberlain wasn't prepared to force them on his people. Also, during that period there were many economic limitations that faced the British government. First of all, Britain was in debt to the USA after World War One after it borrowed massive amounts of money to fund its operations during the First World War, and a growing proportion of Britain's budget went towards paying Britain's war debt to the USA. The great depression between 1929 and 1933 also worsened Britain's financial and economic situation. Owing to the slump in world trade, Britain's export earnings fell by nearly 50%, businesses collapsed and there was mass unemployment throughout the Nation. Britain's balance of payments went into a deficit as imports began to exceed exports. As a result, Britain was forced to cut spending in order to balance the books so that Britain was not spending more than she was earning. This meant that spending was cut on military spending simply to balance the books, as Britain was an empire, with imperial markets and trade routes to protect with reduced military resources, Britain could not afford to commit to military intervention to check Hitler's expansion into Europe. The threat of communism also explains why the appeasement approach was justified politically. Many conservative politicians viewed Stalin as the greater of the two totalitarian evils. During the time when appeasement was advocated and pursued towards Nazi-Germany, the United States was at the same time in an extremely isolationist phase. This made the situation even more delicate and difficult. They feared that as Britain and France were busy fighting Germany in the West, the Soviets would invade Poland and then eastern Germany. This was the biggest problem because Britain and France couldn't protect many of the countries from Hitler. Czechoslovakia and Poland are two good examples of countries that were Germany's targets, and they simply could not be protected by Britain and France because they were too far away. The only county, which could protect these two countries was the Soviet Union. France and Briton, though, feared the spread of communism as much as they feared Hitler. Therefore, to them it seemed that the best solution was to keep the peace as long as possible. In conclusion, I believe that appeasement was the diplomatic option of choice in 1938. Firstly, the Treaty of Versailles imposed many restrictions on Germany's internal affairs, which were later on widely viewed by the Allied nations as being unfair to Germany. Many people, especially on the left of the political spectrum, argued that German re-armament, the re-occupation of the Rhineland and the acquisition of the Saarland were merely examples of the Germans taking back what was rightfully theirs. Secondly, memories of the First World War contributed to the use of appeasement, many countries were still suffering economically and socially from the war and did not want another war to begin anytime soon. Lastly, there was a Communist threat that had arisen and many conservative politicians viewed Stalin as the greater of the two totalitarian evils. [12] (b) "Hitler should be blamed for starting World War Two." How far do you agree with this statement Explain your answer. I agree to a large extent that Hitler should be blamed for starting World War Two. Hitler's idea of self-sufficiency, his desire to unite German speaking people and to dominate Europe and the world were the most significant causes. His rise was helped by Britain's and France's policy of appeasement, unemployment in Germany and indirectly by the failure of the League of Nations and the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Hitler's desire to gain lebensraum and self-sufficiency was the most significant cause of the Second World War. His whole foreign policy from coming to power seems to be focused on preparing for a war. In October 1933, soon after coming to be dictator of Germany, Hitler showed his contempt for the Treaty of Versailles by withdrawing from the League of Nations, which also showed his lack of desire for peace. At the same time he also withdrew from the disarmament conference again showing peace was not a big priority for him. In fact he straight away went against the Treaty of Versailles, began to build up Germany's army, navy and air force (Luftwaffe), spending a huge proportion of Germany's income on the military; in 1935 Hitler introduced conscription. Hitler also, chiefly through propaganda, attempted to increase Germany's birth rate; perhaps preparing for a much later war or great losses. He also started the 'Hitler Youth' where young boys were indoctrinated with Nazi ideas and trained to fight and accept war. Hitler thought Germany had lost World War One as they had to rely on other countries for war materials and this is why he wanted to achieve autarky (self-sufficiency) in Germany. His introduction of the four-year plan seems to us to be an obvious way of Hitler saying he wanted a war. The plan aimed to make Germany self-sufficient in war materials such as steel, rubber and oil. In fact, the amount of money invested into the industry and military meant Germany needed a war to stop its economy from collapsing (one can rape a country of its materials once it has been conquered). Hitler taking the Rhineland and annexing of the Sudetenland, although aggressive, was reasonable as both contained mainly Germans. His 'pressurized' take over of Czechoslovakia however was a lot different as it contained few Germans. It was not a reversal of the Treaty of Versailles but Hitler's first striving for Lebensraum. The League of Nations is also partly to blame for not preventing the outbreak of the Second World War. Many of its policies failed (the Geneva Disarmament Conference is an example of this), and some actually hindered its work (such as disarmament, as it robbed the League of military support from Britain and France), and it was unable to provide effective resistance to aggressions such as Abyssinia and Manchuria, for instance. In the case of the former, the League's attempted measures against Italy failed (it banned the selling of arms, which actually hurt Abyssinia more than Italy, and undertook other equally ineffective economic sanctions). The secret Hoare-Laval pact conducted between the British, the French and the Italians undermined the League's efforts considerably. As a result it was largely discredited as it showed the League's powerlessness when faced with a great power, set a dangerous precedent and paved the way for Hitler. Germany was later able to start re-armament (completely disregarding the treaty of Versailles) and even to re-occupy the Rhineland, all without opposition from the League of Nations. Historians witnessed a return to old diplomacy as a result of the League's failures and because of the power vacuums left by the USSR and the USA with their isolation. Diplomacy in the 1930s hence became very complex and returned to the style of old, once again setting a climate of suspicion and uncertainty. The League of Nations cannot take the entire blame for its failure to prevent war, however, since it seemed by this time that major powers (such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan) were unwilling to cooperate with the League, and as a mediator or umpire the League could only go so far if the member states themselves refused to be mediated. After all, the League could hardly force countries to forge alliances and to get along with each other... The USSR played an active role in causing the Second World War as well, as exemplified by the Nazi Soviet pact. This pact entailed that Germany and Russia would not go to war for 10 years, and that if Germany should attack Poland it would be split in half between them (the Northern part going to the USSR), not to mention the economic agreement which involved the Soviets selling raw materials to the Germans in exchange for finished products such as machinery. This essentially meant that if Germany was to go to war against the West over Poland, the Soviets were guaranteeing not to enter war, thus ensuring that Germany would not be facing a war on two fronts. This may have precipitated war in that it made Hitler much bolder, knowing he would not have to face his main foe, the Soviet Union, over Poland. A general appeasement policy was also at fault, a principle that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain particularly believed in. This appeasement policy was conducted to avoid war at all costs and to avoid a repetition of the First World War. It has been argued that if an overzealous war enthusiasm had produced the mass slaughter of World War I, then the resulting determination to avoid war at all costs in the 1930s proved equally counterproductive, with Europe's failure to oppose Hitler leading him to believe that he could do as he pleased with little or no consequences or response from other countries. In this view the delay caused by appeasement increased the number of people killed when war ultimately became unavoidable. Another view argues that there were elements within the German Army which would have removed Hitler from power if he had backed down in the face of Allied opposition. Finally, some have argued that had the Allies put a hard line on Czechoslovakia, Germany would have had less time to rearm and the resulting war would have been less destructive than that which we have known. Appeasement, however, can be justified in that Britain for instance had many other threats to face at that time, such as Italy in the Mediterranean and Japan in the Far East, and thus it was probably not easy to find a viable solution other than appeasement. They were also unsure until 1939 whether self-governing British states such as South Africa and Canada would join Britain in an eventual war. The fear was that a war could split the British Empire. Chamberlain, who was already a pacifist by conviction at any rate, was also informed that if a war were to be declared German air raids might kill or injure two million civilians in the first year of the war. It is more than possible that such information swayed him completely in favour of appeasement. Hence it can be argued that the international climate of the 30s created the conditions for war. In addition the Wall Street crash of 1929, and the ensuing global depression, contributed to the general instability. States turned inward as the effects of global depression hit their countries, as it made them less concerned with international politics and more with their domestic troubles. This evidently contributed to the deterioration of international goodwill and diplomatic cooperation between political powers. Many in Germany saw as the solution to the depression the acquisition of new territory, which would provide valuable raw materials, contribute to Germany's exports market, and if nothing else distract the German population from domestic problems (a tactic used many times by governments throughout history). Some actually believe the latter to be the main driving force behind Hitler's heightened aggressiveness in the late 30s, and perhaps what triggered the onset of World War II. In conclusion, we can see that there are many reasons why Hitler was able to get into a position to start World War II, but it was Hitler who was the aggressor. He clearly had prepared his country for war, had embraced war as a manifestation of German resurgence he deserves to be blamed for the war as much as any other causal factors. However, it must be noted that there were many other contributing factors of relevance and significance. The Depression, the role of the League of Nations and the unwise Appeasement Policy all played a complementary role. The Great Depression lessened the power of the allied nations and made the axis leaders appealing as they guaranteed prosperity. The Depression also caused the failure of the League of Nations and weakened many countries as they limited their military spending. Perhaps it was the responsibility of Britain and France for following such a loose policy of appeasement. The appeasement policy, which was adopted in fear of another war, was an advantage for the Nazis. Seeing that they had no one to oppose them, the Nazi army openly marched into other territories. [13] Read More