Thus the direct premise that followed from this catechism was that victory beyond doubt will go to that power that will manage to exhibit and retain decisive air superiority throughout the conflict. Still such findings and predictions failed to muster a commensurate support and budgetary allocations from the US authorities. It was only in the thick of the World War II that the validity of such forecasts became crystal clear and self evident and the US realized that the stature and scope of its Air Force needs to be unavoidably expanded and broadened.
In fact such provisions became necessary after the Japanese air attack on the Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (Lord 4). This unexpected attack revealed the extent to which the Japanese intended to rely on their air power to have an upper edge in the war. This attack also revealed the potential and capabilities of the Japanese Air Force, its ability to plan and execute debilitating air operations and its skill for withholding and camouflaging the information and intelligence pertaining to its air preparedness. Pearl Harbor was a painful eye opener that was as much the result of the Japanese air preparedness as the lack of prompt US initiative in response to the ensuing developments in Europe and Japan.
This attack also made the US cognizant of the vulnerability of its Air Force and its air defense systems. Luckily, the Pearl Harbor attack unleashed a sea change in the US foreign policy and its defense preparations (Cate). It was decided that from now onwards, the US Air Force ought to play an aggressive and proactive role in the future conflicts. President Roosevelt decided in favor of an unprecedented expansion and refurbishing of the US Air Corps and substantial and impressive allocations were made to procure fighter aircraft for the army (Cate). In the mean time, the US Air Force was already anticipating such salubrious developments and hence it took no time in gearing up and responding to such alleviated expectations and bold plans. The strategic stress was also laid down on the upgrading of aerial infrastructure and the development of new airfields and air bases to enhance the tactical potential of the US Air Force (Cate). There is no doubt that such developments were to change the face of the US Air Force not only in the II World War, but their reverberations were audible in the much later US missions like the Operation Desert Storm.
Though the US Air Force fighters and bombers were soon carpeting the Pacific skies, still the US Air Force some what reluctantly entered the European horizons in July 1942 (Wolf 156). The scope of the US Air Force was extended to the European territories only at the repeated request and encouragement of the British army, which was continually suggesting a scheme for the collaboration and cooperation between the Air Forces of the two nations embroiled in this conflict. As American strategic interests in Europe started to become clearer, concise and concrete, the entry of the American Air Force in the European theater of war became a tactical and political necessity. Considering the fact the allied forces operating in Europe were