Military Strategies of the Various Belligerents in World War I - Essay Example

World War I began after Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Saajevo on June 18, 1914. This resulted in a declaration of war madeby Austria-Hungary against Serbia on July 31, 1914. At the time, several military experts thought that the war would be quick, ending after a few decisive battles demonstrated who would be the victor. However, there was one voice that stood out in disagreement amongst this mix. A Polish industrialist named Jan Bloch did not agree with the concept of a swift war, and predicted that this war would devastate Europe because of the modern technologies involved. Reflecting on what happened during the Russo-Japanese War, Block felt that this new, technological sort of war would destroy Europe. 1 A new belief circulated amongst European General Staffs that contingency plans needed to be made allowing them to win any future war they might come upon. The main problem that followed from this, however, was the fact that they did not understand the concept of modern war, and thus the plans they put together actually resulted in a catastrophic war of attrition. Four reasons actually caused this catastrophe. The first issue was the fact that industrialization resulted in weapons and equipment being made on a large scale. Next, there was a huge population growth which allowed for the manpower necessary to create the large armies necessary to fight the war. Third, reserves became a popular concept, and this allowed the armies to grow quickly. Last, the creation of large railroad networks allowed for armies to be supplied in the trenches. The combination of these four concepts would alter the face of war forever, and this resulted in a near death struggle by the end of 1914 that neither country wanted nor expected. Furthermore, none of the European rulers could discover a way to end the terrible war or justify the large amount of men lost to it during the first months of war. Most of them, instead, focused on the next campaign, believing that it would finally win the war-and of course, it never did.2 Each side involved in the war had several issues it needed to face. These issues included figuring out how to mobilize the necessary items in order to actually but together a successful industrial war without completely destroying society as a whole. History indicated that a short, decisive war would be best (the only recent war standing out that stood out in contrast to this at the time was the American Civil War, which at this time was largely ignored as a usual war). The most recent wars, which has included the Russo-Japanese War and the Italian Unification Wars made many believe that modern wars could be quick, fast business forcibly decided by a few short battles. So, there was an overall feeling present in Europe that the European military establishments could win quickly. 3 However, they would be wrong, and they could not have necessarily guessed or understood that they would be. Obviously, they were searching for an answer and looking at things from optimistic perspectives, although they did not necessarily realize this at the time. They are not to blame, because even today, modern historians have problems understanding this war. If one, for example, decides to take a close look at memoirs and study each campaign, the picture simply becomes more and more complex. The only way one can truly understand this war is by taking a close look at military demography, economic systems, labor controls, and transportation theory. One can only understand the Great War by taking a close look via a material assessment in order to lift away obscurity. Therefore, one needs to conclude that three material factors led to the outcome of the war, and these two items include economic mobilization, human and resource mobilization. With this concept in mind, one can understand how each coalition developed its strategies to win the Great War. The outcomes of the Great War were serious indeed; the excessive force of economic spending resulted in the authoritarian regimes still in place to fall apart. Furthermore, Britain and France nearly lost control of the government, and only the fact that America came to their aid actually prevented their downfall. The Americans would come out of the Great War on top, therefore developing their hegemony.4 How can one view the Great War as the first global conflict One needs to consider the definition of "world war." A "world war" is a war that is involving the world's most powerful countries, and spans several continents, lasting for several years. World Wars were made up of systems of alliances in opposition to each other. For instance, the Germans, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire against France, Russia, and Britain would be considered a world war. These powers involved, at the time, had large overseas empires, and this seemed promise that the war would take place on a global scale, because the colonies would have to provide their resources and basically be involved in the war. Furthermore, because the colonies would be used for economic resources, this seemed to promise the fact that the combatants would make war on each other's colonies, so the war would most likely spread to different areas of the world. No other conflict prior to this was fought on such a massive scale and with so many high-technology weapons. The use of this higher technology ensured that production would take place on a massive scale in both nations and colonies, and therefore, whether everybody wanted to be involved, they would be. The fact that America tried to avoid the war and was eventually dragged into it again demonstrates how the war became so important to the world-it would be difficult for any major power not to get involved during the war at this period, simply because, whether American wanted to admit it or not, she was being affected by the war everyday whether she mobilized troops or did not. Therefore, this equation provides the answer when one asks why this was the first global conflict; mainly, nobody could stay out of it, even if they wanted to, and America's actions serve as proof of this. 5 As far as mobilization is concerned, the Great War can be divided into three different periods. Period One stated in August 1914 and ended when the Verdun Campaign began in February 1916. During this period, war was fought with a wealth of labor and Napoleonic tactics, but there was a shortage of munitions. Furthermore, all of the powers were having difficulties making their economies efficient for wartime necessities. There was a general lack of war material, and therefore each side began to develop tactics to deal with trench warfare. 6 The next period, Period Two, began in February 1916, and came to a close during the Passchendaele Campaign in November 1917. During this time period, the war demonstrated several great attrition battles because each of the major powers had figured out how to make the necessary equipment necessary for the battle. There was still a problem, however, most of the powers did not know how to approach war with these well-equipped mass-conscript armies. There was a further development during the war at this time as well. Romania and Russia both collapsed as their military failures destroyed their governments. Germany also exhausted her allies because she failed to adapt and this resulted in the momentary fall of Italy. The stalemate continued through the Verdun and Somme Campaigns. Brusilov's offensive in the East temporarily broke the front, but the strain on the Russian economy lead to revolution. The French Mutiny and Passchendaele almost destroyed France and Britain. The American intervention changed the European war into a global war. 7 The last period of the war, Period Three, started with the revolution in Russia, and came to a close with the Armistice on November 11, 1918. During the first and second phases of the war the Entente squandered its superior resources in wasteful offensives for small shards of ground. Only the addition of American power in the final period saved the Entente. Had America not intervened, Germany would have won. Once America entered the war, it became a race between Germany, the United States, and the Entente to see who would win the war During this time period, Germany could have possibly won the war. Had she been able to concentrate her remaining power in a quick and efficient way, then the country could have put an end to the Entente before the Americans ever set foot on Europe. However, after the Kerensky offensive fell apart on July 1917, she had to move forces to the Western Front in order to put the Ypres and Verdun sectors at ease, and prepared for a large offensive designed to win the war. The German army had to restore front-line unit strength after the costly defensive battles of 1917. They had to assimilate new conscripts, training and equipping them for the new style of warfare practiced on the Western Front. Germany had to stop the Americans from reaching France, complete economic mobilization, and, using unrestricted submarine warfare, reduce Entente munitions production. If successful, Germany might defeat Britain and France before the Americans arrived in strength. If unsuccessful, Germany would be defeated. There were other complexities also at this time during the war. For example, the Entente had its own issues to deal with. The Entente had to get past the French mutinies, access the financial resources provided by America, govern American military power, and also try and fight out offensive attacks planned by the Germans. The Entente decisions became driven by national interest in regards to the American Expeditionary Forces. These interests became the key focus, although they were often contradictory, and would come to dominate the strategic employment of the AEF. Both Britain and France wanted to control American power, but they also had eyes to advance their various imperial interests with this aid as well. The powers began to focus American resources on the Western Front in order to ward off a German victory. But both of these powers also wanted to make sure America would not come to dominate Europe. Regardless, Britain and France knew that American intervention was necessary to prevent themselves from losing the war.8 America had its own issues to deal with, on the other hand. The United States needed to come to a firm conclusion about the role it wished to engage in, and how the country could achieve ends, and exactly what the ends they wished to achieve actually were. American realized that the Entente's increased and ever-increasing dependence on America for aid in the war had forced an alliance with the Entente onto America. Since president Wilson had desired to stay neutral in order to stay out of the war, he had actually prevented the country from becoming prepared for war, which she would have been ready for had she known of the things that were to come. America therefore had to mobilize very quickly in order to effectively participate in the president's war aims. Wilson knew that only victory would allow his hopes for American to flourish, as this would provide the country with diplomatic muscle. However, Wilson did fear that this intervention in Europe could destroy or harm American democracy. Therefore, his focus on the war became that of a temporary focus, but he wanted American actions to be decisive and lead to an overall, and complete, victory.9 This meant that a quick, decisive war effort was the focus of the United States' aims. As Wilson stated, he wanted "peace without victors," and he hoped that this victory would force Europe to accept his fourteen points. American was well aware that she was the economic center of the Entente. In fact, by November 1916, "fully 40 per cent of British war expenditure was devoted to North American supplies, and the burden nearly destroyed sterling as an international currency. The financial and commercial relationships were crucial to Britain: without American production and financial aid Britain would have been simply unable, after April 1917, to continue fighting on anything like the scale to which it had become accustomed. American farms fed the Entente, and its factories and mines supplied their war machines. Doughboys filled the Entente's battle lines, and America financed the war. America only had to prop up the Entente long enough to bring its power to bear. By July 1918 the issue was settled; America had won the race. Without the United States, Germany wins; with American intervention, Germany lost."10 This created some problems for the Entente. Britain and France, by no means, wanted America to win the war in order to dictate the peace. However, at the same time, they could not afford to ignore America's help if they wanted to win the war, as they had become economically dependent on the United States. Europe was horrified about the thought of America coming out of the war as the greatest power in the world. So many European lives had been lost, and Europeans felt that the entry of the Americans so late into the war in order to allow them the upper hand in the peace negotiations was a terrible thing. Regardless, the war could not continue without help from the Americans, although Britain and France resented possible American interference in their own affairs. Europe had become used to an America that did not get involved, and had been happy to avoid dictations of power from the United States. The old European powers of Britain and France were absolutely resentful of the power of the new, effective nation. The French were a proud people, and Marshal Foch, commander in chief of the Entente armies in France, could not allow the upstart American General John J.Pershing to achieve the victory that had thus far eluded him. 11 Thus, in late August 1918, Marshal Foch manipulated General Pershing to change his July plan to reduce the St. Mihiel salient, scheduled to begin on September 12, 1918. Pershing wanted the AEF to reduce the salient, and then to advance across the "open country" of the Wovre Plain to capture the vital resources of the Lorraine Basin and to seize Metz, severing vital rail lines and forcing Germany to sue for peace. Had this plan been implemented, victory would have followed within days. Conquering the Lorraine Basin with its critical transportation networks and strategic resources would have compelled German surrender. The French did not want anyone fighting in Lorraine, because they needed its resources for reconstruction. On August 30-31, 1918, Foch made his decision concerning the AEF and presented Pershing with a fait accompli. 12 In 1918 and 1919, Britain realized that her hegemony was at stake. If the war had continued, British hegemony would have flowed in the direction of America. These types of transfers have happened before in history, but the transfer of power was always from one power in Europe to another, not to a new, young, upstart democratic country with little heritage. Therefore, this was a very unique trend, allowing for the transfer of global, economic, military, and political dominance to flow from Europe into North America. The British had to give into the power of the United States, and they did hope to put a stop to it. British Ambassador Spring-Rice stated, "In the United States, [there is] an under current of feeling that, by the end of the war, America will have all the ships and all the gold in the world, and that the hegemony probably of the world, and certainly of the Anglo-Saxon race, will pass across the Atlantic." He was correct. Britain lost control of American finance during this war, essentially completing American independence from Britain. 13 References Samuel R.Williamson, Jr., "The Origins of the War," in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, ed. Hew Strachan (New York, 1998), 9. Jan Bloch, The Future War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Aspects, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1898), cited in Walter Pintner, "Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, 1986), 366 n. 29; Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, 1986), 281-481; William McElwee, The Art of War: From Waterloo to Mons (Bloomington, 1974). Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, 1991), 31-42, 113-116; Steven N.Miller, Sean M.Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, 1991), 5-7; Larry H.Addington, The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington, 1984), 92-93. Holger H.Herwig, "The Dynamics of Necessity: German Military Policy during the First World War," in Military Effectiveness, vol. I, The First World War, ed. Allan R.Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston, 1988), 80. R.S.Thomas, A Compilation of Memoranda: August 25, 1920 to February 28, 1922, Historical Section, U.S. Army War College, May 3, 1944, pp. 1-5 (Washington, D.C.: NARA, RG165/E320/B1/F4). Robert B.Asprey, The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I (New York, 1991), 538. Dennis E.Showalter, Tannenberg: Clash of Empires (Hamden, Conn., 1991); Henry Bashkin, Finding Aid to Entry Group 320, NM84 (Washington, D.C.: NARA, 1990); and Paul F. Braim, The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Newark, 1987); David F.Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence, 1993), 221-226. Hew Strachan, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (New York, 1998); Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Passchendaele: The Untold Story (New Haven, 1996); John Keegan, The First World War (New York, 1999); Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York, 1999). J.E.Edmonds, Military Operations of the British Army in the Western Theater of War in 1914-1918, 16 vols. (London, 1922-1949). David French, "Sir James Edmonds and the Official History: France and Belgium," in The First World War and British Military History, ed. Brian Bond (Oxford, 1991), 69-86; Keith Simpson, "The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig," in ibid., 141-162; Hew Strachan, "'The Real War': Liddell-Hart, Cruttwell and Falls," in ibid., 41-68. Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, 14 vols. (1925-1956); Les Armes Franaises dans la Grande Guerre (Paris); Kriegsarchiv, sterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 1914-1918, 15 vols. (Vienna, 1931-1938); Center of Military History, United States Army in the World War 1917-1917, 17 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1948). Read More