Major Suggestions in Leviathan - Essay Example

In Hobbes' Leviathan, is it "reason" or "the passions", or both, that leads us out of the of nature Introduction - thesis In this paper, I argue that, according to Hobbes, certain passions which require us to seek peace, allied to our reason, which suggests to us the means of achieving peace, combine together to lead us out of the state of nature. Argument Leviathan, published in 1651, marked an important development in political philosophy, in that it introduced the most powerful version of the social contract theory into political discourse. Hobbes depicts 'natural' man as a creature fundamentally opposed to civil society. It is a picture of humanity lacking basic ties even of family and friendship, and primarily concerned with self-interest. As Hobbes also depicts 'men' in this situation as roughly equal, in terms of physical strength and mental faculties, he cannot see clear winners and losers in this state, or the emergence of a more fixed, systemic hierarchy. The problem, as he sees it, is that there is no overarching 'figure', a being or entity or idea with power to instill awe, to occasion obedience to a greater good beyond the three causes of perpetual war, which he sees as competition, diffidence [fear of attack], and glory [or vanity] [ch13, p2]. Consequently, the lives of people in such a state are famously described as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' [ch13, p3]. Hobbes appears to have been influenced in this negative characterization by the civil war raging in England at the time of his writing. He acknowledges that such a state may never have existed 'generally', but that it exists in places where the power to instill awe is absent: Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate into a civil war. (ch 13, p4]. More notably, he argues that this state of perpetual conflict exists in societies, such as the native societies of America, where, according to his somewhat distant reading, there are no powers to instill awe and obedience. Hobbes believes that humanity emerges out of this peculiarly solitary, untrusting state - in which justice, being a socially developed concept, does not yet exist (ch13, p4] - through a combination of reason and the passions. Hobbes asserts [somewhat contradictorily] that man's nature, besides being a cause of perpetual conflict with his neighbors, also inclines him to peace: The passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement [ch13, p4]. The 'articles of peace' here mentioned are further developed, in chapters 14 and 15, into nine 'laws of nature'. Of these, Hobbes places the one he considers most important at the head. This law states that 'man ought to endeavour peace' [ch14, p1], as far as he is able to achieve it - and failing this, should seek all the advantages of war. Man's natural diffidence, or fear of attack, as mentioned earlier, would best be assuaged by the creation of a peaceful estate, but if this cannot be created, then a preparedness for war, based on the idea that attack is the best method of defense, is the next best option. Hobbes' second law of nature is central to his idea of man moving out of the state of nature into civil society, in that it involves a willingness to restrict individual liberty. He states it thus: That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself [ch14, p2]. With Hobbes' third law comes the important idea of the covenant - what we nowadays translate as 'ontract'. 'Men perform their covenants made', he writes [ch15, p1]. I take this to mean that contracts must be made explicit, so that they are known and understood. Hobbes considers this idea of 'the covenant made', as the foundation of justice. Thus he defines justice in a highly legalistic way, and simply does not allow for a 'sense' of justice or injustice, such as might be posited as existing in a 'state of nature'. The other six natural laws as defined by Hobbes are: that we should be grateful for the gifts we receive, that others not repent of giving them; that we strive to accommodate ourselves to others; that we ought to pardon the past offences of others [presumably within reason], so long as they repent of having committed them; that in avenging ourselves we should look more to future benefits than to past injustices; that we should not declare hatred or contempt for others in word, deed or in any other public way; and that we should acknowledge the equal nature of others [a version of equality before the law'] [ch15, pp5-9]. It is important to note that all of these laws are couched in terms of obligation, and are thus contrasted with what Hobbes describes as 'the right of nature', which everyone, before entering into a contracted state of civil society, recognizes. This right is characterized by Hobbes as ''the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto'' [ch14, p1]. It is clear to Hobbes that these natural laws, which entail obligation, cannot be enacted or enforced, without some overarching force that would 'compel performance' [ch14, p5], for the covenants or contracts by which certain individual liberties are to be given up require a more stable state of affairs than the perpetual conflict that pertains to the state of nature. However, there are certain contracts or agreements which, contravening natural right, such as the right to preserve our own life, must be considered invalid. Hobbes reflects here on confessions extracted by torture - a relevant issue in his era as it is in ours - and notes that 'what is in that case confessed tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured, not to the informing of the torturers, and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony: for whether he deliver himself by true or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own life'' [ch14, p8]. The compelling of performance, in the matter of covenants, is, according to Hobbes, ensured by means of two natural proclivities; fear and pride. Since pride, or glory, in appearing to have no need to break covenants, is too rare to be relied upon in a competitive environment, fear is the principal 'passion to be reckoned upon' [ch14, p8]. In pointing this out, Hobbes acknowledges that the fear may be of a vengeful or punishing religious spirit - and that the fear of such spirits exists in a state of nature - but he believes that the fear of men, especially when vested with the legal and other powers constituted by a civil society, is a greater fear. The notion of justice, which Hobbes claims has no credence in a state of nature, is intimately bound to the notion of propriety, or ownership - and ownership can only be guaranteed by the state, or Commonwealth. Hobbes summarizes it thus: before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth [ch15, p1]. The Commonwealth, then is the essential enforcing and protecting power, enforcing covenants which protect the peace, allowing men to emerge from a state of perpetual conflict into one of relative peace, and giving birth to the very concepts of justice and propriety. It derives its power from its capacity to coerce and to instill fear into the hearts of those who would consider non-compliance with covenants. On the other hand its existence is intended to encourage the tendencies of natural law, a set of obligations arrived at by reason as promoting a state of peace and in so doing furthering the interests of those contracted to it. Conclusion Hobbes is generally seen as a pessimist with respect to human nature. He envisages an aggressive self-interest resulting in a kind of mutually assured destruction brought about by perpetual warfare. It is a view clearly reflecting the troubled times in which he lived, and it takes little account of the kinship and other ties which enrich and strengthen human culture, and morality. Naturally it does not take into account more recent understandings from sociobiology and evolutionary psychology which reveal us as social beings throughout our history, with a 'self-interest' far less individualistic than that of man in a Hobbesian state of nature. However, in exploring the conflicting desires and fears of human beings within his Commonwealth, and how passions and desires might be restricted and in some ways facilitated by the reasoning that leads to the positing of natural law, and in highlighting some of the individual obligations necessary to maintain a peaceful and productive state, Hobbes has contributed significantly to our understanding of an effective political system. Bibliography Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Accessed November 2006. Adelaide University etexts. Peters, Richard S (ed). Body, man and citizen: Thomas Hobbes, selections from his writings. New York: Collier, 1962. Read More