Peter Winchs The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy - Essay Example

Education and Social Science Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, which was originally published in the year 1958, has been regarded as one of the landmark explorations of the social sciences and Winch's argument in the book remains as essential as ever. Winch has been regarded as a enthusiastic and fervent supporter of the relevance of philosophy in order to understand the 'society' in its entirety and he challenged the arguments of people who considered it as an extraneous 'ivory towers' pursuit. He also attempts to counter the arguments of scholars who consider social science as closely connected to physics and other natural sciences. According to the scholars on the topic of social science, this subject of study has been slow to imitate the natural sciences and liberate from the dead hand of philosophy and this has resulted in the slow growth of this branch of study. They maintain that it is important for the social science to follow the methods of natural science rather than those of philosophy if it should make some significant progress. The main purpose of Peter Winch is "to attack such a conception of the relation between the social studies, philosophy and the natural sciences." (Winch, 1958, p 1). According to Peter Winch, a successful social science in general and sociology in particular would more nearly resemble literacy criticism than physics and other physical sciences and he provides several justifications for his claim all through his book. Winch's justification of his claim becomes evident in a reflective analysis of his distinctions between and among 'understanding and explanation,' 'motives, reasons, and causes,' and the difference between the sociologist's and the physical scientist's relation to the phenomena that they investigate (the 'subject matter' of the social sciences), and this paper undertakes an analysis of these aspects of the book along with a summary. In his The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy Winch attacks the contemporary conception of the relations between philosophy and the social studies and he proposes to undertake a discussion of the nature of philosophy since it will clarify his ideas. In his book, Winch argues that a successful social science in general and sociology in particular would more nearly resemble literacy criticism than physics and other physical sciences and he provides the central core of his argument under the title 'Understanding Social Institutions.' He maintains that 'understanding' is more essential phenomenon than 'explaining' and it clarifies his major arguments. According to him, it is essential to use the term 'understanding' rather than explaining, though he does not mean to allude to the distinction made by Webber between 'casual explanation' and interpretive understanding'. "The point I have in mind is a rather different one. Methodologists and philosophers of science commonly approach their subject by asking what the character of the explanations offered is in the science under consideration. Now of course explanations are closely connected with understanding. Understanding is the goal of explanation and the end-product of successful explanation Unless there is a form of understanding that is not the result of explanation, no such thing as explanation would be possible. An explanation is called for only where there is, at least thought to be, a deficiency of understanding." (Winch, 1990, p X). Winch considers 'understanding' as the standard against which the deficiency of the knowledge must be measured and this calls for explanation. The understanding one already has is expressed in the concepts which constitute the form of subject matter that one is concerned with. On the other hand, these concepts also express certain aspects of the life characteristic of the people who apply them. The interconnections among these aspects are the major subject of explanation in the book by Winch. It is also vital to understand the connections among concepts such as motives, reasons, and causes in order to comprehend the major claim of Winch in his book The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. Winch is unambiguous that the discussion of the distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences, which is the central concern of the author in the book, revolves round the concept of generality and the different ways in which this characterizes one's understanding of natural and social phenomena respectively. "I expressed this difference by saying that our understanding of natural phenomena is in terms of the notion of cause, while our understanding of social phenomena involves the categories of motives and reasons for actions. Furthermore, I argued, whereas the category of cause involves generality by way of empirical generalizations that of a reason for action involves generality by way of rules. And these notions - of generalization and of rule - differ from each other in important logical respects." (Winch, 1990, p XI). Winch undoubtedly maintains that the social science in general and sociology in particular resembles literacy criticism more than physics and other natural sciences. The traditional scholars, such as Mill, regard that all explanations are essentially of the same logical structure. This makes such scholars consider that there can be no basic logical difference between the principles according to which one explains natural changes and those according to which the social changes are explained. Thus, such view maintained that the methodological issues relating to the moral sciences should be seen as empirical and such a method has an attitude involving a wait-and-see attitude to the question of what can be achieved by the social sciences. However, according to Winch, "the issue is not an empirical one at all: it is conceptual. It is not a question of what empirical research may show to be the case, but of what philosophical analysis reveals about what it makes sense to say. I want to show that the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered in the natural sciences." (Winch, 1958, p 71-72). Winch specifies that the concept of 'understanding' is essential for the social science as man is a social being and the man learns to understand the rule when he is taught a particular rule of language. It is obvious that the concept of understanding is rooted in a social context which is essential for the knowledge of social science. "Some social scientists have acknowledged the difference in concept between our currently accepted descriptions and explanations of natural and of social processes respectively, but have argued that the social scientist need not adhere to this non-scientific conceptual framework; that he is at liberty to frame such concepts as are useful for the kind of investigation he is conducting." (Winch, 1958, p 75). The distinction among the concepts such as motives, reasons, and causes as well as the difference between the sociologists and the physical scientists in relation to the phenomena that they investigate also explains the major justifications of Winch who claims that a successful social science in general and sociology in particular would more nearly resemble literacy criticism than physics and other physical sciences. Winch justifies his argument mainly by discussing the attempt to interpret explanations of behaviour in such terms as based on generalizations of the causal type. Explaining the rules governing the physical sciences, Winch offers explanations for his central argument. According to him, to explore the type of regularity studied in a given kind of enquiry means an examination of the nature of the rule according to which judgments of identity are made in that enquiry. These judgments are understandable only relatively to a given mode of human behaviour, governed by its own rules. "In a physical science the relevant rules are those governing the procedures of investigators in the science in question Those rules, like all others, rest on a social context of common activity. So to understand the activities of an individual scientific investigator we must take account of two sets of relations: first, his relation to the phenomena which he investigates; second, his relation to his fellow-scientists." (Winch, 1958, p 84). The subject of study in the social sciences differs greatly from that of the natural sciences such as physics. In other words, there is immense difference between the sociologists and the physical scientists in relation to the phenomena that they investigate. The topic of study in social science is close to that of literacy criticism than physics and other physical sciences. Thus, Winch maintains that successful social science in general and sociology in particular would more nearly resemble literacy criticism than physics and other physical sciences. "I have made no attempt, in this book, to consider the undoubted differences which exist between particular kinds of social study, such as sociology, political theory, economics, and so on. I have wanted rather to bring out certain features of the notion of a social study as such. I do not think that individual methodological differences, important as they may be within their own context, can affect the broad outlines of what I have tried to say. For this belongs to philosophy rather than to what is commonly understood by the term 'methodology'." (Winch, 1958, p 136). In conclusion, Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy counters the argument that social science is closely connected to physics and other natural sciences. Significantly, Peter Winch argues, throughout his book, that a successful social science in general and sociology in particular would more nearly resemble literacy criticism than physics and other physical sciences and he provides several justifications for his claim all through his book. Winch's distinctions between and among 'understanding and explanation,' 'motives, reasons, and causes,' and the difference between the sociologist's and the physical scientist's relation to the phenomena that they investigate (the 'subject matter' of the social sciences) best justify his claim. References Winch, Peter. (1958). The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. p 1. Winch, Peter. (1990). "Preface." The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge. p X. Read More