Critical Interpretation of Contemporary American History - Essay Example

07 August 2007 Critical Interpretation of Contemporary American History: Empire and Militaries Since the end of the World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, America has gained a reputation of the global political, economic and military center in opposition to the Western world and Asia. During the second half of the XX century, the United States has claimed to seek peace and stability. In spite of opportunities and advantages of this foreign policy, increased militarization and enormous spending on the military sector have transformed the American society, its political and social values. Argument: American militarism has negative consequences on society and economy; it limits freedom, democracy and liberty subordinated to the military expansions and global political dominance. In the book The Sorrows of Empire Johnson claims that increasing militarization of society and global political power of the USA limits ideas of democracy and liberty established by the US Constitution. The same ideas are expressed by Sundhaussen (1998) and Welch (2004) who state that militarization of society bring the American nation more 'sorrows and grievances' then security and peace. Among them are internal cleavage, economic stress, and external pressure. The means of military power is often identical to the means of assuming power in the first place. Following Sundhaussen (1998): "The military is by its very nature a potential threat to democracy, but in well-established democracies civilian supremacy has generally been maintained, though there are dangers of excessive military influence" (329). According to Johnson (2004), since 2001 the USA government has increased military spending and increased its military presence abroad. Furthermore, just as the original conspiracy to seize power had civilian adherents, the coup that presages a return to civilian rule is instigated by an alliance of military and civilian elements. Johnson compares modern American Empire with the Roman Empire which had a great influence on the western world and its historical development. For instance, "Bush and his administration have worked zealously to expand the powers of the presidency at the expense of the other branches of government" (23). The development of military empire is a part of the American history which goes back to the 1950s-1960s. In stark contrast to the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has been remarkably consistent in its foreign policy agenda and its attempts to follow through on campaign pledges. It has sponsored the country's largest ever military buildup. It has generated the highest level of tension in U.S. Soviet relations since the 1962 missile crisis, resulting, for several years, in a hiatus in communication at virtually all levels on virtually all issues (Aylett and DeMarco 98-99). It has reinforced the various intelligence agencies, expanding both surveillance and paramilitary capabilities, reinstating the practice of surveillance of U.S. citizens at home and abroad, treating any agency of government and any private organization or profession as legitimate "cover," and introducing new measures to protect secrecy and punish whistleblowers the Reagan Administration has escalated U.S. military involvement in Central American conflicts continuously, mindless of overwhelming popular opposition to its policies at home and in allied countries of Europe and Latin America; mindless of multiple opportunities for negotiation and compromise; and mindless, finally, of the certainty of ignominious failure (Aylett and DeMarco 101). While it is clear that security interests have always loomed large in the shaping of U.S. policy, it is less clear how such interests are defined and limited. The concept of security is eminently elastic. Johnson (2004) underlines that "the paradoxical effect of this grand strategy is that it may prove more radically disruptive of world order than anything the terrorists of September 11, 2001 could have hoped to achieve on their own" (6). The boundaries of what is to be secured stretch to encompass whatever the policymaking body has, or thinks it has, or thinks it should have. Thus as the United States, over the course of the twentieth century, has expanded its stakes in less developed countries, through private investment, through the emplacement of military installations, and through the cultivation of economic, political, and military elites, it has expanded concomitantly its security interests and the threats to those interests (Aylett and DeMarco 51). As U.S. power grew and the actual threat of European intervention in less developed countries diminished, nationalism, expressed in resentment of U.S. influence, came to be seen by U.S. policymakers as essentially foreign-inspired and thus threatening to U.S. security. Taking into account these facts, it is possible to agree with Johnson that the increasing military power of the USA will bring the nation four main 'sorrows': (1) "a state of perpetual war, leading to more terrorism against Americans; (2) a loss of democracy and Constitutional rights, rights as the presidency eclipses Congress; (3) the replacement of truth by propaganda, disinformation, and the glorification of war; (4) bankruptcy, as the United States pours its economic resources" (7). In combating nationalism and incipient nationalist movements, the United States, in turn, has validated their arguments and contributed to their growth. United States hostility has also increased the likelihood that such movements would adopt "alien" creeds (e.g., Marxism) and, in some cases, seek alien support. In the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy, this, in turn, reinforces the perception among U.S. policymakers of threat to the national security (Aylett and DeMarco 45). Thus U.S. foreign policy has traditionally stressed the promotion of open markets, free enterprise, and a welcome mat for foreign investments--goals which have been presented as in the general interest of mankind. The material interests to be pursued in less developed countries have varied over the years in tandem with the evolution of the U.S. and international capitalist systems. From a concentration early in the century on the extraction of primary products, the purchase of government bonds, and the pursuit of markets for U.S. manufactured goods, these interests were refocused in the 1950s and 1960s on direct investment in manufacturing for local consumption. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. interests have become more heavily involved in manufacturing for export and in the direct extraction of capital through stock market operations and interest on loans (Friedman 119). However, as the role of protecting these and other interests has been assumed by various governmental departments and agencies, including in particular the Department of Defense and the various intelligence agencies, the bureaucracies involved have developed various interests of their own. These bureaucratic interests tend to go beyond the minimal requirements of maintaining a hospitable climate for foreign investment in systems otherwise free to choose their own forms of social organization to the idea of control for its own sake. Following Johnson (2004): "Our garrisons send a daily message that the United States prefers to deal with other nations through the use or threat of force rather than negotiations, commerce, or cultural interaction and through military-to-military, not civilian-to-civilian, relations" (4). Moreover, as the roles of the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies in the making and implementation of policy have been strengthened the roles of the Department of State and the various development agencies, the concept of control (generally referred to by the term "influence") has been more tightly drawn and the categories of individuals, groups, policies, and ideas seen as threatening to U.S. security have been expanded (Aylett, DeMarco 67). Before the events of September 11, 2001, there had not been an immediate military threat to the national territory of the United States, and there had not been no such thing as an objective assessment of security threats. Johnson (2004) underlines that security and insecurity is in the minds of the strategists. For instance, the Reagan Administration, in 1983, perceiving a threat to U.S. national security, launched an invasion of the tiny, distant island state of Grenada. The most nearly credible of the many rationales presented by administration spokesmen for that action was fear that if it did not invade the United States would be viewed as a "paper tiger." The "paper tiger" insecurity complex has been cited at some point by virtually every U.S. administration since World War II to explain strategic goals and military actions that are otherwise inexplicable (Aylett, DeMarco 69). Following Johnsom (2004): "our militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities" (2). In fact, such evidence as is available suggests that what is in doubt among U.S. allies and enemies alike is not whether or not the United States will use its military power but whether or not it will use that power in a rational manner. No rational person could discount the military power of the United States, but obviously there are limits to the efficacy of military "solutions" to political problems (Johnsom 86). Critics admit that the American people have the political will to defend themselves, but there are clearly limits to the willingness of the American people to defend governments of dubious legitimacy in distant lands. Following Mehta (2003): "many are therefore inclined to think of empire as, in some senses, un-American, a betrayal of its identity and fundamental values" (49). If policymakers proceed, nevertheless, to make extensive commitments on the basis of such casual declarations of vital interest, their fears of loss of credibility may become self-fulfilling. It has commonly been the case that the individuals, groups, or nations whose wealth and power would appear to make them most secure are, in fact, most paranoid; by their frenetic attempts to ensure their security, they threaten to bring on their own destruction All U.S. administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, base their policies toward less developed countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, the South American countries) on considerations of military power, including the security of U.S. business and banking interests (Aylett and DeMarco 45). However, there are appreciable differences in the manner in which administrations from opposing extremes of the U.S. political spectrum assess security threats and respond to them. These events and actions of the government weaken the image of American nation and its economic potential. Many political leaders agree that the Vietnam war, the war in Afghanistan and Iraqi wars proved military weakness of the USA and its inadequate strategies and tactics (Johnson 298; Aylett and DeMarco 101). It is possible to conclude that the selective ignorance and ideological blinders that are characteristic of individuals and institutions in the U.S. foreign policymaking apparatus influence the development of a strong military empire which threatens economic and social stability of the countries. The events of the September 11 did not give rise to new foreign policies but supported traditional militarization and expansion typical for the American state. Obsessed with the military aspects of its presumed global mission, the United States has weakened its own economy, leaving it with more sticks but fewer carrots with which to pursue its goals. The usual liberal explanation for the "failures" and absurdities of U.S. foreign policy is bungling bureaucratic inefficiency and outright ignorance. Evidence to support explanations of that sort is plentiful. Political leaders always stress the necessity of promoting stability in areas, such as Latin America and the Middle East, considered strategically important to the United States. That being the case, it is at once ironic and tragic that the United States can always be expected to frustrate or, if necessary, to crush revolutionary movements in other states. That the United States, always proclaiming stability and influence to be its goals, would, by its own actions, perpetuate instability and global militarism. Works Cited 1. Aylett, J.F., DeMarco, N. The Cold War and After (Hodder 20th Century History). Hodder Murray; 2Rev Ed edition, 2005. 2. Friedman, Th. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. Anchor; 1 Anchor edition. 2000. 3. Johnson, Ch. The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic Metropolitan Books, 2004. 4. Mehta, P. B. Empire and Moral Identity. Ethics & International Affairs 17 (2003): 49. 5. Sundhaussen, U. The Military: A Threat to Democracy The Australian Journal of Politics and History 44 (1998): 329. 6. Welch, S. D. After Empire: The Art and Ethos of Enduring Peace. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004. Read More