Internecine Conflict as Modus Operandi for the Sudanese - Essay Example

Internecine conflict is modus operandi for the Sudanese. Since achieving independence from joint Anglo-Egyptian condominium governance in 1956, Sudanhas been repeatedly torn by civil war and regional dispute. Although the twenty-year civil war between North and South terminated with the signing of the Naivasha Accords on January 9, 2005, peace has yet to settle upon the war-ravaged nation. In February, 2003, a new conflict broke out in western Sudan; more specifically, the three regions of Northern, Western and Southern Darfur. Initially, it appeared that this latest crisis arose as the result of differences between nomadic Arab tribes and sedentary black African ones. But to characterize this crisis as a tribal conflict would be simplistic in the extreme. To the contrary, the Darfur crisis is caused by political, economic and social marginalization that, unless properly addressed by both national policies, will wreak havoc upon the region for some time into the future. To fully understand the root causes of the present crisis, it is necessary to gain a complete appreciation of the Darfur region in its proper geographic and historical contexts. Geographically speaking, the western portion of Sudan known as Darfur is in area about 493,180 square kilometers, about 20% of the nation's total territory of 2,505, 813 square kilometers and is subdivided into three wilayats or states known as Gharb (West) Darfur, Janub (South) Darfur, and Shamal (North) Darfur. These states suffer from the lack of perennial watercourses and as a result, their population is scarce and tends to cluster around permanent wells. Western Darfur is a plain that has the greatest water supply. The drainage from the volcanic massif, the Jabal Marrah, washes onto the plain, allowing for a somewhat larger settled population. This area also has a significant portion of the so-called qoz sands. Here, although livestock raising is the major economic activity, significant crop cultivation also takes place. In contrast, North and South Darfur are semi-deserts that have little water from the wadis or the wells that dry up in the winter. The soils in these areas support vegetation for grazing (Geography). The entire region has few natural resources. About six million people inhabit Darfur, drawn from about eighty different tribes and ethnic groups. From a subsistence perspective, these ethnic groups fit into two categories. First, there are the livestock herders who are for the most part, Arabic speakers. The second group is composed of the farmers, who are bilingual and are considered Africans. The ethnic groups in Darfur include the Fur, Bani Halba, Tanhor, Borty, Habaniya, Zaghawa, Zayadia, Rizaigat, Masaleet, Taaishya, Maidoub, Bargo, Dajs, Bani Hussain, Tama, Mahria, Mohameed, Salamat, Messairia, Eraighat, Etafab, Fallata, Ghimir, Bani Mansour, Ab-Darag, Selaihab, Mima, Turgom, Marareet and other African and Arabian tribes. The language spoken is Arabic and the religion for both Arabs and Africans is Sunni Muslims (Darfur Conflict). Historically, the inception of modern day Darfur came with the Fur dominated Keira dynasty that arose in the seventeenth century. This sultanate, which was established by Sulayman Solongdungo (1650- 1680), managed its expansion throughout the region through a combination of peaceful and coercive incorporation of territorial and tribal groups (Young). In 1787, Sultan Mohammed Tayrab extended the sultanate to the Nile when he conquered the Funj province of Korodofan (Young, 2). The rulers of the Keira dynasty then continued to encourage a pattern of immigration into the region to provide for increased manpower needs. Whole groups were brought into the area through means such as land grants and high sultanate positions (Young, 2). Eventually, this process of assimilation and incorporation settled the basic pattern of ethnic grouping into specific regions that still stand to the present day. The tribal distribution that emerged can be categorized by livelihood and ecology. The sedentary farmers, which include Berti, Marareet, Mime, Daju, Bergid, Tunjur, Dading, Fur, and Masaleit inhabit the central region. The wetter, savannah regions in the south became home to the cattle nomadic groups such as the Ta'aisha, Beni Halba, Fellata, Habbaniya, Ma'alyia, and Rizeigat. Finally, the camel herding nomadic tribes like the Mahamid settled in the northern semi-arid regions (Young, 3). The Keira dynasty continued to rule Darfur until 1874 when the Turco-Egyptian forces of the Ottoman empire conquered Sudan and its regions (Coalition). The brief period of Turco-Egyptian rule was marked by turbulence in Darfur with sporadic revolts by the Fur and the Bagghara cattle herders in the south, who were upset with the governments taxation system. This period also marked the exploitation of the lucrative slave trade with Southern Sudan by Arab and European traders (Young, 5). The Bagghara, cattle herding nomadic groups, took part in this enterprise, moving south and trading with small-scale merchants known as the jallaba. With the advance of the slave trade the beginning of the commercial polarization of north-south Sudan emerged, reducing previously established trade links with Darfur and leading to the central government's policy of marginalization of the region that continues to the present day (Young, 5). Turco-Egyptian rule however, was short-lived. In 1881 Muhammed Ahmad declared himself the Mahdi, the anointed one, who would restore to Islam its purity. The Madhi's forces, known as the Ansar, were gathered from all over Sudan and, in 1885, overran Khartoum. Mahdist rule, too, was characterized by turbulence. For example, when Mahdi's successor, Abdallah ibn Muhammad, demanded that the region provide soldiers for the Sudanese army, several tribes rose up in revolt. Subsequently, British forces in a battle at Omdurman overthrew the Mahdi in 1883. In his place, the British recognized Ali Dinar as Sultan and Darfur was left to govern its own affairs (Young, 6) In1916, concerned that the region was falling under the influence of the Turkish, the British invaded Darfur and incorporated it into Sudan. At this point, the economic development in Sudan was designed to serve the needs of a colonial economy. Most of the available resources were allocated by the Anglo-Egyptian government to those areas around Khartoum and the Blue Nile province, leaving the rest of the country relatively neglected. For this reason, until Sudanese independence in 1956, Darfur remained an undeveloped backwater (Young, 6). As will be seen, this neglect or "marginalization" is a major underlying underlying cause of the present ongoing crisis. Achieving independence did not mean peace for Sudan, which, since1956, has experienced two civil wars and a number of revolts and other disturbances. The present crisis involving Sudan's Darfur region had its inception in 1987 when a Chadian Arab militia, armed by Libya, was driven into Darfur by Chadian and French forces. This militia, known as the Janjaweed, then allied itself with drought stricken Darfurian nomads in an intense war over arable land with the neighboring Fur (deWaal). Later, in 1991, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from southern Sudan, attempted to instigate a rebellion in Darfur, but was crushed by an Arab militia and the Sudanese army (deWaal). Throughout the 1990's sporadic uprisings occurred, sparked mostly by land and livestock disputes. Local leader's attempted to settle these disputes through inter-tribal councils, but their efforts were futile. The government security services responded to the situation by arming Arab militias to try and disarm Fur and Masaleit defense groups (deWaal). Subsequently, two major rebel groups were formed to carry on the fighting in Darfur. In 2002, Fur defense groups and Zaghawa units joined together, with the support of the SPLA, to form the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). After publishing a manifesto, the SLA began staging raids on government garrisons and police stations. Initially, Abdel Walid al Nur, a lawyer whose vision called for equality for all Sudanese, led the SLA. But ultimately, the Fur and Zaghawa wings of the SLA failed to cooperate, and a split occurred between Walid's supporters and a more militarily aggressive group led by Mini Minawi. The two SLA factions then began to fight each as much as the government forces (deWaal). Another rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), joined the SLA rebellion in March, 2003. Formed by Islamic dissidents ousted from power in Khartoum, this faction was more cohesive than the SLA and relied heavily on the Zaghawa Kobe clan power base of its founder, Khalil Ibrahim (deWaal). Additionally, the JEM apparently had the support of the Chadian government and the backing of then Sudanese opposition leader, Hussan al-Turabi (Darfur Liberation Front). Since the fighting broke out in 2003, a humanitarian disaster of almost unbelievable magnitude has been created that continues to worsen in recent months. Thousands upon thousands of individuals have died or been forced to flee war ravaged areas. Accurate death toll and people displaced statistics are hard to come by as the Sudanese government places severe restrictions on foreign journalists' and relief workers ability to access certain refugee camps. Currently, the estimated death toll is extremely high, ranging anywhere from UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan's estimated 450,000 dead, to a lower range of between 200,000 to 400,000 as arrived at by social scientists, John Hagan and Alberto Palloni. Furthermore, these scientists estimate that over a million people have been displaced in West Darfur alone (DeKoupil). Attempts to halt the disaster have been made, through the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Amis) and by the brokering of the 2005 Peace Agreement (Darfur Peace Agreement). But the African Union mission is too poorly equipped and staffed to have any hope of ending the bloodshed and the peace agreement has already been broken. New steps must be taken immediately to halt the inexorable tide of death and destruction before it reaches proportions not seen since the Holocaust. To do this an appreciation of the underlying causes of the catastrophe by national and international forces must be established. Foremost such understanding must come from the Sudanese government. For years, the government of Omar El-Bashir has asserted that the fighting in Darfur is the result of conflict between sedentary African farmers and nomadic Arabic herders. A June 2005, issue of SudaNews, a newletter produced by the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D. C. is a prime example. According to the Sudanese, the fighting in Darfur is the result of inter-tribal conflict over scarce resources, especially between farmers and cattle herders who invaded agricultural lands in search of fresh pastures (Darfur Conflict,2). Tribal armed militias emerged due to fears that the government could not protect the people from the encroachments of other militias and armed criminal gangs like the Janjaweed (Darfur Conflict, 2). The fighting became exacerbated due to the inability to settle tribal disputes through traditional inter-tribal councils because of the government's modernizing of the judicial system (Darfur Conflict, 2). In any event, the fighting was initiated by rebel forces, who in 2003, attacked government facilities and police stations, killing innocent policemen and government workers (Darfur Conflict, 3). This version of events completely ignores the larger picture, as a review of the geo-political situation in Darfur outlined above clearly demonstrates. Admittedly, conflict has been caused between tribes because of the scarcity of natural resources. Recent droughts have caused nomadic herders to push across more and more settled lands in search of adequate pastures. Breaking into lands that other, more sedentary tribes have long considered their homelands has certainly caused considerable inter-tribal tension (Saaed). But tribal conflict is not the only reason for the humanitarian disaster currently existing in Darfur. As can be seen by the above outlined Darfurian history, successive governments have carried on a policy of marginalization that stretches back to the nineteenth century Turco-Egyptian domination of the region. At that time, the emphasis placed on the lucrative slave trade, as participated in by the Bagghara, coupled with a heavy system of taxation and the de-emphasis on previous Darfurian trade links led to the more settled population's economic decline (Young, 5). This pattern of marginalization continued with the Anglo-Egyptian colonial government that allocated resources only to already resource rich areas along the Nile to accommodate solely colonial needs and interests (Young, 6). After independence was achieved in 1956, the pattern of marginalization of Darfur by the Sudanese government continued. Colonial condominium rule left the new government with a valuable flow of income that could have addressed the regional disparity issues and launched programs to assist in Darfur's development. Yet the Sudanese government actually intensified the already existing marginalization. In fact, it did little to change existing economic, social, and political patterns, to the continuing detriment of Darfur (Young, 8). Ultimately, the first step toward building a lasting peace in the region must be for the government to admit and accept its own responsibility for exacerbating the crisis. Continuing to deny its cupability in supplying and aiding the Janjaweed must halt. There is plenty of evidence to prove that the Sudan government is directly responsible for the bombing of civilian sites and the arming of the Janjaweed militias. The government must also begin to take steps toward reversing the years of economic and political marginalization, for failing to do so will increase the already existing tribal resentment that precipated the outbreak in 2003. Without the Sudanese government changing existing policies of political, economic and social marginalization, the hope of peace in Darfur will not come at any time in the near future. Works Cited "Amis: African Union Mission in Sudan." The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. 19 Mar. 2007 . "Darfur Liberation Front." Global Security.Org. 17 Dec. 2006. 19 Mar. 2007 . "Darfur Peace Agreement." US Department of State. 08 May 2006. 19 Mar. 2007 . Dewaal, Alex. "Darfur - the Crisis Explained." Prospect Magazine Mar. 2007. 19 Mar. 2007 . Dokoupil, Tony. "A Grim Calculation." Newsweek 14 Sept. 2006. 19 Mar. 2007 . "Geography." Country Studies. 19 Mar. 2007 . Reeves, Eric. "Genocide in Darfur: the End of Agnosticism, February 1, 2004." Sudanreeves.Org. 01 Feb. 2004. 19 Mar. 2007 . Reeves, Eric. "A Short History of Darfur." Coalition for Darfur. 09 Mar. 2005. 19 Mar. 2007 . Saaed, Bakri. "Preface." Environmental Degradation as a Cause of the Conflict in Darfur (2004): 6-7. 19 Mar. 2007 . Young, Helen, Abdul Monim Osman,, Yacob Aklilu, Rebecca Dale, and Babiker Badri. Darfur 2005:Livelihoods Under Siege. 2005. South Africa Regional Poverty network. 19 Mar. 2007 . Read More