An understanding of the term One Man Bridge Operation - Dissertation Example

One Man Bridge Operation The purpose of this paper is to develop an understanding of the term “one man bridge operation”, as applied in navigation of a maritime vessel and the manner in which the number of personnel manning the bridge at any given time has seen a reduction, leading to the practice of a single man controlling the operations on the bridge of a ship. The implications of this especially in terms of safety of the ship, due to incidents at sea owing to the disadvantages of a single man look out and the legal position on the practice of a single man bridge operation seen in some ships are also examined. The method employed in collecting material for the paper included training material for navigating officers, publications of the Admiralty and articles on the Internet from maritime safety organizations and other articles on single man watch keeping operations of vessels at sea. The result has been to find that one-man bridge operation is a regular practice especially in vessels that are undermanned as well as otherwise and does pose a risk not only to the vessel itself, but also to other vessels at sea and the environment due to the lack of proper look out and the human fatigue factor. One Man Bridge Operation Introduction: Advances in technology especially with regard to equipment on board a ship, both on the navigation side and engine side, have made it possible to reduce the complement of personnel manning a ship. The advantage in this is that it reduces costs of running a ship with a positive economic impact for the owner of the ship or the management of the ship. Owners of ships and ship management companies are thus in a position to ply ships with reduced manpower. The resulting disadvantage is to put a strain on the complement of the crew of the vessel leading to non-compliance of safety regulations in the navigation of a vessel at sea. Thus there is a conflict in terms of the economical running of a ship and the safety aspects of the vessel at sea. The reduction in manpower is such that safety concerns have been raised, especially with regard to single man bridge operation that dispenses with the extra look out facility. This paper attempts to study this issue of one-man bridge operation that is happening out of lack of adequate manpower and to assess the possible solutions. This report is limited to navigational training aids and details as could be sourced from the Internet and there is no claim that the paper is a complete record of one-man bridge operations and its implications. The purpose of this paper relates to part of my study course on maritime navigation developments and navigation safety. One Man Bridge Operation: The meaning of the term one-man bridge operation is contained in the term itself. This term means that a single officer mans the bridge without the assistance of any other members of the navigation team either officers or ratings. The significance of this is that the bridge is in fact the control centre of all activities of the ship and especially the hub of all the navigation activities. It is mandatory to have an Officer On Watch (OOW) on the bridge at all times, who is responsible for the safe navigation of the ship during his period of watch keeping and assistance normally is present with at least a seaman acting as look out and sometimes a helmsman too. To understand the factors that have led to a single officer on watch, without the assistance of at least an additional look out, it is necessary to go back and look at the developments that have taken place on navigational aids available on board the ship. (Bridge Procedures Guide. 1998). Developments in Navigation Aids: The sextant, the compass and the binoculars constituted the basic equipment in earlier times for the purpose of navigation. The Global Positioning System (GPS), the radar and more powerful binoculars have replaced these. The GPS enables the ship to know its precise location at any given time. The radar enables the location of objects in the vicinity of the vessel and the binoculars enhance the vision capabilities of the look out, just as before. (SATELITTE NAVIGATION SYSTEMS. Vol. 8. 2001). Since July 2004 the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) has been made mandatory for vessels going out to sea, which enables other ships to get information on the type of vessel giving out the signal. (Safety of navigation). In addition there have been advances in the communication equipment on the bridge including the Internet. All these equipment have led to a reduction in the manual workload of the navigation personnel in their duties on the bridge and raised the possibility of reduction of personnel available for these duties. Economy Aspects: As late as three decades ago there were five navigational officers on board a ship in addition to the Master. The salaries paid to seafarers are considered decent. As a means to reduce the cost of running a ship with the rising wage bill, ship owners and ship management companies have cut the complement of officers as well as seamen on board the ships, as the work load on board ships was seen to decrease with the additional equipment available on board the ship easing the running of the ship. The example of downsizing as a cost reduction exercise that is in practice by the managements of many organizations in business enterprises, which reduces personnel strength, but increases the responsibilities of the personnel in the organization to be more competitive, provides an understanding of the reduction in human resources on a ship. Unfortunately, some ship owners and ship management companies in their drive for cost reduction in running of ships have concentrated on this factor only and reduced manpower on board to levels below the optimum from the safety point of view. It is this drive for economy at the expense of manpower and the requirements for safe navigation that have led to single man bridge operations seen aboard vessels at sea. (FATIGUE SUFFERED BY MERCHANT SEAFARERS). Regulations on Look Out for Seafaring Vessels and the Legal Implications: The regulations on look out for sea faring vessels is contained in Rule 5 of the Convention on the Regulations for Preventing Collisions Sea, 1972 (COLREGs) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which came into force in 1977, This rule states “every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision” (Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs). The wording appears not to clearly spell out the requirements for proper look out and there is a justification. The term look out does not imply a single watch keeper. In terms of the rules and as per legal interpretation the term look out stands for not only the individual, but also the systematic collation of relevant data and thus makes it a performance standard, with no connection to the number of personnel and techniques used in the function. This demarcation between Rule 5 being a performance standard and not a technical standard is the reason why the Master of the vessel and the OOW have a lot of leeway in the determination of the ways and means in collection of the relevant data. Rule 5 however does not take away the responsibility of the OOW in his role to use all available means in the discharge of this function of his. Therefore the one-man bridge operation is legal as the number of lookouts to be posted is at the discretion of the Master of the vessel and the OOW. (Capt. Bruseeau, P.Joseph and Lt. Cmdr. Peter, J. Brain. Will The Look-out Be Redundant? (Fall 98) ). The guidelines to assist the right use of these discretionary powers is to be found in the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code (STC W Code) of 1995 which states “the OOW may be the sole look-out in daylight provided that on each such occasion: the situation has been carefully assessed and it has been established without doubt that it is safe to operate with a sole look-out; full account has been taken of all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: state of weather visibility traffic density proximity of dangers to navigation the attention necessary when navigating in or near traffic separation schemes. assistance is immediately available to be summoned to the bridge when any change in the situation so requires”. (Bridge Procedures Guide). The STCW Code of guidelines also require that if the sole look-out is to be part of the regular navigation duties, then there should be very clear guidance on the manner in which it is to be made operational and these guidelines be made part of the shipboard operational procedures manual. This guidance should include the circumstances under which sole lookout watch keeping can be initiated and the support for this operation and the circumstances that mandate its withdrawal. It also calls upon the master of the vessel ensuring that the OOW has had sufficient rest before commencing duties and the OOW believes that he is capable of handling all the functions required of him on the bridge inclusive of the sole look out function and the support that is available is clearly understood for the different circumstances that may arise and the manner in which this assistance can be activated at the earliest and that all the equipment on the bridge is fully functional. (One man bridge operated (OMBO) Ships). The reason for these measures to be taken in a one man bridge operation is because look out is such a vital function in navigation and the OOW needs to be fully alert, well trained and experienced, if the single man bridge operation is to be successfully undertaken as multi-tasking is the capability that is being asked of the OOW. The duties of the of the OOW are not just watch keeping but also include charting the course of the ship, updating the maintenance manuals and monitoring the communication to the vessel and also the communication within the vessel. Especially at night the OOW is the sole officer responsible for the safety of the ship, the safety of the cargo and the safety of the lives of the personnel on board. With such responsibilities on his hands, single man bridge operations is fraught with risk and the minimum support that the OOW requires is that of a seaman on look out to reduce that aspect of all the work that has to be attended to. Utilization of One Man Bridge Operation: The legality of one-man bridge operations is clear and that it is in regular practice can be seen from the STCW guidelines on single man look out in the training manuals for navigation officers. This is reinforced by the regulations that cover the number of personnel to be present on the bridge on different kinds of ships for safe watch keeping. In passenger ships the watch keeping team is to consist of the OOW and the helmsman, with a lookout or radar watch only when necessary. On automated container ships and like vessels there need be only the OOW or rather OMBO. On other cargo vessels, tankers and like vessels the watch keeping team is to consist of the OOW and a helmsman or look out. (Dimitris, Petrogonas. Safety of Navigation in the Aegean Must Be Upgraded as Soon as Possible). This becomes even more evident when a study conducted by the Maritime Accidents Investigation Branch (MAIB) as a result of the growing controversy on one-man bridge operations. This study was conducted on six ships of less than 1600 gross tonnage to observe the bridge functions at night. The study while finding that one-man bridge operation did not pose untoward risk for the vessels, observes in its results that none of these vessels posted an additional look at night on a regular basis. (ONE MAN BRIDGE OPERATION AT NIGHT – PHASE II). A study conducted by MAIB more recently in 2004 on the watch keeping safety aspects, paints an even more alarming picture in that it not only confirms the practice of one man bridge operations, resulting in the OOW acting also as the sole look out and leading to the grounding of twelve vessels. (Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study). These studies easily enable us to conclude that OMBO operations are happening regularly on board vessels at sea and that incidents at sea have resulted due to the disregard of the provisions that permit one-man bridge operations. Factors That Have a Negative Effect on One Man Bridge Operations: Natural factors of low visibility, rough seas and the like have been difficulties that navigation has had to deal with from the time that ships started plying the seas. These factors have been compounded by the developments in the maritime industry. The growing global trading has led to the shipping industry growing in leaps and bounds. The result of this has been congestion in the sea-lanes and places a demand on the OOW being extra alert in sea-lanes of high congestion. Such congestion can be seen in many sea-lanes around the world and more so when the sea-lane narrows like in the English Channel. Acknowledging the growing congestion and the requirement for order in the sea-lanes the IMO has come out with Traffic Separation Schemes that lay the guidelines for movement of vessels within the sea-lanes and the manner in which ships enter and leave the sea-lanes. The OOW has to be extra cautious when the vessel is entering a sea-lane or leaving. This is very similar to the extra care that a motorist has to take as he enters or leaves a highway. The difference lies in that it is so much easier for the motorist because of the manoeuvrability motor vehicle in comparison to the low manoeuvrability of a sea vessel and the larger it is the more so. In coastal areas the problem of running aground is an area of concern and this places extra responsibility on the OOW to ensure that the ship is kept in clear waters, while also avoiding the coastal sea traffic. Another major area of concern for the OOW is fishing vessels in coastal waters. These days fishing vessels in their search for large fish catches have started venturing further into the seas from their original fishing grounds and can be found in waters a few hundred kilometres from the coast. The methods of fishing have also become varied and pose a challenge to the OOW, such that the “THE MARINERS HANDBOOK”, has devoted a few pages describing the different means employed for fishing currently, both in words and in graphics. (THE MARINERS HANDBOOK). The Human Fatigue Factor: However the greatest area of concern in assessing the challenge faced by the OOW and the efficiency level of single-man bridge operations gets focussed on the area of human fatigue. There are two aspects to this and the first is the nature of the job function. Long voyages at sea doing with a repetitive nature of work and minimal means of recreation leads to monotony and fatigue. The second aspect is the long hours of work that have become a second nature to the crew of a ship. A look at the normal complement of crew of a medium size tanker will make this evident. Besides the Master of the ship, the navigation team consists of three officers in the form of the Chief Officer, Second Officer and Third Officer. There may be Cadet on board depending on the policy of the company with regard to cadets. In addition there is a Bosun, three Able Bodied Seamen (ABS), and one Ordinary Seaman (OS) to assist the navigation officers. The Master of the vessel is responsible for all that happens in and to the vessel. The watch keeping is shared by the three other officers in two four-hour shifts and thus comprises of eight hours of watch keeping, with the three ABS being the lookout in a similar shared manner. We have seen that watch keeping is a multi-role function especially at night. Their duty does not end with this. The responsibility in keeping the ship in proper condition is also shared by these navigation officers. The Third Officer is responsible for the proper maintenance of all the safety equipment on board the ship. The Second Officer is responsible for charting the course of the ship and the maintenance of all the required. He is also the medical officer of the ship and is in charge of the medical stores on board the ship as well as treatment in case of sickness or accidental injuries. These officers may draw the support of the Bosun or ratings, if the Chief Officer spares them. The Chief Officer is responsible for the proper functioning of the all the other navigation equipment on board the ship including the bridge equipment. In addition at ports he is responsible for the loading and unloading of the cargo as well as the victualing activity. In all these functions the ratings and the Bosun assist him. These additional functions place a heavy toll on the efficient functioning of the navigational team as day in and day out the work hours put in them amount to a greater part of the day and leads to fatigue. Thus the manning policy of ships plays an important role in the fatigue factor. (FATIGUE SUFFERED BY MERCHANT SEAFARERS). This is further compounded by the manning policies in some ships that cause a further reduction in the navigation team. This example proves it. An 80m long bulk carrier ran aground off the Western Islands of Scotland. MAIB investigation showed that the navigation team consisted of the Master of the vessel and only one other officer, which made it necessary for them to share the watch keeping. The Master was on duty from 1800 hrs to 2400 hrs and at the end of this period went down and aroused the only other officer and returned to his watch keeping duties. Fatigue overtook the Master and he fell asleep and at the same time fatigue prevented the other officer from waking up. They both woke up when the ship ran aground. There was no additional seaman look out or alarms to support the watch keeping activity. (Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study). Possible Consequences of One Man Bridge Operations: One-man bridge operations has been the cause of many an incidents at sea that has been reported and investigated between 1994 and 2003. A study of these investigations has shown that just on the issue of grounding of vessels, fatigue was the contributing factor in 82% of the cases and further that of these nine cases, eight were in OMBO mode due to the reduced strength in the navigation team that ruled out the possibility of an additional look out. Examples from this study include the grounding of a 1990gt general cargo vessel with the Chief Officer as OOW, in OMBO mode. The Chief Officer was on a six hour on six hour off watch keeping mode due to reduced navigation team strength and had just completed a set of port calls stretching the officer further. At 4.04 AM he fell asleep standing at the controls of the ship and a course correction required at 4.15 AM was missed as a result. An hour later the ship ran aground and the officer woke up from his sleep still standing at the controls. In yet another example a 40,000gt container collided with a 24 m fishing vessel and the OOW was totally unaware until hearing the distress may day calls from the fishing vessel before she sank. (Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study). Thus human fatigue and OMBO in combination can be extremely dangerous leading to many an incident at sea. Conclusion: IMO, COLREGs and the STCW 95, have laid down regulations and norms that govern one-man bridge operations and these have caused a reduction in the incidents at sea and thereby increased the safety of vessels at sea. Yet, the situation has not been brought totally under control and as seen human fatigue in combination with one-man bridge operation is still a problem area. My humble viewing of the situation and the manner in which this can be addressed runs this way. Incidents at sea due to human fatigue and one man bridge operations is due to the improper manning of ships and the navigation team and the Master of the vessel and the navigation team pay the price even though they are not responsible for the manning policies on board the ship. A minimum complement of four navigation officers and four navigation ratings should be made mandatory on board all seagoing vessels irrespective of type of vessel, size of vessel and length of voyage. This complement may be increased in the case of very large vessels. Inspections of ships that are currently in place can be utilized to ensure proper manning of vessels. The fines for improper manning of vessels should be high so as to act as a deterrent. These fines should be imposed on the ship owner or ship Management Company. The quantum of fine should be similar to those imposed for polluting the environment as this measure has been effective in making tankers wary of polluting the seas. Such steps would cause ships to be manned in an optimum manner and if not remove at least reduce the problem caused by human fatigue and the one-man bridge operation. . List of References Admiralty Charts and Publications, 2001, SATELITTE NAVIGATION SYSTEMS, Vol 8, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office. Somerset. Admiralty Charts and Publications, 2004, THE MARINERS HANDBOOK, Eighth Edition, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office. Somerset. Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study, MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH, Available at : www.maib.gov.uk/publications/safety_studies/bridge_watchkeeping_safety_study.cfm - 17k - 17 Nov 2005 - Capt. Bruseeau, P.Joseph and Lt. Cmdr. Peter, J. Brain, 1997, Will The Look-out Be Redundant?, Available at: http://www.maritimeconsultant.com/macnewsletters/fall98/LOOKOUT.HTM Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs), IMO, Available at: http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=649&topic_id=257 FATIGUE SUFFERED BY MERCHANT SEAFARERS, Jobships.com. Available at: http://www.jobships.com/jobships_2.0/jobshipsindia/Publish/fatigue.asp?title=fatigue.asp Dimitris, Petrogonas, Safety of Navigation in the Aegean Must Be Upgraded as Soon as Possible, Available at: http://www.fundp.ac.be/prelude/manifestations/rhodes/actes/petrongonas.pdf International Chamber of Shipping, 1998, Bridge Procedures Guide, Third Edition, Marisec Publications, London. ONE MAN BRIDGE OPERATION AT NIGHT – PHASE II. Project 292, Research Branch. MARINE SAFETY AGENCY, Available at: http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga-research_report_292.pdf. One man bridge operated (OMBO) Ships,1992, Requirements Concerning Navigation, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES, Available at: www.iacs.org.uk/ureqs/URN.PDF Safety of navigation, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING, http://www.marisec.org/ics/issues/safenav.htm. Read More