The Viability of Primary and Secondary Qualities - Book Report/Review Example

The Viability of Primary and Secondary Qualities The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, for John Locke, is an issue of fundamental importance. Our knowledge of the world around us, in his view, is dependent on this distinction. He was not the first philosopher to believe in the validity of the distinction. Indeed, he is in noble company as the distinction has also been embraced by such luminaries as Descartes, Newton, and Galileo. Notwithstanding that he was building upon an already well-established concept, there were and there remain disagreements. Locke is useful for two reasons. First, his work serves as an authoritative statement of the distinction. Second, his work serves as the basis for those whom deny the validity of the distinction. Therefore, the work of Locke is quite suitable as a starting point for an analysis of the validity of the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. One of Locke's main points is that what we do know about the world is a matter of perception. In this way he sets out to distinguish, by virtue of his primary versus secondary qualities analysis, actuality from our sensory interpretations. The viability of this distinction has been questioned. George Berkeley and A.J. Ayers have pointed out what they claim to be contradictory assertions by Locke. They deny the logical cohesion and therefore the viability of his distinction. They point out epistemological problems which, they assert, render his distinction nothing more than speculation. Locke, in their view, is hardly an empiricist. Some have argued that Berkeley and his philosophical progeny have either misunderstood or mischaracterized Locke's work. What is the truth of the matter This essay will present Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, criticisms of this distinction, and a personal statement regarding the validity of the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities. John Locke: Primary and Secondary Qualities As a preliminary, it is necessary to define what Locke means by a quality. He states that a quality is a power that is capable of producing an idea in our mind. This definition is significant because it separates the quality from our mind; more particularly, Locke establishes a causal relationship in which a quality inherent in an object causes us to have an idea about that object. From this initial definition of a quality, Locke proceeds to divide a quality into two specific types. He attempts to draw a distinction between what he terms primary qualities and secondary qualities. Locke characterizes primary qualities as being inseparable from the object being observed. Everything has fundamental properties. These fundamental properties are constant and cannot be ignored. As an example, Locke presents the following, Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter... These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number (2:8:9). Locke therefore views solids, extensions, figures, motion or rest, and number as primary qualities. These qualities produce in us ideas about the object being observed. A justified knowledge of the primary qualities is inherent not in our ideas, which are the effects, but in the object. These primary qualities, being primary, survive arbitrary division. These primary qualities do produce ideas in us and, significantly, these ideas resemble the primary qualities which produced them. This notion of resemblance is a comparatively close glimpse into the actuality of an object. Secondary qualities, in effect, are deceptions. They give us no knowledge of the underlying actuality. In short, this is where our perceptions mislead us and distort the truth of the knowledge being sought. In Locke's view, these secondary qualities are nothing more the consequences of the primary qualities on our sensory experiences. He dismisses the veracity of secondary qualities as follows: Qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, etc. These I call secondary qualities... For, if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. (2:8:10 and 2:16:2) This distinction leads to conclusions which conflict with our everyday experience. This conflict, though, is the essence of his theoretical discourse. Locke's world of justified knowledge, as compared to our sensory world, is a rather drab place. The primary qualities are without taste, without colour and without odor. These are secondary qualities. More particularly, the senses belong to us individually, as effects, and are not an inherent component of the primary qualities. He justifies this separation by stating that there is something inherent in every object which causes us to sense. The concept, be it taste or odor, is in our mind alone. Locke employs the example of colour: "Let us consider the red and white colours in porphyry. Hinder light from striking on it, and its colours vanish; it no longer produces any such ideas in us: upon the return of light it produces these appearances on us again" (2:8:19). For Locke the primary qualities persist, and they are incomprehensible to us. All that we do comprehend is the effect. The colours are effects. The main point is that our descriptions are of the secondary qualities rather than the underlying properties of the primary qualities. This is presented in a seemingly simple way, and yet it is very complicated. Turn off the lights, deprive our senses of the secondary quality, and what we are left with is the primary quality. Locke presses this distinction by referring to a blind man's sense of color and a deaf man's sense of sound. In short, there are secondary qualities, and these are the effects of the primary qualities on the blind man and the deaf man, respectively. These distinctions are also a manifestation of Locke's view of the reflectional truth of secondary qualities. There is not, in contrast with primary qualities, any resemblance between the idea and the cause. To sum up Locke's view, qualities produce in us ideas. Primary qualities are divisible and retain their reality. Secondary qualities are the effects of our perception of the primary qualities. Our ideas are therefore reflections of knowledge. Our ideas are not true knowledge and therefore limit our understanding of our physical world. George Berkeley and A.J. Ayers: Criticism of Locke's Distinction The viability of Locke's distinction, however, has been criticized. Bishop George Berkeley was one of the more vocal critics. He went so far as to deny the distinction. The essence of his criticism was that Locke was contradicting himself. On the one hand, there was an underlying material reality. This underlying material reality, in turn, was able to produce ideas in us through our sensory perceptions which were not the truth of the matter. Material reality was independent and separate from what we perceived it to be. On the other hand, Locke also argued that we were unable to comprehend this material world accurately. In short, we were capable of knowing nothing more than our perceptions and our ideas that were the effects of this underlying material reality. To put it mildly, Berkeley found this contradiction extraordinarily foolish. In short, Berkeley found no distinction and he found the concept of resemblance to be forced and contrived. This world devoid of secondary qualities would therefore be incomprehensible and unknowable (Berkeley, 1988). In addition, Berkeley attacked the idea that primary qualities produced uniforms ideas. Different people perceived primary qualities differently; as a result, there was no evidence to support the proposition that any qualities were mind-independent. Berkeley was not alone in his criticism. A.J. Ayer states that The famous distinction which Locke drew between primary and secondary qualities is not a distinction between those perceived qualities that are unaffected by the conditions of observation and those that are unaffected. Since all are affected, there is no such distinction, as Berkeley realised (The Problem of Knowledge, p.114). The epistemological problem that Locke faces is, therefore, a very real challenge. By characterizing secondary qualities as an aspect of perception, meaning subjective, how do we know that the primary qualities are not also subjective. We do not know, and this is a weakness in the viability of Locke's distinction. This incompleteness renders, in Berkeley's view, his entire theoretical framework untenable. Another weakness is Locke's insistence that primary qualities, from our point of view, exist only to the extant that they are perceived. What more can we know about these qualities than our ideas What use, therefore, is Locke's distinction if, under all circumstances, this is the ultimate limit of our ideas. His ancillary distinction, between justified knowledge and unjustified knowledge, is therefore irrelevant to knowledge as it affects us. We are trapped in a vicious circle and Locke offers no suggestions for transcending this trap. Indeed, he creates the trap with his very distinction. A very straightforward expression of this criticism is the red book example commented on by M. Ayers, whom inquires whether a red book is, in fact, really red. He states it thusly, "It might be asked why Locke should assume that the power to appear red is not in general simply due to the body's being intrinsically red" (Ayers, M., p.15). In the final analysis, Locke's distinction does not tell us for certain the book is not red. If it is, and that is how it is perceived, then our knowledge is justified. Even if it is not red, Locke's distinction does not aid us in discovering its true properties. Justified knowledge, in his view, is simply inaccessible. What relevance, therefore, does a justified knowledge of this sort offer Some have argued that Berkeley and his progeny have misunderstood Locke's work. This type of argument proceeds on the premise that Berkeley overextended Locke's argument by interpreting it as stating that no secondary qualities exist. This overextension, if true, would make any attempted distinction impossible. I do not believe, however, that Locke escapes this interpretation for the reasons stated hereinabove. The Berkeley-type critiques are fair readings of the text. In conclusion, while attractive, there are significant problems associated with the distinction that Locke attempts to draw between primary and secondary qualities. The epistemological criticisms are particularly damaging. He supports a distinction which is logically inconsistent. In my view, the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities, as expressed by Locke, are not valid. References Ayer, A.J. (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin Books. Ayers, M. (1999). Locke (The Great Philosophers). Routledge: New York. Berkeley, G. (1988). Principles of Human Knowledge/Three Dialogues. Penguin Books Ltd: London. Locke, J. (1689). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Retrieved 28 July 2006. http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Locke/echu/ Read More