Justification Employed by Kant in his Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals - Essay Example

Evaluate the extent to which the methods of justification employed by Kant in his Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals provide models for other theories of justification Metaphysics of morals, by Kant, is one of the most known ‘philosophical’ texts which refer to the analysis of the issues that lead to certain human behaviour. Although Kant deals with the analysis of the human behaviour, he stills avoid to refer to the human reactions from a critical point of view (i.e. as to whether a particular action was moral or not) but he just defines certain criteria for the evaluation of the human behaviour supporting that the integration of the human reaction with the particular system of evaluation (as presented in his work) can be achieved only with if based on the observation of the actions from an objective point of view and not a critical one because in this case there is the possibility that certain behaviours could be characterized as hostile to the general social framework, an action which should be avoided – at least at the primary stage of the behavioural analysis. Current paper deals with the identification of any possible element of Kant’s work – particularly the Metaphysics of Morals – which can be used as a substantial theoretical source for the support of other theories of justification. In order to achieve the above task the paper has been divided in three parts. Part One presents the methods of justification used by Kant in Metaphysics of Moral. A general overview is also made regarding the value of Kant’s work for the researchers in the area of moral philosophy. Part Two refers to the theories of justification used by other philosophers, like Rawls and Hare. The idea of utilitarianism is also presented in this part in order to explain the stages of development of moral theory in the history. Finally, Part Three summarizes the views presented in the above two parts in an effort to identify the possible relation between the methods of justification used by Kant and those applied by other theorists in the area of moral philosophy. It is also examined to which level the first ones could be used as models for the second ones. Part One – Methods of Justification in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals In order to understand the Kant’s perceptions regarding the justification applied in all aspects of human behaviour we should primarily refer to the two fundamental ‘formulae’, which are in fact the theoretical framework on which Metaphysics are based. More specifically, in accordance with Kant the following two formulae can support the interpretations of human behaviour as presented throughout his work: a) the Formula of Universal Law : “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”, and b) the Formula of the End in Itself : “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity [‘rational nature’], whether in your own person or in that of another, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end”. The above two formulae are also followed by a series of assumptions made in order to explain the presence and the functionality of these formulae in terms of daily life. In this context, the following assumptions/ critical views characterize the views of Kant regarding the moral and the justification: “a) There are ends in themselves, b) Pure reason is practical. Agents act simply because of nature of agency, c) each justification requires a transcendental deduction and d) , rational beings with a will must conceive of themselves as having free-will (as the only condition under which they can act ) (= it is dialectically necessary for agents to think that they have free-will)”. All the above assumptions could be summarized in the following conclusion: “free-will is “dialectically necessary” (synthetic a priori) for a being with practical freedom”. In other words, all theoretical assumptions and findings have as a main target the justification of actions made in the context of ‘free-will’ with all the risks that such a condition can include. One of most characteristic elements of Kant’s paper is the use of examples as a tool to justify the actions of human beings. This method, which perhaps shows an influence from Plato or Aristotle, helps the reader to understand the real motives of a particular human reaction even if it is not included among the examples presented. In Metaphysics, Kant ‘insists on keeping the purely rational concepts, laws, and principles of moral philosophy strictly separate from the empirical elements of practical anthropology; this is not to say that he treats the a priori part of the doctrine of morals in isolation from empirical psychological concepts and observations about the special nature of human beings but instead he allows that such elements are necessarily brought into the formulation of the system of pure morality’ (Edwards, 2000, 887). One of main issues examined in Metaphysics of Kant is the issue of origin. Kant tried primarily to prove that ‘the concepts of metaphysics, are mere logical functions, that is, ways of synthesizing concepts to form judgments (irrespective of whether they are analytic or synthetic.); accordingly, the metaphysical concept of substance/accident contains nothing more than the logical form of subject/predicate, whereby any arbitrary pair of concepts may be united in a judgment; cause and effect merely the hypothetical form of judgment, whereby any arbitrary pair of judgments may be united as condition and conditioned’ (Waxman, 1995, 810). In the above context, reason is proved to be ‘a great metaphysical impostor, whose representations, the ideas, have no epistemic warrant whatsoever while metaphysical conundra cannot be solved so long as reason arrogates to itself a direct and unrestricted epistemic or cognitive role’ (Rush, 2000, 837). The above analysis leads to the assumption that ‘logical functions are what remain after we abstract from all content of the concepts in a judgment; they are merely the various ways in which any concept, or judgment, may be combined with any other (universally/ particularly, positively/negatively, and so on), and so are utterly devoid of objective sense or signification’ (Waxman, 1995, 811). In all the above procedure, reason has a dominant role. For Kant reason has been regarded as having ‘a transcendentally, yet positive role’ as it is explained by Rush (2000, 837). In this way the visual representation of reasoning can be achievable using the arguments of Kant. More specifically, according to Rush (2000, 837) using Kant’s theory of reasoning we can come to the conclusion that ‘very generally a transcendental argument has the following logical form: y, if x, and if y is a necessary condition upon the possibility of x’. From a similar point of view, Bristow (2002, 551) presents a ‘Hegel-inspired sketch of the argument strategy of Kants Transcendental Deduction of the categories’. The above sketch - which has been created by Hegel and presented in the work of Ameriks (1985) - involves specifying: first, the general epistemological problem to which the deduction (or, more generally, the critique of reason) is addressed; second, the principle of apperception as the articulation of the standpoint of the thinking subject and as the starting point of Kants solution of this problem; third, the main claim of the deduction; fourth, how this claim constitutes a solution of this epistemological problem; and last, subjectivism as the cost of this solution’ (Bristow, 2002, 551) At a next level, the issue of morality which also plays a substantial role in the formulation of Kant’s methods of justification needs to be analyzed in accordance with the principles and conditions that Kant used as theoretical basis. At this point we should explain the meaning of ‘moral theory’. According to Phillips (1998, 183) ‘a moral theory is a theory that gives a comprehensive account, either explanation, justification, or both, of morality; what makes a moral theory contractualist? roughly and trivially, the notion of a contract, either actual or hypothetical, plays an important theoretical role’. At a next level, Altekruse et al. (2004, 163) make a distinction between moral and ethics. According to them ‘ethics is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as the study of standards of conduct and moral judgment; Morality is the quality of character, the rightness or wrongness of an action; In a more generic definition, ethics can be viewed as a way of understanding and examining the moral or the good life’. The above definitions lead to the conclusion that ‘ethical theory and moral philosophy refer to philosophical reflection on moralitys nature and function’. Furthermore, it should be noticed that for Kant ‘in order for an action to have moral worth, nonmoral incentives may not be present when the agent is motivated to perform an action; hence, the discussion is intended simply to reveal what is added to an action when a person acts from the motive of duty over and above every possible nonmoral incentive; Kant does not mean to suggest that an agent cannot act from the motive of duty if he is at the same time inclined to act in the way that duty per se demands (or, in other words, if reference to the cooperating inclination underlies the relevant act description’ (Edwards, 2000, 887). In other words, the most important element for a person’s decision to proceed to a specific action is the issue whether this action is moral or not while this evaluation is based mainly on the person’s thoughts, values and experiences. The influence of the external environment – which is described by Kant as ‘duty’ – is usually limited. Part Two – Methods of justification used in the area of moral philosophy The area of moral philosophy is characterized by the existence of several interesting theoretical views which have been applied at a next level in order to evaluate specific sociological or moral issues that tend to appear very often especially in the modern society. In this context, Gauthier and Rawls have been considered to be the most known representatives of moral philosophy in the post-Kant era. The work of Gauthier has been examined by Phillips (1998, 183). The above researcher has been dealt mainly with Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement in which ‘Gauthier sets out to develop a theory of morals as part of the theory of rational choice; Our theory must generate, strictly as rational principles for choice, and so without introducing prior moral assumptions, constraints on the pursuit of individual interest or advantage’. When evaluating the work of Gauthier, Phillips (1998, 183) notices that Gauthier ‘takes it that rational individuals ought to maximize the satisfaction of their subjective preferences (made consistent and coherent), and that these preferences are at least nontuistic, that is, that they do not range over the preferences of other individuals with whom they interact’. From a similar point of view, R.M. Hare ‘rises to the defense of utilitarianism by questioning the relevance of "fantastic cases" that critics of utilitarianism use as a "trick" to make the utilitarian "look like a moral monster"; Hare argues, our ordinary moral intuitions may lead us astray in "highly unusual" cases’. The above theoretical views stated by Hare are criticized by Chang (2000, 5) mostly because they have not been proved as of their content. More specifically, Chang (2000, 5) notices that ‘while Hare might persuade us that our ordinary moral intuitions may be mistaken in "highly unusual" cases, he does not demonstrate that in fact they are mistaken in the particular hypotheticals in question; thus, if after "leisured moral thought," we still find that we cannot attach the same urgency to utilities arising from different sources, this intuition need not be put down as the result of the inculcation of simple principles during our "moral education’ (Chang, 2000, 5). As for Rawls, it has been noticed by Hittinger (1984, 586) that ‘the most striking and certainly one of the most controversial features of Rawlss Theory was his argument that "the right" subordinates (for purposes of the political order) not only material interests in the economic sphere, but also individuals fully considered conceptions of the moral good, human flourishing, and final ends’. In the Theory of Justice (1971) Rawls ‘deployed a social contract theory to vindicate liberal political principles of civil liberty and distributive justice without appeal to a utilitarian calculus; while the conception of political justice has been considered as "justice as fairness" according to which rational contractors, deliberating behind a "veil of ignorance," agree to a scheme of justice prior to knowing how the scheme materially affects their individual interests or conceptions of moral or nonmoral good(s)’ (Hittinger, 1984, 585). Although the above views of Rawls as presented through the study of Hittinger can be used as a significant start point for the evaluation of the code of ethics as it is used in the various areas of social and political sectors, however, it is questionable whether the above theory could be used in a broader term in order to analyze and explain specific sociological or moral issues. For this reason it has been noticed by Hittinger (1984, 585) that ‘Rawls explains that a "serious" shortcoming of Theory was his failure to adequately distinguish between "a moral doctrine of justice general in scope" and "a strictly political conception of justice" (p. xv). If justice as fairness is based upon a general moral theory, then it would seem that citizens must endorse a comprehensive philosophical doctrine in order to reach consensus about the principles which ought to inform the institutions of the polity’. The use of utilitarianism from Rawls has been criticized by Stein (2003, 479) who stated that according to Rawls ‘Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons and does not take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals’. Furthermore, the above researcher refer to Nozick who introduced the term ‘separate’ as follows: ‘To use a person in this [utilitarian] way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person’. He also explains that ‘The most straightforward meaning of the "separateness" charge is that utilitarianism conflates people, treating them as if they were not separate, as if they were parts of one person’ (Stein, 2003, 479). Part Three - use of Kant’s methods of justification as models by other theorists in the area of moral philosophy The methods of justification as presented by Kant have been used extensively in the area of moral philosophy for the support or the evaluation of a series of theoretical frameworks. One of the most characteristic cases of Kant’s influence in moral philosophy has been Rawls who accepts the issue of ‘morality’ as expressed by Kant supporting particularly the value of ‘individual morality’ which interacts continuously with the social justice. More specifically in accordance with Rawls ‘a society united on a reasonable form of utilitarianism, or on the reasonable liberalisms of Kant or Mill, would likewise require the sanctions of state power to remain so; Call this ‘the fact of oppression’; an enduring and secure democratic regime, one not divided into contending doctrinal confessions and hostile social classes, must be willingly and freely supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active citizens’ (Rawls, 1996, 38). Moreover, Rawls (1996, 48) supports that ‘the distinction between the reasonable and the rational goes back, to Kant: it is expressed in his distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical. Apart from Rawls, a moral theorist that has been influenced significantly by Kant is Hare. We can indicatively refer to the views of Hare about utilitarianism. In accordance to Hare (1981, 4) ‘utilitarianism itself is compounded of two ingredients, a formal and a substantial; and the formal element needs only to be rephrased in order to come extremely close to Kant; there is a very close relation between Benthams Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one (ap. Mill, 1861:ch. 5 s.f.) and Kants Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (1785:52). Hare also supports the views of Kant about justice. More specifically regarding the problem ‘faced by legislators, of what the laws are to be; including the question of what penalties are to be attached to breaches of them’, Hare states that ‘the thinking which they should do in order to answer this question is a very close analogue of critical moral thinking, and was so used by Kant (1785:75); it also involves moral thinking itself, of all kinds; for the question of what the laws ought to be is in part a moral question’ (Hare, 1981, 162). On the other hand, Gauthier (1986) opposites to the theory of Kant that morality cannot be justified in terms of self-interest. More specifically, Gauthier (1986, 4) supports that ‘in certain situations involving interaction with others, an individual chooses rationally only in so far as he constrains his pursuit of his own interest or advantage to conform to principles expressing the impartiality characteristic of morality; to choose rationally, one must choose morally and in this way morality can be generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral premises of rational choice’. On the other hand, Gewirth (1994) does not accept the existence of free will as stated by Kant and he recognizes that morality should be regarded as divided in two major categories: positive and normative. More specifically the above theorist states that ‘a morality is a set of rules or directives for actions and institutions, with accompanying attitudes or feelings, especially as these are held to support or uphold what are taken to be the most important values or interests of persons or recipients other than or in addition to the agent; within this general characterization, the positive conception of morality consists in rules or directives that are in fact upheld as categorically obligatory; contrasted with all such positive conceptions of morality is a normative conception; this consists in the moral precepts or rules or principles that are valid and thus ought to be upheld as categorically obligatory’ (Gewirth, 1994, 5). It has to be noticed that although Gewirth explains the issue of morality through the above theoretical framework, in practice he avoids to use morality in order to explain the human behaviour preferring the principle of Generic Consistency. Furthermore, it seems that theorists in the area of moral philosophy do not always succeed into inserting Kant’s views in the analysis of current moral or sociological issues. Regarding this issue Baldachinno (2002, 25) stated that ‘Kant is not the final word on personal or political ethics; indeed, his thought suffers from a fundamental weakness that is retained by both Habermas and Professor Day (2002) and, to a lesser degree, by Hayek; the latter theorists have failed to incorporate into their thinking several advances over Kants ethics and epistemology that profoundly affect how we ought to think about universals, including most especially that of the ethical; the result of this failure is a highly abstract view of ethics, both personal and political, that does not take into account the concrete circumstances of morality and also does not consider that rigid adherence to abstract principle may have adverse, even disastrous, consequences’. According to the above researcher the failure into the application of Kant’s views in modern philosophical concerns should not be regarded as the result only of the lack of cooperation between Kant and modern theorists (at a theoretical level) but also of the possible lack of substantial theoretical material in the work of the above theorist that prevent modern theorists from using his work while examining philosophical issues of specific area of interest. Under the above terms, the use of Kant’s methods of justification as models for other theories of justification would not be considered as feasible. The reason for this assumption is the fact that although the theories stated by other theorists in the area of moral philosophy present similarities with the theories stated by Kant (with a more close connection between Kant and Gauthier) it has been proved that the above theories present problems as of their applicability in real terms. For this reason, their interaction with another theoretical view could be possibly regarded as a threat towards their credibility. More specifically, in this case a series of controversial issues could appear and the theoretical view would lose its value as a creation of mind on a specific philosophical issue. References Altekruse, M, Engels, D, Freeman, S. (2004) Foundations for Ethical Standards and Codes: The Role of Moral Philosophy and Theory in Ethics. Counseling and Values, 48(3): 163-172 Ameriks, K. (1985) ‘Hegels Critique of Kants Theoretical Philosophy’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46: 1-35 Baldacchino, J. (2002) Ethics and the Common Good: Abstract vs. Experiential. Humanitas, 15(2): 25-44 Bristow, W. (2002) Are Kants Categories Subjective?The Review of Metaphysics, 55(3): 551-568 Chang (2000). Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle. Yale Law Journal, 110(2): 1- 43 Day, R. 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