Aristotle on Akrasia - Essay Example

Aristotle on Akrasia Ethics and ethical values have been the favourite s of philosophy from time immemorial and the ancient Greek philosopherslike Socrates, Plato and Aristotle considered such virtues to be of vital importance to a well-lived life. Aristotle, following the teachings of his masters, observed the ethical values as complex and practical wisdom, which cannot be gained solely by the learning of general rules, is the requirement for a better position on questions that deal with ethics. The position embraced by this great master of philosophy on the character traits of “akrasia” (incontinence or lack of mastery) and “enkrateia” (continence or mastery) are of remarkable consideration. Therefore, making a study or close analysis of the position taken by the great master of philosophy on reasoning and understanding by a novice in the deep and vast ocean of philosophy would be particularly remarkable. In such an endeavour, in this study, a judicious presumption of the position of Aristotle on the question of akresia is arrived at in this paper through a scrupulous discussion of the possible conclusions of the Greek master. Therefore, asked about his position on akresia, provided with two statements, “akrasia is a familiar everyday phenomenon” and “akrasia is impossible - whenever we act we are doing what we think best in the circumstances, all things considered; doing what we personally think best, deep down, as distinct from what other people preach at us or nag us about,” Aristotle would hold the estimation that both the statements are true of fact. It is mainly because of the great master’s concern to maintain the firm denial of akresia with common sense’s affirmation of its possibility and regularity as practiced by Socrates. To go beyond these possible conclusions of Aristotle, it may be maintained that an exploration of the question why people act wrongly even when they know they should not be, which is a relevant topic for discussion even in the current period, makes it clear that the account of Aristotle, at some moment when dealing with the idea of incontinence, is obscure. It is mainly due to the fact that the teachings of Aristotle are not preserved well enough, rather than in Spartan lecture notes. An example of such an inconsistency may be examined as follows. It can be safely stated that the position of akrasia gaudily exhibits what happens if an amalgamation of moral education is not accomplished. The match between appetite and correct behaviour, in an incontinent person, has not been completely articulated. “Aristotle does not stipulate how, exactly, a person “gets stuck” in incontinence. Presumably, early associations between pleasurable feelings and virtuous behaviours either were insufficient or inconsistent. At any rate, enough repetition seems to have occurred for the incontinent to be able to recognize ethical behaviour, but not enough for this behaviour to have become internalized. As a consequence, the incontinent possesses knowledge of the good, but this knowledge is not personally compelling. Pleasure continues to pursue its own ends, and the potential for conflict is born.” (Kerdeman 2004). In an analysis of the possible view of Aristotle on the two statements, i.e. “There is no such thing as akrasia and whenever we act we always do what we judge to be the best thing in the light of all the circumstances in which we have to choose” and “Akrasia is a perfectly familiar phenomenon and we often act against our better judgement,” it is noteworthy that Aristotle’s teachings affirm both the views to be matters of fact. A deep analysis of the ideas of Aristotle on akresia would clarify why there is a possibility for such a position to be taken by him. As we understand from the ideas of Aristotle, which is reflected in the seventh book of his Nicomachean Ethics, the passion or the feeling of an akratic person draws him against his reason, i.e. passions conflict with the reason in such a person. It is remarkable that Aristotle differentiates between propeteia (impetuosity) and astheneia (weakness). It may also be maintained that Aristotle stresses on the appetite for pleasure and anger in his treatment of the concept of akrasia. Both of these lead one to impetuosity and limitation. However, the focal point maintained by Aristotle makes it clear that the appetite for pleasure is the passion that weakens reason. As he upholds, there are two kinds of akresia, the first termed as “unqualified akrasia” or the one caused by an appetite for pleasure, and the other, akrasia “with respect to anger” or considers a qualified form of akrasia. It may be comprehended that there are “four forms of akrasia: (A) impetuosity caused by pleasure, (B) impetuosity caused by anger, (C) weakness caused by pleasure (D) weakness caused by anger.” (Aristotles Ethics. 2001). One more remarkable point needs to be appended to this discussion of akrasia as conceived by Aristotle and that is the similarity in the position taken by him to that of Socrates. Thus, we find that Aristotle is in pains to uphold the compatibility of Socrates’ denial of akrasia with common senses assertion of its possibility and frequency. It is at this juncture that we find Aristotle holding a kind of view which maintains the stand of both the statements expressed in the statements above. As he introduces the concept of akrasia and deals with the issues in understanding the phenomenon, Aristotle holds with Socrates that there is nothing to be called as akresia and points out that this thesis conflicts with the concept of appearances, i.e. phainomena. Aristotle, in a way, affirms the position taken by Socrates when he clarifies that a person acting against the his reason may be considered to be one with unqualified knowledge who may be considered as possessing knowledge on the one hand, and not possessing so, on the other. However, “Aristotle’s agreement with Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these ways... Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor... And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action.” (Aristotles Ethics. 2001). Therefore, it is not matter of fact that Aristotle holds all the views of Socrates concerning the concept of akresia. In the modern context, the greater or more significant matter is that knowing what is right and doing the right things are different and this fact can be gathered from Aristotle’s disagreement with the ideas conveyed by Socrates. “Aristotle disagrees with Socrates’ belief that knowing what is right, always results in doing no wrong, because doing the right thing is not always as simple as one might think it should be. Aristotle believes that the failure to behave well even on those occasions when one’s thought processes resulted in the “right” answer can and does exist… Aristotle seemingly distinguishes between various senses of knowing what is right and what is wrong, and various things a person needs to know to act rightly, and eventually concludes that Socrates is in a way right and in a way wrong.” (Rosenson 2000). In short, in the view of Aristotle, a fault of character which is not vice, is termed akresia. Though we discussed in detail the various steps involved akresia as suggested by Aristotle, the most significant of all these can be identified as the position of this master philosopher that favours both the statement we are dealing with. The statement by Johnny is evidently supported by the position of Aristotle as is clear from his elaborative discussion on the concept. In these discussions, we gather the idea that akrasia is a familiar idea, and though we have the right knowledge of the existence of vices we go on following the same path. It is the clear indication that whatever knowledge we have, they are different from the actual practice. In a very interesting situation, most often people do things they know are bad and some of the examples may be observed. They know that eating deep-fried foods and cream cakes, or smoke or over-indulge in alcohol etc are all bad just as they understand that they should control their anger, unprotected sex is risky and that they ought to be studying. However, as opposed by their knowledge of all these, they eat dried foods and cream cakes, smoke, indulge in alcohol, just as they lash out, do unprotected sex, and are chatting in some café to respond to the latter examples. This is a clear idea that is being discussed by Aristotle in his discussion on akresia. In the same way, there is another statement to be considered and the vital discussions of the statement made by Frankie which maintains that there is nothing as akrasia also, in a deeper analysis of the concept, is supported by Aristotle. The ability of the people to do what they judge to be the best thing in the circumstances is the prime determiner of their actions. Therefore, the remarks by others, including those by parents, teachers, politicians, priests and society and their irritating positions do not affect the decisions of people as they do only which is considered best by their thinking. All our actions will always be the result of what we judge to be best in the light of all the circumstances in which we have to choose. This position is the same as the one taken by Aristotle in his further discussions on the concept of akrasia. Aristotle’s position, interestingly, is based on his dealing with the question of what kind of knowledge one has when one acts contrary to ones knowledge of what is best. Another crucial remark by Aristotle is that human action can be represented as the outcome of a practical syllogism containing universal and particular premises. When both these two positions of Aristotle together set out we get the reason for his backing of both the statement and this is most remarkably maintained in the fact that the akratic person has unexercised knowledge of the key particular premise. Thus, we can best comprehend the position of Aristotle on the statements by Johnny and Frankie. However, it is of paramount consideration to think beyond what Aristotle has maintained in his discussions and a dedicated analysis of the particular stand by the classic philosopher on the statements, bring to our notice that as much as we agree with the position of Aristotle we can at some point or the other find him in want of further clarification of the matter. For example it will be commendable to note the reply of Aristotle to an objection in a situation where the akratic person may actually say, ‘I shouldn’t be smoking this cigarette,’ so he can’t have unexercised knowledge that it’s a cigarette.” Aristotle’s reply to this objection will, expectedly be startling one. Some remarkable questions on the issue would as follows. When he says we have unexercised knowledge of the particular premise, of what precisely is one supposed to have unexercised knowledge – the particular premise simplifier (“This is a cigarette”) or the particular premise as falling under the universal (“This cigarette is bad for me”)? Or would Aristotle have done better to say that we have unexercised knowledge of the universal premise? Or does he in fact float such a solution via the apparent suggestion that desire for the thing specified in the particular premise leads you to erect a convenient legitimating universal premise? All these questions are of crucial considerations in relation with the position of Aristotle. In the ultimate conclusion, it may be remarked that, at the same time Aristotle is justified for his position on the statements that are considered in this paper, there are areas that need further clarifications as his thinking alone is not able to resolve some of the crucial objections raised against his specific stand or point of view. Bibliography Aristotles Ethics. (2001). Akrasia. [online]. Stanford Encyclopaedia of philosophy. Last accessed 21 February 2008 at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/ KERDEMAN, Deborah (2004). Educating Ethical Behavior: Aristotle’s Views on Akrasia. Last accessed 21 February 2008 at: http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/92_docs/KERDEMAN.HTM ROSENSON, Jonathan (2000). Aristotle. PHIL 1300 - Fall 1999-2000. Last accessed 21 February 2008 at: http://www.rosenson.com/papers/aristotle_akrasia.htm Read More