National Wage and Equal Pay - Essay Example

National Wage and Equal Pay Case of 1972: An Analysis Wednesday, April 09, 2008 Australia’s labour movement took a progressive turn in 1972, reflected in the decision released regarding National Wage and Equal Pay Case. The 1972 resolutions upheld and expanded the 1969 Equal Pay Case, extending the legal notion of ‘equal pay for equal work’, and effectively disbanding the legal concept of the family wage in favor of equal pay for both men and women. The case was brought by Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) to campaign for equal pay for its women members, piggybacking on a 1969 precedent. This case sought to expand the concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to ‘equal pay for work of equal value’. The AEU was a progressive and politically active union, and a number of factors contributed to its success. Though women were not highly represented in metalworking, the AEU was able to make progress because of its competitive organization and dedication. Diane Fieldes ranks as indicators of success in this particular case, “The distribution of metalworkers throughout the economy (by 1970 metal trades unionists were 17 per cent of all unionists), and the traditional role of the fitter’s rate as representative of all craftsmen’s wages [… ]In the early 1970s, whatever happened in the metal industry was a standard to which other unions aspired (Fieldes, 4). In the early seventies, women all over the world were beginning to exercise their public rights, as they pertained to labour and otherwise. The fact that this case was brought to bear is extremely indicative of the thinking of the times: women working outside the home had begun to consider themselves entitled to an equal and fair wage, begun to feel that the concept of the family wage was outdated and furthermore, that this same concept was the source of injustice. In addition to the 1972 decision, the 1970s saw other important steps for women in the labor force. As Dalton, Draper, Weeks, and Wiseman write, As a result of long, hard lobbying by women unionists, the 1977 Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) adopted the Working Women’s Charter, and in 1979 obtained maternity leave as a right in industrial awards (11). Society in general was beginning to be receptive to such notions. Fieldes remarks that the metalworkers union was not noted for its inherent progressiveness, nor for its majority female membership, but rather for its competitive organization and discipline: The final factor of note in the metalworkers’ union’s campaign for equal pay is the composition of the union’s membership. In March 1969 the AEU’s female membership was approximately 2,000 out of 84,000 (2.4 per cent). In December 1974 the AMWU had 186,121 members of whom 16,000 (8.5 per cent) were women. It is again possible to draw a useful comparison with the insurance industry (approximately 50 per cent female in this period). If equal pay is regarded as an issue in which the "gender interests" of women workers are counterposed to their male counterparts, we should expect a stronger response from unions with large female memberships, and a correspondingly weak one from unions such as the metalworkers’. Yet the differentiating factors were not the number of women in the industry, but the industrial strength and militancy of the union (and also their politics, in a more general sense). Women in a union like the AEU were able to make greater advances than those in relatively less well-organised areas of the workforce, even though they were numerically marginal to the union as a whole (Fieldes, 4). The decision itself is progressive and sound, however, it does not take into account the considerable sexism that existed in 1972 and still exists today in the labour market. Despite the fact that this decision is nearly forty years old, pay inequities exist in Australia and elsewhere: the document’s final comment “In our view the community is prepared to accept the concept of equal pay for females and should therefore be prepared to accept the economic consequences of this decision” is a simplistic and idealistic statement that is not reflective of either the economic or social reality in the Australian labour market. It is well-known that public opinion takes years to catch up with progressive legislation; instead of being a reflection of public opinion, legislation interpreted liberally is often a precursor of what public opinion will be several years or several decades later. In the United States women were admitted to institutions of higher learning in the 1870s-1880s, however, it is only in the last twenty years that women’s enrollment levels have reached that of men, and women worldwide remain significantly underrepresented in such fields as architecture, mathematics, economics, and medicine. In Australia, women earn 87.5% of mens pay (full-time non-managerial adults, ABS 1996) although they make up 43% of the workforce. 57% of working women are full-time, 63% of working-age women (15-64 years) are in the labour force, 52% of women with children aged 0-4 are in the labour force, and 58% of women with children aged 0-15 are in the labour force (ER 2). This formidable presence certainly is not reflective of the pay inequities that still exist. Though technically and statistically ‘progressive’, Australia encounters some of the same discrimination problems it faced in the 1960s and 70s. As The Public Service Association of the NSW writes, In theory, women in Australia have been paid the same as men since the equal pay decisions of 1969 and 1972 in the federal Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. But even today, statistics show that women still earn less than men. Currently in the NSW public sector the most recent statistics show that women in full time work earn only 84% of what men earn, and for women in all forms of work (that includes, part time and casual workers) only 67% (ER 1). While the written decision itself contains some extremely progressive concepts, it does not address concrete effects of its implications, nor does it provide any counsel on surmounting a public opinion that is slow to catch up with reality. The decision states, “In our view the concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is too narrow in today’s world and we think the time has come to enlarge the concept to ‘equal pay for work of equal value’. This means that award rates for all work should be considered without regard to the sex of the employee.” There are several contradictions in this statement, which are reflective of the authors’ general lack of profound sociological comprehension. For one, this ‘work of equal value’ is a subjective label that sets out no legal provisions for evaluation. Therefore, every employer has the flexibility to decide which work is ‘valuable’, and can essentially set their own standards without immediate ramifications. To wit: when city sanitation workers remove garbage they are paid poorly and considered to occupy the bottom rung on the professional ladder, however, effects are immediate and drastic if these workers do not do their job. Cities are immediately converted into a Petri dish of public health threats, streets reek, and rodents come out of nowhere. Conversely, tax lawyers are generously paid, but no city suffers such immediate and averse effects when relieved of a handful of tax lawyers. While certainly less glamorous, I would submit that sanitation workers provide a service of equal value to that of tax lawyers, however, the payroll does not see it this way, and the decision provides no guidance or evaluating standard for ‘work of equal value’. Secondly, the decision implies that the differentiation between ‘equal work’ and ‘work of equal value’ would be seen primarily between women and men, and not between professions. Though the document is a decision regarding gender-based pay discrimination, it does not recognize that industry-based pay discrimination is largely based on a prevalent cultural sexism or, at least, outdated ideas. The last line, “this means that award rates for all work should be considered without regard to the sex of the employee” makes the logic of the decision seem purely gender-based, and does not consider the fact that pay inequities exist in fields that have been traditionally occupied by women but now are socially open to both women and men. Administrative assistance, teaching, and nursing are historically underpaid positions and historically female; this paragraph implies that we are seeking equitable pay based only on biological differences, not on the quality or purpose of work, and does nothing to recognize that this field-based discrimination grew from a gender-based discrimination. While addressing the symptom, the decision does not address the problem. The document is progressive in the sense that it could be interpreted as making allowances for physical strength within the wider context of value. ‘Equal pay for equal work’ as set forth by the 1969 decision would mean, intuitively, that a woman and a man who each shovel a coal for a day are entitled to the same pay. However, biology stipulates that most women do not have the same upper body strength as most men, and therefore the amount of coal that a woman shovels would likely be less on a daily basis. ‘Equal pay for work of equal value’ provides a margin allowing for physical differences, however, it sets out no legal basis upon which to determine the value of said work. The document could be interpreted precisely to remedy this issue of sanitation workers versus tax lawyers, but social reality and capitalism do not have incentive to begin to value work which was previously devalued or valued at less. Though this decision sought to remedy the fact that the 1969 decision denoted that “equal pay was not applicable ‘where the work in question is essential or usually performed by females but is work upon which male employees may also be employed’” (Fieldes, 1), it did not provide specific legal remedies to do so. The restrictive character of the 1969 principles was illustrated by its application to female classifications in the Meat Industry Interim Award in December 1969. Commissioner Gough granted equal pay to about 120 women out of 2,000 employed under the award. By the time of the 1972 equal pay case, figures could be produced to show that only 18% of women workers had benefited as a result of the 1969 decision. When the unions approached the Commission again in 1972 it agreed to widen equal pay to "equal pay for work of equal value", but the effects were still limited. Whereas before 1972 male and female jobs were compared to see if they were basically identical, after 1972 work was compared to see if it was very similar in content or tasks, rather than any attempt being made to evaluate the work more generally (Fieldes, 1). As Ms. Short notes, employers had little imperative to fully apply the decision, and little economic motivation to do so. “Following the equal pay decisions of 1969, 1972 and 1974, equality in award wages between the sexes was widely assumed to have been achieved in Australia, but this assumption may be incorrect […] The implementation of the 1972 equal pay for work of equal value decision is examined in some detail to reveal how the decision was not fully applied to female-intensive work areas. This resulted from the way work value has been traditionally approached in Australia and the failure of unions to bring the necessary cases to the Commission (Short, ix).” The 1972 decision piggybacked on the decision of 1969, and the document is careful to do its legal predecessor justice. The decision garnered further public attention and support from a spectrum of social actors. ACTU President Jennie George is quoted in Labor Online as saying, "First, it [the decision] really raised public consciousness about equal pay as a basic human right. The publicity given to the case and the demonstrations by women in support of it was very valuable…Secondly, winning the principle was terribly important. We take it for granted that we had to win it but that is not the case - it was strenuously resisted by employers." (ER 1). Ms. George said the case showed the importance of the Industrial Relations Commission and maintaining relevant award rates in helping women gain more equitable pay rates (ER 1). However, this piece of legislation, in addition to its predecessor, sets out only guidelines and not standard procedures, while still allowing for discrimination. The assumption was perhaps that legal interpretations would allow for continued development of the concepts, but, as Fieldes continues, Most importantly, both [decisions—1960 and 1972] were hedged about with qualifications. Both decisions retained the concept of the "family wage". Wage-setting continued to be underpinned by the notion of the male breadwinner and dependant female. In order to lessen the impact on employers, the increases that were granted were to come into effect in installments over a number of years. Both claims were initiatives of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), both were opposed by the employers and the Liberal-Country Party government, and both failed to address the fact that there was no minimum wage set for women. The effect of this last factor meant the lowest-paid male in 1973 got $60.80, while employers could still pay women as little as $34.50 (1). When considered within the context of the labour movement of the 1970s in Australia and in the developed world, this decision sets out important theoretical standards for equal pay. However, as it does little to provide for either the social ramifications or the persistent wage gap that it exists, as it provides no specific qualifications about how to calculate the value of work, leaving ample room for creative interpretation, and for a society set in its ways to continue its pay discrepancies. While a critical and indispensable step towards equal pay, the 1972 decision, even with the 1969 decision as a legal predecessor, is an insufficient mechanism to stand alone. Social change requires unyielding commitment on the part of citizens, and they in turn require strong, enforceable legislation in order to facilitate this process. Works Cited: Electronic Resources: 1. Workers Online, Official Organ of LabourNet. Issue 17, June 1999. http://workers.labor.net.au/17/d_review_women.html 2. ACTU, Office for the Status of Women 3. PSA: Public Service Association of NSW. Pay Equity. http://www.psa.labor.net.au/women/equity.html Print Resources: Dalton, Tony & Draper, Mary, Weeks, Wendy, & Wiseman, John. Making Social Policy In Australia: An Introduction. © 1996 Allen & Unwin Fieldes, Diane. Fighting for equal pay: The Australian metal industry 1969-1972. A companion piece is included in the book Rebel Women, edited by Sandra Bloodworth and Tom OLincoln. © 1998 Interventions, Melbourne. Hodgin , R.W., and E. Veitch. Punitive Damages: Reassessed. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1972), © Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. Short, Christine. Equal Pay—What Happened? Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, No. 3, 315-335 (1986), © 1986 IRSA Read More