Texas A&M Bonfire Disaster - Case Study Example

Texas A & M Bonfire Disaster Copyright Emergencies and crisis incidents are likely to continue to present themselves in all communities fromall over the world. However, it is important that efforts are made to try to learn from what had occurred and to implement better mitigation strategies so that future mishaps can be avoided. The Texas A & M University bonfire disaster of November 18, 1999 resulted in a tragic loss of young lives when a university tradition went wrong due to organizational and physical failures. The previously mentioned incident is important for all those with an interest in emergency response and disaster management because it depicts how something routine and playful can suddenly go wrong in a community. This critical essay presents a brief look at what can be learnt from the previously mentioned incident and the essay illustrates how communications play an important role in disaster mitigation and emergency response. Declaration I certify that, except where cited in the text, this work is the result of research carried out by the author of this study. _____________________________________________ Name and Signature of Author October 2008 This write - up is presented in fulfilment for the requirements related to a critical essay on the Texas A & M University Bonfire Disaster of November, 1999. Biographical Sketch Acknowledgements Contents Introduction 1 Management of the Texas A & M University Bonfire Disaster 4 Conclusion 10 Bibliography/ References 13 (This page intentionally blank) Introduction On November 18, 1999 preparations for the annual Texas A & M University bonfire which used to be an annual event on the eve of the football game between Texas A & M University and its archrival the University of Texas at Austin went horribly wrong when the forty foot stack which was being constructed for the bonfire collapsed. The collapse occurred during the early morning hours on the previously mentioned date. The stack that was being constructed consisted of approximately 5000 logs which were being stacked for a bonfire and as a result of the collapse twelve people died and another twenty - eight had to be hospitalized with serious injuries. 1 The incident was particularly sad because most of those that suffered were young people who were preparing for what was supposed to be an event that had been a part of the university tradition for a long time. The previously mentioned incident was an emergency response incident and although emergency medical personnel from the University Emergency Medical Service were on the scene at the time of the collapse, a 911 call was considered as being appropriate considering the magnitude of the disaster. The first 911 call was received at the City of College Station’s Emergency Communications Center at 02:43 hours and this means that a delay had possibly occurred before it was decided that a call had to be made for further assistance. The caller had reported that the bonfire stack had collapsed at the university campus and that as many as thirty people were suspected to be trapped under logs. Emergency response was swift and the first ambulance and fire teams arrived on the scene after approximately four and a half minutes. However, the magnitude of the disaster required additional assistance and about 3200 personnel from fifty different agencies were later involved in a rescue effort that was too last for about twenty-four hours. 2 Detailed investigations of the incident were later conducted and these investigations involved several United States government agencies. Investigations into the incident were also ordered by the President of the Texas A & M University who appointed an independent commission to investigate what had transpired. Apart from experts and staff from the Texas A & M University other agencies including the OSHA, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission and the United States Fire Administration etc also carried out their own investigations into the incident. The previously mentioned incident at the Texas A & M University is worth studying in depth by all those who have an interest in crisis and emergency management and response because it is an example of how recklessness and possible internal communication problems can lead to a serious incident with loss of precious lives. After all, mitigation or the identification of risk to society and people as well as preparedness, response and recovery are important responsibilities of the government and corporate managers. 3 4 This essay presents a discussion about the problems associated with the proper management of the previously mentioned incident and the lessons that can be learnt from various reports related to the incident. Management of the Texas A & M University Bonfire Disaster Communications has been recognised as being a critical component in the proper mitigation and management of emergency incidents. 5 Proper communications is not only important in responding to a disaster incident but communications is also important in preventing disasters. Thus, perhaps if the Texas A & M University administration should have been more stringent in communicating to the students about requirements for observing safety precautions when constructing the bonfire stack. Also, perhaps the exercise should have been supervised by representatives of the university administration. Investigative reports indicate that the reason for the collapse of the Texas A & M University bonfire stack was primarily due to the excessive wedging of the second stack logs into the first stack logs and also due to the use of inadequate wiring for holding the logs together. 6 The steel cables that had been used in the previous years had not been used to hold together the logs for the stack at the time of the incident and this suggests a less than responsible behaviour by those who were involved with the construction of the stack. Thus, a complex and inadequate engineering structure had been permitted to be built without design guidelines, engineering controls, supervision or written directions. It has to be understood that a new team of students was to construct a new bonfire stack every year and this means that previous experience was not likely to have been a teacher. Even if someone in the Texas A & M University administration had pondered about the issues related to the dangers that were involved with the construction of the bonfire stack, written guidelines, warnings or instructions had not been issued to the students involved with the construction of the stack or to other administrative, sports or security personnel. Thus, organisational failure contributed to the physical design inadequacies. Texas A & M University administration periodically assesses risks associated with student organizations and activities. However, despite a previous 1994 collapse of the bonfire stack which was attributed to poor soil conditions after rain, nothing had triggered any alarms over the design or the construction methodology for the bonfire. Thus, the university administration had not been prepared for what transpired on November 18, 1999 and no lessons had been learnt from the previous 1994 collapse, except that lime should be used for stabilising the soil prior to construction. 7 Furthermore, a memo from a professor of mechanical engineering who had been appointed to head the Texas A & M University staff team that investigated the bonfire stack collapse indicates that the bonfire stack that was being built was not forty feet tall as was suggested in reports but that it was in fact 59 feet high and that two more stacks were still to be constructed prior to its completion. Thus, it will appear that the students had a free hand in deciding about how they were going to construct a potentially dangerous structure. 8 Sophisticated and increasingly cheaper electronic communications equipment present new opportunities and challenges for the management of emergencies and crisis situations. 9 The first responders to the bonfire incident were fortunate to have radio systems that were interoperable because emergency services from the City of Bryan which had also participated in rescue efforts had installed 800 MHz radios only ten days prior to the incident. These radios were similar to the trunked radios that were being used by nearby College Station. However, the Texas A & M University administration had instructed its 43,000 students to call home and notify their families that they were okay and this had resulted in the telephone and the cellular systems becoming overloaded. Perhaps if such a request had been slightly delayed until after the initial response activities had been concluded, the overload could have been avoided. Although, luckily the overload did not affect the first responder teams, it is likely that this overload may have interfered with other organisational activities that were being carried out or perhaps such an overload could have had an impact on other emergency reporting activities on that day. Obviously, too many things had been happening very quickly and perhaps the inter–jurisdictional emergency management plan that had been in place had not provided for broad instructions to be issued about the use of communications to those who were immediately affected by the incident, including the university administration and hospitals. An overzealous media had dispatched a number of helicopters and news gathering teams on satellite television trucks to the site of the incident after receiving initial reports about what had transpired. The number of satellite television trucks that were moved to location numbered about fifty and these trucks were not precisely helping with the rescue and incident management efforts. The helicopters were making noise over the scene of the incident and this noise interfered with the equipment that was deployed to try to detect survivors in the rubble. Flying dust from the helicopters also made it difficult for the rescuers to carry on with their work. Only the FAA was able to clear the helicopters out by declaring a three kilometre no fly zone around the site of the incident at the request of the incident command post that had been established. 10 Thus, perhaps it would have been far more appropriate for the inter-jurisdictional emergency management plan to have provided for a location from which the media could have gathered the latest information and for only selected journalists and media personnel to have been permitted on site. The media does have a right to know and a right to present the news truthfully to the public, but open and cooperative media relations are often the best with the media relationship being proactively defined in the inter-jurisdictional emergency management plan and the university administrative procedures. Media should be considered as being a customer that has to be provided reasonable service during emergency management and emergency managers and the media are partners. However, it is only possible to have a decent relationship if communications are clear and the lines of responsibility are well defined. When multiple responding agencies are involved, it is likely to be far more appropriate to try to establish a single source for the dissemination of information to the media during an incident. Press liaison officers who permit selected group of journalists to visit the incident site and provide periodic news updates are likely to satisfy media demand for information. Perhaps a code of conduct for the media during emergency operations can be developed in cooperation with the media. 11 Media relations are best handled by providing for the establishment of a press centre for the emergency operations command and the university. It should be possible for such a press centre to constantly present new information as it becomes available to the media and to take any questions that can be answered either immediately or clarified in the near future. Establishment of such centres should be a part of the emergency management plan and perhaps the university is best served by having a permanent media relations unit as a part of its administrative structure. It should also be possible to have a media website for the university and perhaps an emergency media relation website for a regional administration. 12 The release of an internal investigation report for an incident which has involved loss of young lives like the one which has been described can be of great interest to the media because such a report is also likely to be of interest to the community at large. Friends, students, parents and all those who have an affiliation with the university are likely to be eager to know about expert opinion. Thus, it is important that a press release should be presented and this should be accompanied by notification on the university website. A press conference in which an opportunity is provided to journalists to present any questions about the report is also likely to be useful. It is important that any press releases do not present mixed messages and this means that a coordinated release of information is necessary in an open and honest manner. 13 Any release to the media should emphasize hope and something better for the future because lessons ought to have been learnt and the community expects to be served better. Conclusion It is clear from the previous discussion that organisational and physical flaws had contributed to the Texas A & M University bonfire incident of 1999. Communication failures prior to the incident had contributed to what occurred later. However, despite a few problems, the emergency response was properly handled and community spirit prevailed to assist everyone during a difficult time. The communications and organisational problems that have been identified in the previous discussion are almost certain to have resulted in holistic improvements for future mitigation because a lot of investigation and soul searching was involved and very many reports with contributions made by a large number of people assisted with trying to identify and bring about necessary improvements for the future. (This page intentionally blank) Bibliography/ References 1. Erickson, Paul E. Emergency Response Planning for Corporate and Municipal Managers, 2nd Edition. Elsevier Butterworth–Heinemann, 2006. 2. Farazmand, Ali. Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management. Marcel Dekker Inc, 2001. 3. Haddow, George D. Introduction to Emergency Management, 2nd Edition. Elsevier Butterworth–Heinemann, 2006. 4. Reynolds, Barbara. Crisis Emergency Risk Communication by Leaders for Leaders. Centers for Disease Control, 2004. October 9, 2008. http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/65019DA8-ECCA-42A1-9692-A5A438B2E262/0/CERCleaderscoursebook.pdf 5. Special Commission on the 1999 Texas A & M Bonfire. Final Report May 2, 2000. Special Commission on the 1999 Texas A & M Bonfire, 2000. October 8, 2008, https://esc.angellearning.com/AngelUploads/Content/JSTR-7H356F/_assoc/cb3ab435ba240eb7c47a8a5fdd68001E/Texas_AandM_Final.pdf 6. United States Fire Administration. Technical Report Series - USFA-TR-133, Bonfire Collapse Texas A&M University College Station, Texas - November 1999. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999. October 8, 2008. https://esc.angellearning.com/AngelUploads/Content/JSTR-7H356F/_assoc/cb3ab435ba240eb7c47a8a5fdd68001E/Texas_AandM_FEMA.pdf Read More