Virtues of the Mind by Zagzebski - Case Study Example

In Zagzebski’s article “Virtues of the Mind”, the attempts to provide a clear idea of how virtues and vices are developed, suggesting that they are strongly linked to the processes of the mind. The author suggests a basic definition of virtue as “an acquired excellence of the person in a deep and lasting sense” while a vice is defined as “an acquired defect of the soul” (444). From this basic definition, the author then raises the question of how this ‘acquisition’ occurs as it cannot be definitively argued that they are completely controlled by the individual nor can it be convincingly argued that the individual has no control over their own development. The author attempts to prove this point by examining the available literature on the topic. This begins with a lengthy quote from Hobbes in which it is argued that virtues and vices are a product of “the different constitution of the body and partly from different education” (445). As the author points out from this passage, Hobbes held that the primary motivation for the development of these vices or virtues was a man’s desires or passions. Other thinkers examined include Ralph Waldo Emerson, who suggests that the lazy man simply accepts what comes his way while the man with passion will seek to discover the truth, and John Dewey, who explores the concept of ‘reflective thinking.’ To conclude her argument, Zebzewski suggests that there isn’t a significant difference between the concepts of intellectual virtue or moral virtue because they both tend to lead one in the same direction. Actions, thoughts and behavior all tend to run along the same lines. There is a distinction, though, between ‘virtues that lead to certainty’ as compared with ‘virtues that lead to understanding’ as what it takes to know something is definitely true is not typically the same thing as figuring out what it takes to understand something as it is – the sum is not always equal to the parts. Stewart Cohen, in his article “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier and the Lottery,” argues against previous claims made by David Lewis regarding solutions to the three epistemological problems listed in the title. Cohen’s main contention is that Lewis’s contextual approach to these problems, in which he applies “certain mechanisms of context-sensitivity – what he calls ‘rules of relevance’” (706), overreaches it bounds and is therefore not able to solve the Gettier problem. To make his argument, Cohen first attempts to define for readers the applicable difference between the Gettier problem and skepticism and the lottery. He defines context-sensitivity as a difference of perspective between observers using clear imagery, like the Coloradan who says a road is flat while a Kansan, seeing the same road, says it is not flat – the difference is a matter of experience (706). Cohen then goes on to illustrate how contextualism can help to meet some of the questions of skepticism by defining the parameters or levels of belief – the perspectives of the viewers. Where Cohen takes issue with Lewis, though, is in his application of contextual-sensitivity to the Gettier problem. Cohen fails to clearly define the concept of the Gettier problem as he pushes into this subject. He merely alludes to it through his analysis of Lewis’ attempt to link the Gettier problem with the lottery. This clumsy approach to the issue serves to confuse the reader and creates difficulty within a previously easily understood article. Within this discussion, he explores the Rule of Actuality and the Rule of Resemblance in which he finally begins to explain what is meant by the Gettier problem and how it differs from the lottery, although he does acknowledge a relationship between the two. In the end, he rejects Lewis’ use of the Rule of Resemblance to solve the Gettier problem. In their article “Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification”, authors Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath argue that the concept of evidentialism is false. In attempting in explain human intuitions revealed through questions referred to as ‘train cases’, the authors indicate that what is needed is not evidentialism but a pragmatic condition on the epistemic justification. To illustrate what is meant by ‘train cases’, the authors explain that people tend to have a more certain knowledge that something will happen when the stakes are low, but have less certainty when the stakes are high. In making their argument, the authors illustrate how the rational individual will pay more attention to the decisions being made if the outcome is of greater importance. For example, if Sarah wants to go to Foxberry for a day of shopping, she will hop on a train that she believes will take her there, but does not necessarily know it will. “You are justified in believing that the train will stop in Foxberry only if you are rational to prefer as if the train will stop in Foxberry” (747). However, if Sarah needs to go to Foxberry in order to visit a dying relative in the hospital, she might take the extra precautions of checking schedules, verifying train numbers and enquiring of the conductors whether she is on the correct train. When the stakes are higher, “you are not justified in believing (and hence do not know) that the train will stop in Foxberry” (748) and thus need to verify the destination and will not be fully convinced until you actually arrive at your intended destination. In presenting these cases, the authors claim they have provided the pragmatic condition to the problem of intuition from an epistemological approach. They suggest that our intuitions or beliefs are justified without proofs up to a certain threshold, but that this threshold will be determined to some degree by the relevant features of the situation. In his article “The Problem of the External World,” Barry Stroud analyzes Descartes’ conclusion presented in his First Meditation in which “the philosophical problem of our knowledge of the external world gets posed” (13). Through his examination, Stroud attempts to illustrate why Descartes came to this conclusion by examining the argument presented within Descartes’ book, and then attempts to explain “how it acquires that special character that makes an unsatisfactory negative answer inevitable” (7). The argument presented in First Meditations is frequently the subject of intense study from a variety of approaches. As Stroud explains it, Descartes’ conclusion is that there can be no knowledge of the external world because we cannot gain knowledge through our senses because our senses are easily fooled. Descartes explains his reasoning for this conclusion by telling the story of how he is then sitting in front of a fire with a piece of paper in his hands. In questioning whether he is really doing this, he remembers that he has had dreams in which he is doing exactly this same thing. Whether awake or dreaming, his senses are capable of giving him the same information, yet one state can be said to have a more ‘true’ element than the other. However, the fallibility of the senses in this example proves that we cannot trust the information we gain from the senses. Since all of our information about the external world comes to us through our senses, though, Descartes determines we cannot know anything about the external world. The primary question, according to Stroud, is whether or not we need to know we are not dreaming in order to know something of the external world. If we need to know we are not dreaming, then Descartes is correct, because there is no way to confirm whether we’re awake or asleep. If it is not important, though, we may know something. Read More