hildhood embodiment can be considered and there is no single linear and monolithic theoretical tenet that can possibly include all social, cultural and anthropological aspects of childhood embodiment. However, childhood embodiment is unique than other phases of the development of an individual because it is when the body is directly in a rapid flux, which is not experienced at other phases of human life, except may be at an extreme old age. Embodiment of children, thus need to take into account all the aspects that go into the formation of the childhood body.
In order to execute a comprehensive theory of childhood embodiment it is important to locate the ‘body’ within the history of cultural, sociological and anthropological disciplines that have been vigorously, and at times, violently, divided into camps of biological and social reductionism. One point of view has been intent on summarily precluding the other view, and at times quite unexpected ideological fidelity has been worked out among conflicting schools. If we divide the whole approaches into ‘foundationalism’ and ‘non-foundationalism’ schools, then probably the conflicting trends become much clearer. The Foundationalist schools have a strong grounding on the body. It believes in a kind of physiological starting point, as the body being the nodal point in which and through which all other experiences are grounded. It is the base on which the superstructure of society is based. This is very clearly associated with the naturalistic view of the body. The naturalistic view is best expressed in Shillings words:
The capabilities and constraints of human bodies define individuals, and generate the social, political and economic relations which characterize national and international patterns of living. Inequalities in material wealth legal rights and political power…are given, or at the very least legitimized, by the determining power of the biological body. (Shilling 41)
While there is a