Ways to Prevent Engineering Misconduct - Coursework Example

An engineer’s job is to identify and present solutions for a particular need. This could be in the form of designing a building, a bridge or a machine and carrying out the entire feasibility study in terms of its strengths and weaknesses; what materials to use, how frequently carryout maintenance, how much life span to expect and hundreds of similar questions. Ultimately, the designed object/structure would fail (meet an end) but an engineer is expected to avoid a catastrophic failure before that time. Being unsuccessful at this task could lead to financial losses, environmental damage and above all, loss of life. This brings us to the questions: what code of conduct should be adopted by an engineer to avoid such a situation? What legal system is in place to keep a check on the work under progress? More importantly, what repercussions must be imposed on the guilty engineers for unethical practices? These questions will be answered in the later part of the essay in light of case studies of historical engineering disasters like the Minnesota Bridge over the Mississippi River. Before proceeding to legal issues and case study, one must have an insight into how a construction project is managed. It basically comprises of three parties. First being the client, this in our discussion, is the government. Second party is the consultants and the third is the contractor. The client hires the consultant to design the project, which may be a housing society, a building or a bridge. The consultants do the entire groundwork including planning and designing. The plans are submitted to the client who gets them vetted from another organization. They redo all the calculations and check the plans for any short comings. Once the plans are passed, they are handed over to the hired contractors who start the construction. The consultants pay regular visits to the site to ensure the work is being properly done, proper materials are being used, the construction practices being used are correct etc. Meanwhile, separate supervisors may also be hired by the client, someone trustworthy, to keep an additional check on everything. The question that plagues the mind here is: how can, under such elaborate management planning can shortcomings still exist? Reasons for the failure of a project are multifarious, ranging from human factors and design flaws to usage of wrong materials and natural extreme conditions like storms etc. In majority of the cases, it is a combination of the above stated causes. To ascertain the reasons of failure at the engineers end, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich conducted a study and classified the causes into: insufficient knowledge (36%), underestimation of influence (16%), ignorance, carelessness and negligence (14%), forgetfulness and error (13%), relying upon others without sufficient control (9%), objectively unknown situation (7%), imprecise definition of responsibilities (1%), choice of bad quality (1%) and other reasons were computed up to constitute 3% (Srinivasan and Halada). The collapse of the Minnesota Bridge is an eye opening, one of the many examples of engineering disasters that bear witness to the engineering misconduct and how it goes unnoticed (negligence during the inspections) resulting in some very dreadful consequences. The Minnesota Department of Transportation gives the following fact sheet about the Minnesota Bridge listed in their online resources. The bridge was built over the Mississippi River, Minneapolis in 1967 by the Hurcon Inc. and Industrial Construction Company. It was 113 feet, 4 inches wide and 1907 feet long. The deck steel truss was made up of three parts: the deck, the super structure and the sub structure. The center river span 7 was 456 feet in length. The truss was constructed of welded components and was approximately 60 feet deep at the landside river piers (piers 6 and 7). The two trusses were connected by welded floor beam trusses (running transverse to traffic) with 27-inch rolled steel beam roadway stringers running parallel carrying the deck and traffic loads to the floor beam trusses. The approach span superstructures were supported by 14 continuous 48-inch deep welded plated girders (five approach spans were at the south and six approach spans were at the north). Spans 6, 7 and 8 were the main river spans and the traffic loads were supported by two steel deck trusses parallel with traffic. The truss was symmetrical with spans 6 and 8 each having a length of 266 feet. The capacity of the bridge was rated safe for legal truck loads (up to 80,000 pounds per truck), which is the standard use for bridge design today. The bridge was rated to be safe to carry permitted (overweight) loads of up to 159,000 pounds. Moreover, deck Steel Truss bridges have an average life span of about fifty years and so, the Minnesota Bridge was schedules for reconstruction in 2020-2025 (Minnesota Department of Transportation Fact Sheet). The bridge collapsed during the evening of 1st August 2007, consuming the lives of thirteen people while injuring approximately 145 people. This caused an outcry from the entire nation calling for an immediate investigation into the causes of the disaster. There was widespread speculation at first. Some blamed the use of potassium acetate on the bridge deck to avoid accumulation of ice during the extreme winter season. Others laid the responsibility on the corrosion and metal fatigue that went unnoticed during the inspections that were carried out annually since 1993. One thing that must be highlighted here is the fact the bridge had been classified as structurally deficient. A 2001 inspection found the girders distorted. The report also noted a concern about lack of redundancy in the main truss system, which meant the bridge had a greater risk of collapse in the event of any single structural failure. An inspection in 2005 gave the bridge only 50 on a scale of hundred for structural stability (Wikipedia I-35W Mississippi River bridge). What was the government doing then? Why hadn’t any action been taken to restore the stability of the bridge? Who were responsible for the absence of any action towards the right direction? After extensive research and investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board investigators, the cause of the collapse was narrowed down to the design feature. Thirteen of the gusset plates that were used to hold the bridge beams together were found to be fractured. Detailed study revealed that the plated used were too thin (0.5 inches) to bear the weight. Contributing factor was the weight of the bridge itself. Minnesota Department of Transport had added two inches of concrete to the bridge deck over its lifetime resulting in twenty percent more weight to be carried by the bridge. Furthermore, on the day of collapse, two hundred and seventy tones of construction equipment were piled just above the bridge’s weakest spot. It also came to light that the engineers and the inspectors were devoid of any system to double check all safety features of the bridge (Stachura). This directly affected the very credibility and quality of inspections and though they were done frequently enough, the thoroughness and the analysis of the collected data to recommend maintenance of parts became a question in itself. Though investigators ruled out the possibility of corrosion being a major factor in the collapse, the mere presence of it is a witness to the negligence on the part of the authorities and the inspectors. Coming to the blame game, the first ones to come under the hammer are the design engineers and consequently, the entire consultant firm. They are at a fault for not understanding the impact of their decision about the plates in haste of reducing costs of material. Next in line is the vetting organization who simply failed to perform her job altogether. She was supposed to recheck the plans and designs for any errors yet this grave error in the truss design and the plate thickness passed unnoticed. The third one responsible for the collapse are the construction company/contractor who deposited two inches of concrete over the bridge without studying the strength of the bridge and its present load bearing capacity. Furthermore, during the present maintenance work, the contractor who placed all the heavy equipment towards one part of the bridge, which later turned out to be the weakest point of the bridge is at blame too. The explanation of the above is to reiterate the point that it is not just one reason that causes an engineering disaster but a series of steps that contribute and all escalate the process. How could the catastrophe at Minnesota be prevented? The answer is fairly simple. Through proper check and balance at every stage of the project. The major lapse was at the engineers end. This could be because of any of the factors discussed at the very start of the article namely lack of knowledge or plain negligence at the engineers part, which can only avoided by the government while choosing the consultant firm. A strict, stringent policy must be adopted to select the most favorable and worthy consultant firm to plan and look after the project. The consultants must submit reports about past experiences give presentations and pass through an elaborate interviewing process to be deemed as eligible to handle such projects. The vetting organization employees must be analyzed for being up to date and technically sound enough to handle such an important task. The contractors must be supervised by the consultants and another, separately hired project supervisor from the government, who oversees the quality of work being done at the site. One who also follows all the materials being used since using bad quality material also reduces life of a structure. In addition, regular maintenance and inspections must be carried out. Very detailed inspections from the very start would help point out any irregularities that might occur in the material and immediate action could be taken in time. The credibility of the inspectors is an issue as well. They must be equipped with the proper knowledge and know how about the structures in question, in this case, bridges. Having done special courses, attended workshops and having years of experience are the sort of people who should be entrusted with this significant task. The Minnesota Department of Transportation has set out clear guidelines for this purpose. Articles have been issued with steps of how to proceed with inspections of cracks, metal fatigue, corrosion etc and how to present recommendations. It further goes on to state how those recommendations will be followed and acted upon. It even defines the qualifications that the inspectors must meet for their job: “The Bridge Office is responsible for reviewing the inspectors qualifications. The lead inspector must be certified (by Mn/DOT) as a Bridge Safety Team Leader. Completion of the FHWA training class "Inspection of Fracture Critical Bridge Members" and the Mn/DOT Bridge Inspection Proficiency Examination is required. Only individuals qualified as American Society for Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) Level II or III technicians, shall conduct non-destructive testing (NDT), by ultrasonic methods” (Minnesota Department of Transportation Inspection Guideline, p5). In addition to everything being done by the Minnesota Department of Transport, The Federal Highway Administration annual compliance reviews the bridge inspection programs of Mn/DOT’s Central Office, Districts, and Counties. The Bridge Office also participates in these audits. Review of the fracture critical inspection process is included within the scope of these audits. Amongst all these stringent policies, how can one ensure that these are being followed precisely as they should be? Regular checks of the paper work and surprise inspections by the head are a few of the solutions to ensure that the workers follow the outlined rules and regulations. Moreover, formulating laws against anyone breaking the rules would force the engineers and the technical staff to be vigilant at their jobs. Fines, suspension and firing in the worst case scenario would also bring home the gravity of the job into every one’s mind. Such laws should bind each and everyone from the consultants and contractor to the very worker who does maintenance work on the site. Presently, there are laws that govern misconduct of engineers. In cases where the engineers are found guilty, they may be fined, jailed, or their license suspended or cancelled altogether depending on the magnitude of the error and the losses incurred. In 2005, an engineer was held of misconduct for writing and promulgating a misleading report. “John F. Sheils, a professional engineer, prepared a report regarding the structural integrity of a residential roof. He concluded that the roof would withstand winds of 70 miles per hour and a "major storm." After a hearing before an administrative law judge, Floridas Board of Professional Engineers determined that Sheils report was misleading and constituted professional misconduct. The board formally reprimanded Sheils, fined him $1,000, put him on two years probation, and required him to take a course in professionalism and ethics” (Howrey). Prosecuting Mr. John F. Sheils was a very good step and would set an example for other engineers, thus, hopefully reduce engineering disasters. History is full of examples of disasters that occurred due to misconduct of engineers. Even today, many projects might be underway destined to meet the same fate. It can only be countered by a group effort. Engineers must follow their code of ethics; be honest to their job, give in their best, explore every possibility during brainstorming sessions and not let their ego come in their way while such meetings are underway. Government must allocate large budgets to make maintenance work possible on time. Furthermore, pay the inspectors and other engineers a good sum of money to discourage disloyalty, discontentment and inclination towards acceptance of bribes and doing unjust favors. Government should also introduce check-ups and follow ups at each stage and introduce laws against anyone violating the set regulations. Only then can we expect to have a good, professional working environment that would be beneficial for the firms, the client and the taxpaying citizens. Works Cited Howery. "Misleading Report by Engineer Held to Be Professional Misconduct." Construction WebLinks. 14 Nov. 2005. 24 Sept. 2009 . Minnesota Department of Transport Inspection Guideline. "Inspection Guidline July 2007." Minnesota Department of Transport. 19 July 2007. 24 Sept. 2009 . Minnesota Department of Transport Fact Sheet. "Interstate 35W Mississippi River Bridge, Minneapolis Fact Sheet - Oct. 16, 2007." Minnesota Department of Transport. 16 Oct. 2007. 24 Sept. 2009 . Srinivasan, Vasudevan, and Gary Halada. "Engineering Disasters and Learning from Failure." 8 Dec. 2008. 24 Sept. 2009 . Stachura, Sea. "Despite Final NTSB Report, Some still have Questions." MPR NewsQ. 13 Nov. 2008. 24 Sept. 2009 . Wikipedia. "I-35W Mississippi River Bridge." Wikipedia Encyclopedia. 24 Sept. 2009 . Read More