Campaign Finance Reform: Positive Steps in the Right Direction - Research Paper Example

Campaign Finance Reform: Positive Steps in the Right Direction Campaign Finance Reform has been a bone of contention for both parties who continually charge the other with accruing campaign funds in a manner and in amounts that make fair elections a virtual myth. Among the electorate and in the halls of government charges that current campaign finance reforms are not working and have merely redistributed the inequity prove distorted in light of the reality. The notion that the application of market concepts and simple transparency rules applied to campaign finance will be sufficient to achieve fairness also does not hold up under scrutiny. Evidence reveals that campaign finance reform has had a positive effect on the campaign climate and on the otherwise undue influence of big money contributors seeking to forward their business and personal goals. Contributors who formerly applied their influence through massive sums find themselves unable to buy influence as before, creating a certain if not perfect climate of transparency. Criticisms of attempts to reform the system usually reference factors other than its overall positive affect on elections and transparency, causing some, especially politically conservative pundits who favor a free market attitude regarding campaign finance, to charge that it has been largely ineffective. “...campaign-finance regulation, has been a bust. Politics is no less corrupt than before McCain-Feingold was passed in 2002. And, in the minds of many Americans, things have actually gotten worse” (Sager, par. 2). Based on statistics gathered in 2005 “... only 9 percent of filers elected to support the Presidential Election Campaign Fund; the number has been decreasing steadily for years” (Sager, par. 4). To make what he sees as a larger point, Sager focuses on attitudes toward public contribution, which is a small aspect of campaign finance reform. The intimation is that people, electors, have no interest in campaign finance reform and that attempts to do so are a futile waste of time. Obviously this article and Sager’s opinions were written before the 2009 Presidential election, when Barak Obama raised an enormous election war chest through public contributions. However, campaign finance reform is not only a matter of how Americans feel about publically-financed election campaigns; it is related to our very democracy and who is actually in control of our government. The original McCain-Feingold bill addressed issues pertinent to this. The term “soft money” is defined as political donations made in such a way as to avoid federal regulations or limits, as by donating to a party organization rather than to a particular candidate or campaign. One can only imagine the abuses that might occur under such activity. Under the bill and to regulate such activity, money set aside for party building activities (soft money) is prohibited from being spent on the campaigns of individual candidates and amounts over a cap fall under federal regulations and thus require full public disclosure. Other enticements make sense and encourage a more local campaign financing support system such as “...free television time as well as breaks on advertising would be granted to those candidates who raise 60 percent of their funds from in-state sources...” (Lee 25:1). Findings by the Special Commission on Campaign Finance Reform state unequivocally the negative effect on elections of unregulated soft money contributions as they have evolved over time. “Soft money directly challenges many of the basic values of our campaign finance system. Soft money exemplifies the danger that large private contributions can have undue influence on the operations of government” (Dollars 127). The report goes on to assert an even more disturbing fact. “...donations are part of a network of relationships in which a network of potentially large donors are linked up to federal officeholders” (Dollars 127). The implications are obvious. This combined with a reported National Party receipts in 1998 five time the 45 million in other soft money receipts and triple the ten percent soft money share of party receipts in 1994, the justification for and urgency of real reform is indisputable. The issue of whether or not reforms are working, however, is another matter, since the term “working” applied to such a complex concept can be deceiving and hard to pinpoint. While the workings of reform may be elusive, when applied to political and economic realities it can be seen as a positive influence on an issue the resolution of which is evolving in increments every day. In their article on the 2001 New York mayor race, I $ New York: Bloomberg Batters Campaign Finance Reform, Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein challenge the notion that limits under current reform laws handicap poorer candidates without access to hard money enjoyed by wealthier candidates. “The spending limit that (Mark) Green agreed to in return for public funds was suspended because of Bloombergs high spending, allowing Green to raise and spend whatever he could (around $15 million)” (par. 4). The same article states the following: Although the McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan bills in Congress have been roundly condemned by ultra-reformers for raising candidate contribution limits to $2,000 and increasing hard-money contributions to parties, the New York City experience suggests that McCain, Feingold, and company are at least on the right track. Better to have incremental reform than none at all ( par. 9). The authors add that Green’s loss also might have had little to do with Mayor Bloomberg’s hard money advantage allowed even under reform (par. 7). Further defending the positive outcome of current reforms, Mann and Ornstein point out positive reform outcomes. “Finally, it means free TV time and cheaper mailing costs for candidates who can raise substantial amounts on their own in smaller contributions from average citizens: Something billionaires cant do (because of restrictions relating to access to hard money)” ( par. 8). In the article The Collapse of the Campaign Finance Regime Thomas Mann makes clear his opinion on what McCain-Feingold has legitimately achieved to this point. First clarifying the main purpose of the bill—to restore the effectiveness and credibility of longstanding contribution limits and restrictions on the use of corporate and union treasury funds in federal elections—he states goals which have been achieved. “The ban on party soft money has been remarkably successful: parties and elected officials are out of the business of soliciting large unlimited contributions from corporations, unions, and individuals” (Mann, par. 8). Rather than looking at finance reform as a plus or minus in terms of whether or not it “works,” an author of the McCain-Feingold bill, Russ Feingold, sees his work as in an appropriate and realistic light as “...a milestone for campaign finance reform”(Feingold website, par. 4). He suggests that within the context of the reform bill as a work in progress more work needs to be done in the areas of public financing of congressional elections, presidential public financing, loopholes in federal regulations, electronic disclosure of Senate campaign finance reports (par. 4). Regarding questions about the constitutionality of aspects of reform, courts have held that the government has every right to set restrictions. The United States Court of Appeal in Vermont held that “...limitations imposed by the state of Vermont on candidate spending in state election campaigns are ‘supported by [the states] compelling interests in safeguarding Vermonts democratic process from 1) the corruptive influence of excessive and unbridled fundraising...’” (Briffault 1). While courts, including the Supreme Court, have tended to follow an earlier decision (Buckley v.Valeo) that prohibits spending limits, Briffault concludes that a different legal pattern is evolving that leans toward the former decision and away from the latter (1) with courts explicitly focusing in their decisions on the spending aspects of electoral campaigns and tending to confirm the government right to limit ways and means of collecting contributions. In short, while candidates may spend their money on whatever they wish, amounts collected may be restricted by how and from whom they collect it. In line with the evolving theory of successful reform, Briffault thinks this favors theories of current reform. “... in recent years some lower federal courts have expressed discontent with Buckleys apparent constitutional preclusion of spending limits” (B par. 1). Other constitutionally based arguments consistent among legal fundamentalists are also vacuous and tinged with assumptions that fly in the face of reality. “I have become increasingly convinced that almost everything the American people know, or think they know, about campaign finance is wrong. Campaign spending is not exploding, but in fact is rising at a slower pace than advertising for most categories of consumer goods” (Smith, Preface xi). To equate spending on advertising consumer goods with that spent on influencing what choices we will have for making selections of those charged with daily decisions that significantly impact our lives, and that of thousands of citizens, is to say the least, an inappropriate and irrelevant comparison. Aside from financing, other specific aspects of reform relate to prohibitions against foreign contributions, which when considered closely represent a significant step in ensuring our elections remain uninfluenced by factors and entities with interests outside of the welfare of our nation. An article reinforcing the necessity and application of this restriction is interesting. The report discusses the indictment of two Thai businesswomen for allegedly steering $679,000 in foreign campaign contributions to Democrats, the latest of several cases brought against well-connected party fund-raisers” (Miller & Grunwald A05). Quoting from a 24-count indictment, the defendants used the illegal contributions to ‘to gain access to President Clinton and members of his administration’" (AO5). Charges of obstructing justice by “...erasing their computer hard drive and hiding records” (A05) were also filed. Would this indictment have occurred without reform? On the federal level the highly regarded Pew Charitable Trust has worked to support organizations that develop a body of research and data to fully understand the nature of the problem (need for reform); to communicate those findings to the public and to policy makers; to identify practical solutions and to monitor campaign finance laws and policies (Pew website, par. 1). Their partner organizations include: the League of Woman Voters Education Fund, Brookings Institution, American Enterprise Institute, Brigham Young University and others (par. 4-5). Pew attests to the effectiveness of reform. “These widespread efforts helped to lead to the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act in 2002, which increased grassroots fund-raising and reduced the influence of large donors (par. 5). Testimony from respected organizations such as Pew further reinforce the reality that reform as a process is proceeding and that efforts are working. “The first job, says Feingold, is to keep the dam in place... People always said, The bill doesnt go far enough, and they were right....What the bill did was to help make campaign finance reform an issue... that sense of possibility is what makes real reform possible” (Nichols qtng. Feingold, 1). The notion of progress is affirmed and seconded. "Had McCain-Feingold failed, I think there would have been despair about whether anything could be achieved" (Nichols qtng. Nyhart, 1). The fact that the reform bill was approved at all was considered by many a minor political miracle. "For people who were involved in this fight, the idea that McCain-Feingold got through an extremely conservative House and was signed by a President (George W, Bush) who had vowed not to sign it created a sense that reform could not be denied"(Nichols qtng. Nyhart, 1). While few would disagree that in reforming any system, reformers, as charged, at times go overboard in their corrections, attempts at reform are appropriate and effective. Despite analysis of the 2009 presidential election as example of reform manipulation, even those alleged manipulations show a tendency more geared to public participation in the campaign finance process than ever before. “Mr. Obama pulled in more than $750 million ($104 million between Oct. 15 and Nov. 4 alone) from more than 4 million contributors during his presidential run. Thats the most money raised from the most people in history” (Washington Post Editorial, website, par. 2). Questions about who actually contributed the money and whether smaller public contributions were “bundled” to offset larger contributions lost by soft money is, due to reporting rules, an unanswered question. Yet the reality remains that a significant portion of this money in smaller increments came from individuals. “Just as lobbyists soon will be required to disclose how much money theyve given to or bundled for candidates, we shouldnt have to rely on the conscience of presidential contenders to release their bundler information (par. 3). In making this statement its author reveals something quite significant about whether reforms are working and forcing transparency. Candidates who for years have accepted money from lobbyists in return for political and favors will not be forced to reveal the amounts and source of such donations. Failing to insist on this information inhibits transparency. That is obvious. A final analysis as to whether campaign finance reform is actually working and how is expressed in a presentation before an American Constitution Society panel held in Philadelphia: The first question in judging the effectiveness of enforcement is what we wish to have enforced.  On the basics, the law has been plentifully enforced.  Contributions limits are enforced; disclosure requirements are enforced; most, for that matter, of the Code of Federal Regulations implementing the federal law is enforced.  Not always within the same election cycle as the occurrence of the violation, and not always with the degree of mercilessness in the setting of fines that critics call for:  but, still, enforced.       Even the parts of the Code that govern the spending of unions and corporations—spending considered under the campaign finance laws, in an unfortunate equation of unions and corporations, "soft money"—have been enforced more effectively than many suspect, with real consequences (Bauer, par. 1-2). Given the arguments for and against campaign finance reform, and given what experts have to say about its effectiveness, can we really assume that changes in the undo influence of wealth within the political system will occur without specific reforms? Would simple transparency help in preventing wealth and power from dictating how our government runs and what decisions are made? No amount of transparency can remedy the reality of the impact of huge war chests gathered through contributions from those with vast financial resources to spend. We have all seen in the past year what the unrestricted unregulated marketplace produces—economic chaos. That such thinking assumes a positive impact on campaigns and elections is ludicrous. Yes reforms have been manipulated to parties’ and candidates’ advantage. But that is not an argument not to pursue them in the interests of furthering democracy. The fine tuning will certainly take place over time. As we have seen, progress is an evolving process. What works comes in increments, and nothing will ever change if don’t at least try to change it. Works Cited Bauer, Bob. “Can Campaign Finance Reform Actually Work?” Comments Prepared for an American Constitutional Society Panel, Philadelphia, 5 June, 2008. http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/news.html?AID=1277 Briffault, Richard. “The Return of Spending Limits: Campaign Finance After Landell v. Sorrell.” Fordham Urban Law Journal Vol. 32:3 (2005) 399+. Dollars and Democracy: A Blueprint for Campaign Finance Reform Book by Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Special Commission on Campaign Finance Reform. Fordham University Press, 2000. Feingold, Russ. Web site. (2009). http://feingold.senate.gov/issues_campaign_reform.html Lee, Tena Jamison. “A Pro and Con Debate: How Much Campaign Finance Reform Do We Need?” Human Rights 25:1 Winter (1998). American Bar Association website: Individual Rights and Responsibilities. http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/leewint98.html Mann, Thomas E. “A Collapse of the Campaign Finance Regime?” The Forum 6:1 (2008). Republished on Brookings website (Sept 29, 2009). www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/04_campaignfinance_mann.aspx Mann, Thomas E. and Ornstein, Norman. “I $ New York: Bloomberg Batters Campaign Finance Reform.” The American Prospect 12 (December 17, 2001). www.questia.com. Miller, Bill and Grunwald, Michael. “Thai Women Indicted In Fund-Raising Probe.” The Washington Post Tuesday, July 14, 1998: A05. www.washingtonpost.org/wpsrv/politics/special/campfin/stories/indict071498.hm Nichols, John. “Campaign Finance: The Sequel: With McCain-Feingold Finally Paswsed, It’s Time to Focus Again on Public Funding.” The Nation Vol. 274 29 April, 2002. www.questia.com Pew Charitable Trusts Website: Campaign Finance Reform. Copyright 1996-2009. http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=492 Sager, Ryan. “Campaign Finance Reform Has Been a Bust.” Real Clear Politics (website) August 2, 2006. www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/08/a_reformer_without_results.html Smith, Bradley A. Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform. Princeton University Press, 2001. 12 (December 17, 2001). www.questia.com. The Washington Post. Editorial. “Campaign Finance: A Victim of President-Elect Obama’s Success.” Mon. 15 Dec. 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/14/AR20081140 1783.html?referrer=emailarticle Read More