Terrible Aberfan Disaster - Essay Example

Aberfan Aberfan is a village in Wales situated about 6.5 Km on the Southern side of Merthyr Tydfil and at theWest banks of Taff valley. The small village is surrounded by mines hence its major economic activity is mining. Most of the villagers earn their living from working in these mines. Mining activities in the Merthyr Vale were begun in 1869. This was influenced by the industrial revolution occurring at the time. The mines were developed with the main aim of sustaining the energy sources for the Dowlais Ironworks in Merthyr Tydfil town. Deep shaft mining was adopted because the coal seams in Merthyr Vale were too deep (Rapoport, 2005). In 1947 the British Government entity, National Coal Board (NCB) acquired the ownership of Merthyr Vale. This was after the Prime Minister Clement Atlee’s nationalized the coal industry with the aim of further industrializing Britain. Aberfan has a population of about 60,000 people. The population is made up of the English, Welsh and Irish mixture of people who came to work in the mines. The villagers have strong kinship ties which bond them together as a unit of one family depicting strong attachment they have for the village (Rapoport, 2005). The disaster The mining operation yielded a great deal of excavated mining spoil comprising of debris, loose rock, slag and residues referred to as tip. This led to the establishment of about 7 tips for depositing the spoil. The seventh tip was located on the Merthyr mountainside overlooking the Aberfan village. The tips were created by emptying colliery rubbish loaded trams as one creates children sandcastles. The tips contained a mixture of coarse material and tailings (the finer materials) produced as waste at the mines. The first tip was opened during the First World War (1914-1918) (Madgewick, 1996). However, there were no regulations, restriction or legislations guiding the creation of tips and monitoring the tipping practice. This led to creation of tips without consultancy from a surveyor who was supposed to examine the proposed tip site by studying its geology, metrology, hydro-geology, the soil type and mechanism (Madgewick, 1996). The surveyors usually give advice and recommendation about the proposed site advising if it is viable for carrying out the proposed project. Therefore, the NCB dumped the spoil on the mountainside indiscriminately. The tips were built over highly porous sandstones and directly above numerous underground springs. NCB found it economical i.e. time and cost saving to damp the spoil near the mining area instead of looking for safer locations in the remote areas of the village which were not inhibited and therefore posed no threat. In 1939 the tips at Abercynon slide resulting to a circulation of a memo warning of its dangers. Tip 4 also slipped resulting to its disuse. In the same year tip 5 was established which displayed signs of bulging in 1951 (Paul and Grosser 1965). However, in 1963 the Aberfan local authorities were overwhelmed by the dangers lurking over the village and especially the village primary school due to the large amount of slag and high peak of the seventh tip which could have easily weakened the ground below it. Their fears were raised by the occurrence of a small landslide on the seventh tip the same year. However, its impact was not big therefore did not cause any disturbance to the Aberfan village. They consulted NCB and raised their fears. Aberfan residents also warned NCB of the dangers that the tips posed. As an example they referred to the tips which were left unattended. For instance the fifth tip caught fire in 1958 which was still burning into the 1960’s (Laurie 1977). Mining debris are usually very volatile and can be ignited very easily when in contact with air or exposed to atmospheric conditions which create a favourable environment for occurrence of chemical reactions between the different constituents of the debris. Sadly such fires were usually ignored and no attempts were taken to extinguish them regardless of the threat they posed to the surroundings and the people working in the mines. NCB argued that the fires would eventually burn themselves out (Cain and Cain 1964). From 1963 to 1964 a plethora of letters voicing concerns about the safety of the Pantglas School because of the dangers posed by the seventh tip were sent to NCB and other copies of the same letter to the area Chief Mechanical Engineer and the Borough and Waterworks engineer. NCB ignored and discounted the claims comforting the local authorities and villagers that they were at par with their actions and their operations were safe. Therefore, there was no need for raising false alarms and worrying over it. This was in reference to the inspection they had conducted on all the tips after a slide from a tip in Tymawr was experienced (Cain and Cain 1964). On Friday, 21st October, 1966 the dreaded predicament happened. For about two weeks prior to this fateful Friday, Aberfan had experienced heavy rains which caused development of several crevices on the seventh tip. As workers were reporting to work they noticed the upper flank of the seventh tip had sunk about 3m. At around 9 am the seventh tip sunk a further 3m and at 9.30 am over 400, 000 cubic meters of debris saturated with water started to flow downhill at a very high speed. The mountain was sunny thus rapidly liquefying the front part of the mass. The workers who witnessed the landslide as it begun were unable to raise alarm and request for immediate response (Morgan et al 2003). This is because the only means of communication between the workers on the mines and the NCB headquarters was through a telephone. However, the telephone cable had been stolen repeatedly, a fact that made the NCB officials to ignore replacing the cable again. The workers just sent a messenger to the colliery. The villagers were also not in a position of noticing the landslide because the village was still foggy, due to the autumn season, enabling only a visibility of about 50m. About 120,000 cubic meters of the viscous sludge was deposited on the lower slopes of the mountain but about 400,000 cubic meters hit the village forming slurry of about 12m deep (Morgan et al 2003). The landslide destroyed about 20 terraced houses located on the Moy road, a farm that was nearby, houses in the vicinity, one of the three North-South street, the northern part of the Pantglas Junior school where the wall was crushed and some parts of the Pantglas Senior School. Thick mud and rubble destroyed the houses forcing villagers to evacuate and about 10m of the slurry filled the classrooms. Students at the Pantglas Junior Schools had just entered their classrooms from a gathering to finish up with the last school details before they went for their half term break (Welldon, 1971). The landslide made a loud roar as it slid downhill making most of the villagers to think it was a plane about to crash. For instance, one of the teachers at the junior school ordered the students to hide under their desks. People noticed it was a landslide when it was too late and warnings could not be sent to others. Most of them were shocked and just stood still facing the monster that ate their village. About 28 adults died 5 of them were teachers and 116 students aged between 7 and 10 years succumbed into the sludge, reporting about a death toll of around 140. Many more were injured and others reported missing because their bodies were never retrieved. The dead suffered from multiple crush injuries which made them to bleed internally, fractured skulls and asphyxia (Welldon 1971). The response After the landslide had completely settled frantic parents run to the school and begun digging on the rabbles in an effort of rescuing their children. However, most of their efforts were fruitless because they were clawing the debris with their bare hands and were still in shock thus achieving very little. A few minutes later the Merthyr Tydfil police filled the scene and took over the rescue operations. Most people also tried to drive to the village to offer a helping hand after the news spread but their efforts were hampered by the sludge that was still flowing down the slope. Efforts of trained rescuers were also slowed down by the incompetence of the large crowd that had gathered to offer their help. Over 2000 emergency service workers had arrived at the scene by the next day and had worked continuously for 24 hours. However, during the day they had to halt their activities because more water flowed down the slope again (Jordan and Lexi-faur 2004). Although the scene was filled with competent rescuers, the rescue process took a period of about a week because of the deep depth of the sludge that covered the bodies. The number of retrieved dead bodies was overwhelming resulting to the use of Bethania and Aberfan Calvinistic Chapel as temporary mortuaries. The police played a big role in the rescue efforts. They provided a 24 hour surveillance of the mortuaries and organized telephone installation and water supply into the chapel. They took charge of the body identification process, medical examination of the dead body’s processes and burial and cremation orders. Occupants of Northern Ireland, Bristol, South Wales and the Midlands provided coffins. The Merthyr Mayor organized an Aberfan disaster fund to aid the villagers and bereaved to oversee the burial process and rebuild their lives. Thousands of donations were collected as people had greatly been saddened by the mishap (Ian and Martin 2000). The response emanated by Lord Robens of Woldingham, the chairman of the NCB at that time has been under scrutiny and criticism. This is because when he heard about the disaster he did not immediately go to the scene or emulate any efforts and actions to show his concern. Instead he went ahead to be admitted as the chancellor of the Surrey University. Moreover, he visited the scene on the evening of the following day, Saturday. To make matters worse Roben solicited funds from the public disaster relief fund to oversee the process of removing the other tips above Aberfan instead of using the emergency funds allocated by the coal board (Tweedale 2004). Cause of the disaster Roben was quick to conclude that the landslide had been caused by actions of a natural unknown spring that was beneath the tip. A fact that was completely untrue because the old generation at that time of the disaster could remember playing in a stream where the Merthyr Vale Colliery tip had been built when they were children. The labour government, led by R. T. Hon. Harold Wilson MP, appointed tribunal of inquiry under the Tribunals Inquiry Act of 1921 comprising of a judge, lawyer and engineer among others to investigate the root cause of the disaster (Jasper 1967). Their findings revealed that the stream under the tip had swelled because of the overwhelming amounts of water due to the heavy rains. This made the tip to be unstable causing the landslide to occur. It was confirmed that there was a small rotational slip that occurred causing a disturbance to the saturated water. This together with the warmth at the mountain made the tip to liquefy and flow downwards (Edmund 1966). It was also established that since the establishment of the tip in 1958, it had experienced a series of minor slips, an instability that the NCB officials, tip workers and villagers were well aware of. Although this was the same stream that the NCB denied knowledge of and the villagers acknowledge knowing about its presence, no prosecutions were made and none of the NCB employees were demoted or fired. The only responsibility NCB took was paying the families that lost their children a total of £500 per child (PASC 2004-2005). The tribunal also concluded that the disaster was caused by lack of proper guidance from the NCB authorities, use of poor communication channels, ignorance depicted by the failure of NCB to respond and act to the warnings the organization was represented with and use of incompetent men to undertake the mining process including tipping. Therefore, the total blame was directed to NCB (Barton 1969). Aftermath The villagers were psychologically affected, for instance the children could not go outside to play as this affected the parents that lost their children. Tension between the villagers especially between those that had lost their children and those that their children had survived greatly arose. Most people feared to go to sleep when it rained and most had to take sedatives to enable them sleep through the night. As a result of the trauma there was an increase in alcohol and health related problems. Birth rates and cases of nervous breakdown also increased (Anthony 1973). In 1989 the Merthyr Vale was closed and The Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act of 1969 was re-evaluated to include missing regulations and legislations to oversee mining activities thus avoid the re-occurrence of such an incident. The provisions made provided legislations protecting the public from the dangers of tips and disused tips. In 1992 an emergency-planning department was established due to occurrence of a plethora of national disasters in other parts of Britain (Ian and Martin 2000). Lessons learned Tribunals formed should be transparent and have an organized structure. Its findings should also be reviewed to ascertain them so that appropriate legal action can be taken. This will prevent some facts that can help to solve a case from been revealed years later when any course of action taken bears little implications to the victims that suffer. Politicians should not be allowed to wholly take charge of economic activities or major activities. This is because they poorly manage them as they have the power to do so. They control these activities with greed and corruption with the only aim of profiting. For example, Roben did not care about the safety of the villagers when establishing tips, his only concern was to reduce the overall expenses of the company and thus maximise its returns. The government should protect the consumers and not the producers. This is because in most occasions the producers are not affected by occurrence of any incident. On the other hand consumers bear most losses and suffering. The government had not laid legislations to protect the Aberfan residents; this resulted to an embezzlement of the disaster fund that was raised in an attempt of helping the villagers. Also NCB was not forced to pay for the cost of transferring the remaining tips. The power of local authorities should be well defined to enable it execute actions without fearing political or major government institutions. Aberfan local authority could have prevented the disaster from occurring if only they had the power to close down the Merthyr Vale mine owned by NCB, a British Government entity. Serious penalties on corporations that revoke legislations, regulations and restrictions should be implemented. This will help organizations to fully abide by them. If the government had set strict penalties NCB could not have run its operations as it did. For instance establishing tips on unsafe grounds. Also those responsible for the occurrence of the disaster could have been prosecuted, demoted or sacked. If care was not taken the implications of the Aberfan 1966 disaster could have been replicated in Preston due to the intensive industrial activities in the region, for example the construction of the first British motorway bypass. Recommendations From the above it is quite evident that the ignorance, greed and corruption of NCB and government officials contributed to the occurrence of the Aberfan disaster. The disaster will remain as a nightmare in the minds of most of the survivors. This grief will be passed on from one generation to another therefore, to curb future occurrence of such predicaments there should be implementation of land reforms guiding agricultural, housing and urbanisation activities. This will protect land and monitor any deforestation, on shore and off shore mining, coal and oil exploration, digging bore holes, building transport and cave routes, extractions and excavation activities. This will also prevent occurrence of landslides. It is highly recommended that actions of protecting the environment such as recycling activities and use of renewable energy sources like biogas and biodiesel should be established. Awareness on the dangers of carrying out the above activities should be made especially to the public. Lastly, legislations that first ensure safety of the public and employees then the output of the organization as the second thing should be implemented. References Anthony, J (1973), The child in his family, Wiley, New York. Barton, H (1969), Communities in disaster, Doubleday, New York. Cain, C & Cain, B (1964), ‘Aberfan disaster’, Journal of the American academy of child psychiatry, Vol.3, p. 443. Edmund, D (1966), Report of the tribunal appointed to inquire into the disaster at Aberfan on October 21st 1966, HL 316, HC 553. HMSO, London. Iain, M & Martin, J (2000), Aberfan: government and disasters, Welsh Academic Press, Cardiff. Jasper, A (1967), Report on the disaster at Aberfan tribunal, HMSO, London. Jordana, A & Levi-Faur, D (2004), The politics of regulation: examining Regulatory institutions and instruments in the age of governance, Edward Elgar Publishing, Gloucester. Laurie, L (1977), I cant stay long, Penguin, Harmondsworth, Penguin. Madgewick, G (1996), Aberfan: struggling out of the darkness, Valley & Vale, Blaengarw. Morgan, L, Scourfield, J, Williams, D, Jasper, A & Lewis, G, (2003), The Aberfan disaster: 33-year follow-up of survivors, British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 182, pp. 532-6. Paul, L & Grosser, G (1965), ‘The aftermath of the Aberfan 1966 disaster’, Community mental health journal, Vol. 1, p. 339. Public Administration Select Committee (2004-2005), First report of session, Government by inquiry, HC 51-I, At the Houses of Parliament website [pdf file, 1.5MB]. Rapoport, I (2005), Aberfan: the days after: a journey in pictures, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Tweedale, G (2004), Robens, Alfred, Oxford dictionary of national biography, Vol. 47, pp. 80-82. Welldon, C (1971), ‘Family process’, Community mental health journal, Vol. 10, p. 281. Read More